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Dethorn Graham v. City of Charlotte M.S. Connor R.B. Townes T. Rice Hilda P. Matos M.M. Chandler
827 F.2d 945
4th Cir.
1987
Check Treatment

*2 patrol Connor then returned to his HALL, Before RUSSELL and Circuit backup summon assistance. Judges, BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Graham, point, At this the throes Judge. reaction, Berry’s the insulin exited automo- HALL, Judge: K.K. Circuit Berry’s bile and ran around it twice. At Graham, plaintiff request, approached Berry Dethorn in an ac- Connor to assist alleging tion restraining unconstitutional infliction in catching Graham. When Berry approached, respond appropriately sat cers to Connor and down to medical testified he lost emergency. alleged curb. Graham He also the officers’ during time consciousness conduct amounted discrimination on the lying he was face down on when he awoke handicap in violation basis § ground hands cuffed behind the Rehabilitation Act of 29 U.S.C. his back. Finally, pendent Graham asserted § assault, imprisonment claims of false intervals, *3 other

At different four Char- infliction intentional of emotional dis- officers, Townes, police lotte R.B. Hilda under Chandler, Rice, tress North Carolina Matos, common law. M.M. and T. arrived response Connor’s on the scene to September The case on for came trial on backup. quest began for A crowd also to 16-17, In addition to his ac- own gather nearby apartment complex. from a incident, presented count of the Graham police After the officers determined that no testimony the William Berry and Officer crime committed the had been at conve- sought Townes. also Graham to introduce store, they place nience decided to Graham expert by Dr. Robert Meadows him patrol transport in a home. training.1 subject proper police on the struggled Graham testified that he presentation Following plaintiff's the the officers because would allow case, all defendants moved for directed display him to reach his wallet and a card pursuant to Upon verdict Fed.R.Civ.P. identifying him as a He also diabetic. motions, the consideration of the district maintained that the officers refused to al- court first concluded that a reasonable give orange low one of friends him his jury, viewing light the evidence in the most juice and one of the officers cursed plaintiff, favorable to could not find that him juice. when he asked for the Graham by the infliction of force the officers struggle, further maintained that in the his constitutionally excessive. The court against face was slammed the hood of the allegation also found that Graham’s of im- forcibly car before was then proper inadequate police training by the shoved into car and the driven home. City of by Charlotte was refuted the testi- point It undisputed is that at some dur- mony expert Finally, of his own witness. ing the unfortunate incident Graham’s foot rejected court the handicap claim of was broken. also Graham contended that discrimination based on 504 of the Reha- § he suffered eye, an abrasion over his left ground Act on the bilitation stat- handcuffs, that his were by wrists cut did not ute reach misconduct of sort right that his injured shoulder was and that alleged Accordingly, Graham. the dis- he developed loud ringing in his ear granted trict court all for a motions direct- being as a result of onto “slammed” plaintiff's ed verdict as to all counts of the hood of the automobile. complaint.2 subsequently brought a civil ac- tion in district court on July II. City and the Charlotte five appeal, On Graham contends that present individual officers on No- presented was sufficient to vember 1984. In raise alleging addition jury question constitutionally infliction of whether the officers’ excessive officers, charged force provide use force and refusal to medical city had failed to train constitutionally its offi- care were unreasonable. Meadows, experienced 1. Dr. appeal, instructor in the this Graham contends that the court justice, employed Appa- field of criminal at restricting opinion expert. erred in University lachian State at the time the trial. permitted express The court Dr. Meadows specific 2. The district court’s order made no opinion regarding appropriate po- level of pendent reference to the state claims. Graham declined, however, training. lice The court suggests, that a directed on "all verdict opinion concerning allow Meadows offer an implied counts” that a verdict was directed conformity whether the officers acted in granted in those claims. adequate training on November 1984. In argues any amount of force used and the extent of Graham further legal applied Appellant’s an incorrect standard theory, inflicted. how- in support of when it assessed the evidence ever, misreading a substantial rooted Finally, force claim. his excessive previous of our decisions. court committed that the district maintains Kidd, rejected court’s lower de disposition error both the reversible constitutionally termination that excessive claims and the limitation im- his state tort solely upon force turned expert testimony. posed on Dr. Meadows’ intentionally deprived plaintiff actor had merit in of Graham’s con- We see no Instead, specific right. of a constitutional tentions. we concluded that an excessive force claim matter, reject a threshold As required “grapple” the court to with both any suggestion that the district court erred degree applied of force and the factual setting forth the standard correct Kidd, context which the force arose. constitutionally Citing force. excessive rejecting 77 4 F.2d at 1261. Far from con *4 in King factors articulated in our decision factor, King the fourth sideration of (4th Cir.1980), Blankenship, 636 F.2d 70 v. concepts held that such “malicious as and expressly the considered: district descrip sadistic” be should understood (1) application The need for the for the degrees tions of the of that force exceed force, and, thereby, privilege, implicate state’s (2) relationship between need constitutionally protected intrusions into and the amount of the force that was “personal security.” Id.3 used, specifically In more Carter and Jus- (3) inflicted, injury of The extent tice, question we have confronted the of (4) applied Whether force was a jury how best to instruct the the issue faith good effort to maintain and re- force. excessive Our concern has been discipline maliciously store or and sa- that jury should examine all of the distically very purpose for the determining relevant circumstances when causing harm. whether the of force use was constitution- argues, that subse ally exclusively unreasonable and not focus quent including decisions of this Court any one factor. While that issue has (4th Rogers, Carter v. 805 1153 F.2d Cir. not juncture, conclusively at this been 1986), Dennis, (4th v. Justice 793 F.2d 573 4, nothing ultimately solved that we decide Cir.1986), O’Neil, and Kidd v. 774 F.2d proper regard jury instructions is (4th Cir.1985), King have altered the likely propriety affect by abandoning factors consideration of application court’s balanced of the four allegedly whether the excessive force was King ruling factors when on a motion for a “applied maliciously sadistically for the directed verdict. very purpose of causing harm.” Graham conclude, therefore, We that the dis contends that excessive force is now mea- totality sured on trict not legal a court did use an erroneous circumstances only force, that examines deciding need standard when whether Graham’s Kidd, was, recognized course, right per- In that not an incarcerated security may, depending upon sonal circumstances, the factual prisoner. complaint His of excessive force did rights protected by involve not, therefore, eighth arise under the amend- fourth, eighth fifth amendments. the re- unreasonable, however, suggest ment. It is by Supreme cent decision Court in the United States conceptual that a factor could be central to one Albers, Whitley 475 U.S. type of force excessive claim but reversible er- (1986), 89 L.Ed.2d 251 the court merely by ror when considered the court arising concluded that an excessive force claim under the another context. eighth "ultimately amendment turns applied good force ‘whether in a faith 4. panel decision in Justice was vacated discipline effort to maintain or restore or mali- grant rehearing, (4th of en banc F.2d ciously sadistically very purpose for the Cir.1986). opinion of the full court has not ” causing harm.’ [Citations omitted] at yet been announced. motion for a Townes testified could withstand a direct- that crowd that case only question remaining gathered becoming verdict. The unruly. ed In light of standard, a under that reasonable testimony, that uncontested the district viewing light in the jury the evidence most removing court’s conclusion that plaintiff could have found favorable expedient was an of avoiding method fur- per- Graham’s constitutional that eminently ther confrontation is reasonable. security was violated officers of sonal question There is no from the available police department, e.g., Charlotte record physically that Graham resisted the Gladden, (4th 660 F.2d 1024 Wheatley v. place effort to him in the Sadly, car. Cir.1981). agree the district court We question there is also no that in the course could appellant’s support evidence that resistance, of that sustained a broken verdict his favor. Nevertheless, foot. there was no testimo- undisputed It is on November that ny from juror which a reasonable could 1984, Officer Connor a man in observed infer that struck officer Graham or in agitation run into a obvious conve- any way injury. Indeed, inflicted that store, immediately, exit nience almost enter strongly available suggests away. rapidly car and drive Under those injury was both accidental and self-in- circumstances, suspicion reasonable would flicted. investigative stop at justify least brief alleged Graham also the officers Indeed, appellant vehicle. has not con- “slammed” his into head the hood of an appeal stop in this the initial tended causing automobile thereby Berry’s improper. automobile was manifested itself ringing as a continuous *5 occurred, stop Once the Graham’s right his ear. Berry, testified induced was so illness behavior erratic that that push while he saw the officers appel- Berry was forced to seek officer’s as- during lant’s head struggle, down he restraining in sug- sistance him. Graham impact Moreover, heard no the car. with gests appeal sitting on he was calmly appellant presented no medical evidence to the additional officers when arrived support allegation injury. his of head and handcuffed him. trial testi- mony, however, he was that had no memo- Finally, agree district court ry transpired what between time the that there is no that the evidence officers stopped was and the moment he re- appellant denied medical treatment. In- gained ground. on the lying consciousness deed, testimony the uncontested of Officer Although Berry initially testified that Gra- Townes was that was twice Graham asked time, ham was calm at conceded on whether he medical wanted assistance. cross-examination that statement to Townes further testified that Graham de- 26, 1984, on November he had offer, clined the at the scene both of the “having stated Graham fits.” was Of- stop transported and at was the time he to Townes, backup ficer the first officer on his home. scene, plaintiff’s was called as witness Appellant’s unfortunate encounter arrived, and testified that when he Department the Charlotte Police on No- lying ground kicking was back- vember a lamentable was occur- toward Finally, ap- wards Officer Connor. regrettable rence. It is deeply pri- that a witness, Meadows, pellant’s expert own Dr. vate citizen committed no who had crime opined under the circumstances it was forcibly custody taken into and suf- appropriate to subdue and handcuff him. Nevertheless, fered as a result. Clearly evidence Graham’s own fails to clearly indicates that at each unnecessary demonstrate either or exces- stage incident, the of the actions of the juncture. force at sive this essentially officers were reasonable under nothing We likewise see the evidence the circumstances. suggest bounds of below that the consti- noted, soundly As the district tutionally impermissible behavior were every push by a subsequent state actor can crossed efforts of the shove officers remove from the rise to the violation of scene. level of a constitu- appeal, fairly maining rights. may It be debated the limitation of Dr. tional the Charlotte officers of Police significance. whether the Meadows’ has no wisely behaved November Department convinced, however, are 1984. We IV. jury weighing the evidence a reasonable foregoing reasons, judgment For the legal presented accordance with below court is affirmed. Circuit, this could not find standards in AFFIRMED. applied constitutionally

that the force We, therefore, agree with the excessive.5 BUTZNER, Judge, Senior Circuit dissent- grant decision to a directed district court’s ing: of the defendants. verdict in favor I

III. Affirmance remaining grant district court’s contentions Appellant’s regard of a long. us directed verdict the faulty need not detain With rests on claims, premise state see no indica pendent rights that Graham’s and the con actually ad tion that the district court duct of the are measured a stan granting in its a direct dressed them order implement eighth dard fashioned jurisdiction Pendent over state ed verdict. prohibition against amendment’s cruel and judi matter of claims in federal court is a punishment. unusual It error to re cial Workers discretion. United Mine quire to prove, words Gibbs, King (4th v. Blankenship, 636 F.2d light L.Ed.2d 218 the thor Cir.1980), that the “maliciously acted ough explicit disposition of all of Gra sadistically purpose very claims, ham’s federal we conclude that the causing King harm.” dealt with a con pendent district court’s silence on guard vict’s claim for cruel and claims indicates that those claims were dis punishment unusual in violation of the prejudice appellant’s missed without eighth To amendment. such a establish pursue them in court. We violation, prove a convict must “unneces can see no abuse discretion that deci sary and pain.” wanton infliction of Whit sion. *6 Albers, 312, 1078, ley v. 475 S.Ct. U.S. 106 We likewise see no merit in Graham’s 1084, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 But Graham claim that the district court erred in re- was not a He not even convict. was stricting the testimony expert of his wit- pretrial person detainee or a arrest. under ness. which the district citizen, free, He was a innocent a man who related to barred whether the officers job responsible had a North Car present 14, 1984, on November acted Department Transportation. olina Un with proper training. accordance Even fortunately, he suffered from diabetes and were we to conclude that occasional insulin reactions. court’s action somehow exceeded its broad Supreme Court has even hint- never discretion in determining evidentiary ad- person ed that a in Graham’s situation missibility, there would still nobe reason to subjected rigorous should be to the stan- disturb the decision Dr. below. Meadows’ eighth dards of the in order amendment to proffered testimony only was relevant to damages injuries by recover for inflicted City Graham’s claim that the of Charlotte police. distinguishing The reason for failed train police its officers ade- quately. between not, however, a convict and a free citizen is Graham has ap- pealed the against police privileged dismissal of claim clear. The are to in- City. regard With to the punishment issues re- flict free citizen. 5. Our unqual- deplorable decision should not read be This restrained. behavior which approval ified of the conduct the Charlotte Depart- reflects little credit on Charlotte Police Indeed, officers. profoundly dismayed we are ment, cannot, alter basic conclu- our by language coarse and abusive sion that no constitutional inflicted. employed against appellant during the time he

951 convict, justification rigorous no insist that the Consequently, there is stan absolving liability from proof unique unless dard of to a convict’s claim their prove the citizen can conduct arising eighth under the amendment bars proving the test for cruel and satisfied Graham’s action as a matter of law. Their punishment. unusual argument by supported logic is neither nor Instead, is precedent. by it refuted Terry amendment, applicable made The fourth long recognized and Garner. We too have fourteenth, pro- through the states precepts these basic fourth amendment people vides that “the of the to be jurisprudence. O’Neil, Kidd v. against See 774 ... persons their unrea- secure 1252, (4th Cir.1985). F.2d 1255 ... seizures shall not be violat- sonable ed____” precedent Supreme Court estab- II this amendment —not

lishes eighth applicable per- claim of a —is reasonably in making acted an protests police arising conduct son who out investigative stop. that is But not the end investigatory Ohio, In stop. Terry inquiry. fourth amendment Garner 1868, U.S. 88 20 L.Ed.2d 889 392 S.Ct. explains: “Because one the factors is (1968), authority held that the Court intrusion, plain the extent of the it is investigatory stop to make an “must depends only reasonableness on not when a gen- tested the Fourth Amendment’s be made, seizure is but also how it is carried proscription against eral unreasonable 471 1699; out.” U.S. at 105 S.Ct. at see at searches seizures.” U.S. 20, 28-29, Terry, also 392 U.S. at at 1879. a dual inquiry: S.Ct. This involves 1879, 1883-84. at The conduct of the police justified action “whether the officer’s the stop after is critical to this inquiry. inception, its it was reason- at reviewing Because we are a directed ver- ably scope related in circumstances dict must determine whether there is justified the interference in the which first permit jury evidence which would place.” 392 at 88 S.Ct. at U.S. reach a verdict in favor of Graham. Our Recently, rejecting po- claim that governed following review stan- are kill apparently lice authorized to dard: unarmed, nondangerous fleeing suspect, determining In whether the evidence is Supreme Court reviewed fundamen- weigh sufficient the court is not free to principles govern tal the interaction of pass the evidence or on the credibility citizens. Tennessee v. Gar ner, 1694, 1699, judg- witnesses or to substitute its (1985), L.Ed.2d 1 the Court reiterated that ment of the jury. facts for that of the “[wjhenever an officer restrains the free Instead it must the evidence view most person of a away, dom to walk he has favorably party to the whom the person.” seized that The Court then ex- give motion is party made and *7 plained: “To determine the constitutionali- benefit of all inferences reasonable from ty of a seizure must balance the na- ‘[w]e the evidence. quality and ture of the intrusion on the Miller, Wright & Practice Federal and individual’s Fourth Amendment interests 543-45; Procedure 2524 at see also Con § against importance governmen- Ore Carbide tinental Co. v. Union & Carbon alleged justify tal interests the intru- rp., 1404, Co ” sion.’ U.S. at S.Ct. at 1699. 8 L.Ed.2d 777 Garner, Terry, In neither nor Whitley Properly viewed, the evidence discloses suggest does Court that the intrusion investigatory stop officer’s re- an on individual’s fourth amendment inter- unarmed, that Graham vealed that he investigative stop ests occasioned danger public, presented no and that proves by pre- valid unless the individual probable no cause existed believe he had ponderance police of the evidence that the Berry promptly committed a crime. told “maliciously acted sadistically and for the very purpose suffering harm.” officer causing Although that Graham was police acknowledge sugar After is not from Graham had reaction. twice, Berry hypothetical question and to a

run around the car cross exami- officer him down investigating favorably calmed police nation framed most for the ap- officer he sat on the curb. Another disregard of much of Graham’s evidence. peared inquiry and about Graham’s without Again, jury proper was the arbiter aside, pushed Berry condition rolled Gra- weight to expert’s be accorded the over, A ham handcuffed him. third sponse. opined: officer the scene and arrived investigatory Within minutes after the sugar of people “I’ve seen a lot diabe- stop police they dealing were knew tes that never acted like this. Ain’t noth- seriously with a ill man who innocent ing wrong drunk. with M.F. but Lock scope crime. Whether the and con up.” the S.B. duct of their seizure violated the reason Graham, by handcuffs, When restrained requirement ableness of the fourth amend asked an officer to look in his wallet for his presented question ment clearly for the decal, diabetic the officer told him to “shut jury to determine accordance up” against Berry’s and slammed his head Terry principles explained and Garner. place car. Aware that could no charges Graham, against four officers police A

threw him into a car. friend

brought orange juice to the

where Graham was confined handcuffs. give

Graham asked the officer him

orange juice, responded and the officer

“I’m giving you shit.” officers took Graham to his home where he col- KELLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, Mazie lapsed yard. gave in the him Friends or- ange juice and took him ato doctor. injury Graham suffered a head that left COUNTY; PRINCE GEORGE’S Prince ringing him with a in his ear an abra- George’s County Department of Social sion on injuries his head. He also suffered Services, Defendants-Appellees, wrists, shoulder,

to his to his If credited, broken his foot. evidence is Equal Employment Opportunity jury could find that the caused the Commission, Amicus Curiae. injuries. No. 86-3876. position take the that Graham Appeals, United States Court of proved no actionable harm Berry, because Fourth Circuit. one of witnesses, did not hear any impact police pushed when the Gra- Argued March ham’s head the car and because Aug. Decided Berry’s police investigator statement to a differed in respects some from testimo- n ny. emphasize also that Gra-

ham’s expert acknowledged witness that it appropriate to restrain him. Reliance arguments these for affirmance violates

both reviewing the standard for a directed

verdict and Federal Rule of Evidence 607.

A party longer is no bound state-

ment of his jury’s own witness. It was the

function—not the court’s—to decide which Berry's

version of account to believe.

Moreover, expert soundly criti-

cized manner which the con-

ducted themselves. His police rely

which the response made

Case Details

Case Name: Dethorn Graham v. City of Charlotte M.S. Connor R.B. Townes T. Rice Hilda P. Matos M.M. Chandler
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Date Published: Aug 25, 1987
Citation: 827 F.2d 945
Docket Number: 86-2163
Court Abbreviation: 4th Cir.
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