Appellant Bernard Depree, alias Bernard Dupree, and his co-defendant, David Burney, Jr., were jointly tried for the murder of Atlanta Police Officer Frank Robert Schlatt and for two counts of armed robbery at a furniture storе on May 13,1978. The State waived the death penalty. Appellant was found guilty of murder and two counts of armed robbery and was sentenced to life imprisonment on each count with the sentences to be served consecutively. Burney was also convicted and received three life, sentences which this court affirmed in
Burney v. State,
The factual situations in the robberies and murder are described *241 in the Burney and McClesky decisions and will not be repeated here.
1. In Case No. 36300, appellant alleges in his first enumeration of error that he suffered extreme prejudice as a result of the dеnial of his motion to sever his trial from that of his co-defendant. He contends that his trial was prejudiced because the confession of his co-defendant was admitted into evidence and because his co-defеndant’s attorney had never tried a criminal case “properly” and had antagonized the jury before the trial had begun. Beyond those statements, appellant offers no demonstration of prejudice.
Under Code Ann. § 27-2101 (Ga. L. 1971, pp. 891, 892), defendants in capital felony cases in which the State has waived the death penalty may be tried jointly or separately in the discretion of the trial court. Being discretionary, the trial court’s denial of the motion to sever will not be disturbed unless the defendant can make a clear showing of prejudice.
Reaves v. State,
Following a Jackson-Denno hearing, Burney’s confession was admitted into evidence through the oral testimony of рolice officers. In this testimony, Burney made references to himself, Warren McClesky, Ben Wright and “another black male,” or “other black male subject.” Appellant was never identified in the testimony nor did it tend to identify him.
The prоcedure the State followed in editing out appellant’s name from his- extra-judicial statement comports with procedures suggested in Paoli v. United States,
Appellant complains by supplemental brief that the State first stated to the trial court that it would not violate appellant’s rights in regards to the statement by the co-defendant and the Bruton rule but as the trial progressed, the appellant was identified. He contends that after the situation calling for the Bruton rule “no longer obtained” *242 the State used that rule as a weapon against appellant by explaining a redaction process to the jurors, thus advising them that they were no longer being thwarted by such legal niceties from finding out that the appellant was named in his co-defendant’s confession. He claims this was a “well engineered plan to red flag” the co-defendant’s confession against him and was prejudicial. We find no merit to the argument.
After appellant’s edited statement was introduced, appellant’s co-defendant took the witness stand to denounce part of the statement. This freed the State to cross examine him about his extra-judicial statement, including the identity of his co-defendant, and it also gave appellant the right to cross examine. Suсh a procedure does not violate the Bruton rule. In United States v. Morgan, 562 F2d 1001 (1977), cert. denied
Appellant misplaces his faith in the purpose of Bruton, a narrow decision which overruled priоr holdings that a court could issue curative instructions to a jury after a co-defendant’s extra-judicial statement not subject to cross examination was introduced into evidence. The evil Bruton sought to cure was the violation of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. See Pointer v. Texas,
Appellant does not argue the effectiveness of his co-defendant’s counsel nor the contention that he had antagonized the jury and that portion of his first enumeration is considered abandoned.
Appellant has failed to make a clear showing of prejudice and the trial court did not err in denying the motion to sever.
2. Appellant contends the triаl court erred in refusing to disqualify two jurors for cause. One of the jurors was a former policeman, the second had relatives who were police officers. Both stated during voir dire that the fact that the murder victim was а police officer would have some effect on the way they thought in the case. However, the first juror, in response to a question from the court asking him if he could be a fair and impartial juror replied, “I would like tо think that I could, yes sir.” The second juror, in response to a similar question, stated that she harbored no doubts about being fair and impartial.
While the record reflects some indication that each juror might
*243
be influenced by the fact that the case involved the murder of a policeman, neither indicated a fixed opinion that could not be influenced by the evidence. We held in
Taylor v. State,
In
Tennon v. State,
3. Appellant contends, as his third enumeration, that the trial court erred in permitting, over timely objection, a rebuttal witness to testify when the name of thаt witness was not on the list of witnesses. Appellant concedes that the court allowed counsel time to interview the witness before he testified but contends such procedure was not adequate to cure the еrror.
We have held many times that calling an unlisted witness in rebuttal is not error.
Prevatte v. State,
4. As his fourth enumeration, appellant complains that the trial court erred in failing to direct the prosecutor to refrain from certain of his argumеnts to the jury. He made no objection at the time of the arguments and raises the issue for the first time on appeal. We have carefully considered appellant’s citation of authority but agree with the State that there is nothing in this enumeration for the court to review.
State v. Griffin,
5. Appellant contends also that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for new trial on the grounds that the testimony of accomplice Ben Wright, Jr., was not independеntly corroborated by evidence which tends to connect the accused with the crime. Wright testified in detail about the circumstances of the robberies and the slaying of Officer Schlatt. The testimony put the appеllant at the scene as a participant. The testimony of Wright’s girlfriend, Mary Jenkins, clearly corroborated Wright’s testimony in putting the four
*244
defendants together the morning of the robberies and murder. The rebuttal testimony of Howard Jamеs Smith, who had been a jail mate of the appellant, also tended to establish appellant’s identity and connection to the crimes. Corroboration as to identity and participation was sufficient to meet the test this court established in
West v. State,
*244 Appellant contends that the testimony of Mary Jenkins should be viewed as if she were an alleged accоmplice because her own testimony and that of Ben Wright, Jr., clearly show that she was an accomplice to the other defendants. A review of the record fails to support such a theory. Appellant’s enumeration No. 5 is without merit.
6. In Case No. 36301 (pro se), appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his extraordinary motion for new trial. He alleges there was evidence discoverable under Brady v. Maryland,
In its order denying the motion, the trial court stated that it had carefully considered the entire file of the case and could find no material favorable to the defendant.
The trial transcript shows that Mary Jenkins, on direct examination, testified to numerous arrests and convictions. Defensе had the opportunity at that time to question her concerning prior convictions and any promises by the prosecution for her testimony. We held in
Goodwin v. State,
We have reviewed the record, the briefs and citations of authority and in our opinion the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, would enable a rational fact finder to find the appellant guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia,
Judgments affirmed.