Dеrrick Trevor GRIFFIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.
No. A16-0323.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
Aug. 3, 2016.
We affirm in part the denial of Jackson‘s petition for postconviction relief. We affirm the denial of Jackson‘s challenge to his conviction based on the alleged recantation by Lаmar. The postconviction court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that Lamar‘s out-of-court statements were not admissible under
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
STRAS, Justice (concurring).
In accordance with my dissenting opinion in State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 267 (Minn.2014), I agree with the court that Jackson is entitled to be resentenced to a term of life imprisonment with the possibility of release. Based on my dissent in Ali, however, I cannot fully join the сourt‘s opinion because I believe that every juvenile offender facing a mandatory term of life imprisonment is entitled to such a remedy and that partial severance, not revival, fully resolves the constitutional defects in Minnesota‘s current first-degree murder statutes. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 314-26, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting in part) (discussing partial severance). Accordingly, I concur only in the judgment of the court.
Derrick Trevor Griffin, Rush City, MN, pro se.
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, MN; and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Michael Richardson, Assistant Hennepin County Attorney, Minneаpolis, MN, for respondent.
CHUTICH, Justice.
In 2012, a Hennepin County jury found appellant Derrick Trevor Griffin guilty of two first-degree murder offenses for the shooting death of one victim. See
On July 31, 2015, Griffin filed a timely petition for postconviction relief, claiming that he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The postconviction court summarily denied rеlief, that is, it denied relief without holding a hearing. Griffin now appeals the postconviction court‘s denial of relief. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
We review the denial of a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of discrеtion. Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn.2012). A postconviction court abuses its discretion when it has “‘exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.‘” Brown v. State, 863 N.W.2d 781, 786 (Minn.2015) (quoting Reed v. State, 793 N.W.2d 725, 729 (2010)). We review the postconviction court‘s legal conclusions de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. Greer v. State, 836 N.W.2d 520, 522 (Minn.2013). A petition for postconviction relief may be
Griffin‘s claims on appeal can be grouped into four categories. First, Griffin alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the district court‘s admission of an out-of-court statement made by Griffin‘s wife, K.G., who identified Griffin near a bar shortly before the murder occurred.
Second, Griffin asserts violations of
Third, Griffin contends that his two first-degree murder convictions, for the murder of one victim, violate
Fourth, Griffin asserts that his appellatе counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim on direct appeal. But to establish that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a claim of ineffective аssistance of trial counsel, “the appellant must first show that trial counsel was ineffective.” Fields v. State, 733 N.W.2d 465, 468 (Minn.2007); see Sullivan v. State, 585 N.W.2d 782, 784 (Minn.1998) (“Sullivan‘s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim is predicated on the underlying claim against his trial counsel. If he cannot establish a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, his appellate counsel claim automatically fails.“). Accordingly, if Griffin cannot establish that his trial counsel was ineffective, his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel necessarily fails.
Griffin‘s claim that his two first-degree murder convictions violate
Given the above, our analysis of the ineffective-trial-counsel claims addresses only Griffin‘s claims that (1) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of K.G.‘s out-of-court statement and (2) his convictions violate
Under the Knaffla rule, if a postconviction claim was raised, knоwn, or should have been known when a direct appeal was filed, that claim is procedurally barred and will not be considered in a later petition for postconviction relief. Leake v. State, 737 N.W.2d 531, 535 (Minn.2007) (citing Knaffla, 309 Minn. at 252, 243 N.W.2d at 741). An unraised claim is not Knaffla-barred, however, “if (1) the claim is novel or (2) thе interests of fairness and justice warrant relief.” Andersen v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Minn.2013).
Whether these exceptions to Knaffla, including the interests-of-justice exception, are still available after enactment of
In 2005, the Legislature amended
section 590.01, subdivision 1 , to provide that “[a] petition for postconviction relief aftеr a direct appeal has been completed may not be based on grounds that could have been raised on direct appeal of the conviction or sentence.” ... Based upon the 2005 amendments to the statute, it is unclear whether the Knaffla exceptions remain applicable to petitions for postconviction relief. Because that issue has not been raised by the State, we decline to reach it.
Andersen, 830 N.W.2d at 8 n. 3 (citations omitted).
Even assuming that the interests-of-justice exception remains applicable to this petition, however, a viable claim “must have substantive merit and must be asserted without deliberate or inexcusable delay.” Id. at 8. Griffin contends, and the postconviction court concluded, that the interests-of-justice exception applies to overcome the Knaffla rule regarding Griffin‘s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims because Griffin‘s appellate counsel (on his direct appeal in Griffin I) and trial counsel were the same person.
In so ruling, the postconviction court relied on a decision by the court of appeals, Jama v. State, 756 N.W.2d 107 (Minn.App.2008). In Jama, the court of appeals stated:
[N]o Minnesota cases have squarely considered whether the Knaffla bar applies when the same attorney represented the petitioner at trial and on direct appeal.... [C]onsiderations of fairness are implicated. Counsel may have an inher-
ent conflict of interest because counsel cannot be expected to allege his or her own incompetence as an aspect of appellate representation. For this reason, a petitioner‘s failure to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-triаl-counsel claim on direct appeal cannot be considered inexcusable. Courts in other jurisdictions have reached this conclusion.... In sum, in these settings ... failure to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is presumptively neither deliberate nor inexcusable and that, in fairness, further review should not be barred.
Id. at 112 (citations omitted).
We have not yet addressed whether the Knaffla interests-of-justice exception applies when trial counsel and appellate counsel are the samе person. We need not decide this question here, however, because even if we assume that the Knaffla interests-of-justice exception applies and that Griffin satisfies it, his underlying ineffective-assistance claims lack merit, as shown below.
Griffin argues thаt his trial counsel should have objected to the district court‘s admission of an out-of-court statement by his wife, K.G.4 Under Strickland, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is established if “counsel‘s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Fields, 733 N.W.2d at 468 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)).
Because the application of the Strickland test involves a mixed question of law and fact, our standard of review is de novo. State v. Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d 823, 842 (Minn.2003); see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698. There is a “strong presumption” that counsel‘s performance was objectively reasonable. King v. State, 562 N.W.2d 791, 795 (Minn.1997).
Applying these principles here, we conclude that the lack of an objection by Griffin‘s trial counsel was objectively reasonable. We held on Griffin‘s direct appeal that the district court‘s admission of K.G.‘s out-of-court statement was not an abuse of discretion under the applicable evidentiary rule. Griffin I, 834 N.W.2d at 695 (“Given that the [district] court applied the correct legal test and based on its overall analysis of the relevаnt factors under
Similarly, Griffin‘s claim that his convictions violate
Finally, Griffin‘s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is predicated on his underlying claims against his trial cоunsel. Because he cannot establish that his trial counsel was ineffective, his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective necessarily fails.
Affirmed.
MARGARET H. CHUTICH
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE