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Deputy v. State
500 A.2d 581
Del.
1985
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*1 DEPUTY, Stanley Andre Defendant

Below, Appellant, Delaware,

STATE Plaintiff

Below, Appellee.

Supreme Court Delaware. 7,May

Submitted: 1984. July 31,

Decided: *3 Delaware, Inc., Union of as ami-

Liberties cus curiae. HERRMANN, C.J., McNEILLY,

Before JJ., HORSEY, CHRISTIE, MOORE and constituting en the Court banc. HERRMANN, HORSEY, Justice, Chief CHRISTIE, Justices: MOORE Stanley Andre was convicted murder, two two counts of intentional murder, first one count of counts of *4 degree posses- robbery, one count of and deadly during the com- weapon sion of a arising from the all felony, mission of a Byard and robbery and of Alberta deaths penalty hear- Following separate Smith.1 ing, sen- the death the defendant received degree four first tence for each of the murder convictions. numer- appeal

In sets forth this require re- grounds ous contends which he entered in judgments versal of the both A guilt trial. penalty phases his principal is that defendant’s contention was vio- right to counsel Sixth Amendment interrogated further lated when was committing magis- police after a State custody of him to the remanded trate had Although of bail. prison in lieu authorities prior statement made defendant had court, the later appearance in at his before a sec- committment interrogation after his provided given, which ond statement was his conviction evidence to sustain essential charges. murder on two intentional constitutional vio- nature Given the defend- lation, that the must conclude we (cid:127)Gary Dodge (argued), Dodge & R. police to the statement ant’s second Johnson, P.A., Dover, O’Brien, Dean C. was, there- the crime he confessed to Lewes, appellant. for at his trial. We fore, improperly admitted Georgetown, Gary Myers (argued), A. inten- defendant’s accordingly reverse Parkins, (argued), Wilmington, John A. Jr. find the but error tional murder convictions Reed, Dover, Department of and Dana C. felony convic- murder harmless as Justice, appellee. for any of no merit in Because find tions. we contentions, con- we Wilmington, other Hagerty, the defendant’s Catherine B. murder convictions Dover, Williams, clude that for American Civil John Flamer, co-defendant, Upon appeal, affirmed. penalty. this Court Henry Deputy’s William separately convicted of the mur- was tried Flamer death herein. Flamer received the ders outlined penalty imposed and the death description those matched Henry that of William convictions should be Flamer, affirmed. nephew of the deceased who lived near the Smith residence with his

GUILT PHASE grandmother defendant, Deputy. and the I. When the detectives went to Flamer’s home, grandmother told them The State’s evidence revealed the follow- there; nor, Flamer was not did she have ing: any knowledge of his whereabouts. She Early morning February permitted police to search the second floor Police, the Delaware State stationed of the house for They Flamer. discovered Troop Bridgeville, report 5 in received a paper bags brown containing items of fro- apparent of an double homicide west of zen food similar to those found at Harrington, Delaware. addition, Smith residence. police Calloway Detectives Chaffinch and re- bayonet, seized a stained ap- with what sponded arrived, report. they When peared blood, to be dried bayonet and a Harrington officers from the Police closet, sheath. In a first-floor the detec- Department already scene, were set, tives found a television the cable from along son, with the decedents’ Arthur B. piece which matched the of cut antenna Smith, who had discovered the bodies of his cable left in the Smith residence. Smith, parents, Byard and upon Alberta *5 evidence, Based on this entering detectives the house. obtained a warrant for Flamer’s arrest. parents, elderly His couple, an had been While at Justice of the Peace Court brutally Smith, stabbed to death. Mr. who report detectives received a that Flamer years old, was weighed 5'6" tall and Tavern, had been seen at the Blue Moon lbs., had separate received 79 stab wounds. Woodside, Delaware, south of on Route 13. wife, old, His years weighed who was 69 police detectives, accompanied Three State tall, lbs. and was 5'4" had sustained 66 officers, Harrington police two drove to separate stab wounds. The wounds each the Blue Moon Tavern. victim sustained varied in size. From the wounds, size of the the medical examiner Flamer, recognized One of the detectives was subsequently able to determine that walking compan- down Route 13 with two each had been weap- stabbed with two ions, defendant, Coleman and the Ellsworth ons —a bayonet-type knife and a smaller Stanley Deputy. Andre All three were knife. stopped weapons; although and frisked for police Deputy’s felt a wallet back police found missing certain items pocket, they did not remove it. All three First, from the couple’s home. had Smith were read Miranda warnings. Flamer noticed that his father’s missing car was pursuant was arrested to the warrant. driveway. from the The television set was identification, When asked if he had gone, also its apparently antenna cable cut Deputy replied that he did not. When Bags with a knife. of frozen food were name, Deputy replied in asked his an strewn about the scene. Police found the manner, lying identity, about his “evasive” pin watchband of a watch as well. although police were unaware of the they investigating scene, While were misrepresentation at the time. All three report the two detectives a received that p.m. custody were taken into at 3:15 belonging the car to the deceased had been Troop transported arriving were at Felton, located north of Delaware. Inter- p.m. 4:00 yielded views of Felton area residents a description Upon arriving Troop of the man believed to have at Flamer told morning. police Deputy abandoned the car earlier that A the that him had awakened family police morning accompany Smith told that him member and asked however, Deputy and asked Deputy poly- house to remove some take a to the Smith said, graph Deputy agreed. test. There, Due to he found the a food. Flamer time, snow storm2 and Detective Chaffinch’s de- other de- Smiths dead. At the same further, question Deputy him did sire to interrogated Deputy. He read tectives appearance before make his initial a rights, he indicated his Miranda day3 and was held ov- judicial officer that if he wished to understood. When asked Bridgeville Depart- Police ernight at the attorney, Deputy response. no see'an made ment. pocket, Deputy’s police coat found They belonging Byard wallet Smith. Troop transported Deputy to police watches, also two one of which found morning. the next A approximately 9:00 pin. Deputy told missing its watchband hours polygraph test administered two given test, him wal- police Deputy that Flamer had undergoing Before later. signed acknowledging let. written form warnings. request He did not Miranda Depu- Based on Flamer’s statement Deputy told lawyer.4 When the examiner ty’s victim’s wallet and possession polygraph, Deputy that he had failed the watch, pin missing a which was watchband accompanied Flamer police that he had told scene, Deputy like one found at the residence to obtain some to the Smith’s p.m. approximately was arrested at 4:30 ensued, argument Flam- money. anWhen given Deputy Because Flamer and had stabbing Byard Alberta began er Smith. conflicting involve- stories as to other's stop at- begged Deputy to had Smith murders, their ment in the continued nothing tack, Deputy and went but did p.m., questioning. approximately At 6:00 taped then Detective Chaffinch home. identity and Deputy’s Flamer revealed true Deputy’s statement. Wilmington police had out- stated Deputy took before Detective Chaffinch ar- standing Deputy’s murder warrant for ap- his initial of the Peace for the Justice information, verifying that rest. After p.m. 2:00 At approximately pearance war- Police on that State arrested again hearing, Deputy was read his *6 police approximately p.m. 7:00 rant at penalties he rights and told of the Miranda provided then dinner for the two men. then com- The Justice of the Peace faced.5 evening, Deputy During questioning Deputy to Correctional mitted the Sussex (hereinafter “S.C.I.”), telling in default that he was Institute told Detective Chaffinch him, of bail. did not believe the truth. Chaffinch snowfall, lawyer would Harrington Q. asked for a

2. heavy If a result of As given form] waiver to p.m. he written [a of the Peace had closed at To been [have] Justice bring magis- committing sign? the defendant before night stopped. would have necessitated drive have Had trate No. We would A. attorney to Dover under hazardous conditions. have been no there would asked questions. no fur- would have continued We 5(a) provides, Super.Ct.Crim pertinent R. ther. part: 2(b) (a) Appearance. making provides: officer Initial An 5.J.P.Crim.R. any a warrant or an arrest with without Committing (b) Justice of Statement peace officer shall take the other authorized committing of the Peace Justice Peace. The delay person without unreasonable arrested complaint the defendant shall inform against available Justice of the before the nearest counsel, him, right of his to retain county in which offense Peace hearing. right preliminary He have a to his committed, judge alleged to have been defendant that he also inform the shall Wilming- City Municipal Court for the any state- required to a statement and make ton, the warrant or the court out against may be used him. made him ment with the command of in accordance issued committing Peace shall allow Justice of the the warrant. opportunity reasonable time the defendant the defend- and shall admit consult counsel testi- 4. The detective who administered test provided in these rules. to bail as ant hearing suppression as follows: fied at Deputy Troop was taken back to 5 to Deputy returned. Chaffinch talked to “... transportation Troop await At S.C.I. getting telling the truth. About [a]bout questioned Deputy Detective Chaffinch the truth about the incident.” At 9:50 briefly arrangements while were made to p.m., gave Deputy taped another statement Deputy prison. commit Uniformed offi- during which he confessed his involvement Deputy cers then left with headed for in the crime. S.C.I. Deputy At that time said that he and However, ignored Detective Chaffinch gone Flamer had to the Smith’s to obtain judicial commitment order and directed money. argu- The Smiths refused and an bring Deputy the officers to Troop back to began stabbing ment ensued. Flamer questioning light 5 for further of dis- Byard begged Smith and Alberta Smith crepancies Deputy’s story and new infor- Deputy stop Deputy got the attack. provided by Flamer. mation After knife from Flamer and stabbed Alberta polygraph, Deputy had stated that he had Byard Smith. Flamer continued to stab gone money, to the Smith’s to obtain but using Smith Deputy another knife. After started, stabbing had left when without Smith, appeared stabbed Alberta she to be Yet, having obtained funds. when he dead, Deputy Shortly returned home. custody, was taken into he had in his $25 Therefore, thereafter, pocket. Flamer carrying Chaffinch arrived items wondered why Deputy money needed to obtain gave from from the home. Deputy Smith’s He already Smith’s when he had funds. money. Deputy some said that he killed Moreover, Deputy making while his Alberta Smith out of fear that she would appearance magistrate, before the Flamer report police. them to the had told Deputy that both he and Deputy again had read been the Mi- had participated in stabbings, using warnings questioning randa before the be- two knives. Police then located the second gan. completed After had knife at the scene of the arrest. statement, he was asked his under- about cross-examination, On Chaffinch admit- standing rights: of his Miranda ted that he judicial violated the commit- Q. you explained your O.K. Have been ment order because try wanted to “[he] rights, your right to silent Miranda be get the correct statement from him.” He rights attorney to an and all that? testified further: A. Yes.

Q. you What would characterize as a correct statement? Q. many you How times have been told A. Truth. that, you’ve apprehended? since been *7 Q. A confession? 2 A. About or 3. Yes, you A. say could that. Q. you you Have been asked if want to Deputy Troop arrived back at 5 at about attorney? see an 4:30 p.m. or 5:00 and Detective Chaffinch A. Yes. questioned briefly him about these con- Q. you opportunity Have had an to talk departed cerns. Chaffinch then for a meet- attorney you to an if wanted to see one? ing Seaford, Deputy in he but told that he A. Yes. would questioning continue the when he in returned about one hour. Chaffinch tes- Deputy suppress moved to all evidence Deputy: tified that he told him seized from and all statements made IWhen come back we will sit down and during period his of After detention. get put taped the whole truth and it on a hearing, Superior granted Court you statement and will be taken to S.C.I. suppress. motion to of Del- State appealed this We re- Deputy jail ap- held in aware to Court. cell until versed, proximately night pursu- finding 9:30that when Chaffinch the initial detention 588 presence Del.C. 11 have ant to 19026 to been established defendant’s at § Deputy, v. Del.Supr., murders,

lawful. State 433 Smith time of the residence 1040 A.2d made 20 about hours after he was first custody. Relying upon McNabb into taken trial, jury After a was convicted States, v. United U.S. 63 318 S.Ct. murder, of of two counts intentional two Mallory (1943) 87 819 L.Ed. and murder, of count counts one of rob- States, United 354 U.S. bery degree in first and one of count (1957), 1 L.Ed.2d the defendant ar- 1479 possession deadly weapon during of a gues prior length his detention felony. of a commission have rendered the statement should II. statement inadmissible. McNabb adopted the This Court A. State, Mallory Vorhauer v. in Del. rule8 above, As the defendant noted made two (1965), Supr., 212 decided to A.2d 886 and incriminating statements which were re- during a deten exclude evidence obtained by police; prior one corded was made period tion which the 24 hour exceeded appearance and one after his initial in in the Del.C. Vo specified 11 1911.9 In § the Justice of the Peace Court. Both state- rhauer, any detention ex was held that defendant, challenged ments were ceeding be considered an 24 hours would first, suppression hearing, at the and later illegal delay, deten and an unreasonable Following trial. the remand law, delay unless the tion as a matter of Court, the trial court decided that state- permissible delay criteria. met the section’s voluntarily were made ments and were during made Any inculpatory statements police.

properly by the The de- obtained in illegal be rendered detention would in fendant asserts that the trial court erred admissible. its determination. less than hours delay Faced with a The defendant contends that his first re- Del.Supr., Webster in statement, incriminating corded made on (1965), that: this Court stated 8th, morning February was admitted “unreasonable”, Superior delay may be and into evidence violation of [A] statement, Statute, 5(a).7 and the Criminal Rule His violation of Rule during incriminatory provides: or statement obtained § 6. Del.C. in evidence. unlawful is inadmissible detention (a) peace may stop person A officer 5(a), adopted after Federal Criminal Rule abroad, public place, or in a has who reasonable McNabb, brought requires be a defendant ground suspect committing, has committed magistrate "unnecessary” de- before without crime, may isor about to commit a demand lay. The to “unreason- Delaware Rule refers name, address, him business abroad 5(a). delay. Super.CtCrim.R. able” going. where (b) Any person questioned so who fails predecessor to 11 Del.C. 9. 11 Del.C. 1911 was § identify explain himself his actions to the 1909. § may satisfaction of officer be detained questioned investigated. further language used 1909 is identical § (c) period provided The total detention 1911 and reads follows: § Hearing delay; permissible this section shall not exceed 2 hours. The without delay. detention is not an arrest and shall not be re- *8 released, any every person corded arrest record. At ar- as an in official If not otherwise magistrate brought person a end the so detained be before the of the detention rested shall delay, any charged in event be and without unreasonable and shall released or be arrested shall, brought possible, 24 be so within he if with a crime. arrest, Sundays holidays exclud- hours of ed, supra county note 3. judge 7. the unless a resident county is detained or of the where where he good cause McNabb-Mallory crime was committed for The rule was derived from the 8. States, a Mallory he be held for further v. shown orders that period McNabb v. United United States, rule, exceeding of not 48 hours. supra. confession Under this

589 though brought custody than 24 in on Feb- less hours duration. after he was into But no clear-cut standards of reasonable- ruary 7th. defendant then trans- The prescribed. may ness be ease must Station, Each ported Bridgeville to the Police judge be considered the on its trial night. following where the spent he facts; own and the of hours of number morning he was returned to Delaware prior appearance detention before a Troop State Police where he consented to Justice Peace is of the to be considered examination, polygraph a after judge, together the with trial all of no evi- made his statement. There was case, the the other circumstances of in police dence that the acted in a hostile or delay determining whether the was un- manner, anything or that but “an coercive reasonable. ... atmosphere cordiality” had existed dur- Webster, Webster, supra at 301. In the ing interrogations. Excluding poly- been approximately defendant had held for police chargeable graph testing, the were confession, four making hours before a interroga- only three four hours of with and, “totality after a of the circumstances” during period, tion time the 20 hour with review, this Court ruled that there had being given 12 the defendant about hours’ delay having been no unreasonable reviewing rest. After these circumstances brought defendant before a of the Justice detention, surrounding say we cannot Peace. Superior that the Court erred as matter recently, More in Fullman v. Del. finding the delay of law reasonable. Supr., (1978), 389 A.2d 1292 this Court affirm Consequently, we the trial court’s ruled on the a 21 reasonableness of hour decision to admit the defendant’s first re- Webster, delay. Citing supra, the Court corded statement. considered all the circumstances case taped Defendant asserts that his second that, and determined excluding time the statement made under circumstances spent defendant sleeping undergo had rights which violated to counsel ing polygraph testing administered at his guaranteed by Sixth and Fourteenth request, delay chargeable Amendments.11 Furthermore, was no more than six hours. “an atmosphere of cordiality mutual Amendment of Con Sixth permeated trust proceedings.” Full provides that: stitution of the States United man, 389 at 1298. The Court also prosecutions “In all criminal the accused noted interrogation place that the took on a the assistance of counsel for shall ... have Sunday, the 24 which excluded from hour Supreme his defense.” In the Court’s limit Following set forth 1909. analyses concerning point which a totality review, of the circumstances and Fourteenth Amend defendant’s Sixth majority delay of the Court rea ruled the attach, the Court rights ment to counsel sonable, affirming Superior Court’s ad stated, that, minimum, repeatedly at a has mission of inculpatory Fullman’s statem representa legal defendant is entitled to ent.10 adversary “at or time that tion after proceedings have been initiated case, judicial present the defendant Illinois, against Kirby 406 U.S. him.” inculpatory made his first statement after 682, 689, 1877, 1881, L.Ed.2d being 32 approximately detained 20 hours. S.Ct. Alabama, interrogated (1972); He was three hours Powell v. U.S. about therefore, and, J., tarily, Duffy, concurring opinion. under inadmissible filed Bustamonte, dictates of Schneckloth presented 11. This was not to the trial claim U.S. 99 S.Ct. 36 L.Ed.2d court, therefore, which, opportuni- never had an In view of our resolution ty to rule Sixth Amendment claim or on the issue, we need and will Sixth Amendment not Instead, possible waiver thereof. defendant’s the claim. address the voluntariness trial, hearing suppression and at *9 claimed statement made involun- that the was 590 Court,

45, 55, (1932); and John 77 158 trate in the Justice of Peace 53 S.Ct. L.Ed. 1019, Zerbst, 458, to son v. 58 was ordered committed a correctional 304 U.S. S.Ct. facility (1938); prior issuing to second state- and Brewer v. Wil 82 his L.Ed. 1461 ment, adversary liams, 387, 1232, pro- 430 51 we assume U.S. 97 S.Ct. magis- began Illi (1977); cess when he went before Escobedo v. 424 L.Ed.2d Cf. Williams, supra 97 v. nois, See Brewer 478, 1758, trate. 12 378 84 S.Ct. U.S. judicial S.Ct. at 1239. Since the adversarial (1964). applies 977 principle L.Ed.2d This process certainly underway, defendant was proceedings whether are commenced at time legal to assistance entitled charge, preliminary hear way of a formal confession. he made his second information, indictment, arraign or ing, Id. The Supreme explained ment. Court attorney before right to an Defendant’s stage at initial criminal that it is this being questioned demonstrated further justice process, government has when the trial, testimony at by Detective Chaffinch’s on particular focused its efforts a defend violating the candidly admitted where he prosecutorial forces have be ant and commitment Court's Justice of the Peace gun him, operate against to that the assist at defendant by continuing order to detain imperative. Kirby v. ance of counsel is nine hours police troop an additional for Illinois, supra 92 S.Ct. at 1882. Defend eliciting in- express purpose for the ill-equipped to simply ants are handle Chaf- criminating Detective statement. pretrial stages assist “critical” without the would have finch testified that representative a can ance of trained who troop until he told at the remained complex address issues of substantive This recitation the detective “truth”. Wade, v. procedural law. United States certainly sup- intention detective’s 218, 1926, 18 1149 388 U.S. 87 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d had arrived ports notion that defendant 263, California, (1967); Gilbert v. 388 U.S. pretrial proceed- stage his at a critical (1967). 1951, 87 S.Ct. 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 Un representation was ings right his where right-to-counsel like the situation discussed crucial. Arizona, 436, in Miranda v. 384 86 U.S. necessarily fol inquiry 1602, 16 (1966), L.Ed.2d other S.Ct. 694 indicated the defendant lows whether cases, Fifth Amendment the defendant’s right to counsel. desire to waive right is not Sixth Amendment to counsel the waiver of right, like such a waiver of dependent upon request the defendant’s protected fundamen constitutionally other Cochran, 369 Camley v. such counsel. by the rights, stringently reviewed tal 888, 506, 513, 884, 82 L.Ed.2d U.S. S.Ct. 8 Miranda, supra 86 S.Ct. at courts. Instead, right 70 is acti the latter 2055, 1628; Schneckloth, supra S.Ct. 99 judicial adversary pro the initial vated Brewer, In supra 97 S.Ct. at 1242. ceeding applies statements burden is the State’s such situations it defendant, if made even unsolicited. or relinquishment prove intentional “an Ohio, 356, McLeod v. 381 85 S.Ct. U.S. right privi known of a abandonment curiam). (1965) (per 14 682 L.Ed.2d Zerbst, supra v. Johnson lege.” acknowledged have The courts

at 1023. “heavy” one and this Court’s decision Flamer v. be a state’s burden to (1984), presumptions Del.Supr., indulge 490 114 in all reasonable will Miranda, su ap finding waiver. against we assumed that the defendant’s initial Brewer, supra 1628; pearance in the Justice of the pra Peace S.Ct. Janis, adversary qualified 1241, 1242, and Brookhart the initiation of S.Ct. at case, process. Dep Similarly, since 1246 16 L.Ed.2d 384 U.S. S.Ct. arrested, appeared magis- uty (1966).12 before a trial, Generally opportunity have is for the court determine the court did not trial Zerbst, ruling. supra Johnson there has been a waiver but because make such whether Sixth Amendment issue was not raised at S.Ct. at 1023.

591 Ohio, U.S., supra; McLeod v. reading Massiah v. Our sug- waiver standards supra. gests (1) the State must show: comprehended

the defendant the Indeed, nature of according Supreme right (2) forfeiting; which he was analyses Court’s in Fifth Amendment by defendant either his cases, own words or con- requested once the accused has duct, indicated an presence during affirmative desire to re- interrogations, of counsel linquish (3) rights; these interrogations and that he did so such must cease until coun voluntarily. present sel is or until the accused himself

has initiated further communication or con Edwards v. Ari A careful police. review State’s versation with zona, 477, 1880, 1885, brief and the 451 record below has failed to U.S. 101 S.Ct. 68 Miranda, see also (1981); su convince this Court that L.Ed.2d 378 State has met pra proof. its burden of The record 86 S.Ct. at 1627. is void of the Sixth Amend context, suggests evidence which ment once judicial that defend the adversarial understanding right ant had a real of his to process begun, has defendant is entitled to possible counsel or consequences presence during of counsel police inter legal a failure to rogations secure assistance. Fur as a matter right. of inherent thermore, Therefore, remain we unconvinced that only means which waiver relinquished right. established, While it could be and still remain consis was true that the defendant read tent with the Fifth Amendment waiver anal Miranda rights separate on four ysis, occasions would involve some form of affirma prior confession, to his second he never tive overt action the defendant which but, instead, responded inquiries, to such willingness indicated his to talk to law en passively ques continued to answer forcement officers.14 police. tions of the responses po Mere to consider the On the issue of waiver we interrogations lice initiated distinguishable are not suffi facts here to be from those to show a valid waiver.13 See Ed in Flamer. Flamer v. cient 490 A.2d Arizona, supra wards v. see 1885; also Thus, at 113-115.15 on the basis of this 529, 1049, (1972) (where suggests 13.The State S.Ct. 34 L.Ed.2d 501 that defendant's failure to 93 request attorney being given expressed after his Mi doubt that the courts first Massiah rights randa right should be sufficient indicia of an to counsel could ever be waived and then relinquishment" could, "intentional of defendant’s applicable determined that if it stan- right thereby to counsel and invoke waiver. We imposed pro dard would be the same one on se disagree. Supreme Court has stated that trial). defendants presence pretrial stages counsel at critical 14. Authorities have noted that waiver of a Sixth so, important, is often as if not more than the is, right Amendment to anything, counsel if Powell, presence supra of counsel at trial. 53 more satisfy difficult standard to than the Fifth 59, 60; States, S.Ct. at Massiah v. United 377 U.S. right Amendment to counsel waiver. 201, 1199, 1202, (1964); 84 S.Ct. 12 L.Ed.2d 246 Satterfield, (S.D.N.Y. F.Supp. U.S. v. 1976); 417 Wade, 293 Therefore, supra U.S. v. 87 S.Ct. at 1930. Massimo, 324, (2d U.S. v. 432 F.2d 327 incongruous judges go it seems for trial to Cir.1970) denied, cert. 400 U.S. 91 S.Ct. great lengths assuring such themselves that (1971) (Friendly, 27 L.Ed.2d 633 J. dissent right knowingly intelligent to counsel is ing). ly waived when a defendant decides to forsake trial, proceed pro legal representation se at precludes 15. One circumstance which our find- right treating the forfeiture of the same while case, ing opposed of a waiver in this manner when administered a less cautious Flamer, presented that Flamer was pretrial. enforcement officer at law an adverse morning, Justice of the Peace Court in the 708, 721-724, Gillies, U.S. Moltke v. See Von day after his arrest. 316, 322-3, (1948) (for a 92 L.Ed. 309 hand, Deputy brought On the other judge's responsibilities in of the trial discussion deciding morning. Troop Police 5 that same He then ability Sixth to waive the accused’s polygraph voluntarily submitted to a test. trial); right counsel at see also Amendment poly- When informed that he had failed the (S.D.N. Satterfield, F.Supp. U.S. taped graph, state- defendant offered his first Zelker, Y.1976) Lopez States ex rel. and United mid-afternoon, At about he made his ment. (S.D.N.Y.1972), F.Supp 344 F.2d 1405 aff’d appearance of the Peace initial in the Justice (2d Cir.1972), U.S. cert. denied 409 *11 592 State,

record, Del.Supr., 552, we find that the State satis- 492 A.2d 563-565 cannot heavy overcoming (1985). of fied its No matter how the burden evidence was against presumption by jury, finding waiver. guilt viewed of was felony mandated on the murder counts. We, therefore, taped rule that the second For these reasons hold we that the admis- improperly ad- confession of defendant was harmless, sion of the second statement was mitted in violation of defendant’s Sixth beyond doubt, felony reasonable However, right to counsel. Amendment murder convictions. The intentional mur- our in this matter does not man- decision hereby der convictions are reversed. of complete date reversal under facts Despite the fact the defend- this ease. erroneously ant’s second confession B. evidence, admitted into we conclude that contends the trial court erred Defendant beyond a error was harmless reason- evidence, admitting in into over defendant’s felony able doubt as to the murder convic- objection, autopsy photographs nine Wainwright, v. tions. See Milton 407 U.S. victims, photographs and two of the victims (1972) 1 33 L.Ed.2d It is taken at the scene of the homicide. (where applied the harmless error rule was 403 defendant’s contention that Rule of petitioner’s Amend- to a violation of Sixth requires the Delaware Rules of Evidence see also United right counsel); ment photographs.16 exclusion of these Defend- Redman, rel. v. States ex Ahmad pho- prejudicial ant claims the effect of the (D.Del.1984) (where the harm- F.Supp. 802 value, tographs probative outweighed their applied error rule to a violation of less and, presented, light in of other evidence rights petitioner’s Fifth Amendment under merely As such evidence was cumulative.

Miranda). State, Bailey recently said in this Court However, say error we cannot (1984): “The Del.Supr., 490 A.2d was harmless as the two intentional in Judge has admit- Trial broad discretion murder convictions. of ting rejecting photographic evidence or admission, argues By his own defendant murders.” the victims and scenes of nothing statement added second first state- which inconsistent with his photographs None ment, had except the fact that he stabbed pic color, probative of these but the value Smith. Mrs. taken at the scene tures of the victims circumstances, they are relevant substantiate we clear and all the Under autopsy photo robbery state motive. confidently state that the second can multiple from wounds jury’s guilty graphs illustrate did not contribute to the ment knives, including “defense robbery. two murders two different verdict as to Since wounds, are relevant type” and these place during commission of the took participation of more intent and the robbery (in jury decided that show which the of the commission than one assailant participated), had the elements we these circumstances murders. Under clearly established. murder are into evidence State, Del.Supr., say cannot admission A.2d Martin v. of discre an abuse photographs was (1981); Del.Supr., 416 these Hooks judge. the trial also Whalen v. tion 189, 197 relevant, may Although evidence be excluded to the Sussex committed and was ordered However, substantially outweighed facility. probative Detec- County value if its Correctional ignored danger prejudice, order this commitment confusion Chaffinch unfair tive troop police for an Deputy misleading jury, at the and detained or consid- the issues eight the confession hours before delay, additional of time or need- undue waste erations of finally elicited. question was presentation of cumulative evidence. less provides: D.R.E. 403 Deputy also contends that the trial five. made no showing to the con- Moreover, court abused its in requiring trary. discretion him appeal, Deputy on this to show in testimony advance that the has prejudice not demonstrated certain proposed officers he to call as from resulted the actions of the trial court. State, Del.Supr., defense witnesses would be cumulative. Johnson v. 379 A.2d 1129 *12 Deputy ruling contends that pre such prejudicial required mature in that it C. prior

him to reveal entire defense calling of his first no witness. There is Deputy contends that there was insuffi- merit in these contentions. support cient evidence to his convictions of degree, in robbery the first 11 DelC. permits D.R.E. 408 trial judge the to 832(a)18 felony two counts of murder § exclude cumulative evidence. D.R.E. 403 (murder degree in robbery the first with (footnote 16, supra). underlying felony), 11 Del.C. police sought Deputy officers to call 636(a)(2).19 § during had all testified the State’s case-in- Deputy argues that the record contains All subject chief. had been to cross-exami- theft, no evidence of a necessary element Therefore, probable nation. it seemed degree robbery both offense of first testimony their as defense witnesses would felony the offense of murder. We merely be cumulative. In the exercise of disagree. discretion, the judge trial ruled he testimony, would exclude such absent ample The record contains evi indication that would be not cumulative. Deputy dence theft. having of admitted Deputy showing. made no such At the accompaniedFlamer to the Smith residence case, close of the defense the trial court purpose obtaining money for the of from gave the defendant opportunity another addition, elderly couple. Dep In when show that testimony police offi- arrested, uty police him found in cers would not be cumulative. Defense possession Byard Smith’s wallet and counsel declined.17 watch.

We find no abuse of discretion in here Deputy also claims that there is no evi- requiring the offer proof. showing There was dence murders occurred testimony likelihood that the in committing was cumula- the “course of theft.” 18. 11 DelC. § ing, were cross-examined. ing degree” as follows: the crime: flight who is degree weapon; or use of a in the second of commission of the 11 DelC. Presumably Harrington rebuttal, (a) (1) (3) Is armed with and uses or threatens the (2) officers A Causes Displays therefrom, [******] trial court when person not dangerous § 831 the State called three of the four 832(a) provides: Deputy sought after physical injury Police degree what is participant defines commits the crime of he or another guilty permitted making instrument. Chief. In appears crime "robbery when, robbery a sufficient to call. Deputy or of to be a addition, participant in the in the course any person in the first immediate crime; Again, to recall robbery second deadly show- dur- all 19.11 DelC. theft, A degree commission of force thereof taking another felony or immediate (a) the commission or degree when: lessly causes the death of another (2) Compel (1) Prevent or (2) person engage in other conduct A he uses or In the course person [******] * when, immediately after the person upon is 636(a)(2) provides: of the theft. guilty * the owner of the another in the course of property guilty threatens overcome deliver attempted * flight robbery of murder person and in furtherance of or to the retention * up therefrom, resistance to the commission taking; with intent to: immediate use in the second * property property committing aids in the first he reck- * or person of a or or claim, Deputy 119 unrecorded side bar confer- support of this contends contains In disputes significance contains no evidence that he The State that the record ences. commit the theft figure, noting intended to and Flamer of this that: There no merit in murder. prior to the (1) Forty-three place conferences took this contention. attorney. between and his (2) requested 16 Deputy’s counsel con- support mur order accompanying ferences without re- conviction, require the law does der quest be that such conferences recorded. necessarily precede the mur theft that the Nonetheless, judge sponte the trial sua enough that murder facilitate der. It is requested that one of these conversa- Del. the theft. Winborne (1982), tions be recorded. where we Supr., 455 A.2d question and held: requested (3) judge considered 44 confer- trial *13 these, were recorded at robbery ences. Of two person guilty of when “in A is theft, request; only five involved committing he Court’s a uses the course of scheduling person matters. with the upon another ... force (1) resist- prevent to or overcome (4) intent bar con- requested five side State taking property ferences; of or to the bailiff, ance to one. immediately thereof after the retention that of time, request At no did 831(1). While the taking.” 11 Del.C. § recorded. these conferences be committing “in course of phrase, object to the to Deputy’s failure theft,” requires connection be- “a casual to reporter is fatal Ami- of a court absence of or threat force and the tween use noted in As we cus contention. Curiae’s with theft,” Code Delaware Criminal primary re Flamer, has counsel “Defense (1973), 831 at Commentary 258 § complete to that a sponsibility seeing it for require not that the provision code does conferences, record, is including bar side contemporaneous application of force be Flamer v. appellate review.” made appropriation prop- with the actual v. Rosen- supra at 131. See State erty. It sufficient to facilitate is N.W.2d Wis.Supr., 93 286 feld, Wis.2d taking or the retention commission of (1980). 596 appro- property been after has Moreover, has Amicus Curiae priated. Deputy as a prejudice to to failed show D. confer side bar unrecorded result of the case, in this At time of the trial Union of ences. The American Civil Liberties recording such question of Delaware, (hereinafter in “Amicus Curi- Delaware Inc. within the dis rested ae”), Curiae, Amicus side bar discussions in a brief filed as Thus, where judge.20 of the trial record from the cretion contends that the combined there timely object, to failed hearing subsequent the defendant suppression and the find reversible to upon which is no basis inadequate for review because it trial is The duties as the report volved.” ther form such other the trial may side bar conferences The current 10 DelC. evidentiary prescribe. all Superior [******] judge Whalen evidence, of the Court § determines, 525 rule in Delaware Court nor substantive duties provides, opinions State, Del.Supr., must may require Reporters shall be ... be and other in advance, recorded, Superior pertinent issues are in- requires that nei- matters "unless part: per- that had § cording amount reporting, prejudice. ences F.2d 397 862, 753(b)(1). Despite in contrast, even in death open reversible to of (1980), the failure "all court” under the federal Stephens rev’d on proceedings 77 error, penalty L.Ed.2d mandatory. report side bar other mandatory absent a Zant, in grounds, 235 cases criminal statute, 5th (1983). showing nature 28 does not Cir., 462 U.S. confer- the re- U.S.C. cases 631 error, absent a showing prejudice. (c) “Recklessly”. person acts reck- —A State, supra 131; Flamer v. lessly respect State v. see with to an element of an Bolling, W.Va.Supr., 162 W.Va. offense is aware of when and con- (1978) (showing prejudice disregards S.E.2d re- sciously a substantial and un- quired reporting proceed- even where justifiable of all risk the element exists case, ings mandatory). In this Amicus from his will result conduct. The risk presently Curiae concedes that “there is such degree must be of nature and nothing suggest anything improper disregard gross thereof constitutes a de- during did occur the 119 unrecorded side viation from standard of conduct or off the record As bar discussions.” no person reasonable would observe in the shown, harm the defendant has no been situation. upon exists

basis which to find error. 231(c). 11 Del.C. § While the defendant concedes that E. charge may offenses, State on both he ar- Both defendant and Amicus Curiae gues on that convictions both offenses can- argue that it constitutes reversible error to stand as violation of 11 Del.C. have convicted the on four 206(a)(3), prohibits convicting a degree counts murder the first when person of than one more offense where were, fact, only there two victims. “[ijnconsistent findings required of fact are charged The defendant was to establish the and convict- commission of the of- *14 argues fenses.” ed on two counts of murder The defendant that he intentional The Delaware victed And, the defendant was charged and con- under Del.C. defines der 11 Del.C. tentionally that an offense when: conscious (a) “Intentionally”. first (a) first therefrom, (a) sion ed.) death (1) He (1) If the element (2) In the course of statute defines the commission or A another A 11 on nature [*] degree degree of a “intentionally of another conduct or a result person person two counts of intentionally causes object with [*] felony or to cause person. when: when: he § Code, § 636(a)(2), 636(a)(1), respect guilty guilty to person. (Emphasis recklessly # “recklessly,” engage —A 11 Del.C. § or immediate as follows: involves attempted (Emphasis felony of of murder that to an element of [*] person thereof, which murder in furtherance in conduct of result. causes the murder un- the nature [*] the provides: provides: 231(a)(1) in commis- acts it is his added.) in in the flight death perti- add- [*] in- State, Del.Supr., ny There, we stated: victed of either intentional murder or felo- er respect gues, could not have acted both part: The evidence include a We considered this murder theories. There is no a defendant under degree and, ultimately, murder, When a statute ment of an recklessness ly, knowingly or intentionally negligence element of established also is Del.C. § “recklessly” the two to murder both but finding of recklessness under established charges inconsistency in charging acted suffices to establish an ele- offense, the element also is if a not both. victims. presented supported an or in the suffices at the same time with which states he could have been con- 491 A.2d 439 or person both theories of first A intentionally may provides that criminal offense, very contradict one anoth- factual knowingly. recklessly. if Therefore, issue in Rush to acts intentional- jury’s a “intentionally” the element establish person finding in pertinent verdicts. (1985). he ar- When When both that acts also an v. knowingly part acting suffices establish as follows: nent offense, case, prior immediately element of an the element this person review, also is established if a acts in- judge instruction under trial added.) tentionally. (Emphasis felony statute, read the murder 11 Del.C. 636(a)(2), making jury, it clear that Rush, 491 A.2d at Flamer v. Cf. a person possessing a “reckless” state of supra 117-118. only degree mind can be convicted first Though in we find no merit recklessly kills while murder if commit- contention, defendant’s we note that our Moreover, immediately ting felony. after reversals defendant’s convictions for review, the instruction under trial intentional murder render issue moot. jury judge again advised “[the] killing during the have occurred com- must F. case, felony. In this mission another Amicus also contends Curiae robbery....” would be judge plain trial committed error21 in Considering jury instruction instructing jury that it could convict nothing sufficiently entirety, its we find degree first murder if the defendant of misleading prevented jury so have as to found that defendant acted intention “[t]he perforating] duty its “intelligently from ally recklessly.” Castner, Storey returning a v. verdict.” Jury per need not be instructions objected to supra charge 194. The State, Del.Supr., 492 fect. Whalen whole, misleading as when read (1985); Haas v. United Technolo portion objected to did not amount Corp., Del.Supr., 450 A.2d gies reversible error. adequate “[Jjury are if instructions they jury such are ‘enable G. intelligently perform duty returning its ” the defend- appeal, first time on For the Castner, Storey Del.Supr., verdict.’ given challenges jury instruction ant (1973).” 314 A.2d Whalen v. pursuant to 11 Del.C. court trial *15 Moreover, supra at 559. in assess 307(a).22 § instruction, ing adequacy the of an we that the instruc- the The contends must examine entire instruction and defendant Fourteenth Amendment merely one taken out of con violates his not statement tion First, Technologies, supra argues he rights process. v. due text. Haas United of infer the that, by jury to permitting 1179. the object robbery degree is that the defend- the first 21. Because defendant did not to the the trial, recklessly. jury only upon intentionally It instruction at the basis ant acted and/or plain is, course, going Court can reverse is error. which this is know what difficult to of 18, 824, Chapman California, Therefore, v. U.S. S.Ct. 386 87 person’s our mind. on in another (1967). inference, 17 705 L.Ed.2d jury permits to draw an law the conclusion, words, about to reach a in other 307(a) provides: 11 Del.C. the facts from the state of mind defendant's intention, recklessness, (a) The defendant’s surrounding the act the and circumstances knowledge or time of the belief the offense alleged In reach- to have done. defendant is charged may be inferred for which is conclusion, may you wheth- ing consider this surrounding jury the from the circumstances cir- the defendant’s er a man in reasonable making alleged to have done. In the act he lacked the have had or would cumstances section, permitted the inference requisite recklessness. You intention and/or jury may a reasonable man consider whether however, should, keep at all in mind times at the time in the defendant's circumstances of mind which state that it is defendant’s had or lacked the of the offense would have here, order to convict is at issue and in intention, recklessness, knowledge requisite beyond you required to find are or belief. fact that he in had inten- doubt pertinent portion reasonable of the instruction reads required guilt. for tion recklessness follows: and/or you an element of the I have instructed degree the first of murder in offenses

597 (i.e., existence an suggested of element his state permissive inference. mind) proof Therefore, from surrounding cir he has not demonstrated a viola- cumstances, right instruction relieved the tion of process to due under the proving every State of its burden ele Fourteenth Amendment. beyond ment of the offense a reasonable Although Montana, Sandstrom v. su- Wilbur, doubt. Mullaney v. U.S. pra, presumption, involved a conclusive 684, 1881, (1975); 95 S.Ct. 44 L.Ed.2d 508 defendant relies on dicta from that case in 358, 1068, Winship,

In re 397 U.S. 90 S.Ct. support argument. Sandstrom, of his (1970). Further, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 the de that, presumption Court noted if “[a] argues imper- fendant that the instruction which, conclusive, although not had the missibly proof shifted the burden to him shifting effect of persuasion the burden of jury “inasmuch as the was not advised that defendant, would have suffered [it] any permissible inference did not relieve from similar infirmities.” [constitutional] proving the State of its guilt burden of Franklin, 99 S.Ct. at 2459. See Francis v. beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Francis supra 105 S.Ct. at 1972-1973. — Franklin, U.S. -, v. 105 S.Ct. instruction in question here (1985); L.Ed.2d Sandstrom v. Mon did persuasion not shift the burden of tana, 442 U.S. 99 S.Ct. defendant, requiring disprove him to an (1979). L.Ed.2d 39 intentional state of mind. The instruction The defendant concedes that clearly (1) jury told the that: it had to find inference contained in the instruction at intent; that the requisite defendant had the permissive issue here is a inference. Such (2) could, it required, but to infer permits, require, inference but does not requisite the existence of the intent from the trier of fact to infer the existence of an the surrounding killings; evidence element of the offense from the existence (3) inference, given keep even it “had to evidence; and, facts places no in mind at all times that it is the defend burden on the defendant. Francis v. here, ant’s state of mind at issue Franklin, supra 1971; 105 S.Ct. at Ulster and in you order to convict the defendant Allen, County 140, 157, 442 U.S. required beyond are to find a reasonable 2213, 2224, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 doubt that he in fact had the intent and/or required guilt.” recklessness As the Franklin, In Francis supra explained burden, instruction the State’s S.Ct. at Supreme United States infirmity there was no constitutional there Court commented on constitutionality in. permissive inferences: Finally, problems we note that the in- permissive A inference does not relieve proving per- volved the existence of a the State of its *16 persuasion burden of son’s state of mind necessitate some re- requires because it still the State to con- liance on circumstantial evidence. Plass jury vince the suggested that the conclu- State, Del.Supr., sion should be inferred based on the (1983), said: we predicate proven. facts Such inferences sense, judging common in As a matter of necessarily implicate do not the concerns sufficiency the as to the the of evidence permissive of A Sandstrom. inference mind, jury the must be able to state of violates the Due only Process Clause if defendant. weigh the conduct of the suggested the conclusion is not one that situations, Otherwise, only in most the justify light reason and common sense in evidence would be the defendant’s own proven of the jury. facts before the Ul- testimony. self-interested County Allen], supra, 442 ster Court [v. 157-163, Commentary at to 11 U.S. S.Ct. 2224-2227. See also Del.C. § that, light Deputy has failed failed to either make the to show of As has facts, proven requisite showing the reason under Francis v. Frank- and common sense lin, justify supra, County do not the inferred element of intent and Court Ulster v. of 4209(e)(2), Allen, ag- first supra, statutory or to demonstrate a shift in the Del.C. § challenge beyond proof, gravating his the burden of circumstance reason- portion jury prosecutor of in- quoted the trial court’s able The stated that the doubt. rely upon testimony is deemed to be without merit. the structions State would trial of proof statutory for the other two cir- PENALTY PHASE testimony cumstances. No new was of- by penalty hearing. fered the State at the I. introducing The State rested after records guilt of Having our review the concluded previous of for defendant’s convictions of turn our atten- phase case we now cocktail, manufacturing a Molotov sexual phase which penalty tion to the death was assault, manslaughter. judge jury the trial tried before same introduced, mitigat- The defense then outset, the February 1982. At the on factors, ing summary, a Social Service case briefly pursuant to 11 jury instructed psychiatric psychologi- which included their 420923 as to function Del.C. § relating cal to defendant’s examinations penalty stage proceedings: hospitalization at Governor Bacon Health panel, jury our criminal Members of the Center, report July of psychological upon states the convic- code of this State Galliani, Ph.D., the Del- Cono of upon defendant first guilt tion of staff, Hospital psychiat- aware State and a Superior Court degree murder that 6, 1979, report ric Robert W. June hearing deter- separate shall conduct M.D., Buckley, Medical Director of the Del- will mine whether the defendant be sen- Hospital. The aware State defense also probation life tenced to death or without presented testimony of three ministers parole. or Study who had and a Bible instructor attorney, informed the prosecuting The the defendant worked with and observed seeking the death jury that the State was Finally, the de- during his incarceration. penalty jury’s function and that was testified, expressing reverence and fendant should determine whether change describing lifestyle. his imprisonment or life be sentenced death counsel, Following summations parole. The probation jury without by the court as to jury was instructed determining told that sentence also findings jury’s obligations and weigh aggravat- imposed they must to be determining required to make it was ing mitigating circumstances and that imposed upon defendant. sentence be following relying on the the State for deliverations The retired jury then statutory seeking circumstances in three in four unanimous ver- culminated penalty: the death murder for intentional dicts of death —two (a) while The murders were committed felony for murder. and two engaged in com- defendant was grounds of asserts several The defendant robbery. mission phase penalty arising from appeal (b) re- defendant’s course of conduct conten- will address these We trial. persons of 2 sulted in the deaths or more they apply to the defendant’s only as tions probable conse- the deaths were a where murder, we have since convictions quence of the defendant’s conduct. convictions the defendant’s held that (c) pe- were committed for murders *17 must be reversed. intentional murder cuniary gain. 4209(e)(1) The Del. C. § II. attorney informed the prosecuting further A. finding previous their that jury that that the initially contends defendant felo- guilty of counts of two defendant penalty in this case death established, imposition of the murder, pursuant to 11 ny er, A.2d at 121-23. 4209 see Flam- For a detailed discussion Eighth barred plices and Fourteenth robbery committed a and two mur- Amendments of the apparently United States Constitu- ders which were not contem- plated tion as a cruel and punishment robbery planned. unusual when the because the basis of the of in- convictions key element of the Enmund analy- felony may tentional murder and murder played sis is that Enmund no role in the predicated upon accomplice have been an killings. Supreme The United States Court liability theory. instructing jury In stated: regarding its determination of the defend- ultimately judge is for us whether [I]t guilt, judge ant’s the trial stated: Eighth permits imposi- Amendment case, In this charged defendant penalty tion of the death on one such as offenses, which, with the elements of felony Enmund who aids and abets a according contention, may State’s the course of which a murder is commit- actually performed have been another ted others but does not himself who person, Henry William Flamer. You kill, kill, attempt or intend that kill- may find the guilty defendant ing place take or that lethal force will be you offenses in this case if are satisfied employed. concluded, We have it beyond a reasonable doubt that: does not. (a) person performed The other all of Enmund, supra 102 S.Ct. at 3376. charged elements of the offenses as I Enmund, Deputy Unlike admittedly you. have defined them for present and, killings, very at the (b) intended, is, The defendant least, nothing stop did them. There was his object purpose conscious upon were 145 wounds inflicted the two promote or facilitate the commission of victims, weapons two were used in the the offenses. murders, Deputy had one of the vic- (c) aided, counseled, The defendant tims’ morning watch and wallet the after agreed or attempted to aid the other killings. These factors indicate that person in committing the offense. solely participant was not in the underlying felony, present but was instead The defendant jury contends that the may in, during, and involved the actual have relied murders. on the above instruction and his State, In Whalen v. 492 A.2d at we assertion at trial participate that he did not held that: stabbing in the victim, of either and con-

cluded, solely accomplice penalty based on grossly liabil- ... death is not a [T]he ity theory, disproportionate punish- guilty defendant was excessive guilty on all four ment for a defendant found murder counts. The defendant murder, actually contends that who killed his Supreme United States Florida, present opinion victim under the circumstances in Enmund Court’s here. note that such a conclusion We U.S. 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 requirement (1982), comports with the that a prohibits, unconstitutional, as punishment defendant’s ‘be tailored to imposition of the penalty upon death a de- responsibility personal and moral fendant found guilty only under an accom- Enmund, 801, 102 guilt.’ 458 U.S. at plice liability theory. S.Ct. at 3378. Enmund as We do not read prohibiting Supreme Court in Hall v. imposition The Florida penalty of the death in this (1982) State, Del.Supr., Fla.Supr., 420 So.2d 872 faced Whalen case. 492 A.2d Deputy’s a claim similar to stated: with Enmund at 563-565. The degree penalty was convicted of first murder and Hall claims that the death cannot actually sentenced to die for his role an accom- imposed because he did not be En- plice felony, during intentionally to a the course kill the victim. mund Supreme wait- held that Flor- which a death occurred. Enmund had penalty ap- cannot be getaway ed in a car while his two accom- ida’s death statute *18 kill, plied attempt did The to one who not 490 A.2d at 127. defendant’s convic- kill, kill, felony clearly intend to or intend that lethal tion of murder established a aggravating agree statutory used. We with the trial circumstance as de- force be 4209(e)(2). in 11 distinguishable that scribed Del.C. As we court Enmund § provided Flamer, necessary the case. Hall stated in it “not for from instant the weapon prove kill and the this fact a second time at used to Mrs. Hurst State Flamer, present penalty hearing.” 490 A.2d at Additionally, at her death. En- the only aider abettor 127. v. 492 A.2d at mund was an See also Whalen Hall, felony. underlying on the other the

hand, was an aider and abettor to the underlying as felo- homicide as well the D. ny. contends, for defendant also The State, supra Hall v. at 874. appeal, jury time in this first Thus, we conclude that Enmund permitted to consider should not have been preclude imposition does circumstances, statutory aggravating penalty death in case where dur both that the murder was committed guilty only vicariously as a was not “found ing robbery, 11 Del.C. the commission of Whalen, felony murderer.” (e)(2), mur 4209(e)(l)(j)and and that the § State, Del.Supr., 496 Riley 563. See pecuniary gain. der for 11 Del.C. A.2d 997 4209(e)(l)(o). language of 11 Del.C. § 4209(e)(2) duplica- clearly anticipates that § B. statutory aggravating tive circumstances The defendant also contends it That sec may jury. be considered plain permit imposition error to provides: tion penalty the death when the State did not has any case where the prove offer the existence of the evidence first in the been convicted of murder statutory aggravating at the circumstances provision of degree in violation However, penalty hearing. this Court has title, 636(a)(2)—(7) this that convic- “[ejlose scrutiny of our held Flamer that existence of tion shall establish prohib language no statute discloses circumstance statutory aggravating jury consid sentencing its the below from appropriate, or where jury, judge penalty phase ering in the evidence which provision so instructed. This shall be phase.” already liability heard judge preclude jury, shall not Thus, Flamer, jury 490 A.2d at 125. considering applicable, where from that had been properly considered evidence cir- statutory aggravating finding the presented phases of trial in conclud both in this subsection cumstances listed aggravating cir ing statutory that three aggravating circum- any other existed. cumstances evidence. established stances added). 4209(e)(2)(emphasis 11 Del.C. § C. Further, Georgia, 428 U.S. Gregg asserts that the defendant also (1976), 49 L.Ed.2d 859 instructing jury erred in trial court circumstances statutory aggravating murder conviction defendant’s Gregg that sentenced jury 636(a)(2) estab relied on pursuant to 11 Del.C. § was committed that the murder aggra were statutory both the existence of a lished robbery and commission of impose during the necessary vating circumstance pecuni- committed murder was that the contends penalty. Defendant the death Supreme States ary gain. The United imper instruction constituted that the Gregg’s death sentence affirmed presumption. This ar Court conclusive missible system under statutory “the Flamer, holding that rejected in Flamer. gument was *19 which Gregg was sentenced to death does of the character of the individual and the not violate the Gregg, Constitution.” su- circumstances of the crime.

pra at 2941. 862, Stephens, Zant v. 462 U.S. 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2743-44, (1983) (cita- 77 L.Ed.2d 235 Finally, specifically recognized we omitted). Thus, jurors tions were cor- allegedly Flamer that such duplicative rectly permitted to consider factors statutory aggravating circumstances do they that determined were relevant to the prejudice the defendant in a case such sentencing stage, even if such factor had as this aggravating where other and miti- vague been deemed to be too to be used as gating presented factors have been to the statutory aggravating circumstance. jury. Flamer, 490 A.2d at 125. See Zant Stephens, 862, 462 U.S. 103 S.Ct. F. (1983); Florida, L.Ed.2d 235 Barclay v. The defendant’s contention that 463 U.S. 77 L.Ed.2d jury the trial court’s instructions were inad (1983). equate is also without merit. The instruc adequately tion conveyed jury to the E. legal principle jurors op retained the Amicus Curiae contends that Delaware’s tion imprisonment to recommend life de statutory scheme for the consideration of spite any aggravating factors found to ex unspecified aggravating mitigating cir- Flamer, ist. See 490 A.2d at 127-28. cumstances is Specifical- unconstitutional. Whalen, Compare 492 A.2d at 559-62. ly, Amicus Curiae jury reasons that might considered, have ag- as an additional G. gravating circumstance, that the victims Finally, turn statutory we to our obli- “elderly”. were Such alleg- consideration gation imposition to review the of the death edly unconstitutional, would be since this penalty 4209(g)(2) in this case. pro- Section Court has stated that the fact that vides: victim elderly is unconstitutionally Supreme Court shall limit its review vague aas statutory aggravating circum- under this section to the recommendation White, stance. State v. Del.Supr., 395 imposition penalty on and of death and shall determine: Whether, considering totality a. However, our penalty death stat aggravation mitigation of evidence ute makes it clear that jury is to consid upon particular which bears circum- er other characteristics of the crime and stances or details of the offense and the the defendant in determining appropri propensities character and of the offend- ate 4209(d)(1)(b). sentence. 11 Del.C. § er, penalty the death was either arbitrari- Further, the Supreme United States imposed ly capriciously or or recom- recognized has that: disproportionate penal- mended or [Sjtatutory aggravating circumstances ty imposed recommended or in similar play a constitutionally necessary function arising cases under this section. stage legislative definition: supports b. Whether the evidence they persons circumscribe the class of finding jury’s judge’s statutory of a eligible for penalty. the death But the aggravating circumstance as enumerated require Constitution does not jury (e) and, of this subsection section ignore possible aggravating other factors 636(a)(2)-(7) applicable, where of this process in the selecting, among from title. class, those defendants who will ac- b, tually Turning subparagraph be first sentenced to death. What is important stage supported at the selection is an we conclude evidence findings statutory aggra- jury’s individualized determination on the basis *20 vating imposition circumstances have been dis- We find that the of death in opinion. Specifically, cussed in the this case was not disproportion- this therefore ate jury guilty and the found the defendant of two defendant’s convictions and as to felony charges sentence the felony pursuant counts of murder murder accordingly are 636(a)(2). Thus, affirmed. the re- jury’s Del.C. § statutory aggravating liance on circum- the during stance occurred “that the murder PART, IN AFFIRMED IN REVERSED robbery”

the of commission PART. necessarily appropriate. There was is also support the jury’s sufficient evidence (concurring part in McNEILLY, Justice the conclusions that defendant’s conduct dissenting part.) and in deaths, resulted in two 11 Del.C. guilty Stanley Deputy was found Andre 4209(e)(l)(k), and that the were murders § of by jury of two counts Superior a pecuniary gain. 11 committed for Del.C. Degree, First two intentional Murder in the 4209(e)(l)(o). § Murder, of Rob- Felony one count counts of count of Degree in and one bery the First inquiries posed additional are Two Weapon During the Deadly a Possession of a subparagraph 4209(g)(2). under of section sen- Felony. Deputy was Commission of a Initially, given totali we conclude that “the murder of the four tenced to death each on aggravation ty mitiga of evidence in and the year terms on thirty and convictions upon particular tion which the cir bears The ma- convictions. robbery weapon and and cumstances or details of the offense taped evening the late jority has ruled that of propensities the character and the of improperly of was confession the defendant imposed by fender” the sentence death of of his in admitted into evidence violation arbitrarily jury capri neither nor was by the Sixth right guaranteed to counsel as ciously imposed. See Del.C. a conse- As and Fourteenth Amendments. 4209(g)(2)a. § intention- quence majority reversed the appropriate pro have made the We the felo- al but affirmed murder convictions find, after portionality review and careful underlying ny and the murder convictions consideration, imposition Degree and in the First Robbery of crimes penalty Deputy dispro death on During Weapon Deadly Possession of portionate penalty recommended or Felony and also affirmed Commission of a degree imposed in other first murder those in thereon. I concur imposed the sentences arisen under our statute cases that have the 10 disagree that but affirmances statutory aggravating in cir improperly which a admitted p.m. statement was jury. evidence, consequently cumstance was found into Riley 4209(g)(2)a. should be Del.C. convictions intentional murder 997, 1026 (1985); Del.Supr., Flam 496 A.2d reversed.

er, 490 139-40. A.2d at of appeal raised There is no issue during the police

Deputy, in Del- tactics like the other defendants abusive I am although custody interrogation aware who have been sentenced to totality part as of and consider penalty death under 11 was mindful Del.C. § sleep- of Deputy’s claim of guilty unprovoked, found of “an circumstances cold-blood- cell, being threatened ing in a cold of helpless [persons] ed com- murder of [two] head, point” in his police with a “hollow upon lacking ability victims mitted cigarettes being deprived solely pecuniary and of defend themselves and of the absence liquor. I am also mindful gain_”24 Riley, 496 A.2d robbery during in the other Riley, than defendant in Whal- rather 24. As we noted en, guilty committing supra, penalty found cases. death during rape of a murder the commission violent proof by nine the State of an actual verbal where was detained hours. There little, any, relinquishment by Dep- if written communicationwith right uty by investigating after his be- officer or oth- appearance counsel committing during period fore the Peace. officer the nine-hour Justice of the er holding speak than But sometimes actions louder he was confined to the cell at charge policebarracks. The detective words. *21 investigation Deputy inform that he the did Although Judge specifically Trial the going to and that he Seaford when knowingly Deputy ruled that and voluntar- Deputy to the returned he wanted tell him relinquished right Fifth ily his Amendment returning But to from subsequent truth. 8, gave February to counsel when he his Seaford, apparently the detective was satis- p.m., at 10:00 not statement he did interrogate Deputy not to further and fied explore impact the of the Four- Sixth and night police troop the for home and the left right of to teenth Amendments any Deputy. Shortly contact with without present during any have counsel further home, after the detective left for a traffic interrogation appearance his after initial Deputy way started on his to the officer ques- the the before Justice of Peace. The County Institute. In Sussex Correctional during sup- tion was not raised either the meantime, changed the the detective his pression hearing or at trial. inBut Flam- transporting mind and directed the officer er, assumed, here, I do we the same police Deputy to return to the station. agreeing assumption, without with the that any the way Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments I do not condone action of right present trig- failing Dep- transport have counsel were the State Police in gered by facility appearance uty defendant’s initial be- to the correctional without de- Peace, committing fore the lay arraignment Justice after his before the Jus- of impartial Unfortunately, delay an State Court Official. tice of Peace. police procedure result of a was the Pursuant to the mandate of of Justice routine, at least Del- had become lower 2(b), the Peace Deputy Criminal Rule aware, by reason of the Justices of appearance advised at his initial before general having as a rule no one Peace committing Peace, neutral Justice of cus- to relieve the State Police of available judicial officer, against of the complaint pur- for the tody of committed defendants him, counsel, right of his to retain transporting to a such defendants pose right hearing. to have a preliminary Although police facility. correctional Deputy also was advised under the Rule County transport Deputy to the Sussex did required that was not a state- make hence, did not vio- facility and Correctional ment, any may by statement made him Peace, of the Justice late the Order against be used him and he would be after ar- of a defendant transportation allowed rea- the Justice the Peace a facility, should to a correctional raignment, opportunity sonable time and to consult po- delay. This would avoid without occur advised, Having counsel. so been viola- Amendment Fifth and Sixth tential expressed no desire to exercise seems frequency of occurrence whose tions explained thereup- options to him and was left when a defendant is increase custody on ordered to the committed custody prolonged period of for a County Sussex Correctional Institution time. charges non- since murder constituted alleged Amendment viola- Flamer, Deputy to the Sixth As was As bailable offenses. since tion, no violation occurred I conclude turned Police for over State considering totality of circumstances County transmittal to the Sussex Correc- right Amendment delayed Deputy waived his Sixth facility. tional State Police case recent of U.S. facility taking to counsel. Deputy to the corrections Cir., (1984), Karr, F.2d 9th Deputy to the Station and returned Police . ing the difference between the Fifth Amendment intelligent randa and the an defendant of the indicted sel under Court stated: The issue is whether he is the same: untary, United States v. them. er v. liminary hearing.” relinquishment lege. ment attached when he was indicted. and Sixth Amendment 482, (1981) (Fifth Amendment); Amendment Brew Rhode S.Ct. ment, information, arraignment, against an Fifth explicit request by the defendant. Amendment n. formal 2296, Gouveia, 297 The standard for waiver of the Fifth Karr’s The Sixth Amendment Miranda analytically 101 (1980). 1232, 1242, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 Edwards Williams, Appeals Island Amendment judicial proceedings the Sixth Amendment to waiver of that S.Ct. rights [467] right individual (2) warnings sufficiently right Sixth Amendment right the waiver must be 1880, 1883, 1682, 1689 U.S. for the Ninth v. distinct under the Sixth Amend- Innis, knowing to counsel under 430 U.S. Mi- 51 a known Arizona, does not right created Miranda. [180], 104 L.Ed.2d right, (1984). by way rights 446 U.S. right. from the Fifth attaches “when right n. 68 L.Ed.2d 378 validly and right right depend 451 U.S. 387, 404, are initiated Circuit held Brewer v. the Sixth 424 S.Ct. Unlike the 64 L.Ed.2d to counsel intelligent to counsel Recogniz- right, of indict allow or waived (1) inform (1977). on an privi- 2292, coun- 477, pre vol- 97 615 F.2d Payton, Miranda Jordan cert. indictment), (valid diate banc); 100 S.Ct. fendant received (5th Cir.1982); and has indicated a Miranda derstood his found rounding Brown, It has found waiver where case-by-case approach. 569 F.2d 920, 629, (1980). dard. The Fifth and Sixth Circuits have position. 738 F.2d 214 at cy, ant, explain the waiver. light the seriousness of the defendant’s must show the indictment to the defend 1030, explained by ther, 1983). warnings United States No other circuit has Other 634 100 1036 waiver where defendant positions. informed waivers Seventh Circuit United States v. has held that the v. has (6th Cir.), 699 F.2d circuits have circumstances warnings 236, Id. 2950, S.Ct. (4th alone are insufficient. Watkins, prosecutor received right its at 1153. The Id. a neutral 238-39 Cir.1983) (waiver United States 64 1856, significance, See United States v. denied, to counsel. warnings and the sur 922, cert. also United States v. and was Clements, L.Ed.2d 830 222 681 F.2d willingness *22 Miranda (5th adopted adopted Robinson 924-25 64 L.Ed.2d 275 show that he un denied, has endorsed a Woods, 613 F.2d 588-89 (7th judicial officer, rights where the de agent 446 U.S. the defendant Cir.1978) (en informed of Cir., 1067, v. was Id. 713 F.2d this stan warnings (1st Cir.) 446 U.S. interme requires must be (2d to talk. Brown, seeking v. Per officer (1980); 1984). given high 1075 Fur 969, Cir. Williams, indictment), vacated knowledge 430 U.S. at 97 S.Ct. at Amendment view. clear and right the Sixth Amendment can 1242 are split, The Second Circuit takes the strictest required knowingly however, (Sixth Amendment). It counsel explicit explanation has held that waiver of the before an indicted defendant rights regarding before trial intelligently right. what Courts have of the Sixth requires warnings is giving waive “a Karr, L.Ed.2d 728 denied, warnings, where sult counsel equally 706 F.2d Cir.1984) (en banc); counsel, defendant was [464] divided F.2d at 495. had and had U.S. cert. during interrogation), 881-82 previously invoked court, [1020], opportunity Fields (8th Cir.) (waiver 728 given F.2d 654 Miranda Wyrick, to 556, 78 right con (4th Mohabir, United States v. up.” confession Listening tape Cir.1980). Miranda (2d p.m. February on taken at 10:00 F.2d impression knowledgable of a he was gives one man who inference knowingly, voluntarily unhesitatingly enough he so to have done so had wise answering every put him truth- question request His assist- desired. failure to directly, fully, and without further subter- totality of counsel under ance emphasize point Dep- fuge. quote To I can lead no conclu- circumstances here uty’s given very end final statements willing sion other than that p.m. 10:00 of his statement: right or have counsel his to consult waive Q. ha- and to on his nothing you present spar You sure there is with rights told us this incident? He and said so. ven’t about own. knew upon totality of the circumstanc- Based you Every- everything. A. I have told p.m. I am the 10:00 statement es satisfied thing. properly attack into under admitted Q. You killed Miss Alberta Smith? and that all convictions and sen- evidence guess I I don’t A. so. know. should have been affirmed. tences Q. you you guess do so? What mean A. I don’t know whether she dead moving.

or not. She wasn’t

Q. reasonably You’re sure she was Probably

dead. she was dead.

A. Yeah.

Q. question And there is no about the *23 Everything you’ve

truth. told us is defi- nitely the truth? WILSON, Petitioner, S. David Everything truth. A. is the Q. you your explained O.K. Have been

Miranda rights? right Your to be silent Delaware, Respondent. STATE your right Attorney to an and all Delaware, Superior that? County. New Castle A. Yes. Jan. Submitted: Q. you many How times have been told 1, 1985. Decided: Oct. you apprehended? that since have been Two or A. three.

Q. you Have if you been asked want an Attorney?

see Yes.

A.

Q. you opportunity Have to talk had one? Attorney you

to an if wanted to see Yes.

A. old Deputy, thirty year

I also look at

man, stranger rigors who no felon, enforcement,

law a thrice convicted murder

and under arrest for unrelated by him New Castle

allegedly committed clearly supports a

County. The evidence Had

conclusion street wise. Fifth, his Sixth

he wished invoke rights, Fourteenth Amendment time consistently each declined do from rights explained to him were

those the clear apprehension, moment

Case Details

Case Name: Deputy v. State
Court Name: Supreme Court of Delaware
Date Published: Jul 31, 1985
Citation: 500 A.2d 581
Court Abbreviation: Del.
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