3 N.W.2d 150 | Iowa | 1942
The plaintiff sought to obtain a permanent injunction against the defendants and thereby prevent them from selling certain real estate belonging to plaintiff for claimed delinquent taxes. The taxes were, in fact, additional taxes claimed to be due and payable for the years 1937 and 1938. These taxes were sought to be collected by reason of the changed valuation of the plaintiff's property as the result of litigation to which reference will be hereinafter made. The plaintiff claimed that the taxes were illegally sought to be collected and did not constitute a lien on its property. The defendants, by way of defense, asserted that the additional tax by reason of the increased valuation for the years 1937 and 1938 was valid and legal and constituted a lien against the plaintiff's property. The trial court dismissed plaintiff's case on its merits, dissolved the temporary injunction which had been issued at the time of the filing of the plaintiff's suit, and denied the permanent injunction. The plaintiff has appealed.
The record in this case was submitted to the trial court upon an agreed stipulation of facts. They are briefly summarized as follows:
In the year 1937 an assessment in the city of Des Moines, Iowa, was made as required by law. The city council of Des Moines, sitting as a board of review, completed and revised the assessments made by the assessor, and the completed assessments were certified to the county auditor of Polk county. Thereafter the Iowa State Tax Commission, then known as the State Board of Assessment and Review, by reason of proceedings brought before it, gave consideration to the assessments in the entire city of Des Moines, and issued an order directing the local board of review to lower assessments in certain taxing districts of Des Moines and to raise the assessments in other districts.
The order of the state board of assessment and review provided that the assessments in the district in which the plaintiff's *1064 property is located should be raised. The local board of review refused to comply with the order of the state board of assessment and review and thereafter the state board brought an action asking for a writ of mandamus directed to the local board of review requiring it to comply with the order of the state board. On December 21, 1937, the district court of Polk county, Iowa, entered a decree denying the relief sought by the state board. On December 31, 1937, the county auditor of Polk county, certified to the Treasurer the tax books for the taxes due for the year 1937, which were due and payable in 1938. Plaintiff, during the year 1938, paid the taxes then shown by the treasurer's books of Polk county to be due from it and received a receipt which showed full payment of the taxes due.
On December 31, 1938, the county auditor again certified to the county treasurer of Polk county the tax books for the year 1938. This plaintiff paid the taxes for the year 1938, which were due and payable in 1939, as shown by the treasurer's books to be due from it, and received the treasurer's receipt showing full payment of the taxes then due.
The mandamus action brought by the state board of assessment and review, resulted in a denial of the writ in the trial court and an appeal was perfected. In an opinion filed December 30, 1938, in the case of State ex rel. Iowa State Board v. Local Board of Review,
By reason of the change of valuation as it affected plaintiff's property, the county auditor certified to the county treasurer of Polk county, Iowa, certain additional taxes for the years 1937 and 1938. An additional tax for the year 1937, in the amount of $749.35, was placed upon the treasurer's books by the county auditor on March 6, 1940, as was also an additional tax for the year 1938 in the amount of $796.56 on March 18, 1940. These last-named amounts were the additional taxes levied against plaintiff's property. The injunction suit, to which reference has heretofore been made, was brought by plaintiff, who sought to enjoin the collection of additional taxes levied for the years 1937 and 1938.
[1] It is the contention of the plaintiff in this action that, after the tax list has been delivered by the county auditor to the county treasurer, and the taxes as shown thereon have been paid by the taxpayer and a receipt issued, neither the state tax commission nor the county auditor may correct any claimed error and seek collection and payment of additional taxes to the detriment of the taxpayer.
A situation like the one now before us has not heretofore been presented to this court, but a county auditor's efforts to levy assessments by reason of claimed omitted property have heretofore received our attention, and it is our judgment that the reasoning and comments made in cases relative to the effort to levy a tax by reason of omitted property are applicable in the present case.
In the case of First Nat. Bk. v. Hayes,
"The error in the assessment or tax list is one relating to perfecting the tax list in the course of preparation or thereafter, at any time prior to the payment of taxes levied. Retroactive authority is not expressly conferred on the auditor, and there is no good reason for saying that, after the tax lists have been perfected by the officers, in so far as they know, and accepted by the property owner in discharging the burden imposed, *1066 the auditor may go `back of the returns' and, by the correction of errors thereafter discovered, exact payment of additional sums as taxes which neither the public nor the taxpayer knew of, or might reasonably have anticipated. There ought to be a time beyond which even an error in name, description, or valuation may not be corrected to the detriment of the taxpayer, and that time is when the proceedings relating to assessment, listing and collection of the tax, always construed ad invitum, have been consummated by full payment of the amount exacted by the records as they then exist."
In a further case involving the correction of an error in the assessment or tax list by the county auditor, we said, in the case of the First Nat. Bk. v. Anderson,
"It would seem to be equally clear that the authority of the auditor to correct the tax lists of the preceding year continues until the taxes have been paid or otherwise legally discharged."
In the case of Elliott v. Rhoads,
"The one proposition, if any, not fully covered and decided by the cases cited, is the contention of appellant that the payment of the first half of the taxes due in 1923 and the acceptance thereof by the county treasurer estopped the auditor from correcting the error in the assessment, and the county from changing the tax records and from demanding a further payment. This question was discussed and decided in First Nat. Bank v. Hayes,
It will be noted in the case of First Nat. Bk. v. Hayes,
"There ought to be a time beyond which even an error in *1067 name, description, or valuation may not be corrected to the detriment of the taxpayer, and that time is when the proceedingsrelating to assessment, listing and collection of the tax, alwaysconstrued ad invitum, have been consummated by full payment ofthe amount exacted by the records as they then exist." (Italics supplied.)
We therefore hold that in the present situation there cannot be an additional assessment placed against the taxpayer, in a proceedings such as has heretofore been referred to, and the taxpayer required to pay an additional sum, inasmuch as he has paid all that was levied against him as shown by the original records in the treasurer's office. He has already paid the taxes originally assessed against him.
In the case of Bower v. American Lbr. Exp. Co.,
"The sum of complainant's contention is that it, in fact, assessed and paid, at the regular periods, all the taxes properly exactable on or for the solvent credits here involved. The facts averred show this to be true. This court has heretofore held that, when the tax charge on a subject of taxation has been once seasonably paid, it cannot be again rightfully collected. (Pickler v. State,
In the case of Galusha v. Wendt,
"There is some authority for the position that in case of gross undervaluation the state may reassess the property and collect taxes on the real value thereof [State v. Weyerhauser,
[2] In the present case there is no pleading of any character to the effect that the original valuation made by the assessor was made fraudulently or by reason of any fraudulent acts of the taxpayer. That being true, we see no reason why the public, through the taxing authorities, should not be bound by the original valuation placed upon the property by the assessor. There is a statutory provision for an appeal on behalf of the public, where the taxing authorities deem that an assessment is too low, and which provides that any public officer of a county, city, town, township or school district may make complaint before the board of review. Section 7135, 1935 Code of Iowa.
It is a statutory requirement that a taxpayer who objects to his assessment shall be required to appear and appeal to the board of review in order to obtain a reduction in the assessment, and, in turn, to the district court if relief is not given. Inasmuch as a statutory provision has been provided for an appeal by taxing authorities where taxes are claimed to be too low, we see no reason why taxing bodies should not be required to make use of the statutory provisions which are provided in order to obtain an increased valuation and assessment.
The case of German Sav. Bk. v. Trowbridge,
"The law makes him [the assessor] the judge of property values, and his work is subject to review only by the board of equalization." *1069
A further case bearing upon the claimed right to make a reassessment and to levy taxes by reason of the new assessment is that of People's Sav. Bk. v. Layman, 134 F. 635. This last-cited case, which involves an effort of a Polk county, Iowa, treasurer to reassess certain bank stock, holds that a reassessment cannot be made, except in the manner as provided by statute through the board of equalization.
We do not hold that the state tax commission does not have authority to require local boards of review to carry out the orders of the tax commission. We so held in State ex rel. Iowa State Board v. Local Board of Review, supra. However, that case applied to and affected taxing districts and not individual assessments.
It should also be kept in mind that in the case of State ex rel. Iowa State Board v. Local Board of Review, we said at page 871 of
"The order here made was not equivalent to a new or original assessment nor a revision of individual assessments, but dealt with the aggregate valuation in the several zones. It conformed to and corrected the unequal discounts which it determined had resulted in discrimination and is the kind of an order which the state board of assessment and review has authority to make. [Citing cases.]
"* * * Its corrective order was not a reassessment nor was it directed to the individual assessments of individual taxpayers. It merely ordered the pursuance of a uniform mode of valuation for assessments as a substitute for the mode it determined led to discrimination in the valuation of all the real estate in Des Moines for assessment."
Our attention has been called by the defendant to the case of Lamont Sav. Bk. v. Luther,
It is therefore our holding that there can be no additional tax payment required because of the change in valuation by virtue of the order of the state board of assessment and review, for the reasons heretofore noted.
We therefore hold that the court was in error in not granting the injunctive relief sought and that this case must be, and it is, reversed, with instructions that a decree be entered in keeping with our conclusions as herein announced. — Reversed and remanded with instructions.
All JUSTICES concur.
