The DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE AND TAXATION OF the STATE OF WYOMING, Appellant (Petitioner),
v.
CASPER LEGION BASEBALL CLUB, INC. Appellee (Respondent).
CASPER LEGION BASEBALL CLUB, INC. Appellant (Petitioner),
v.
The DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE AND TAXATION OF THE STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee (Respondent).
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., Peter J. Mulvaney, Deputy Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert J. Walters, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Milo M. Vukelich, Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellant *609 in Case No. 88-185 and appellee in Case No. 88-186.
Kenneth R. Marken, Casper, for appellee in Case No. 88-185 and appellant in Case No. 88-186.
Before THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ., and GUTHRIE, J., Retired.
GOLDEN, Justice.
Appellant State of Wyoming Department of Revenue and Taxation (Department) appeals a district court decision granting appellee Casper Legion Baseball Club, Inc. (Legion) an exemption from state sales taxation. The district court's decision reversed the Department's administrative decision denying the exemption, but it denied Legion's motion for costs of a transcript and filing fees on reversal. The issue presented by the Department is whether the Legion is entitled to the exemption as a "charitable" organization under W.S. 39-6-405(a)(xiv) (May 1985 Repl.)[1] and W.S. 39-6-505(a)(vi) (May 1985 Repl.)[2]. Legion cross-appeals requesting an award of costs of the transcript and filing fees.
We affirm the district court in all respects.
Legion is a nonprofit corporation promoting and financing competitive baseball activities for youth in Casper and Glenrock, Wyoming. Any youngster meeting the age and jurisdictional requirements set by the National American Legion is eligible to try out for Legion teams. The Legion program provides physical, recreational, and moral benefits to young people in the two cities. Team members pay no registration fee, although they do pay a refundable uniform deposit. Legion generates income through private donations, admission charges, various fund raising activities, and profits from concession sales at the games. Legion's expenses include coaches' salaries, bus driver fees, bus maintenance, umpire fees, sundry travel and lodging expenses, and costs of administration and organization. Legion is qualified as a federal nonprofit organization exempt from federal income taxation.
In January 1987, Legion applied to the Depаrtment for a state sales taxation exemption of its concession sales and other fund raising activities involving sales. The Department's Manager of the Field Audit Section, Mr. Richard Hubbard, responded by letter. Hubbard denied Legion's request for an exemption saying Legion was not the kind of оrganization that qualified for an exemption under Wyoming statutes. Legion asked for reconsideration in early February 1987, and Hubbard again responded with a denial of Legion's request. Legion then filed an administrative appeal with the State Board of Equalization (Board), a hearing body within thе Department. The Board heard the appeal on September 25, 1987, and affirmed Hubbard's decision.
Undaunted, Legion filed a petition for judicial review of the Board's final administrative decision with the District Court, Seventh Judicial District, in Casper, Wyoming, on January 7, 1988. After reviewing both parties' briefs аnd the record, the district court issued a May 26, 1988, order reversing the Board's decision but denying Legion's motion to recover its costs of a transcript and filing fees. The Department appealed from the district court's reversal of the Board decision to this court on June 6, 1988. Two days latеr, Legion cross-appealed seeking the above mentioned costs. The cases were consolidated for briefing by the clerk of this court.
We review a district court decision concerning an appeal from an administrative contested case by reviewing agеncy findings and conclusions under the statutory standard applied by the district court. See Employment Security Commission of Wyoming v. Laramie Cabs, Inc.,
*610 (A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise nоt in accordance with law;
(B) Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;
(C) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory right;
(D) Without observance of procedure required by law; or
(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute.
W.S. 16-3-114(c)(ii) (October 1982 Repl.). See also W.R.A.P. 12.09 and 12.11(a).
The issue here is whether the Department properly interpreted the meaning of "charitable" as used in the state taxation exemption statutes. If the Department improperly interpreted "charitable," we must review the facts in this reсord in light of the correct statutory interpretation.
Involved in this appeal are two statutory exemptions from state taxation. The first, W.S. 39-6-405(a)(xiv), provides for a state sales tax exemption for "[o]ccasional sales made by religious or charitable organizations for fund raising purposes for the conduct of regular religious or charitable functions and activities * * *." See also W.S. 39-6-405(a)(xii) (May 1985 Repl.). The second, W.S. 39-6-505(a)(vi), provides a state excise tax exemption for "[p]urchases made by religious or charitable organizations in the conduct of their regular religious or charitable functions." By administrative rule, the Department has also adopted a decidedly narrow interpretation of the word "charitable" as it is used in these statutes. Pertinent provisions of Department rules provide that:
(a) Qualified religious or charitablе organizations are those determined by the State Tax Commission to be bona fide associations or corporations organized for and engaged primarily and substantially in religious or charitable activities, including worship, religious education and assisting poor, aged, disabled аnd infirm persons.
* * * * * *
(f) Purchases by civic organizations, service clubs and other organizations not organized primarily and substantially for charitable or religious purposes are not exempt from the tax.
Rules and Regulations of the Wyoming Tax Commission, Department of Revenue and Taxation, ch. III, § 57(a) and (f) at 31-32 (July 3, 1985).
The Department argues that the plain meaning of the word "charitable," does not extend an exemption to Legion because Legion is a private club that promotes its own interests without conferring a public benefit. This amounts to a restatement of the Board's conclusions of law that, although Legion's stated primary purpose is to foster good values and ideals in young people, the way it implements its program does not provide a general public benefit.
The Department ignores the plain language of the statute and focuses on the wrong aspect of the function of a charity. When interpreting a statute or provision we search for legislative intent. Department of Revenue and Taxation of the State of Wyoming v. Hamilton,
We disagree with the Department's interpretation of the statutory language. Black's Law Dictionary defines "charitable" as including "every gift for a general public use, to be applied consistent with existing laws, for benefit of an indefinite number of persons, and designed to benefit them from an educational, religious, moral, physical or social standpoint." Black's Law Dictionary 212 (5th ed. 1979) (citing American Society for Testing and Materials v. Board of Revision of Taxes, Philadelphia County,
Likewise, we reject the Department's attempt to analogize Legion's activities to the activities described in Maxwell Memorial Football Club, Inc. v. Commonwealth,
Maxwell is factually distinguishable from this case. In fact, Legion presents the opposite side of the coin because it is an organization that allows all young persons who desire an opportunity to play organized baseball the chance to try out for a team. After tryouts, a number of youth from the community play organized baseball and learn social, moral, and physical valuеs. Legion's purpose and activities confer a direct benefit on the general public and any benefit to private individuals in the organization is incidental at best. The facts in these two scenarios are completely different and the Department's analogy to the holding in Maxwell is incorrect.
A muсh better analogy can be drawn between Legion and the charity involved in Youth Tennis Foundation v. Tax Commission,
In summary, in deciding if an organization is eligible for the Wyoming's "charitable" taxation exemptions, the Department should focus on whether the charity primarily engages in activities providing an indefinite number of persons in the general public with benefits designed to aid them in an educаtional, moral, physical, or social manner. The Department should also consider whether the charity provides access to those benefits in an equal and nondiscriminatory way. When that standard is applied to Legion, the state taxation exemptions must be granted. The distriсt court was correct in reversing the Board's decision denying Legion's request for a state sales and purchase tax exemption.
*612 Legion does not fare as well in its cross-appeal of the district court's denial of costs for a transcript and filing fees. Legion argues that а party who appeals a final administrative order to the district court and receives a reversal should be able to recover costs as set out in W.R.A.P. 10.05, if this court affirms the district court. Legion speculates that the basis for the district court's denial of the costs and filing fees was thаt W.R.A.P. 12.01 through 12.12 provides an exclusive body of rules for petitions for review of final administrative decisions, and those rules do not contain a provision like W.R.A.P. 10.05, providing for costs to a petitioner who prevails on appeal from a district court reversal.
The Department echoes that argument. It also argues that Legion failed to cite any authority for its position that W.R.A.P. 10.05 is cumulative to W.R.A.P. 12.01 through 12.12 and that the doctrine of sovereign immunity prevents the awarding of costs for judicial review of an administrative action.
Whether the costs described in W.R.A.P. 10.05 are recovеrable in this case is a question of law. We agree with the district court that W.R.A.P. 12.01 through 12.12 is the exclusive means of seeking judicial review of final administrative action. W.R.A.P. 12.01; and Board of County Commissioners of Teton County v. Teton County Youth Services, Inc.,
AFFIRMED.
GOLDEN, J., delivered the opinion of the court.
GUTHRIE, J., Retired, filed a concurring opinion.
GUTHRIE, Retired Justice, concurring.
I concur in the opinion. I do so with a feeling of discomfort and the thought that this ruling is oppressive to the Casper Legion Baseball Club when they are denied their costs. However, I cannot substitute my personal reactions for what appears to be the law.
It is both unfair and oppressive to force an aggrieved party to pay its own costs to secure a review and correction of an erroneous ruling by pursuing its appeal through both the trial court and this cоurt. The trial court found this ruling arbitrary and capricious and we, by this affirmation, approve that ruling. Even a taxpayer is entitled to some protection from oppressive administrative action.
This is a matter which the rule-making power should forthwith consider and correct.
NOTES
Notes
[1] This provision is identical to the current codification in (Cum.Supp. 1988).
[2] See supra note 1.