4 Neb. 97 | Neb. | 1875
It is a well settled rule that a deed, though absolute on its face, may be shown by parol to be a mortgage, yet a court of equity will not declare such a deed a mortgage, unless the proof is clear, consistent, and satisfactory, that the object of the transaction was to create a security for the payment of money.
In this case Joseph Deroin conveyed to Jennings by a deed absolute in its terms, and Jennings, at Deroin’s request, conveyed forty acres of the tract to Neff and Ritter. Jennings sold portions of the tract to Ankron, Pruner, and Freel, all of whom have answered, denying notice and claiming that they are innocent purchasers for a valuable consideration, and we think the proof fully sustains that view of the case. The judgment of the district court as to those defendants is therefore affirmed.
It is apparent that the deed made by Joseph Deroin to II. S. Jennings, although absolute in form, was intended as a mortgage to secure the payment of a reasonable attorney’s fee for defending Deroin on the charge of murder, and that the legal title being in Jennings,
II. S. Jennings, C. C. King, and Rosetta Deroin failed to answer the petition, and thereby admit the truth of
Judgment accordingly.