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Detona Sargent v. State of Ind., and the Consolidated City of Indianapolis/Marion Co., and the Indianapolis Metro Police Dept
27 N.E.3d 729
Ind.
2015
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*1 then, Ultimately, Id. “courts must delve admittedly SARGENT,

into Detona Appellant murkier waters of [the] (Defendant necessity” particu- reasonable under the below), lars of each case as it arises. Id. hypothetical Trustee’s falls Indiana,

between Foster ’s two extremes —cash val STATE of and The Consolidat- ue City amassed over time and not “closeted in Indianapolis/Marion ed Coun- anticipation bankruptcy,” but certainly ty, Indianapolis Metropolitan and The more than a “minor amount” and almost (Plain- Department, Appellees Police certainly exceeding “necessary com below). tiffs forts of life.” But the here are facts much No. 49S02-1312-MI-790. spec closer to Zwmbrun’s end of the greater, trum —the cash value at stake is Supreme Court of Indiana. hardly but inconsistent with the “neces life,” sary comforts of and the Trustee has March not сlaimed that the cash value was “clos in anticipation bankruptcy.” eted Fos bankruptcy

ter entrusts courts with assess

ing necessity” “reasonable case case

under Section 22—and as the Trustee dis argument, meeting

cussed at oral

creditors, see 11 U.S.C. an

early opportunity identify such cases so may question Trustee raise the bankruptcy court’s review. We

therefore need not deviate from the stat language hypotheti

ute’s actual to avoid a problem.

cal

Conclusion

We conclude that under Indiana ‍​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​‍Code 27-l-12-14(e), statutory

section phrase

“dependent upon person” such does not “children,”

modify “spouse” only but

“any relative” named beneficiary as оf a policy. Any potential

life-insurance as-ap-

plied constitutional problems arising from statutory directive be addressed case,

case contemplates. Foster

DICKSON, RUCKER, DAVID, and

MASSA, JJ., concur. *2 Ault, Chaudhary,

Andrew Ábshishek Services, Inc., Indianapolis, Legal Indiana IN, Legal Ser- Brengle, F. Indiana John IN, vices, Inc., Attorneys for Albany, New Appellant. Zoeller, Attorney F. General

Gregory Steiner, Indiana, Deputy Attor- David Lee IN, General, Indianapolis, Attorneys ney Appellee. for RUCKER, Justice. summary judg-

On cross-motions vehiclе for- the trial court deemed a ment awarded the same to the India- feited and Department. napolis Metropolitan Police facts disclose the undisputed However the possession. is entitled to vehicle’s owner reverse the 'We therefore trial court. History

Facts and Procedural Indiana, City of India- The State of Indianapolis Metropolitan napolis, and (collectively “the Depаrtment Police State”) Detona complaint against filed a of her 1996 seeking forfeiture approxi- worth Century Buick automobile $1,700.00. State’s action was mately The commonly referred under what is pursued Statute.” to as the “Civil Forfeiture seq. partic- §§ et More Ind.Code 34-24-1 34-24-1-1(a) section ularly Code part: in relevant (1) All following may be seized: used or are ... if vehicles per- or for use intended towed, possession transрort of them to 27. The vehicle was sons in any manner to facilitate trans- or in January arrested theft. On (B) Any following: ... portation terms agreement, under of an Sar- ... or ... if converted stolen gent pleaded guilty to theft as D a Class of that repurchase the retail value felony days and was sentenced to ($100) is one hundred dollars Department of Correction with all but *3 or more. suspended days probation. four on summary judgment In action the this Twenty days after Sargent pleaded complaint for undis- State’s forfeiture the guilty judg the State moved for summary as puted by facts shown the materials ment on forfeiture complaint its Sar and to the trial follows. presented court are as gent with responded a cross-motion Sargent employed was at a Wal-Mart re- summary judgment. After hearing a the On turn-merchandise distribution center. trial the granted court State’s and motion 16, 2011, September she drove her 1996 Sargent’s denied motion. On Sar appeal Century to arrival Buick the center. After (1) ‍​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​‍gent argued there was no be nexus a her car Sargent allowed co-worker to use attempted tween her theft and the vehicle during understanding her shift with the work; she come used to her and would return that Sar- co-worker so exempt by vehicle was from op execution drive home. befоre gent could Minutes eration of the Indiana and Constitution1 Sargent was scheduled to leave for the exemption Indiana’s civil statute. The in day, grabbed four their she iPhones rejected Court of Appeals both claims and original and stuffed them under packaging judgment affirmed the of the trial court. phones The her shirt. had a retail value of (Ind. v. Sargent 985 N.E.2d 1108 $1,200.00. approximately Sargent As at- Ct.App.2013), vacated. Having previоusly to leave she tempted the center was granted we now judg transfer reverse the by manager detained a stopped and store ment of trial court. Additional facts subsequently and a staff was searched below. set forth member, which revealed the four iPhones. Standard Review Indianapolis Metropolitan An of the officer reviewing grant When a or deni Department Police arrived on the scene fоr summary al of a motion our judgment present manager as the and was store standard of review is the is for same as it questioned Sargent. During questioning, Plonski, Kroger the trial court. v. 930 Co. manager go told the “to outside to (Ind.2010). 1, party N.E.2d 4 that[,] moving if co-worker] make sure [her [in making pri- “bears the initial burden of a Sargent’s waiting, stop car] she should showing genuine ma facie that there are no go [Sargent] home waiting and because issues fаct enti be at of material and that it is coming App. would not out.” 16. tled to as a matter judgment Based on this information the officer went of law.” Gill Inc., Works, Sheet Metal 970 parking Sargent’s to the lot to search for Evansville (Ind.2012) (citations vehicle. The officer car omit located the and ted). Summary judgment found “a female the driver’s Id. if improper seat[.]” is claim, empting 1. This constitutional which a reasonable amount of sale, appeal, raises for first time on refers to payment any from seizure or for the Article Section Constitu- liability debt or hereafter contracted: provides: privilege tion "The the debt- debt, imprisonment no ex- there shall be life, enjoy necessary or to comforts of cept of fraud.” in case laws, recognized shall be wholesome ex- burden, her fa- judgment but if be awarded carry fails to its should movant in Dеfen- succeeds, nonmoving party designated vor ..:. The facts then the suffi- Designation evidence estab- of Evidence are must come forward with dant’s genuine App. issue sustain her Motion.” lishing the existence of cient to Cross determining Id. whether material fact. In The State then filed the affidavit at 8. arresting the review- officer to Sar- summary proper, opposition evidentiary at 26-27. ing only gent’s court considers cross-motiоn. See id. desig- parties specifically agree genuine are no parties matter have Both there Trial R. to the trial court. See Ind. nated issues of material fact. Id. at (H). 56(C), all factual infer- We construe sought As recounted earlier the State non-moving party’s in the favor ences Sargent’s forfeiture of vehicle under of a all doubts to the existence resolve Statute provisions Civil Forfeiture against moving party. issue material part: which relevant *4 Plonski, 5. “The fact that 930 N.E.2d at (1) All following may be seized: have cross-motions for parties filed ... if vehicles are used or summary judgment not alter our does per- person intended use or for review, each standard for as we consider transport in them to possession sons separately whether motion to determine any in manner the trans- or to facilitate judgment moving pаrty is entitled to (B) Any following: ... portation Reid, 980 as a matter of Reed v. law.” ... if ... or property stolen converted (Ind.2012). 277, 285 repurchase retail or value of that ($100) is one dollars hundred Discussion more. support In motion for sum of its 34-24-l-l(a). desig- § Relying on the I.C. mary judgment designated the the State seizing phrase materials and on the nated underlying probable cause for the affidavit or are use” the State “used intended for charge, charging theft information agreed contended and trial court theft, agree copy plea a certified fact genuine “there is no issue of material ment, judgment. and the abstract of in- Sargent and that Defendant Detona In App. 35-39. of her cross-mo support subject tended to use the 1996 Buick to summary Sargent desig tion for transportation prop- of stolen facilitate largely recounting nated her own affidavit however, at 1. erty_” App. Importantly, Separately the facts as set above. forth demonstrating Sargent in addition to that Sargent also filed “Affidavit and Notice an used or intended to use her vehicle Exemption” declaring part of Claim of transportation prop- of stolen facilitate her 1996 valued at Century Buick was erty, the State also the burden of carried $1,700.00. Sargent the automo contended Sargent “in dеmonstrating possession” exempt bile was under the from forfeiture § 34- of the vehicle at the time. See I.C. provision exemption statu Indiana’s civil (a). 24-1-1 moving summary judgment te.2 In facts, Although arising “The different context part: declared in Plaintiff, “posses- on designated by jurisprudence are insufficient to our the issue it can be straightforward: sustain Plaintiffs and Defendant is father claim sion” ($8,000.)” eight pertinent part: 2. The statute "The dollars thousand following property 34-55-10-2(c)(2). a debtor domiciled I.C. exempt: tangible personal Indiana is ... either actual or Actual pos constructive. State’s favor and denying Sargent’s mo- person session occurs when a has direct tion. physical control over the item. Gee v. Conclusion State, (Ind.2004). 810 N.E.2d reverse We the judgment of the trial posses

When the State cannot show actual court and remand this cause with instruc- sion, mаy prevail nonetheless on proof of tions to enter an order granting summary State,. possession. constructive Gray v. judgment in Sargent’s favor.3 (Ind.2011). 171, 174 957 N.E.2d “A person constructively possesses when [an item] RUSH, C.J., (1) DICKSON, J., concur. capability has to main item;

tain dominion and control over the DAVID, J., dissents separate with the intent to maintain dominion MASSA, opinion J., in which joins. (citing control over it.” Id. Lampkins (Ind.1997), 682 N.E.2d J., MASSA, separate dissents with (Ind. reh’g, on 685 N.E.2d 698 modified opinion. 1997)). DAVID, J., dissenting. Here based on the Rule 56 materials presented to the trial apparent court it is dissent, I respectfully as Detona Sar- had neither actual nor con- gent had possession constructive of her structive possession of her Buick vehicle at 1996 Buick Century when she stole four *5 the time it was “used or intended for use” iPhones from her employer on September to “facilitate the transportation” of stolen 2011. This long that, Court has held 34-24-l-l(a). property. § I.C. At all rel- prove order to possession, constructive the evant times Sargent was detained in the State must show that the defendant has store and physical thus had no control over both the intent and capability to maintain the Sargent vehicle. Indeed had not been “dominion and control” over the in actual possession of her car since See, earlier in quеstion. example, Goliday v. day when she (Ind.1999). allowed a co-worker to 708 N.E.2d Though use it on condition the worker would re- at the time of Sargent the thefts was not turn Sargent so that could drive home at physically vehicle, occupying her she ex- the end of her shift. As for constructive erted “dominion and control” over the possession, even if one might Buick, infer that by as evidenced her instruction to Sargent had the “intent” to maintain do- her co-worker to return the vehicle car, minion and control over the the record end of her shift so she could drive home. makes clear Thus, that her detention made it constructively she possessed the impossible for “capability” her to have the Buick.

to maintain such control. I disagree ‍​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​‍majority’s with the conclusion

By failing to that Sargent demonstrate that “the record makes clear that her de- possession” was “in of the vehicle impossible as con- tention made it for her to have templated Indiana ‘capability’ Code section 34-24- to maintain such control.” 1-1, the State was not entitled to Op. forfeiture at 733. Though Sargent true was de- of the tained, vehicle. The trial court thus erred her detention did not terminate her by entering summary judgment Buick, possession constructive itas 3. Because we resolve utоry this case on other construction or Indiana constitutional grounds Sargent's we decline to address stat- claim. away question, have this I towed Should we reached not until vehicle was it. have also with the capability agreed her to control would Court of she lost

that that is not a “debtor” Appeals con- knowledge With § § 34-55-10-2 or Article 22 be- under at the rel- structively possessed her Buick a “debtor” who owes an “[o]nе cause time, § 34- I turn to Indiana evant Code another, obligation esp. obligation an to (a)(1)(B) (2014), which, ma-' as the 24-1-1 money,” and order is not a pay a forfeiture recounts, permits forfeiture of a jority money judgment. Black’s Law Dictio- by the or intended to be used vehicle used (9th 2009). Thus, by nary ed. the plain transport it to possession 34-55-10-2(c), § language of Indiana Code value of at stolen with a retail 1, § 22 as well as Article Indiana Bеcause Sar- least one hundred dollars. Constitution, not entitled Sargent is to ex- Buick to gent fully intended use the from forfeiture of her vehicle un- emption collectively val- transport stolen iPhones 34-24-l-l(a)(l)(B). § der Indiana Code price approximately retail ued at a $1,200, reasons, have and would done so had securi- I respectfully For these dissent. intervened, I ty agree exempt with the Court not Because Buick wаs not from forfeiture, § and the trial court that 34- Appeals I affirm the trial would court’s 24-l-l(a)(l)(B) allowed the State to seize motion for grant summary State’s some the Buick—however ill-advised Sargent’s and denial of motion official summary judgment. find this use of discretion. Court, Sargent argues this Before J., MASSA, joins. for- exempt

her Buick is nevertheless from feiture under Code 34-55-10-2 MASSA, J., dissenting. 1, § and Article 22 of the Indiana Notwithstanding my admiration for the 1, § Article 22 provides Constitution. case, in this majority’s justice desire to do that: fully join I I Justice David’s dissent. write privilege enjoy of the debtor to *6 to separately offer an additional comment life, necessary comforts be rec- of shall about discretion. laws, by exempting a ognized wholesome notes, As Justice David Ms. reasonable amount of from sei- property Wal-Mart, her car to drove work at where sale, the payment any zure or for of debt then employee she committed an theft of liability hereafter and or contracted: work, debt, phones. four cell at While she imprisonment be no there shall loaned her car a friend to run an er- to except in case of fraud. car, rand. The friend it returned and added.) to effectuate (Emphasis Enacted inwas the Wal-Mart lot when was 22, 1, § § Article 34-55-10- Code is, There caught. my judgment, in suffi- 2(c), part, in rеlevant states that “[t]he Sargent constructively evidence cient that a debtor following personal property of possessed her car that it was “intend- and (2) domiciled in Indiana ... exempt: phones, ... transport” ed for use to tangible personal real estate or [o]ther technically eligible and thus for forfeiture. eight of dollars thousand added.) ($8,000).” According really? Sargent and (Emphasis Firing having But $1,700 Sargent, prosеcuted felony to her Buick falls her'righteously valued at theft 34-55-10-2(c) protections enough? § within the not The State had to of take 1, car, § Article 22. too? and her

735 seems, now, it (Ind.Ct.App.2013), overreach has trans. denied 7 This modest, (Ind.2014), grant our Court to some prompted prosecutor 993 used the excessively equitable, relief to the almost against a RICO statute1 common home of a possible thief via the return punished TV, burglar stolе a computer, who and to Buick. It mind twenty-year-old brings cards, tried, and credit un- subsequently quoted maxim that hard cases the often to use successfully, depart- the cards at quote complete law. The more make bad ment, drug, liquor and stores on the same today in to applies from Baron Rolfe 1842 night. Court of Appeals vacated the Sargent’s of case: “This is one those Ms. conviction, racketeering doing but in sо is, ... it no unfortunate cases which precedent have created could doubt, hardship upon plaintiff to be a statute; applications frustrate future remedy, by a but consider- without General Attorney certainly argued so ought not to Hard ation we be influenced. Arg. without success our Court. Oral observed, cases, has frequently been Video Tr. at 33:34-36:38.2 bad law.” apt to introduce Winterbottom (Exch. Wright, Eng. Rep. 152 402 Our Constitution and statutеs police vest Pleas) 405-06. Indeed. tuned for Stay prosecutors with great power initi- to targets of arguments appropriate more ate proceedings that can de- ultimately they “possess” forfeiture laws that didn’t prive liberty divest where their new Mercedes because weren’t proven. certain crimes are State and fed- it at sitting in the time of their arrest. eral legislative bodies have provided thе special large- tools RICO and forfeiture years is not the first time in This recent ly target organized crime3 and narcotics that we have seen an almost de- comical trafficking.4 These tools Weapons of law are not without ployment enforcement critics, Destruction tar- their against pedestrian Mass their misuse fur- invites N.E,2d Moreover, In Miller v. gets. scrutiny.5 ther when authori- Idea, Blakey, ... employed 1. "A who is or asso- Rоbert RICO: The Genesis anof Crime, enterprise, knowingly Organized with an ciated and who at Trends June intentionally partici- conducts or otherwise 16. enterprise pates in the activities of that Although long history, 4. forfeiture through pattern racketeering activity[] has a its influence, past substantially use corrupt has increased in the commits business a Class C (2008). thirty years, hailed felony.” as an effective means of Ind.Code 35-45-6-2 drug addressing tradе. United v. Parcel States St., argument Emery We heard oral with the Miller Land & Residence at 28 914 F.2d Cir.1990) (“One (1st pending. ultimately on powerful order transfer We of the most accept jurisdiction ap- weapons government’s declined over in the arsenal in *7 peal. Attorney ability will tell if continuing drugs Time the General's ‘war’ on to is its explained fears—which needn't be further obtain the civil forfeiture of that is purposes drug the of this dissent—are realized. used for or facilitates violations of the laws.”). "punishing In addition to and deter George Blakey, Robert 3. known his role in ring engage illegal drug activi those who legislation drafting that became the Federal ty,” purpose a is to forfeiture statute Organiza- Corrupt Racketeer Influenced and “defray expense in the some incurred Act, 1961-68, State, §§ tion codified ‍​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​‍at 18 U.S.C. against drug dealing.” battle Katner v. development, (Ind. beginning 1995). traces RICO’s with 655 N.E.2d 347-48 government's attempt the the to understand See, Moores, culminating Mafia and meant e.g., Reforming with text to 5. Eric Civil Act, organized syndi- "combat[] crime and Rev. other Asset 51 Ariz. L. Reform Forfeiture (2009) ("[Current] activity procedural as well of safe- cated as the infiltration 779 legitimate groups.” guards police entities criminal G. are minimal and seize 736 Jus- overreach, among judiciary tempted argument is discussion

ties argu- the oral justice partic- in a tices conference after remedies that do impose ment, the law over the Court has determined but do harm to ular case over this jurisdiction not assume should time. appeal. answer, sometimes, Rolfe’s cases, bring not about hard is to truism transfer Accordingly, granting order place. in the first them VACATED, hereby DE- and transfer is is Ap-

NIED. The decision of the Court as published Dixon v. peals, hereby (Ind.Ct.Apр.2014), Appeals au- REINSTATED Court 65(D). thority. Appellate See Ind. Rule R. App. is at appeal This an end. 58(B). DIXON, Appellant, L. Robert RUSH, C.J., and DICKSON JJ., concur. RUCKER Indiana, Appellee.

STATE No. 84S01-1410-CR-683. MASSA, JJ., dissent from DAVID adopt denial of transfer and would Supreme Court of Indiana. Appeals’ dissenting opinion. Court of March Order

Published 30, 2014, the

By order dated October granted petition seeking transfer

Court from jurisdiction Appeals. Court review, including considering

After further points presented by counsel at oral Cates, goes virtually oversight.’’); no Editorial amok." Yoder & Brad with ment John Board, Hunter, Corrupted Play Bounty USA a Crime- When Police Government Self-Interest Evil, (Nov. 20.2014), (Sept. Today http://www.usatoday. Fighting Tool into an Wash. Post 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ com/story/opinion/2014/11/19/police-civil- asset-forfeiture-profit-drug-trafficking- opinions/abolish-the-civil-asset-forfeiture- ("The programs, program-we-helped-create/2014/09/18/72f08 editorials-debates/19299879/ gains ac-3d02-lle4-b0ea8141703bbf6f_story.html? ill-gotten born in the 1970s to seize drug is not trafficking, wpmk=MK0000203. unmoored Such criticism from have become stage; report original taking profit a recent from their intent of limited to national *8 crime.”). state and out of directors of the raised several concerns about our Even former Guerra, Department’s practices. As- Justice Forfeiture Office local Kristine Asset Seized Cars, Homes Taken— have ‍​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​‍called for an the initiative Star Finds Cases end to sets: create, Indianapolis finding particularly Charged, Not worked to "it And Owners Star, govem- painful heavy Feb. Al. to watch hand at

Case Details

Case Name: Detona Sargent v. State of Ind., and the Consolidated City of Indianapolis/Marion Co., and the Indianapolis Metro Police Dept
Court Name: Indiana Supreme Court
Date Published: Mar 24, 2015
Citation: 27 N.E.3d 729
Docket Number: 49S02-1312-MI-790
Court Abbreviation: Ind.
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