1. In this еminent domain case the appellant condemnor contends that in three instances it was denied a thorough and sifting cross examination of English, the owner of prоperty condemned for the widening of Peachtree Street. As to ground 4, the complaint is that the witness was not allowed to be questioned about why the contiguous prоperty (separate parcels owned by the defendant and three neighbors) was surveyed as one tract. The witness answered that it was necessary to go to а beginning point some distance above his property, and that he had only his property surveyed. Thus, this question was answered. Grounds 6 and 7 referred to a residence somе distance away on Peachtree Road which the defendant testified he had purchased around 1960 and sold within the decade for $16,000. Objections were directed to questions regarding original purchase price and comparable lot size. In sustaining objections the court ruled that the properties were not comparable.
We find no error. "The right of cross examination is
*426
not abridged where cross examination of a witness as to irrelevant matters is not permitted.”
Ga. Power Co. v. Robertson,
2. Where the buildings in question had been razed prior to trial (their value being one of the issues for jury consideration), it was not error to admit phоtographs of the interiors, although they included inventory and other personal property not taken by the condemnor, the court cautioning the jury that these items wеre not to be considered by them, but only whatever light the snapshots might throw on the value of the property taken. Where the admissibility of evidence is doubtful, it is usually propеr to admit it with qualifying instructions.
Atlas Auto Finance Co. v. Atkins,
3. A witness for the defendant, stating his qualifications as an appraiser, named previous clients, including the Highway Department, аt which point appellant moved for a mistrial. The court denied the motion but admonished the witness and instructed the
*427
jury to disregard that part of his testimony. Where the court instructs the jury to disregard a voluntary statement by a witness, even though it may be objectionable and prejudicial, and cautions the witness to confine his answers directly to the quеstions asked, the denial of a motion for mistrial is usually proper. See
Grier v. State,
4. "In arriving at the value ... of a particular abutting lot and building thereon, evidence as to what the value of the lot would have been without the building, and evidence of the value of other abutting lots, was relevant.”
Hurt v. City of Atlanta,
5. "Evidence which ought properly to have been offered in chief, but which was then omitted through inadvertence, if offered with the rebutting evidence should be admitted if otherwise unobjectionable.”
Dennis v. Weekes,
6. Where on cross examinatiоn an appraiser was asked how he arrived at valuation and he replied, "replacement costs plus land value,” a motion to strike the testimony was prеmature. The answer was responsive to the question and does not establish that depreciation was
not
included. If the plaintiff wished to know whether depreciation was considered in arriving at the replacement cost stated, he should have questioned the witness to this effect. On the value of evidence of replacement cost generally see
State Hwy. Dept. v. Murray,
7. The court charged in part: "In estimating the *428 value of property taken for public use, generally it is the market value of the property which is to be considered. In estimating its valuе, all the capability of the property and all the uses to which it may be applied, or to which it is adapted, may be considered, and not merely the conditiоn it is in at the time and the use which it was then applied by the owner . . . The owner is to be paid just and adequate compensation for his property; that is, the value to him, not its value to the condemnor. The measure of damages for property taken by the right of eminent domain, being compensatory in its nature, is the loss sustained by the landowner, taking into consideration all the purposes for which the property is available. Generally speaking, the measure of damages is the market value of the property to be taken, and when this would give just and adequate compensation to the owner, this rule should be applied... the measure of damages for the part of the property actually taken by the Highway Department is the difference between the market value of the whole property just before the tаking and the market value of the remainder immediately after the taking . . .”
Objections were lodged against the inclusion of
value of the owner
and consideration of
all uses for which the property is adapted.
We find no error in the charge. It did not include the "unique and special use” instruction approved in
Housing Authority v. Troncalli,
8. The court refused two requests to charge offered by the plaintiff. The statement "rental income received *429 from the property condemned to determine market value is one of the acceptable methods for ascertaining just and adequate compensation,” told the jury nothing without going into methods of capitalizing a value fixed on such income; it was properly refused. The other merely instructed them that they could сonsider other property as to which testimony had been introduced to throw light on the issue of value; that what testimony on this subject was admissible was largely within the discretion оf the court, and its weight and credibility was for the jury. It did no more than make applicable to one facet of the evidence that which the judge had said in his instructions in chiеf.
9. No reversible error appears because the judge, who had previously charged that they should take into account the value of certain easement rights condemned by a determination of their market value, in a recharge on the subject rеferred to the "value of the property condemned, including the easement[s].” See
State Hwy. Dept. v. Owens,
10. The verdict was within the range of the testimony and is not as a matter of law excessive.
Judgment affirmed.