The question here presented is as to the sufficiency under the statute of frauds of the description of real estate in the following memorandum:
“ $100.00 Northbridge, Mass., Aug. 7, 1900.
“ Received one hundred dollars from E. Desmarais in part payment for a piece of land next to Pelequin, seventy feet on the road and back to an old wall.
“ Elenor Taft.”
The facts in connection with the memorandum were that the land was part of a large tract owned by the defendant, located on the northerly side of School Street and generally known as the Elenor Taft land, and not separated by any distinguishing mark from the large tract of which it was a part. The Pele-quin mentioned in the memorandum owned only one tract of land on this street, and that was on the west side of the large tract. There was an old wall bounding the northerly side of the large lot of the defendant. The contract price for the' lot was $350. The statute of frauds (R. L. c. 74, § 1) requires a memorandum “to contain a description of the land sufficient for purposes of identification, when read in the light of all the circumstances of ownership of the property by the vendor. . . . Attendant circumstances may be shown outside the writing and by parol for the purpose of interpreting and applying the memorandum.” Harrigan v. Dodge, 200 Mass. 357, 359, and cases cited. Bradley v. Haven, 208 Mass. 300. On the other hand, a description which, when applied to the physical features upon the surface of the earth and read in the light of the facts sur
The exact consideration for the conveyance under our authorities need not be stated in the memorandum. White v. Dahlquist Manuf. Co. 179 Mass. 427, 431.
Judgment reversed.