21 Vt. 17 | Vt. | 1848
It is insisted, in behalf of the defendants, that the request and direction of the defendants to the plaintiffs, to cease work and abandon the execution of the contract, is to be considered in the light of a proposition to the plaintiffs, which they weré at liberty to accede to, or disregard, and that, having acquiesced in it by quitting the work, the contract is to be treated as having been relinquished by the mutual consent of the parties. But we do not look upon it in that light. The direction of the defendants to the plaintiffs to quit the work was positive and unequivocal; and we do not think the plaintiffs were at liberty to disregard it. In Clark v. Marsiglia, 1 Denio 317, it was held, that the employer, in a contract for labor, had the power to stop the completion of it, if he chose, — subjecting himself thereby to the consequences of a violation of his contract; and that the workman, after notice to quit work, had not the right to continue his labor and claim pay for it. And this seems to be reasonable. For otherwise the employer might be entirely ruined, by being compelled to pay for work, which an unexpected change of circumstances, after the employment, would render of no value to him. If, for instance, in this case the location of the rail road had been changed from the place where the work was contracted to be done, or if the plaintiffs' employers had become wholly insolvent after the making of the contract, the injury to them, if they had no power to stop the work, might be immense and altogether without remedy. Rather than an injury so greatly disproportioned to that which could possibly befall the workman should be inflicted on the employers, it seems better to allow them to stop the work, taking upon themselves, of course, all the consequences of such a breach of their contract. Such, we think, is and ought to be the law. We are therefore satisfied, that the plaintiffs were prevented from executing their contract by the act of the defendants, and that the contract is not to be treated as having been mutually relinquished.
Treating the plaintiffs as having been prevented from executing their part of the contract by the act of the defendants, we think .the plaintiffs are entitled to recover, as upon a quantum meruit, the value of the services they had performed under it, without reference .to the r.ate of compensation specified in the contract. They might
The defendants, by their voluntary act, put a stop to the execution of the work, when but a fractional part of that which had been contracted for had been done, and while a large portion of that, which had been entered upon, was in such an unfinished condition, as to be incapable of being measured and its price ascertained by the rate specified in the contract. Under these circumstances, we think the defendants have no right to say, that the contract, which they have thus repudiated, shall still subsist for the purpose of defeating a recovery by the plaintiffs of the actual amount of labor and materials they have expended.
In Tyson v. Doe, 15 Vt. 571, where the defendant, after the part performance of a contract for delivering certain articles of iron castings, prevented the plaintiff from farther performing it, the contract was held to be so far rescinded by the defendant, as to allow the plaintiff to sustain an action on book for the articles delivered under it, although the time of credit for the articles, by the terms of the contract, had not expired. The court, in that case, say, “ that to allow the defendant to insist on the stipulation in regard to the time of payment, while he repudiates the others, would be to enforce a different contract from that which the parties entered into.” The claim now made in behalf of the defendants, that the rate of compensation specified in the contract should be the only rule of recovery, would, if sustained, impose upon the plaintiffs a contract, which they never made. They did, indeed, agree to do all the work of a certain description on three miles of road, at a certain rate of compensation per cubic yard; but they did not agree to make all their preparations and do but a sixteenth part of the work at that rate;
The case of Koon v. Greenman, 7 Wend. 121; is much relied upon by the counsel for the defendants. In that case the plaintiff had contracted to do certain mason work at stipulated prices, the defendant finding the materials. After a part of the work had been done, the defendant neglecting to furnish materials for the residue, the plaintiff quit work and brought his action of general assumpsit. The court held he was not entitled to recover the value of the work, but only according to the rate specified. The justice of the decision is not very apparent; and it does not appear to be sustained by the authorities cited in the opinion, — they being all cases, either of deviations from the contract in the manner of the work, or delays of performance in point of time. But that case, if it be sound law, is distinguishable from this in at least two important particulars. In that case the plaintiff was prevented from completing his contract by the mere negligence of the defendant; in this by his voluntary and positive command. In that case there does not appear to have been any difficulty in ascertaining the amount, to which the plaintiff would be entitled, according to the rates specified in the contract; whereas in this it is altogether impracticable to ascertain what sum would be due the plaintiffs, at the stipulated prices, for the reason that when the work was stopped by the defendants, a large portion of it was in such an unfinished state as to be incapable of measurement. That case is therefore no authority against the views we have already taken.
The judgment of the county court is therefore affirmed.