214 Conn. 394 | Conn. | 1990
This appeal concerns the eligibility of disabled members of municipal police and fire departments, who are entitled to compensation under General Statutes § 7-433C,
As stipulated, the plaintiff was a regular member of the fire department of the defendant city, who had passed the requisite physical examination at the time of his employment. Because the plaintiff thereafter manifested symptoms of heart disease and hypertension, a compensation commissioner awarded him benefits under § 7-433c and related medical expenses. Subsequently, the plaintiff qualified for a supplemental award, under General Statutes § 31-308 (d), of “234 weeks of compensation representing a 30% permanent partial impairment of the cardiovascular system at the rate of $397.00 per week commencing on October 10, 1986 . . . .’’On September 30, 1987, the plaintiff retired on a work related disability pension because of his heart disease.
Upon the plaintiff’s retirement, the defendant discontinued the plaintiff’s fringe benefits with regard to
In Felia v. Westport, 214 Conn. 181, 571 A.2d 89 (1990), this court recently reviewed the relationship between § 7-433c and chapter 568. The crucial legislative instruction in § 7-433c is its provision that a disabled police officer or firefighter is entitled to “receive from his municipal employer compensation and medical care in the same amount and the same manner as that provided under chapter 568 if such . . . disability was caused by a personal injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment and was suffered in the line of duty and within the scope of his employment.” We construed § 7-433c to require that, once § 7-433c coverage is established, the measurement of an employee’s economic benefits must be the same as the measure of damages for economic benefits provided to a disabled employee under chapter 568. Id., 185. Further, we held that the economic benefits to which a § 7-433c claimant is entitled include special benefits pursuant to General Statutes § 31-308 (d). Id., 186-87.
As a general matter, once it is accepted that “compensation” in § 7-433c is to be measured in accordance with the provisions of chapter 568, we may look to the definitions in chapter 568 for guidance about the scope of “compensation” in § 7-433c. Except for a reference in § 7-433c’s preamble to the intent to protect covered firefighters and police officers “against economic loss,” § 7-433c contains no definition of “compensation.” In chapter 568, however, General Statutes § 31-275 (14) defines “income” as “all forms of remuneration to an individual from his employment, including wages, accident and health insurance coverage, life insurance coverage and employee welfare plan contributions.” It is appropriate to read these definitions conjointly, because they relate to the same subject matter. Felia v. Westport, supra, 187; Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Costle, 179 Conn. 415, 422, 426 A.2d 1324 (1980). Furthermore, the legislature expressly characterized fringe benefits, in § 31-284b (a), as an economic benefit designed “to maintain, as nearly as possible, the income of employees who suffer employment-related injuries.” We are, therefore, persuaded that the economic benefits that qualify as “compensation” under § 7-433c may include fringe benefits, in appropriate circumstances.
The defendant contends, however, that the plaintiff in this case has not met the conditions for fringe benefits set by § 31-284b (a). The statute requires a disabled employee to make two showings. He must first estab
There is no error.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
General Statutes § 7-433c provides: “benefits for policemen or firemen DISABLED OR DEAD AS A RESULT OF HYPERTENSION OR HEART DISEASE. In recognition of the peculiar problems of uniformed members of paid fire departments and regular members of paid police departments, and in recognition of the unusual risks attendant upon these occupations, including an unusual high degree of susceptibility to heart disease and hyper
General Statutes § 31-284b (a), entitled “Employer to Continue Insurance Coverage or Welfare Fund Payments for Employees Eligible to
“In order to maintain, as nearly as possible, the income of employees who suffer employment-related injuries, any employer, as defined in section 31-275, who provides accident and health insurance or life insurance coverage for any employee or makes payments or contributions at the regular hourly or weekly rate for full-time employees to an employee welfare fund, as defined in section 31-53, shall provide to such employee equivalent insurance coverage or welfare fund payments or contributions while the employee is eligible to receive or is receiving workers’ compensation payments pursuant to this chapter, or while the employee is receiving wages under a provision for sick leave payments for time lost due to an employment-related injury.”
Article XIX of the “Agreement [of the] City of Stamford and Local 786, International Association of Fire Fighters” provides health insurance benefits, such as hospital, medical and major medical coverage, as well as a group life insurance plan, for current and retired employees.
Although the record does not state the basis for the plaintiffs supplemental award, plaintiff’s counsel at oral argument provided this background information, whose accuracy defense counsel did not contest.
At oral argument before this court, defense counsel sought to interject an additional ground for denying the plaintiffs claim for relief under General Statutes § 31-284b (a). Although the issue was neither briefed nor, as far as the record discloses, raised before the compensation review division, the defendant now maintains that, because § 31-284b (a) in its present form was added to chapter 568 after the enactment of General Statutes § 7-433c, its terms cannot be included in any generic cross reference to chapter 568 in § 7-433c. We decline to consider this claim on its merits because of the failure properly to raise it below or to brief it here. See Practice Book § 4185; State v. Rollinson, 203 Conn. 641, 663, 526 A.2d 1283 (1987); Weintraub v. Richard Dahn, Inc., 188 Conn. 570, 571-72, 452 A.2d 117 (1982); C. Tait, Connecticut Appellate Practice and Procedure (1989) § 7.9.