delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Manuel Sesario DePineda, appearing pro se, appeals from the orders of the Fremont County District Court dismissing his petitions for habeas corpus relief. His sole claim on this appeal is that his conviction for first-degree murder is void for want of jurisdiction because the evidence presented at trial established that the crime took place entirely in Adams County and because he was tried in the City and County of Denver by the Denver District Attorney’s Office. 1 We affirm the district court’s denial of relief.
*1280 I
In 1989, a jury convictеd DePineda of first-degree murder based on his participation in the killing of David Martinez. Denver County prosecutors tried thе case in Denver District Court. Evidence at trial established that DePineda and three other members of the Denver chapter of the Brown Berets, a militant Mexiean-American organization, abducted Martinez, took him to a locatiоn on the Platte River in Denver, and shot him several times. Two shots to the head killed Martinez. Martinez’ corpse floated down the Platte River and into Adams County where police authorities discovered the body.
DePineda filed a direct aрpeal of his conviction, and the court of appeals affirmed. People v. DePineda, No. 88CA1900 (Colo. App. October 25, 1990) (not seleсted for publication). DePineda did not seek certiorari review with this court.
DePineda began filing numerous federal habeas corpus appeals and civil rights actions challenging his conviction. After his eleventh habeas corpus аppeal in four years, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals enjoined De-Pineda from filing any further appeals unless hе secured representation from a licensed attorney or received permission from the Chief Judge of the Tеnth Circuit.
DePineda v. Hemphill,
On June 9, 1995, DePineda filed a petition for habeas corpus relief with the Fremont County District Court, which the court denied. On August 14,1995, DePineda filed an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and the Fremont County District Court again denied relief. DePineda collectively appealed the denial of his June 9, 1995, and August 14, 1995, habeas corpus petitions to the court of appeals. On December 1, 1995, the court of appeals dismissed DePineda’s appeal with prejudice because that court lacked jurisdiction оver writs of habeas corpus. See § 13-4r-102(l)(e), 6A C.R.S. (1987). On December 14, 1995, we vacated the court of appeals order dismissing DePineda’s habe-as corpus appeal with prejudice and took jurisdiction over that appeal.
II
As a preliminary matter, we note that DePineda’s assertions of error should properly have been raised in a Crim.P. 35 motion. “A habeаs corpus petition [that seeks relief available under Crim.P. 35] should be treated as a Crim.P. 35 motion based upon the substantive constitutional issues raised therein, rather than [upon] the label placed on the pleading.”
White v. Denver District Court,
Ill
For the reаsons discussed below, De-Pineda’s claim is not properly before us for review.
A
Issues not raised before the district cоurt in a motion for postconviction relief will not be considered on appeal of the denial of that motion.
Whittington v. Bray,
B
Additionally, a defendant is рrohibited from using a proceeding under Crim.P. 35 to relitigate issues fully and finally resolved in an earlier appeal.
People v. Johnson,
On direct appeal, the court of appeals rejected the same claim of jurisdictional errоr asserted by DePineda on this appeal, stating that:
Defendant’s contention that the trial court lacked jurisdiction оver the cause is meritless.
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Defendant waived his claim of improper venue since he did not object at trial. Notwithstanding, the evidence supports the conclusion that an act in furtherance of the offense was committed in the county in which the defendant was tried. Therefore, venue was proper.
DePineda,
slip op. at 2-3 (citations omitted). DePineda’s сlaim on this appeal is a mere reformulation of his improper venue claim on direct appeal аnd, accordingly, DePineda is not entitled to postconviction relief.
See Bastardo,
IV
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the orders of the Fremont County District Court denying relief.
Notes
. DePineda’s claim is one of improper venue, although he does not label it as such. See Colo. Const, art. II, § 16; § 18-1-202, 8B C.R.S. (1986 & 1989 Supp.).