139 F. 236 | 2d Cir. | 1905
The Deyo was the fourth or outside vessel moored at the end of the pier at the foot of Ninety-First street. These craft lay parallel to the end of the pier, one outside of the other. None of them projected beyond the lower line of said pier, but all of them came out to said line, and all projected beyond the upper line of the pier. The tug had three barges in tow, two (the Sharon outside) on her starboard side and one on the port. The destination of the Sharon was the lower side of the Ninety-First Street Pier, where she was to unload into another barge already there. There are shoals off the entrance to the slip on the lower side of the pier, and the usual method of entering, especially on a flood tide, is to head upstream, then round to so that the tow points downstream, bringing the starboard barge alongside of the
It is contended that she is relieved from all liability for the consequences of that fault by the provisions of chapter 378, p. 314, Daws 1897, § 879, which reads as follows:
“It shall not be lawful for any vessel, canal boat, barge, lighter or tug to-obstruct the waters of the ¡harbor by lying at the exterior end of the wharves-in the waters of the North and East river except at their own risk of injury from vessels entering or leaving any adjacent dock or pier; and any vessel,, canal boat, barge, lighter or tug so lying shall not be entitled to claim or demand damages for any injury caused by any vessel entering or leaving any adjacent pier.”
The District Judge held that this statute did not apply, because “the Sharon was bound, for a brief time at least, for the end of the.
Since both vessels were in fault, the damages should be divided. The decree of the District Court is reversed, with costs of this court in favor of the Depew against the Deyo, and cause remanded with instructions to enter decree in favor of the Deyo against the Depew for one-half the damages, without costs.