DePUY ORTHOPAEDICS INC. and, Johnson & Jоhnson, Appellants--Defendants, v. Travis BROWN, et al., Appellees--Plaintiffs.
No. 49A02-1304-CT-332.
Court of Appeals of Indiana.
May 30, 2014.
567
even assuming that all of Deputy Prout’s testimony regarding his erroneous reporting of hours is true, Deputy Prout admitted under oath that he was paid more than was due to him because his paycheck included a shift differential pay increase for working the middle and late shifts—shifts he admits he never worked. As a result, he admitted that he knowingly received money from the Sheriff’s Office that he was not entitled to receive and that he kept that money.
And while this additional compensation that he kept is not a substantial amount, there is no exception for the crime charged if the theft is de minimis. The crime for which Deputy Prout was charged is that he “knowingly or intentionally exert[ed] unauthorized control over property of another person [“Currency of the Marion County Sheriff’s Office”], with intent to deprive the other person of any part of its value or use.”
Ind.Code § 35-43-4-2(a) .Deputy Prout’s own admissions at the expungement hearing show that these elements are met. The fact that unknown “Evidentiary Problems” led the State to eventually dismiss the charges against Deputy Prout does not support the trial court’s grant of Deputy Prout’s Verified Petition for Expungement.
Id. at 17 (citations to record omitted).
We note, however, that Prout received the shift differential pay increase only for October 27, 2011. Moreover, аs Prout correctly observes, the theft charges were not based on his receipt of the pay increase, but rather “for not working at all for MCSO on October 27, 2011, and working less than required of him on each of the three days in February, 2012.” Appellee’s Br. at 16. We agree with Prout that “IMPD’s new arguments about shift differential were never charges brought against him and thus are improper grounds for opposing the expungement.” Id.
To the extent that IMPD challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s determination that no offense was committed, we note that we may neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility and may “consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment. We will not reverse the trial court’s decision where there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting the judgment.” Sotos, 558 N.E.2d at 912. As indicated by our recitation of the evidence adduced at the expungement hearing, the trial court’s judgment is supported by substantial evidence of probative value. Therefore, we affirm.
Affirmed.
MAY, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.
DePUY ORTHOPAEDICS INC. and, Johnson & Johnson, Appellants--Defendants, v. Travis BROWN, et al., Appellees--Plaintiffs.
No. 49A02-1304-CT-332.
Court of Appeals of Indiana.
May 30, 2014.
Eric C. Lewis, Lewis Legal Services, P.C., Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellee.
OPINION
PYLE, Judge.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In this interlocutory appeal, DePuy Orthopaedics and Johnson & Johnson (collectively “DePuy”) appeal the denial of its motion to dismiss on the grounds of forum non conveniens, governed by
We reverse and remand.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court erred when it denied DePuy’s motion tо dismiss.
FACTS
DePuy Orthopaedics, a subsidiary of DePuy Synthes and Johnson & Johnson, provides prosthetic products for hip, knee, and shoulder replacement surgeries. DePuy sells its prosthetic products to hospi-
The product at issue in this case, the ASR™ XL Acetаbular System (“ASR™ XL System”), is a prosthetic hip implant sold in the United States between 2005 and 2010. DePuy International Limited (“DePuy International”), located in Leeds, England, designed and manufactured the ASR™ XL System. Thereafter, DePuy International shipped the ASR™ XL System to DePuy facilities in Warsaw.
Between October 2007 and April 2009, nineteen people residing in Virginia and Mississippi (collectively “the Plaintiffs”) had the ASR™ XL System implanted during hip replacement surgeries; eighteen of the surgeries were performed in Virginia while the remaining surgery took place in Mississippi. On August 24, 2010, DePuy Orthopaedics issued a voluntary global recall of the ASR™ XL System. The Plaintiffs’ doctors notified them of the recall and advised them of the potential need for additional surgery.
On February 29, 2012, the Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Indianapolis, Indiana in the Marion Superior Court for personal injuries alleging negligence, breach of express and implied warranties, and fraudulent concealment. DePuy filed a motion to dismiss based on
On January 11, 2013, the trial court heard oral arguments on DePuy’s motion. DePuy argued that trial in Marion County would not be convenient because the acts alleged by the Plaintiffs in their complaint took place outside Indiana. Further, DePuy claimed that witnesses and evidence essential to their defense were located bеyond the subpoena power of the Indiana trial court. Many of the Plaintiffs’ arguments in response focused on the fact that Indiana has personal jurisdiction over DePuy and that filing suit in Marion County was permissible. As to
On January 22, 2013, the trial court issued an order summarily denying DePuy’s motion to dismiss. DePuy filed a motion to certify the trial court’s order for interlocutory appeal. The trial court granted DePuy’s motion and certified its order. Thereafter, we accepted jurisdiction.
DECISION
Conflict of laws is a body of law governing how disputes which involve the laws of more than one country or state are resolved.
Generally, a plaintiff is free to select the appropriate court or forum to resolve his or her claim. However, there are limitations. One of these limitations is the common law, equitable doctrine known as forum non conveniens. This doctrine grants trial courts the discretionary power to dismiss a case “whenever it appears that the cause before it may be more appropriately tried elsewhere.”
Given the natural tension between the doctrine of forum non conveniens and the preference for open access to Indiana’s courts, courts have struggled to discern the criteria for dismissing a case under the doctrine of forum non conveniens; it has been the subject of “considerable discussion and variance of view.” Id. at 311-12.
In its effort to find this balance, Indiana has adopted
In exercising its discretion to decide whether to dismiss a case on forum non conveniens grounds, a trial court may appropriately consider such factors as:
- Amenability to personal jurisdiction in this state and in any alternative forum of the parties to the action;
- Convenience to the parties and witnesses of the trial in this state and in any alternative forum;
- Differences in the conflict of law rules applicable in this state and in the alternative forum; or
- Any other factors having substantial bearing upon the selection of a convenient, reasonable and fair place of trial.
We review a trial court’s order regarding forum non conveniens motions for an abuse of discretion. Anyango, 971 N.E.2d at 656. An abuse of discretion occurs when “the trial court arrives at a conclusion that is clearly against logic and the natural inference to be drawn therefrom.” Freemond v. Somma, 611 N.E.2d 684, 690 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), trans. denied.
In deciding this case, we find the facts and reasoning outlined by the United States Supreme Court case of Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249, 102 S.Ct. 252, 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1981), whose reasoning the Indiana Supreme Court adopted in Anyango, to be persuasive. There, several Scottish subjects and residents died in an airplane crash in Scotland. Piper, 454 U.S. at 238-39, 102 S.Ct. 252. Preliminary reports concluded that a mechanical failure in the plane or propeller caused the crash. Id. However, further review found no evidence of defective equipment and indicated that pilot error was to blame. Id. An administrator for the decedents’ estates filed a wrongful death suit in California against Piper Aircraft Company, who manufactured the plane, and Hartzell Propeller, the manufacturer of the propellers. Id. at 239-40, 102 S.Ct. 252. Decedents’ survivors filed a separate action in the United Kingdom. Id. The plane was manufactured in Pennsylvania, and the propellers were manufactured in Ohio. Id. at 238-39, 102 S.Ct. 252.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, concluding that dismissal could not be denied “merely by showing that the substantive law that would be applied in the alternative forum is less favorable to the plaintiffs than that of the present forum.” Id. at 247, 102 S.Ct. 252. The Court further stated, while emphasizing the need to retain flexibility in considering forum non conveniens motions, “dismissal will ordinarily be appropriate where trial in the plaintiff’s chosen forum imposes a heavy burden on the defendant or the court, and where the plaintiff is unable to offer any specific reasons of convenience supporting his choice.” Id. Finally, the Court reiterated the relevant public and private interest factors stated in Gilbert. Id. at 241, n. 6, 102 S.Ct. 252. The private factors mentioned were the “relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” Id. The public interest factors to be considered include administrative difficulties for already congested courts and burdening jurors with litigation to which they have no relation or connection. Id. “[W]here the trial court has considered all relevant public and private interest factors, and where its balancing of these factors is reasonable, its decision deserves substantial deference.” Id. at 257, 102 S.Ct. 252. In light of the factors stated in
I. Personal Jurisdiction
Regarding
The next important consideration under
III. Choice of Law
Another important consideration under
Further, applying Indiana’s choice of law analysis, we conclude that Virginia and Mississippi laws would apply to the tort claims in this case. The first part of Indiana’s choice of law analysis is determining “whether the differences between the laws of the states are ‘important enough to affect the outcome of the litigation.’” Simon v. United States, 805 N.E.2d 798, 805 (Ind.2004) (quoting Hubbard Manufacturing Co. v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d 1071, 1073 (Ind.1987)). If there is a conflict, “the presumption is that the traditional lex loci delicti rule (the place of the wrong) will apply. Under this rule, the court applies the substantive laws of ‘the state where the last event to make an actor liable for the alleged wrong takes place.’” Id. However, this presumption is not conclusive. “It may be overcome if the court is persuaded that ‘the placе of the tort ‘bears little connection’ to this legal action.’” Id.
Because the parties in this case agree that the location of the alleged wrong is significant, we will focus our analysis on whether the differences in the laws among Indiana, Virginia, and Mississippi would affect the outcome of this case. In their complaint, the plaintiffs have alleged that they are entitled to compensatory and punitive damages resulting from the hip re-
Under Indiana’s Product Liability Act (“The Act”), “the plaintiff must show that (1) the product is defective and unreasonably dangerous, (2) the defective condition existed at the time the product left the defendant’s control, and (3) thе defective condition is the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.” Natural Gas Odorizing, Inc. v. Downs, 685 N.E.2d 155, 160 (Ind.Ct.App.1997);
In Virginia, products liability actions are not codified, but are rooted in common law. It does not matter whether the theory of liability against a manufacturer is labeled warranty or negligence, the standard of safety of goods is the same; the product must be fit for the ordinary purposes for which it is to be used. Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Gamble by Gamble, 256 Va. 144, 501 S.E.2d 393, 396 (1998). “In order to recover under either of these theories against the manufacturer of a product, ‘a plaintiff must show (1) that the [product was] unreasonably dangerous either for the use to which [it] would ordinarily be put or for some other reasonably foreseeable purpose, and (2) that the unreasonably dangerous condition existed when the goods left the manufacturer’s hands.’” Id. (quoting Morgen Industries, Inc. v. Vaughan, 252 Va. 60, 471 S.E.2d 489, 492 (1996)). Virginia does not recognize strict liability as a ground for recovery in products liability cases. Harris v. T.I., Inc., 243 Va. 63, 413 S.E.2d 605, 609-10 (1992).
Under the Mississippi Products Liability Act, the plaintiff “has the burden of showing that the defect that allegedly was the proximate cause of the injury existed аt the time that the product left the hands of the manufacturer, and that the defect rendered the product unreasonably dangerous. Accordingly, the proof must support that no material change in that product occurred after leaving the manufacturer’s control.” Wolf v. Stanley Works, 757 So.2d 316, 319 (Miss.Ct.App.2000);
Indiana’s conflict of law analysis shows a clear conflict between thе jurisdictions concerning whether strict liability is available as a ground for recovery. Indiana recognizes strict liability, but only against manufacturers. Virginia does not recognize strict liability in product liability cases. Finally, Mississippi allows strict liability against both manufacturers and sellers. The availability, or lack thereof, of strict liability is significant enough to affect the outcome of this case. As a result, conflict of law analysis and
IV. Additional Factors
Finally, with regards to
Second, as previously mentioned, federal courts are already managing pretrial activities related to the ASR™ XL System. Once pretrial proceedings are complete in the MDL, the district court will transfer cases to a proper venue for trial. Thus, Plaintiffs’ claim that dismissal from Indiana to another forum “would reward DePuy for the harm it caused to out-of-stаte plaintiffs, effectively depriving plaintiffs of any opportunity to litigate their case in a state court,” is not persuasive. (Plaintiffs’ Br. 16).
For the aforementioned reasons, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in denying DePuy’s motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds. We reverse and remand to the trial court for issuance of the appropriate order dismissing this case for refiling in Virginia or Mississippi.
Reversed and remanded.
MATHIAS, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.
Lori NICKLAS, Appellant-Defendant, v. VON TOBEL CORPORATION, Individually, and d/b/a Von Tobel Lumber; and Von Tobel Lumber Company, Inc., Appellee-Plaintiff.
No. 64A03-1310-CC-429.
Court of Appeals of Indiana.
June 4, 2014.