Thе instant appeal relates to the application of Code Ann. § 57-108, as amended (Ga. L. 1980, p. 1118), which provides that, effective July 1, 1980, “all judgments in this state shall bear interest upon the principal amount recovered at the rate of 12 per cent per year.” The issue presented for resolution is whether this statutory change in the rate оf interest on judgments applies to an outstanding judgment entered before the effective date of the 1980 amendment.
The facts necessary for a resolution of the issuе before us are uncontroverted. On December 7, 1979, the trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict in favor of appellee-condemnee in the amount of $23,810.00, which sum represented the difference between the amount of the jury verdict and the amount of appellant-condemnor’s initial deposit into court made pursuant to Cоde Ann. § 95A-605(b). The judgment further provided for “interest at the lawful rate of seven per cent per annum [on the $23,810.00] from the date of taking, May 11, 1978.” Subsequent to the entry of judgment, the appellant-condemnor appealed to this court and the judgment of the trial court was affirmed. See
Dept. of Transp. v. Delta Machine &c. Co.,
On April 22, 1981, prior to the withdrawal of the aforesaid funds, appellеe-condemnee filed a motion to amend the judgment entered on December 7, 1979, “so as to conform to [Code Ann. § 57-108, as amended] and to provide that the amount оf $23,810.00 . . . bear interest at the lawful rate of seven (7 %) per cent per annum from the date of taking, May 11, 1978, to July 1,1980, and (R-12)... thereafter ... at the lawful rate of twelve (12%) per cent per annum.” This motion was granted and the 1979 judgment was amended to reflect that from the effective date of the 1980 amendment to Code Ann. § 57-108 until the date of final deposit by the apрellant-condemnor, appellee-condemnee was entitled to receive interest at the rate of 12% per year on the principal owed of $23,810.00. Aсcordingly, the appellant-condemnor was ordered to pay appellee an additional sum of $942.60 representing interest on the judgment at 12 % rather than 7% from July 1, 1980, to April 16, 1981. Appellant-condemnor *253 appeals from the judgment as thus amended.
1. Interest in condemnation proceedings under Code Ann. Ch. 95A-6 is payable to the condemnee in two separate categories. As рart of the “just and adequate compensation” awarded, the final judgment should include interest, from the date of taking to the date of final judgment on that portion of the jury vеrdict which exceeds the amount previously paid into court — pre-judgment interest. The second category of interest in condemnation proceedings is payable on the principal amount of the judgment from the date the judgment is entered until the date the judgment is paid — post-judgment interest. Code Ann. § 95A-616. We note at the outset that as to judgments rendered
after
July 1, 1980, this court has held that “post judgment interest in a condemnation action should be awarded at the rate of 12 percent per annum, in accordance with Code Ann. § 57-108 (as amended by Ga. L. 1980, p. 1118)” and that this amendment “supersedes Code Ann. § 95A-616 insofar as the latter deals with the rate of interest applicable
after
final judgment.”
Dept. of Transp. v. Vest,
Appellant-condemnor contends that all rights and obligations of the parties in the instant case, including the right of appelleecondemnee to receive and the obligation of appellant-condemnor to pay post-judgment interest at the rate of 7 % per year, had vested prior to July 1, 1980, the effective date of the 1980 amendment to Codе Ann. § 57-108. Thus, appellant-condemnor further reasons that the action of the trial court in amending the judgment in question amounted to an impermissible retroactive application of the statute because that action affected previously vested rights and obligations.
The courts of other jurisdictions are divided on the issue of whether interеst on an outstanding judgment is affected by a subsequent change in the statutory rate. One line of cases views interest on judgments as a contractual obligation, while the majority of jurisdictions treat it as an obligation imposed by law as prescribed by the legislature. See Annot.
While recognizing the foreign authority to the contrary, we find that
Mayor &c. of Macon v. Trustees of Bibb County Academy,
Applying the holding of
Macon
to the instant case, we find that the 1980 amendment to Code Ann. § 57-108 increasing the rate of interest on judgments to 12% “was prospective in its operation, and did not embrace any debt due prior to its enactment.” If the Act of 1845 “amending” prior law with regard to the rate of interest on judgments was prospective in its application, it follows that, absent a cleаr legislative intent to the contrary, a subsequent amendment to the codification of that Act should likewise be applied prospectively only. Cf.
Maynard v. Marshall,
We find no merit in appellee-condemnee’s contention that application of the new rate of interest from the effective date of
*255
the amendment only would result in a prospective rather than retroactive application of the amendment. First, no language in the statute indicates a legislative intent that the amendment should be applied to the judgments already in existence prior to July 1, 1980. Had the legislature so intended it could easily have made the 12% rate applicаble to pre-existing judgments after the effective date of the amendment. Secondly, in our view, the construction urged by appellee-condemnee would result in a rеtroactive application of the new rate if applied to judgments which had already become final. “[A]mending statutes . . . are to be construed as intended to hаve operation on
future transactions
only ... [and not] to retroact upon [transactions]... in existence when the amending law was passed...” (Emphasis supplied.) Maynard,
For the foregoing reasons we conclude that the 1980 amеndment providing that judgments shall bear interest at the rate of 12% per year is to be applied only to judgments actually entered after the effective date of the statute. Accordingly, the trial court erred in amending the judgment of December 7, 1979.
2. The remaining enumeration of error has been rendered moot by the holding in Division 1 of this opinion.
Judgment reversed.