Dаna DESJARDINS, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Donald WILLARD; Michael Reynolds, Defendants, Appellees.
No. 14-1786.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Jan. 23, 2015.
For these reasons, we dismiss the appeal as untimely.
John S. Campbell, with whom Campbell & Associates, P.A. was on brief, for appellant.
Daniel J. Murphy, with whom Bernstein Shur was on brief, for appellees.
Before LYNCH, Chief Judge, SOUTER, Associate Justice,* and SELYA, Circuit Judge.
LYNCH, Chief Judge.
What is left of this сase after dismissal of the federal claims involves state law defamation and false light claims by one town official for the town of Raymond, Maine, аgainst another town official.1 This case started in state superior court, and was removed based on federal claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The federal claims were, as we discuss below, correctly dismissed. The remaining state law claims under supplemental jurisdiction involve resolution of a potential conflict between Maine‘s Anti-SLAPP statute,
I.
Dana Desjardins alleges that, beginning in late 2012, defеndant Michael Reynolds, a fellow town official, told the Cumberland County Sheriff‘s Department that Desjardins had attended public meetings drunk and driven while intoxicated. Reynolds allegedly knew, or should have known, that these reports were false because he also attends these meetings and knows that Desjardins rarеly drinks. Desjardins alleges that these false statements damaged his reputation and caused the Sheriff‘s Department to red-flag Desjardins and pull his car ovеr without cause.
In August 2013, Desjardins brought suit in Cumberland County Superior Court. The heart of this case is Desjardins’ state law claims for defamation and false light invasion of privacy.2 He also alleged federal claims under
We affirm the dismissal of thе federal claims. Desjardins’ Fourth Amendment claim fails because there is no proximate causation between Reynolds’ actions and the allegedly unconstitutional traffic stop: the most that the complaint plausibly alleges is that Reynolds request-
II.
This leaves only the state law claims. Where a federal court has dismissed the anchoring federal claims over whiсh it has original jurisdiction, the court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over the remaining state law claims.
Thе district court faced competing considerations as to retention of jurisdiction that differ somewhat from those now before us. At the time of its decision, the case still included defendant Donald Willard, the state claims against whom the court found were readily dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). The district court implicitly concluded that the interests of fairness, judicial economy, and convenience at that time weighed in favor of resolving these state claims. Cf. Camelio, 137 F.3d at 672 (finding relevant whether “the district court‘s disposition of some but not all of the state law claims will materially shorten the time it will take to resolve the parties’ dispute“). On the other hand, the claims against Reynolds were less readily resolved: The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has held that Desjardins’ alleged injury, the ” ‘damages per se’ traditionally associated with libel or slander ... do not satisfy the actual injury requirement of [Maine‘s Anti-SLAPP law].” Schelling v. Lindell, 942 A.2d 1226, 1232 & n. 4 (Me. 2008).3 But, as the district court acknowledged, Schelling may be in tension with Maine‘s constitutional protectiоns for the right to judicial remedies and the new approach to Maine‘s Anti-SLAPP law announced in Nader v. Maine Democratic Party (Nader I), 41 A.3d 551, 559-63 (Me. 2012).4 The district court acknowledged
Defendant Willard is no longer part of this case, and so concerns about fairness to him are no longer implicated. As a result, the balancing of factors now more closely resembles those in Camelio, where the court held that the surviving state law claims should be remanded to state court, from whence they came. 137 F.3d at 672. As in Camelio, the federal claims that formed the basis for removal here have been dismissed “well before trial,” and the remaining state law claims against Reynolds “raise substantial questions of state law that are best resolved in state court.” Id. In light оf these factors, we hold now—as we did then—that the surviving state law claims should be remanded to state court where they began. See id. at 672-73; see also Rivera-Díaz v. Humana Ins. of P.R., Inc., 748 F.3d 387, 392 (1st Cir. 2014) (“The Supreme Court has made pellucid ‘that in the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors ... will point towаrd declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n. 7, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988)))).
We do not reach, and so do not decide, whether the district court abused its discretion in resolving the state claims when it did. We find only that, from our vantage point now, the issues are better resolved by the state сourts, where this case began. In the words of the Supreme Court, “[n]eedless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.” Camelio, 137 F.3d at 672 (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966)). This is particularly true of interрretations of state constitutions.
We affirm the dismissal of the federal claims and all claims as to Willard, with prejudice. We vacate the dismissal of Desjаrdins’ state law defamation and false light claims against Reynolds, and remand with instructions to remand those claims to state court.
So ordered. No costs are awarded.