*1 However, indicates that the the record eval- entity, and its separate as a MRNRC sys- separate filing in a kept records are recommendation the MRNRC uation tem, the LeValley reports to MRNRC the Service’s supported as it only insofar is- all substantive result. Chair for compel opposite the position, sues, than employee other and no Service event, 1999 letter the any accessed the LeValley the ever worked on or it mentions because irrelevant recommendation, that the records. To the extent requested of thé MRNRC influence documents, rely on requested the did MRNRC any of Service influence of not the have been in Ser- process. documents would records, decision-making those in its files, files, and as such not MRNRC vice provided has not Missouri Because Although the to Missouri. nexus offered requisite the to establish were evidence mutu- the did have a and the MRNRC and Service records the MRNRC’s between that relation- agency relationship, ally official beneficial its performance Service’s the private does not ship court did alone duties, that the district we hold transform agency. into a federal entity or- of MRNRC concluding private that the in not err merely an the Service was contrary, were To the of MRNRC records the ganizational of the MRNRC and the rec- ex-officio member agency into federal not transformed forbade expressly Constitution MRNRC ords. employees participating federal us to refer urges further Missouri proceedings. in MRNRC MRNRC vote and by the D.C. Circuit outlined factors the conclude that Service therefore We exercise con did that the Service conclude showing that the its burden of satisfied Burka at issue. See the records trol over records agency were not requested records Health & Human Dep’t States v. United As a of the FOIA. meaning within (D.C.Cir.1996) Servs., result, did not err district court (Burka). concluded Circuit has The D.C. could not be the MRNRC determining that (1) records when agency an controls files private turn over its compelled to agency creator intended the document’s request. to Missouri’s FOIA response (2) records, control over to have from any way not restricted agency was Conclusion it records as disposing of the using and re (3) read or agency personnel pleased, district judgment of the Accordingly, the records to some requested upon lied is affirmed. (4)
extent, were inte the documents and system. agency’s record into the
grated (1) id. Missouri maintains
See control over relinquish intended
Service was a Service LeValley, who
its records (2) not restrict
employee, Service using disposing from any way
ined (3) records, records were read TURNER, Appellee, Derrick Dorrell evi by agency personnel, upon relied indi from the Service by a letter denced nfrom suggestio it had used cating that manual, INSURANCE ARKANSAS to revise its
MRNRC DEPARTMENT, property kept on Service were documents Defendant, employee. a Service *2 PICKENS, Appellant. Mike
No. 01-3498. Appeals,
United States Court of
Eighth Circuit. May
Submitted: July
Filed:
Rehearing Rehearing En Banc Sept.
Denied: 2002.* * Judge Bye grant petition would for rehear- decision in this matter. Judge en banc. part Smith took no *3 AAG, Little argued,
Timothy Gauger, G. Rock, AR, appellant. for Newbombh, argued, Little A. Robert Rock, AR, appellee. BYE, BOWMAN, MAGILL, and
Before Judges. Circuit MAGILL, Judge. Circuit Pickens, the Insurance Commis- Mike Arkansas, appeals of the State sioner for motion denial of his court’s1 the district immu- judgment on summary ap- on presented The issue nity grounds. Whether, quali- narrow one: peal is a it was immunity purposes, fied 23, 1999, that September on upon conferred U.S.C. free from dis- right to be employee the or in discrimination on racial charge based For exercising rights. retaliation below, conclude set forth the reasons clearly established that such and affirm. of date I. Turner, African- Dorrell
Derrick
American,
former
is a
(the
Insurance Commission
the Arkansas
“Commission”).
Turner
May
position
to the
promotion
applied for
Analysis.
Manager of Financial
Assistant
of Arkansas.
District
Wright, Chief
Eastern
Webber
Susan
1. The Honorable
Court for
Judge,
District
United States
however,
dismay,
Much to his
Mettler,
ty.
Turner was
tered October
the district court
public official is
qualified
entitled to
immu
denied Pickens’
summary
motion for
judg-
nity. Vaughn,
II. only if he meets his burden of establishing Under the collateral undisputed order doc and material facts that demon trine, a district denial court’s of a qualified strate that his actions were reasonable un immunity defense be immediately ap der the circumstances. If such Id. facts are pealed. Mettler v. Whitledge, undisputed, then that question is a of law 1197, 1202 Cir.1999); see also Mitchell to be by court; not, reviewed if then it is v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. a question 105 S.Ct. for a jury and summary judg (1985). However, L.Ed.2d 411 ment improper. case, Id. In this Pick because this case comes to us on an inter ens not dispute does that Turner has been locutory appeal, jurisdiction our is ex deprived right, of a nor sup does Pickens tremely fact, limited. the only issue ply the court with any undisputed and jurisdiction this court has to hear is wheth predicate material facts to show that his er Pickens is entitled to immuni actions were reasonable under the circum claim the statutory. Underlying this on or solely stances, Pickens relies rather but an at-will em- premise of whether was not “clear basic that the law the contention or depriva good can fired for the time of the who cause ployee, at ly established” all, See, Buckley Rogerson, bring can an action under e.g., no cause tion. 1125, 1131 right.2 of a contractual for violation review, all case of our purpose For the established,” the To be otherwise, law, must Supreme Court sufficiently clear “must be right’s contours Septem- have been “established” would understand official that a reasonable 23,1999. ber right.” doing violates that he is that what 635, 640, Creighton, 483 Anderson (1987); see 97 L.Ed.2d
107 S.Ct.
IV.
— U.S. —, —,
Pelzer,
Hope
also
666, —
2508, 2515, 153
guarantees
persons
to all
L.Ed.2d
Section 1981
122 S.Ct.
however,
(2002).
every
“the same
requirement,
is no
There
the United States
previ
has
enforce
Territory
action in
very
“that the
make
State
rather,
unlawful,
but
white citi-
ously
enjoyed
been held
as is
contracts ....
(1994).
1981(a)
the unlawfulness
law
light
pre-existing
....”
U.S.C.
zens
*5
F.3d at
Vaughn,
Union,
253
apparent.”
must be
491
v. McLean Credit
Patterson
(internal
citations
quotations and
2363,
1129
164, 179-80, 109
105
U.S.
—
at —,
omitted);
Hope,
also
see
(1989),
Supreme
the
Court
L.Ed.2d 132
(Thomas, J.,
2515;
at 2522
at
id.
122 S.Ct.
“only
§ 1981 covered
con-
concluded that
determination,
this
dissenting).
making
In
the
the
formation of
contract
duct at
initial
the con
view of
to a broad
“we subscribe
impairs
right
the
to
conduct which
and
law,
look
we
clearly established
and
cept of
through legal
obligations
enforce contract
law, including
available decisional
to all
held
Consequently, the Court
process.”
courts,
federal
from other
decisions
§
did not cover racial harass-
1981
state,
precedent
no binding
there is
when
that occurred after
employer
ment
an
(internal quotations
Id.
in this circuit.”
employment
of the
relation-
inception
the
omitted).
That
even
and citations
176-77,
In
2363.
109 S.Ct.
ship.
Id. at
in
decisions
absence
complete
the
Patterson, Congress amended
response
facts,
“clear
a
can be
volving similar
Rights Act
through
§
the Civil
1981
offi
public
if a reasonable
ly 102-166,
1071.
1991,
105 Stat.
Pub.L. No.
the conduct
known that
cial
have
would
so,
scope
the
Congress broadened
doing
(citing
unlawful.
Id.
of was
complained
con-
“make and enforce
phrase
628,
Serrell,
244
Tlamka v.
making, perfor-
“the
include
tracts” to
Cir.2001)).
modification,
mance,
and termination
contracts,
of all
enjoyment
bene-
presented
issue
determinative
terms,
fits,
and conditions of
privileges,
estab-
it was
is whether
appeal
42 U.S.C.
relationship.”
contractual
lished”
1981(b) (1994). Thus,
provides
§
could not be fired
employee
from
that occur
violations
protection
race or
of his
retaliation
the basis
con-
until the conclusion
inception
constitutional
rights,
either
exercising
held,
has
how-
explicitly
the issue
employ-
has
decided
Recently,
concluded that at-will
ever,
maintain
§
at-will
an
maintain actions under
ees could
racially
Maritz, Inc.,
discriminato-
claim
1981
under
Skinner
cases).
(citing
practices.”)
ry employment
Cir.2001) ("Each
appeals that
court of
federal
Skinner,
Patterson,
relationship.
tractual
F.3d at
the United States Su
Court,
preme
while
rejecting
underly
claim,
ing merits of Patterson’s
acknowl
brought
In an action
under
Patterson,
edged that
an
employee,
are first
with determin
tasked
might have a cause of action based on the
employment
Turner’s at-will
employer
promote
claims that
her
failed
was a
relationship
Commission
her
her
at
based on
race. 491 U.S.
one under Arkansas law.
contractual
Id.
so,
doing
S.Ct. 2363.
Court
340. The Arkansas
Court has
stated
that “the
whether a pro
employee’s
held that
“repeatedly
when
motion claim is actionable under
employment
for an
contract of
is
indefinite
depends upon whether the nature of the
term,”
an employment relationship
such
change position was such
it in
at-will. Sterling Drug,
considered
Inc. v.
opportunity
volved the
into a
enter
new
Oxford,
so,
294 Ark.
743 S.W.2d
383 contract
If
employer.
then
Erickson,
(citing
the employer’s
Ark.
refusal to enter the new
Griffin
(1982))
(emphasis
contract' is actionable
1981.”
S.W.2d
add
Id.
added).
ed).
(emphasis
As the Fifth Circuit
nature
Despite
contractual
of an
out,
pointed
has
language
“[t]his
leaves no
at-will employment relationship, generally
doubt that the Court considered the em
“right
employer
to terminate
ployee’s
relationship
[at-will]
with her em
unconditional
abso
ployer
pur
to be a contractual
one”
Unlimited,
lute.”
Servs.
Marine
Inc. v.
poses
§of
it
apparent
1981 because
Rakes,
Ark.
918 S.W.2d
“there can
no
‘new contract’ unless
(1996) (internal quotations and citations
there is
old
Fadeyi
first an
contract.”
omitted).
whether,
But
under Arkansas
*6
Lubbock,
Planned Parenthood Assoc.
law, Turner’s
was proper
termination
of
Inc.,
(5th Cir.1998).
160 F.3d
not relevant
this casé
because
look
merely
to state law
to define the
Patterson,
nature of
Under
purposes
of
relationship
an
the
between
at-will
em
an employment-at-will relationship
Here,
ployee
his employer.
although
a
considered
contractual one even
at-will,
employment
though
independent
Turner’s
an
was
under
state law contract
may
1051;
Fadeyi,
Arkansas law such an
not exist.
employment rela
160 F.3d
Avera,
see
Bishop
also
tionship is contractual in nature
although
(11th Cir.1999);
1236 n. 6
v. Dia-
any independent
Spriggs
it is not
on
based
con
Glass,
mond Auto
165 F.3d
1020 n. 8
right.
tractual
(4th Cir.1999); McKnight v.
Motors
Gen.
Having
determination,
made this
(7th Cir.1990).
Corp., 908 F.2d
we now turn to whether it
was
“rejected
That
in Patterson the Court
that an-
employee
at-will
could
the notion
a
requires
plaintiff
that
not be
for illegal
fired
reasons without
independent
to have
an
contractual
recourse
the protections
afforded
law,”
to sue under state
but rather “[§ ]
§ 1981.
we -take
While
a broad view of all 1981 only requires that
employee
the
have
”
making
available decisional law when
Skinner,
the
a ‘contract.’
at 341
n.
determination whether a principal
read,
of law 2. Properly
the
decision
Patterson
“clearly established,”
was
we necessarily
presumes
at-will employees
that
have
First,
follow hierarchical framework.
rights
“contractual”
under
are
must
address relevant
Court pre
enforceable in
court.
Haddle Garri-
Cf.
son,
121, 126,
cedent.
525 U.S.
minority
intended to install
(at-will
expressly
could
employee
L.Ed.2d
at 1050.
the
be
employees.”
under
U.S.C.
bring action
view,
at-
[was]
with
“conclusion
clear
of interference
kind
court’s
“[t]he
cause
alleged here
employee can
employment
though
relations
an at-will
will
that even
of
cause,
traditional torts
cause,
species
bad
or no
merely
good
be fired
contractual
interference
all,
be fired for
intentional
he or she cannot
cause at
added);
”)
also
see
(emphasis
relations
Id. at
illicit cause.”
1051-52.
Co., 980
Assocs.,
Ins.
Inc. v. Time
Estes
later,
January
A few months
1228, 1232
ter-
to Turner’s
eight
prior
months
about
casts serious
foregoing discussion
The
mination,
the Fourth Circuit addressed
Patterson,
Pickens’ claim because
doubt
reaching same
Spriggs.
issue
an at-
to hold
implicitly, appears
albeit
in Fadeyi,
the court
conclusion as
of action
bring a cause
will
“that
an at-
[because]
held
Fourth Circuit
However,
if there is
§ 1981.3
under
relationship is contractual
will
was
district court
about whether
doubt
may therefore serve
relationships
... such
Pickens’ motion
in denying
correct
§ 1981 claims.”
contracts for
predicate
immu-
summary judgment on
In so con-
Circuit,
questioned
they
whether “at-
nevertheless cast sufficient doubt
adequate support
will
provide[s]
status
over
claims
Turner’s
and demonstrate that
[plaintiffs]
1981 claim.”
section
Gonzalez
the law
not “clearly
established.” We
Co.,
v. Ingersoll Milling Mach.
disagree. Although
recognize
we
Cir.1998);
1035
but
see
support
these
position,
cases
Pickens’
McKnight,
(noting
F.2d at 109
reject
suggestion
Pickens’
that such dic-
at
“[a] contract for
will
tum
equal
footing
stands on
settled
continuing
end
but it is a real and
abruptly
case law.5
nonetheless”). However,
contract
because
plaintiff
provide
did not
Gonzalez
making
When
the determination
direct
evidence
discrimination
could
“clearly
whether
the law was
estab
point
similarly
not
other
situated
to
em-
alleged
lished” at the time the
violation
ployees who had been
more favor-
treated
occurred,
obligated
we are
to include the
ably, the court did not determine the
Tlamka,
decisions of the district courts.
§
Next,
question.
759 BYE, dissenting. Judge, Circuit question us to This leads case, strongly which Supreme Court one “clearly established” The deduces court the cor- is position Turner’s implies over- Court decision Supreme law from a cases one, appeals courts of two plus rect evenly-divided cir- Congress, four by ruled ex- opinions court fifteen district and decisions, district and fifteen cuit court is the position Turner’s state that pressly The court’s against four. court decisions law in one, enough to show correct count) (and conflict with its nose approach We “clearly established.” circuit, I can in our and earlier cases Determining whether it does. hold and munici- government wonder what a not “clearly established” is law is will in our circuit lawyers practicing pal The determination science. precise this case. take from prece- however, balancing of all available a with the point, law on dential decisional v. Mc on Patterson reliance court’s decisions given effect greatest Union, 164, 109 491 Lean Credit Next, we Court. Supreme States United (1989), 2363, deeply L.Ed.2d 132 circuit, and where own our look within was overruled since decision troubling canvass we then point no law on there Act of Rights Civil Congress the district appeals, .of the other courts 101, 102-166, § 1991, 105 Stat. No. Pub.L. courts,7 deci- courts, giving each and state how a I cannot fathom 1071-72. In our weight. requisite its point sion can law longer “good” that is no decision circuit view, two cases the fact that The court’s law. “clearly established” directly support cases district fifteen court authority is appellate on federal reliance im- Court proposition circuit split since equally problematic, suffi- position is that same supports plicitly case) (as presents have in this authority law to demonstrate cient the law is not evidence nearly irrefutable September as of “clearly established” v. Lit McMorrow clearly See established. (8th Cir.1997); Mur tle, Dowd, Cir.
phy v. y. 1992) curiam). cal the court Finally, (per author split 15-4 of district above, culates a hold stated For the reasons mind, this my position. its To ity favoring it was that as of was un law nose count demonstrates employees that at-will “clearly established” settled, these decisions when particularly discrimination could sue circuit. own within our Therefore, split reflect a we AFFIRM Hu Filbern Habitat Compare, e.g., summary denial district court’s Inc., 835-36 F.Supp.2d manity, immunity issue judgment on the (W.D.Mo.1999) (employees-at-will proceedings, further REMAND for claims), v. Becker with Jones today. bring result we reach consistent Cir.1998) (2d (Unpublished (E.D.Wis. WL 640438 Corp., F.Supp.2d Brown, Albertson's, Inc., Decision) (same); 1999) (same); Biglow v. Table Moscowitz (D.Kan.1999) (hold (S.D.N.Y.1994) F.Supp.2d F.Supp. a cause bring cannot (same). *9 1981); Becker Jones v. of action Div., F.Supp.2d Group O'Fallon toward, nor us party has directed 7. Neither (same); (E.D.Mo.1999) v. Moorer 796-97 law on any, decisional state we found have F.Supp. Corp., Aerospace Grumman point. (E.D.N.Y.1997), aff'd, 162 F.3d 675-76 (E.D.Mo. Group, F.Supp.2d America, Appellee, United States of 1999) (employees-at-will may not bring v. claims). Jones, Harold J. also known as Jones, Appellant. Jeff
The court’s
has the
approach
added vice
00-2469,
Nos.
00-3769 and
decisions,
01-1601.
of conflicting
with
such as
Solem,
Cir.1991),
approach. But we also identified a single
opinion from the California Court
disagreeing array of federal au
thority. underwhelming This split au
thority led our court to conclude the law clearly
was not established. Id. at 366-67. attempt court does not even to recon approach Offet,
cile its and I am
similarly square unable to them.
I cannot agree with the court that the
array divergent authority it has uncov- yields “clearly
ered established” law. I
respectfully dissent. America,
UNITED STATES of
Appellee, PALMER, Appellant.
John L. America,
United Appellee, States of Cashaw,
James O. also known J.C., Appellant.
