Case Information
*1 Before: KEITH, McKEAGUE, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL ARGUED: Edward P. Krugman, NATIONAL CENTER FOR LAW AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE, New York, New York, for Appellants. Stefani A. Carter, STEFANI A. CARTER, PLLC, Ypsilanti, Michigan, for Appellees Washtenaw County Community Mental Health and Trish Cortes. Marcelyn A. Stepanski, JOHNSON, ROSATI, SCHULTZ & JOPPICH, P.C., Farmington Hills, Michigan, for Appellees Community Mental Health Partnership and Jane Terwilliger. ON BRIEF: Edward P. Krugman, Gregory L. Bass, NATIONAL CENTER FOR LAW AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE, New York, New York, Nicholas A. Gable, LEGAL SERVICES OF SOUTH CENTRAL MICHIGAN, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for Appellants. Stefani A. Carter, STEFANI A. CARTER, PLLC, Ypsilanti, Michigan, for Appellees Washtenaw County Community Mental Health and Trish Cortes. Margaret Debler, Laura Bailey Brown, JOHNSON, ROSATI, SCHULTZ & JOPPICH, P.C., Farmington Hills, Michigan, for Appellees Community Mental Health Partnership and Jane Terwilliger. William R. Morris, OFFICE OF THE MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellee Nick Lyon.
McKEAGUE, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which KEITH, J., joined, and STRANCH, J., joined in the result. STRANCH, J. (pp. 10–12), delivered a separate opinion concurring in the judgment.
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OPINION
_________________
McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. An association generally has standing if “at least one of
[its] members would have standing to sue on his own.”
United Food & Commercial Workers v.
Brown
,
Mindful that “standing is not dispensed in gross,”
Lewis v. Casey
,
I
The State of Michigan operates a Medicaid waiver program called the Habilitation Supports Waiver (the Program) that provides community-based services to individuals with developmental disabilities. Prior to 2012, individuals receiving services under the Program in Washtenaw County received a service budget based on a single, all-inclusive rate that was intended to cover both the personnel and the program delivery costs. In 2012, the predecessor agency to Washtenaw County Community Mental Health, Washtenaw Community Health Organization, changed the budget calculation method to allow for billing of the personnel costs and the associated costs as separate line items. Amid budgeting struggles in 2015, WCCMH moved to revert to a single, all-inclusive budget method that allocated $13.88 to cover both personnel and the delivery costs of the Program. The reversion was to occur on May 15, 2015. The budgeting change did not reduce the total number of service hours recipients were authorized to receive. The effect of utilizing an all-inclusive rate, however, was to reduce the total budget amount for each recipient. As a practical matter, service recipients had to reduce the hourly rate they paid service providers to maintain the level of hours authorized prior to the budget change. The notice to recipients acknowledged this reality, stating that “[w]hile this is not a reduction in your current level of services, it may reduce the amount you can pay your staff.”
The Washtenaw Association for Community Advocacy (the Association), a nonprofit community organization assisting individuals with developmental disabilities, joined with three individual plaintiffs to challenge these budget reductions and the alleged lack of due process preceding them. They filed suit in federal district court against several entities involved in various capacities with the administration, funding, and oversight of the Program. Relevant to this interlocutory appeal, the plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction pending determination of the merits of their claims. The district court held a two-day evidentiary hearing prior to ruling on the motion for a preliminary injunction.
For the limited purpose of reviewing the district court’s preliminary finding regarding associational standing, two pieces of the record stand out. First, the Association’s Chief Executive Officer, Kathleen Homan, testified that 169 individuals had received notices from the defendants informing them of impending budget reductions. Second, Ms. Homan testified that the three named plaintiffs were among the individuals who received adverse budget notices and that each of them was a dues-paying member of the Association. The district court nevertheless concluded that the Association “fails to have associational standing because the 169 people for whom it claims associational standing to bring the lawsuit have not been shown to be members of the organization.”
The court also held that the Association’s named members in their individual capacities were not entitled to injunctive relief. Among other things, the district court noted “it is undisputed that all named plaintiffs did in fact appeal the reduction[s] and received . . . favorable decision[s] from the administrative law judge.” “Therefore,” the district court held, “there can be no irreparable harm suffered by the named Plaintiffs as a result of the inadequate notice.”
The Association—but not the individual plaintiffs —now asks us to reverse the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. Our inquiry is limited to that issue, and we do not address the merits of any claim.
II
“An association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when [1] its members
would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, [2] the interests at stake are germane to
the organization’s purpose, and [3] neither the claim requested nor the relief requested requires
the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.”
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Envtl. Servs., Inc.
,
Regarding the first element, it generally suffices for an association to demonstrate “at least one of [its] members would have standing to sue on his own.” United Food , 517 U.S. at 554–55 (citing Warth , 422 U.S. at 511). But let us not forget: “standing is not dispensed in gross.” Lewis , 518 U.S. at 358 n.6. That is, “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press,” DaimlerChrysler , 547 U.S. at 352, and “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought.” Id. (quoting Friends of the Earth , 528 U.S. at 185).
An association must follow these same black-letter rules. In Summers v. Earth Island Institute , the Supreme Court affirmed “plaintiff-organizations [must] make specific allegations establishing that at least one identified member had suffered or would suffer harm.” 555 U.S. at 498. Any other “novel approach,” the court wrote, “would make a mockery of our prior cases.” Id. We believe this principle applies equally with regard to each standing element.
Thus, the Association must show that one of its named members “(1) suffered an injury
in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely
to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins
,
The parties vigorously dispute whether the Association through any named member has standing to pursue its due process claim . As we see it, however, the dispositive question here is whether the Association through any named member has standing to seek its requested relief on this interlocutory appeal. To start, we acknowledge the narrow issues this interlocutory appeal presents, and then we explain why the Association does not have standing to seek its requested relief under these circumstances.
* * *
We first pause to recognize the preliminary nature of the district court’s finding regarding
associational standing. In this case, after evaluating testimony at an evidentiary hearing, the
district court found the Association had not shown “a likel[ihood] of success for finding
associational standing,” and thus it had not shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits.
Waskul v. Washtenaw Cty. Cmty. Mental Health
,
courts that “an inability to establish a substantial likelihood of standing requires denial of the motion for preliminary
injunction, not dismissal of the case.”
Id.
at 913. The heightened standard does not apply at the pleadings stage.
Id.
Where, as here, “a party seeks a preliminary injunction on the basis of a potential constitutional violation,
the likelihood of success on the merits often will be the determinative factor.”
City of Pontiac Retired Emps. Ass’n
v. Schimmel
,
We also note the very narrow requested relief on this interlocutory appeal. While the Association and its three named members jointly and separately sought preliminary injunctive relief below, only the Association challenges the district court’s denial of preliminary injunctive relief. See supra note 2. And the Association does not seek all the relief it did below. The Association only requests that we direct entry of a preliminary injunction granting its unnamed members (1) “fresh notices” and (2) “hearing rights with respect to the reductions in their CLS budgets.” Put succinctly, the Association seeks relief that “allows individuals whose services were reduced to have the opportunity to have an administrative law judge decide whether the May 2015 budget reduction was proper.”
So, with these two important clarifications in mind, does the Association enjoy standing to pursue these narrow types of injunctive relief? In short, no. Each of the Association’s named members—and thus the Association—failed to establish a substantial likelihood of establishing standing to seek the very discrete and preliminary types of relief sought on appeal.
As the Association freely admits, “[t]he three named [members] . . . [received]
administrative law hearings” prior to the date of the complaint, the precise relief that the
Association now seeks for its unnamed members. It’s impossible to conclude that the
named
members were suffering actual or imminent injury at that time from a loss of due process that
would find redress through (1) fresh notices and (2) hearing rights.
See Steel Co. v. Citizens for
a Better Env.
,
We do not deny the possibility that at least one (or more) of the Association’s named
members (and thus the Association) could establish standing in district court to assert a due
process
claim
. Each named member individually alleged that they had been denied the full
panoply of due process rights required under
Goldberg v. Kelly
,
In sum, even assuming at least one named member (and thus the Association) has
standing to advance a due process
claim
, the requested injunctive relief on this interlocutory
appeal simply would not have provided redress to any named member for any actual or imminent
injury at the time the complaint was filed.
See Citizens for a Better Env.
,
Therefore, we conclude the district court did not err in denying injunctive relief. But that
does not mean the district court is entitled to a rubber stamp. As it turns out, the court appeared
to have erred in one sense: It failed to credit unrebutted testimony that the three
named
plaintiffs
were also members of the Association.
See Waskul
,
III
For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of the Association’s motion for a preliminary injunction and REMAND this matter for further proceedings.
bootstrap a plaintiff into federal court.”). For this reason, the concurring opinion’s analysis regarding standing misses the mark.
________________________________________ CONCURRING IN THE JUDGMENT ________________________________________ JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment. I agree with the majority opinion that the decision below denying a preliminary injunction should be affirmed but disagree with its reasoning. I would affirm based on the factual findings of the district court and our standard of review. On the record before us, we cannot conclude that either of the budget calculation methods at issue is required or prohibited by statute or regulation and, therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that there was “not a high likelihood of success to claims under the Social Security Act or the Michigan Mental Health Code.”
I write separately to address standing. WACA has alleged a cognizable due process
violation for at least one named member that is sufficient to give WACA associational standing
to pursue a preliminary injunction. We have consistently held that for governmental notices such
as those at issue here to be constitutionally adequate each “must comprise ‘(1) a detailed
statement of the intended action . . . (2) the reason for the change in status . . . (3) citation to the
specific statutory section requiring reduction or termination; and (4) specific notice of the
recipient’s right to appeal.’”
Barry v. Lyon
,
Like the majority, I find that at least one of the named Plaintiffs, and therefore WACA,
has established standing to assert a due process claim.
See
Maj. Op. at 7. I disagree, however,
with the majority opinion’s narrow reading of the pleadings, which led to its conclusion that
injunctive relief founders on WACA’s failure to maintain associational standing.
Id.
at 7–8. Our
published precedent holds that standing is a threshold inquiry and is “determined as of the time
the complaint is filed.”
Cleveland Branch NAACP. v. City of Parma
,
Though I disagree with the majority opinion’s analysis of standing, I agree that the injunctive relief sought by the Plaintiffs here is extremely narrow in scope and that we review the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. Com-Share, Inc. v. Comput. Complex, Inc. , 458 F.2d 1341, 1342 (6th Cir. 1972) (holding a decision “granting or denying a preliminary injunction will not be disturbed unless contrary to some rule of equity or the result of improvident exercise of judicial discretion”). Under that highly deferential standard, I cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in determining that there was “not a high likelihood of success” on the merits.
Although WACA has not demonstrated that it was initially entitled to the extraordinary
remedy of a preliminary injunction, it should be noted that “the proof required for the plaintiff to
obtain a preliminary injunction is much more stringent than the proof required to survive a
summary judgment motion.”
Leary v. Daeschner
,
Since this appeal was filed, moreover, significant developments have occurred in the
district court. Plaintiffs filed a second action involving additional plaintiffs that has been
consolidated with the instant case. With the addition of new plaintiffs, the peculiar
circumstances concerning the three named Plaintiffs upon which the majority opinion relies
would have to be reevaluated, particularly if those individuals have not secured administrative
relief or were precluded from doing so as a result of deficient notices. A new look at WACA’s
associational standing under our caselaw is appropriate. The standard for evaluating
associational standing requires the district court to assess whether WACA demonstrates that a
single member with a cognizable injury had standing to sue in his or her own right.
ACLU of
Ohio Found., Inc. v. Ashbrook
,
Notes
[1] The Medicaid waiver program was established by Congress in the early 1980s in an attempt to de- institutionalize individuals with developmental disabilities by providing community-based treatment alternatives. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No 97-35, § 2176, 95 Stat. 357 (1981). The statutory provisions of the Medicaid waiver program specify that the costs of community-based services may not exceed that of institutionalization. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(2)(D). Michigan’s program is overseen by the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services and mandates a person-centered planning process in which medical need determines the amount, scope, and duration of services for recipients.
[2] Prior to and throughout the course of this litigation, the named plaintiffs, the only identified members of the Association, pursued administrative relief. All three received favorable decisions from an Administrative Law Judge. The parties dispute whether the administrative relief granted fully restores the plaintiffs’ benefits and whether that relief permanently restores the plaintiffs’ budgets. But since those named members have not joined in this interlocutory appeal in their individual capacities, and the Association does not seek relief on this interlocutory appeal that would redress these alleged injuries, we need not weigh in on this dispute at this juncture.
[3]
“The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements. Since they are not
mere pleading requirements but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff’s case, each element must be supported
in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof,
i.e.
, with the manner and
degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.”
Lujan
,
[5] It’s true that at the time the complaint was filed, one of the named members, Mr. Wiesner, had not yet received a decision regarding the denial of benefits after his administrative hearing. Thus, as pled, he theoretically could have had standing to seek narrow injunctive relief requiring “a continuation of benefits pending appeal,” though a decision has since issued in his case. But the Association does not seek this type of injunctive relief on this interlocutory appeal. Thus, we cannot “bootstrap” the Association’s requested relief to Mr. Wiesner’s standing to pursue other types of injunctive relief. See id. at 107 (“Relief that does not remedy the injury suffered cannot
[1] Counsel for WACA raised this concern at oral argument, stating: They did not get a proper notice that said we are about to take negative advance action against you and if you appeal, because this is a negative advance action—and this goes all the way back to Goldberg against Kelly—if you appeal you are entitled to continuation of benefits pending the appeal. And that never happened, still hasn’t happened. Oral Argument at 8:17, Waskul, et al. v. Washtenaw Cty. Cmty. Mental Health, et al . (No. 16-2742), http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/ internet/court_audio/aud1.php.