Opinion by
Plаintiff, the Colorado Department of Transportation (CDOT), appeals from an order denying its request for declaratory judgment against defendant, the City of Idaho Springs. We affirm.
I. Background
The city has adopted regulations under the Areas and Activities of State Interest Act (AASIA), sections 24-65.1-101 to -502, C.R.S.2007. It asserts that CDOT must comply with these regulations. CDOT disagrees.
To settle the question, CDOT filed an action in the district court seeking declaratory relief under C.R.C.P. 57. In support of its request, CDOT argued that it was exempt from the city's regulatory scheme for three reasons:
1. CDOT is not subject to regulations promulgated under the AASIA because it is not a "person" within the meaning of that law.
2. Alternаtively, the AASIA conflicts with, and implicitly has been repealed by, provisions in Title 48 of the Colorado Revised Statutes.
3. Insofar as they may apply to CDOT's core functions, the city's regulations are preempted by Title 48.
The district court denied CDOT's motion for declaratory relief and certified its order as a final judgment under C.R.C.P. 54(b).
II. Statutory Schemes
CDOT's arguments center on the relationship between the AASIA and Title 48. We briefly introduce these statutory schemes.
A. AASIA
The AASIA is a land use act. It allows local governments to designate certain areas of land and physical activities as "matters of state interest." §§ 24-65.1-201, -208, C.R.S. 2007. Onee a local government has designated an area or activity as a matter of state interest, it must develop regulations (consistent with statutory criteria) to protect the utility, value, and future of the land. See §§ 24-65.1-101(1)(a), 402, C.R.8.2007.
Any person who would develop land in a designated area or conduct a designated activity must obtain a permit from the local government. § 24-65.1-501(1)(а), C.R.S8.2007. If the proposed development or activity does not comply with the applicable regulations, the permit application must be denied. § 24-65.1-501(8)-(4), C.R.$.2007. Any person who does not obtain a permit may be enjoined from conducting the development or activity. § 24-65.1-501(6), C.R.S.2007.
B. Title 48
Title 48 governs part of the state's transportаtion system. Among other things, it places CDOT in charge of developing the state transportation plan. See § 48-11-1101, C.R.93.2007. It also requires CDOT to "construct and maintain all roads comprising the state highway system." § 48-2-102, C.R.S. 2007.
Title 48 ensures that the state's transportation planning process complies with 23 U.S.C. §§ 134-185 and 23 C.F.R. pt. 450 so that Colorado may be eligiblе for federal funding. See, eg., 28 U.S.C. § 184(k)(5) (fed *493 eral funds may be withheld for failure to certify compliance with federal law). It divides the state into transportation planning regions and allows each regional commission to prepare a regional transportation plan. § 43-1-1108, C.R.S$.2007. CDOT then integrates the regional plans into a statewide plan. See §§ 48-1-1101, -1102(7), -1108(B), C.R.9$.2007; see also 28 U.S.C. § 185(g).
III. Discussion
CDOT contends that the district court erroneously rejected its arguments in denying declaratory relief. Because these arguments present issues of statutory interpretation, we review de novo. Bostelman v. People,
For the following reasons, we conclude that the district сourt properly rejected CDOT's arguments.
A. CDOT Is a Person
As noted, the AASIA requires any "person" to obtain a permit before developing land in an area of state interest or conducting an activity of state interest. § 24-65.1-501(1)(a). We conclude that CDOT is a "person" under the act.
The AASIA defines "person" as follows: "As used in this article, unless thе context otherwise requires ... 'Person' means any individual, limited liability company, partnership, corporation, association, company, or other public or corporate body, including the federal government, and includes any political subdivision, agency, instrumentality, or corporation of the statе." § 24-65.1-102(6), C.R.8.2007.
CDOT recognizes that it qualifies as a "person" under this statutory definition. But it contends that this definition does not control. Relying on the introductory clause of section 24-65.1-102, CDOT argues that the definition is inapplicable because "the context otherwise requires."
We reject this argument.
1. Meaning of "Context"
We begin by considering this question: What did the legislature mean when it said, "unless the context otherwise requires"? What information constitutes "the context"?
As with all statutory terms, we construe "context" according to its plain and ordinary meaning. See Vigil v. Franklin,
We therefore focus on statutory text in determining whether to disregard the definition of "рerson" set forth in section 24-65.1-102(6).
2. Application
Contrary to CDOT's view, the relevant statutory language indicates that CDOT is a person under the AASIA.
As noted, the AASIA allows local governments to regulate various activities of state interest. § 24-65.1-402(1), C.R.98.2007. One of these activities is the "[slite selection of arterial highways and interchanges and collector highways." § 24-65.1-208(1)(e), C.R.S. 2007.
Because the site selection of arterial highways is an activity often conducted by CDOT (under the provisions of Title 48), the context suggests that the legislature intended to subject CDOT to some degree of local regulatory control under the AASIA. See also § 24-65.1-104(8), C.R.S.2007 (for purposes of the AASIA, an arterial highway is a "limited-access highway ... constructed under the supervision of [CDOT]"). If CDOT were
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exempt from local control, parts of the AA-SIA would be meaningless. See Colo. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Menor,
3. Absurdity
CDOT predicts that if we apply the statutory definition (and thereby subjеct it to regulation under the AASIA), cities and counties will adopt burdensome schemes that will lead to protracted delays, loss of federal funding, loss of uniformity in the highway system, and other procedural and financial hardships. It suggests that, to avoid such absurd results, we must recognize that it is not a "person" under the AASIA.
We reject this suggestion. Although we must avoid interpretations that lead to absurd results, see Alvarado v. People,
Every legislature must grapple with the problem of unintended consequences. If a statute gives rise to undesirable results, the legislature must determine the remedy. Crooks v. Harrelson,
Here, the potential results do not justify a departure from the AASIA's unambiguous language. CDOT's dire predictions may not come true, possibly because local governments may choose to act reasonably. But even if CDOT's forecast is accurate, the situation will not be so difficult as to shock the general or moral common sense. .The problem, if it arises, is one that the lеgislature is well equipped to address.
B. The Schemes Do Not Conflict
CDOT advances this alternative argument: To the extent that the AASIA would allow local governments to regulate CDOT's activities, the act has been implicitly repealed. CDOT's position rests on two premises: (1) by allowing local control over CDOT's core functions, the AASIA necessarily conflicts with the transportation scheme set forth in Title 48; and (2) if the two schemes conflict, Title 48 prevails because its provisions are more specific and more recently enacted.
We conclude that CDOT's argument fails on its first premise because the two schemes do not necessarily conflict.
If pоssible, we will construe statutes to avoid inconsistency. City of Florence v. Pepper,
Here, we perceivе no manifest or irreconcilable conflict between the AASIA and the statutes that govern the transportation planning process, sections 48-1-1101 to -1105, C.R.S.2007. Although Title 48 vests CDOT with broad authority over the planning and construction of highways, the exercise of this authority does not necessarily require that CDOT be free of every conceivable regulation under the AASIA. Cf. City & County of Denver v. Bd. of County Comm'rs,
Indeed, the AASIA and Title 48 are easily reconciled because the schemes advance compatiblе goals. Although CDOT has the final word over the state's transportation plan, it must consider local concerns "including examination of the impact of land use decisions on transportation needs and the exploration of opportunities for preservation of transportation corridors." § 48-1-1104(5)(b), C.R.S. 2007. Similarly, locаl governments must ex-erceige their regulatory powers under the AA-SIA in a manner that does not conflict with state transportation plans. See, eg., § 24-65.1-204(Bb)(c), C.R.S.2007 ("Arterial highways and interchanges and collector high *495 ways shall be located so that ... [dlirect conflicts with adopted local government, regional, and state mаster plans are avoided.").
C. Local Regulation Is Not Preempted
CDOT contends that Title 48 preempts the city's ability to regulate transportation planning or construction. We perceive no express or implied preemption and do not consider the issue of operational preemption.
1. Introduction
Ordinarily, we would preface our prеemption analysis by determining whether the local regulations are within the seope of the local government's legislative authority. See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Bowen/Edwards Assocs., Inc.,
The purpose of the preemption doctrine is to establish a priority between potentially conflicting laws enacted by various levеls of government. Id. A state statute may preempt a local regulation in three ways: (1) "the express language of the statute may indicate state preemption of all local authority over the subject matter"; (2) "preemption may be inferred if the state statute impliedly evinces a legislative intent to completely occupy a given field by reason of a dominant state interest"; and (8) "a local law may be partially preempted where its operational effect would conflict with the application of the state statute." Id. at 1056-57.
Because CDOT has not applied for a permit, we have no reason to consider the validity of any particular regulation. See City & County of Denver v. Bd. of County Comm'rs,
2. Express Preemption
The legislature has recognized that state and local governments both have an interest in transportation. See §§ 24-65.1-203, 43-1-1101. Because transportation is a matter of shared state and local interest, we will recognize a legislative intent to preempt local authority only if that intent is expressed in unequivocal language. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Bainbridge, Inc.,
Contrary to CDOT's argument, section 43-1-1101 does not express an unequivocal intent to preempt all local regulation of transportation issues. Thе statute indicates that CDOT is "the proper body, in cooperation with regional planning commissions and local government officials, for developing and maintaining the state transportation planning process and the state transportation plan." § 48-1-1101. But the statute does not foreclose all locаl regulation; it remains open to the possibility that the statewide planning process will leave some questions unresolved and that local governments may decide those matters by regulation.
3. Implied Preemption
"[Plreemption may be inferred if the state statute impliedly evinces a legislative intent to completely occuрy a given field by reason of a dominant state interest." Bowen/Edwards,
Although Title 48 places CDOT in charge of the statewide planning process, it does not suggest-by its language, purpose,
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or scope-that the legislature intended to displace all local regulation of transportation issues. Title 43 gives local governments a voice in the statewide planning process, but it does not foreclose other methods of control, such as regulation under the AASIA. See Bаinbridge,
Any doubt on this score is answered by the AASIA. We cannot conclude that CDOT was meant to occupy the entire field of transportation planning when the legislature has indicated that local governments may regulate the site selection of airports, transit terminals, and highways. See §§ 24-65.1-208, - 402(1). CDOT's role in transportation planning does not necessarily conflict with, or dominate, the city's interest in preserving the use and value of land. See Bowen/Edwards,
4. Operational Preemption
Operational conflict arises when a local interest is implemented in a way that materially impedes or destroys a state interest. Bowen/Edwards,
We acknowledge that local governments could enact regulations that would impair CDOT's ability to accomplish its duties, and we recognize that such regulations could be invalid under the doctrine of operational preemption. But we cannot determine whether the city has enacted such a regulation because CDOT has not developed a record on this issue. See id. at 1060 ("Any determination that there exists an operational conflict between the county regulations and the state statute or regulatory scheme ... must be resolved on an ad-hoe basis under a fully developed evidentiary record.").
The order is affirmed.