Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.
Paul Deppenbrook worked for Republic Technologies International, LLC (RTI), a steel company that filed for bankruptcy in
I. BACKGROUND
A. Statutes
The PBGC is a federal corporation charged with “administerfing] and enforcing] the plan termination insurance provisions” of ERISA. PBGC v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth.,
In order to appropriately distribute benefits under a plan, the PBGC and the plan administrator
The PBGC cannot administer certain types of pension plans. “In enacting ERISA, Congress distinguished between two types of employee retirement benefit
Moreover, not every pension benefit included in a defined benefit plan is insured through ERISA.
B. Facts
When Deppenbrook’s employer filed for bankruptcy, the PBGC stepped in to terminate the employees’ pension plan. RTI,
The PBGC selected June 14, 2002, as the plan termination date in order to avoid paying shutdown benefits to former RTI employees. Id. at 664-65. The PBGC was concerned because “shutdown benefits [would] potentially increase[ ] the amount of unfunded liabilities for the plans by almost $96 million.” Id. at 664. The district court in RTI, however, rejected the PBGC’s proposed date, concluding that “the plan participants continued to have strong reliance interests in the receipt of shutdown benefits” even after the PBGC notified the participants of their plan’s termination. Id. at 665. The district court ultimately set the plan termination date as August 17, 2002 — one day after RTI sold its assets to another firm — obligating the PBGC to pay shutdown benefits. Id.
The Sixth Circuit reversed. It held that “[a]fter the employees received notice that PBGC intended to terminate the pension plans ..., the participants no longer had a justifiable expectation in the accrual of vested pension rights,” including shutdown benefits. Id. at 666-67 (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the employees’ reliance interest in shutdown benefits was not as “strong” as the district court had concluded because shutdown benefits were “contingent on bankruptcy court approval, and that approval was not given until ... one month after PBGC issued the notices of termination.” Id. at 667 (emphasis in original). The Sixth Circuit also chastised the district court for not giving “appropriate deference to PBGC’s conclusion” and reset the plan termination date as June 14, 2002.
The PBGC and RTI entered into a settlement agreement that outlined how the RTI employees’ pension-plan accounts were to be administered. While the PBGC administered the defined benefit portion of the plan, the settlement agreement specified that the parties were to hire a third-party accounts administrator to handle the funds in the individual accounts. The agreement provided that the accounts administrator was to terminate the individual accounts and allow employees to receive the funds using one of the options provided under the pension plan. Employees could not, however, decline the distribution. The PBGC also reduced the monthly benefits payable under the defined benefit portion of the plan for employees based on the amounts distributed from the separate individual accounts.
With the settlement agreement in place, the PBGC calculated the monthly benefits owed to each employee. Deppenbrook believed his benefit calculations were in error
Deppenbrook sought such review, suing the PBGC in district court here. After discovery was completed, both parties cross-moved for summary judgment. In ruling on the motions, the district court made three central holdings. First, it held that the PBGC properly interpreted ERISA and its own regulations by insuring only benefits that were nonforfeitable on the plan termination date. See Deppenbrook v. PBGC,
II. ANALYSIS
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Forsyth Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Sebelius,
We consider one matter before addressing Deppenbrook’s arguments. When we are called to interpret a statute that the agency under review is charged with administering, we typically apply Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC,
We first ask whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue, in which case we must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, however, we move to the second step and defer to the agency’s interpretation as long as it is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
NRDC v. EPA,
On appeal, Deppenbrook makes three arguments. First, he argues that he was entitled to shutdown benefits because he was constructively terminated before June 14, 2002, the date of the plan termination. Second, he contends that ERISA required the PBGC to insure and administer the funds in his individual account. And third, he claims that the PBGC unlawfully amended the provisions of his pension plan.
A. Shutdown Benefits
As already noted, shutdown benefits “are enhanced early retirement benefits for certain workers who are affected by a facility shutdown or business cessation.” RTI,
Deppenbrook attempts to circumvent this result by arguing that he was effectively terminated on May 1, 2002, the date he received the WARN Act notice.
Deppenbrook further posits that, under ERISA, the WARN Act notice period is a “required waiting period.” ERISA defines a nonforfeitable benefit as a benefit for which the plan participant has “satisfied the conditions for entitlement ... other than ... completion of a required waiting period.” 29 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(8) (emphasis added). Deppenbrook contends that he satisfied the conditions for shutdown benefits on May 1, the day he received the WARN Act notice. The period of time after he received the notice was simply a “required waiting period” that did not affect the vesting of his shutdown benefits on May 1. We disagree.
The WARN Act 60-day period is explicitly described by statute as a “notice” period, not a “required waiting period.” See 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a). Additionally, the text of ERISA forestalls Deppenbrook’s argument. The relevant provision reads:
“[Nonforfeitable benefit” means, with respect to a plan, a benefit for which a participant has satisfied the conditions for entitlement under the plan or the requirements of this chapter (other than submission of a formal application, retirement, completion of a required waiting period, or death in the case of a benefit which returns all or a portion of a participant’s accumulated mandatory employee contributions upon the participant’s death)....
B. Individual Accounts
Deppenbrook next contends that the PBGC misinterpreted 29 U.S.C. § 1321 in failing to insure his individual account, instead forcing Deppenbrook to receive a lump sum distribution of his individual account balance and then offsetting his monthly pension payable under the PBGC-administered defined benefit portion of his plan by an equal amount. But he acknowledges, as he must, that ERISA’s coverage does not extend to an “individual account plan,” 29 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(1), or to a “defined benefit plan, to the extent that it is treated as an individual account plan,” id. § 1321(b)(12). The PBGC points to these provisions as support for its decision not to administer Deppenbrook’s individual account plan. Deppenbrook responds that the governing provision is 29 U.S.C. § 1321(c)(1), which states that “the term ‘individual account plan’ does not include a plan under which a fixed benefit is promised if the employer or his representative participated in the determination of that benefit.” According to Deppenbrook, then, the PBGC had to insure his individual account because section 1321(c)(1) provides that it was not an individual account under ERISA. We are unpersuaded.
An individual account plan is defined as “a pension plan which provides for an individual account for each participant and for benefits based solely upon the amount contributed to the participant’s account, and any income, expenses, gains and losses” attributed to the account. Id. § 1002(34). Deppenbrook’s pension-plan benefit included “a defined benefit pension determined in accordance with Article 5” of the pension plan, as well as an “Individual Account Benefit based on the balance of the Individual Account of the Participant.” JA 410. Each individual account was simply “an account maintained on behalf of a” plan participant. Id. at 411. As explained earlier, supra page 168, the PBGC is statutorily prohibited from insuring this account.
Section 1321(c)(1) does not help Deppen-brook. That section provides that an individual account plan “does not include a plan under which a fixed benefit is promised if the employer or his representative participated in the determination of that benefit.” Deppenbrook’s individual account was not comprised of a fixed benefit determined by his employer. Instead,
Deppenbrook notes that, as a result of an earlier corporate merger, he had one pension plan — a defined benefit plan — with an individual account component. He believes that the individual account was part of the overall defined benefit plan and that the PBGC was thus obligated to insure the entirety of the plan. The individual account, however, is explained in a separate appendix to the defined benefit plan. Dep-penbrook does not point to any evidence that his individual account ever merged with his defined benefit account. Instead, it retained the essential features of an individual account throughout the course of his employment at RTI. Because the Congress wanted the PBGC to insure only those portions of a plan that promise a guaranteed benefit, both the text and purpose of ERISA make clear that the PBGC could not insure Deppenbrook’s individual account. The PBGC therefore properly interpreted ERISA and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in failing to insure Deppenbrook’s individual account.
C. Unlawful Amendment
Deppenbrook’s final argument is that the PBGC unlawfully amended his pension plan by requiring him to accept a distribution of his individual account (triggering an offsetting reduction in the payments to him under the defined benefit portion of the plan). Assuming arguendo that the PBGC in fact amended the plan, Deppen-brook cannot identify a statutory provision that bars the PBGC from doing so. He points to 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g), which says that a plan participant’s accrued benefit generally “may not be decreased by an amendment of the plan.” But see Hughes,
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is affirmed.
So ordered.
Notes
. Although Deppenbrook’s notice of appeal indicates that he "and those similarly situated” appeal the district court's judgment, Joint Appendix (JA) 180, Deppenbrook, as a pro se party, may represent himself only. See Georgiades v. Martin-Trigona,
. ERISA defines a plan administrator as "the person specifically so designated by the terms of the instrument under which the plan is operated.” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A)(i). If the instrument creating the plan does not specify an administrator, "the plan sponsor" is the administrator. Id. § 1002(16)(A)(ii).
. A "defined benefit plan” is broadly defined in ERISA as "a pension plan other than an individual account plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35).
. The Supreme Court has noted that “nonfor-feitable” and "vested” are synonymous in this context. Nachman Corp. v. PBGC,
. Deppenbrook was also involved in litigation in the Third Circuit. In Nicol v. USWA, he and other former RTI employees sued their union — the United Steelworkers of America (USWA) — for its conduct during the closing of the plant where they worked.
. The WARN Act "provides protection to workers, their families and communities by requiring employers to provide notification 60 calendar days in advance of plant closings and mass layoffs.” 20 C.F.R. § 639.1(a). The advance notice allows "workers and their families some transition time to adjust to the prospective loss of employment, to seek and obtain alternative jobs and, if necessary, to enter skill training or retraining that will allow these workers to successfully compete in the job market.” Id.
. Deppenbrook also appears to argue that he was effectively terminated when he received a 90-day advance notice of plant closure pursuant to a provision in the master collective bargaining agreement. This argument fails because, like the WARN Act notice, the 90-day advance notice period is not a "required waiting period” under ERISA. See infra pp. 173-74. In any event, even if the 90-day advance notice period were such a waiting period, Deppenbrook had no break in continuous service before the plan termination date.