*1 disregarded has precedent Wyoming Recent I believe that this disre- approach, and requiring
gard complicated has matters analysis made under Barker
an to be both 48(b). my opinion, Sides’
and W.R.Cr.P. have been decid-
speedy trial concerns could 48(b), and the statement
ed under W.R.Cr.P. test and the both the constitutional is incorrect and must be utilized
cedural rule
needlessly thoroughly confuses the issue. my position in Hall
explained J., spe- (Wyo.1996) (Macy, concurring),
cially and in J., (Wyo.1995) (Macy, spe- concurring). specially concur-
cially Those my position reflect
ring opinions continue to
on this issue. DETHERIDGE,
Charles Edward (Defendant),
Appellant Wyoming,
The STATE (Plaintiff).
Appellee
No. 96-334. Wyoming.
Supreme Court of
Aug.
II. FACTS felony Detheridge charged with stalk- 7,1995 Wyo. ing April on violation of Stat. 6-2-506(e)(i) (1997). 5, § Arraigned May on 1995, initially Detheridge’s trial date was set 10, July Shortly arraign- for 1995. after his ment, Detheridge filed demand for pursuant trial to At the same W.R.Cr.P. 48. time, Detheridge also filed a motion to dis- charges, challenging miss the the constitu- tionality stalking hearing A statute. 2, on his to motion dismiss was set for June 1995, parties and were ordered to submit briefing on the issue. Hackl, Defender; Sylvia L. State Public Domonkos, Counsel; Appellate Donna D. and awaiting While the district court’s decision Extern., Macehia, Raymond Ap- Student for challenge, on pellant(Defendant). 10, July pass 1995 trial to date was allowed entry without a continuance or new Hill, General; Attorney William U. Paul S. 16, setting. 1995, August On Rehurek, the district General; Deputy Attorney D. Mi- dismiss, court denied the motion to but did Pauling, chael Attorney Senior Assistant not set General; Realizing a date for trial. Lauer, Director, Theodore E. Pros- of W.R.Cr.P. 48 Program; Joseph ecution Assistance and W. appeared jeopardy, August on Intern., Appellee(Plaintiff). Cole Student requesting the State filed a motion an order LEHMAN, C.J., THOMAS, Before setting date. The motion reminded MACY, TAYLOR,* GOLDEN and JJ. only the district court that a few re- 120-day period mained within the allotted in TAYLOR, Justice. which to commence a but the Appellant plea entered a request conditional of motion not did include a for a contin- felony charge nolo contendere to a stalking explanation uance or an delay. Noth- reserving right appeal alleged ing while until Detheridge was done filed a motion procedural Finding errors this court. for lack Septem- dismiss trial on denied, merit in his claim that he was not afforded a ber 1995. The motion was pursuant September we another trial date was set reverse. 1995. Detheridge plea entered a conditional
I. ISSUES 29, 1995, September nolo on contendere Appellant, Charles Detheridge Edward an agreement appeal ditioned on (Detheridge), presents three issues re- would forthcoming. originally be He was Only discussion, view. two issues warrant January scheduled to be sentenced on and we reiterate those issues here: on ruling sentencing, Prior to district court realized it had not ruled on II
ISSUE pending motion to dismiss or remand the deny Did the trial court appellant court, therefore, case. The district continued constitutionally guaranteed right to a until a future time so it speedy trial? could accompanying review motion and III ISSUE briefs. Did trial court its discretion [abuse] appellant’s 29,1996, it when denied the April motion for On filed another sentencing? from relief requesting motion the district court rule on * argument. Chief Justice at time oral imposing sen- not foreclosed from him. should sentence pending motion and/or period Id. of time. after the forthcoming, tence response
noWith
from
or for relief
a motion to dismiss
filed
for,
IV. DISCUSSION
1996. The basis
judgment on October
*3
delay of over one calendar
motion was the
his
48(b)
A. W.R.CR.P.
plea.
year
he
his
On October
since
entered
right
to
A criminal defendant’s
25, 1996,
Dether-
the district court denied
grounded
trial is
in the constitutions
speedy
year
him to one
idge’s motions and sentenced
Wyo
of
and the State
of the United States
he
including the condition that
probation,
of
pro
ming.
recognition that
48
prom-
the victim. As
have no contact with
procedural
criminal defendants
vides
ised,
timely followed.
appeal
of this
protection
ensure the
mechanism to
right, we have held that com
constitutional
OP REVIEW
III. STANDARD
Yung,
mandatory.
is
pliance with its terms
1032; McDermott,
P.2d at
at
897
906 P.2d
speedy trial claim to
review a
We
pertinent part,
pro
48
1299. In
of W.R.Cr.P. 48
the mandates
ensure
vides:
guarantees have been met.
and constitutional
(b)
1028,
State,
Speedy
(Wyo.
1032
trial.
906 P.2d
v.
we determine whether
fewer than 120
gan,
made a written demand
between
897
925,
at
1995).
der
otherwise
excluding
1300. If a
P.2d
W.R.Cr.P. 48. Kleinschmidt
908
930
We
defendant’s
P.2d at
1295,
(Wyo.1995);
vigorously
48(b)(3).
the
begin by
delay
1300
time
days
930;
Hogan
has exceeded
(Wyo.1995). Delays of
asserted
arraignment and
are
periods
McDermott,
McDermott
calculating the
for a
the defendant
permissible.
v.
State,
specified in
rights
120
v.
897
v.
908 P.2d
trial
State,
State,
days,
time
P.2d
Ho
has
un
or
rule.
to trial within 120
ment unless
the defendant
cluded
counsel
(1)
ant to
(3)
(2)
(C)
n
The
A
It is the
n
[*]
in
and the defendant
Delay granted by the court
paragraph
criminal
computing
continued as
is
responsibility
charge
days following arraign-
(4)
periods
or
the time
tried.
(5);
shall be
provided in this
to
of
shall be
insure
the
for trial:
brought
pursu-
court,
ex-
v.
(Wyo.1996);
439-40
Hall
913
(4)
to
six
Continuances not
exceed
State,
1364, 1370(Wyo.1996). If the
911 P.2d
arraignment
months from
date
so,
apply the
has not done we
four-
defendant
by
follows:
granted
the trial court as
be
in Barker
part constitutional test articulated
514, 530,
(A)
supported
92
Wingo, 407 U.S.
S.Ct.
On motion
defendant
affidavit;
(1972),
adopted in
or
by
L.Ed.2d 101
(Wyo.1972),
Cosco
(B)
attorney
On motion of the
denied,
411 U.S.
93 S.Ct.
rt.
court if:
state or the
ce
(1973),
to ensure that
The Rules of Criminal Procedure “shall be
simplicity
procedure,
construed to secure
in
While the
dispositive
above issue is
of
in
fairness
administration and the elimination
case,
compelled
this
we feel
to address Deth-
unjustifiable
expense
delay.”
eridge’s claim that he was denied
process
due
2. The plain language
of by
delay
the unreasonable
in sentencing.
places
responsibility
W.R.Cr.P. 48
the
of en-
32(e)(1)provides,
part:
suring
timely
equally
a
on the district
imposed
Sentence shall be
without unnec-
court,
prosecution
the
and the
In
defendant.
essary delay, but
may,
the court
when
Kleinschmidt,
439-40,
913 P.2d at
we held
there is a
important
factor
to the sentenc-
period
that a
of 123
did not violate
ing determination
capable
that is not then
W.R.Cr.P. 48 when the defendant failed to
resolved,
being
postpone
imposition
the
a
file written demand for a
trial and
of sentence for a reasonable time until the
object
failed to
to three continuances within
capable
factor is
of being resolved.
Hall,
120-day period.
the
See also
911 P.2d
Yates,
In
addressing
792 P.2d at
the
at 1370.
the
supported
Unlike
facts which
predecessor
32(c)(1),
of W.R.Cr.P.
un-
we
Kleinschmidt,
our decision in
equivocally
stated that one
is a reason-
a
filed
demand
trial.
period
able
require
imposition
time to
the
Despite
written demand for a
sentence,
and that
in excess of one
neither
district court nor the
year is presumptively unreasonable.
prosecution
any steps
took
to reset the trial
date,
continuance,
file request
state the
A court
pronounce
not
sentence on a
why
necessary,
reasons
a continuance was
expiration
defendant after
of such
grant
time,
prior
even
a continuance
clearly
the conclu-
unless
record
establishes
120-day period.
sion of the
those facts and circumstances that excuse
MACY, Justice,
concurring.
specially
imposition of
delay,
making later
thus
must
The State
sentence reasonable.
majority
agree
I
with the result that
facts
establishing
those
burden
bear the
issue, but
regarding
reaches
and circumstances.
clear
disagree with the statement that the
I
48 vitiates
need
violation of W.R.Cr.P.
Yates,
explained
792 P.2d at
four-part
test ar-
consider
possibility
prevent the
rule is meant to
this
Wingo,
in Barker v.
407 U.S.
ticulated
greater punishment than is deserved
that a
(1972).
have harsher
words, Detheridge served two terms of precise- This is
bation for same offense. ly reasoning which renders such Morgan, Tom BOLACK and Thomas Having show that failed to (Defendants), unreasonable. Appellants reasonable, the court delay was imposing over foreclosed from sentence CHEVRON, INC., U.S.A. guilt was from the time one calendar (Plaintiff). Appellee established. No. 97-58. Wyoming. Supreme Court V. CONCLUSION Aug. 1998. The failure to continue schedule Sept. Rehearing Denied during 120-day period Dether- arraignment, after his written demand idge’s violated 48(b). His conviction is reversed.