442 So. 2d 950 | Fla. | 1983
Lead Opinion
This cause is before the Court because of apparent conflict between the opinion of the district court below, State, Department of Revenue v. Johnston, 422 So.2d 935 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), and opinions of two other district courts, State, Department of Revenue v. Markham, 426 So.2d 555 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), and State, Department of Revenue v. Adkinson, 409 So.2d 53 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). We accepted jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution. Because we find this cause distinguishable on its facts from those cited in conflict, we discharge jurisdiction.
All three cases arose in the wake of the Florida legislature’s passage of the Truth in Millage (TRIM) Bill requiring county property appraisers to appraise property at just valuation, that is, one hundred per cent of fair market value. In the case of Fla-
After several extensions of time in which to file, the final tax roll was submitted to the Department of Revenue on May 29, 1981 and accepted. On June 17, 1981, the property appraiser filed a motion in the circuit court to have the interim roll declared the final roll, pursuant to section 193.1145(8)(d), Florida Statutes (Supp.1980), which provides:
However, the court, upon a determination that the amount to be supplementally billed and refunded is insufficient to warrant a separate billing or that the length of time until the next regular issuance of ad valorem tax bills is similarly insufficient, may authorize the tax collector to withhold issuance of supplemental bills and refunds until issuance of the next year’s tax bills. At that time the amount due or the refund amount shall be added to or subtracted from the amount of current taxes due on each parcel, provided that the current tax and the prior year’s tax or refund shall be shown separately on the bill. Alternatively, at the option of the tax collector, separate bills and statements of refund may be issued. In addition, the Court may find that the implementation and administration of a reconciliation between the interim and final rolls or that the preparation of a final roll is not in the best interest of the public. Upon so finding, the court may enter an order confirming taxes levied against interim assessments to be final for the year in question; property appraisal adjustment board petitions may then be filed with respect to interim assessments, and delinquent provisional taxes shall then be subject to the provisions of chapter 197.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The circuit court conducted a full eviden-tiary hearing, at which the Department of Revenue alone opposed the motion; no Fla-gler County taxpayer opposed confirmation of the interim roll. Testimony was presented, primarily by county officers, showing that reconciliation would require disruption of the county’s adopted budget, with a resulting cut-back in services and capital projects; that the county would lose $1.4 million in state revenues which would not be immediately replaceable from increased county revenues; that because of limited staff and resources the process of reconciliation would halt preparation of the 1981 tax roll, which was projected as being in full compliance with the TRIM Bill requirements. In short, the undisputed testimony presented the picture of a county caught on a treadmill of “catching up” on just valuation without being able to achieve the goal mandated by the legislature absent fiscal chaos.
The trial judge in weighing these facts, “considered the impact of revenues on a State wide basis” and “weighed impact upon the economy and the orderly flow of Government functions in Flagler County.” In light of the legislature’s own statement of policy regarding adoption of interim rolls as final — “It is the intent of the legislature that no undue restraint shall be placed on the ability of local government to finance its activities in a timely and orderly fashion.” § 193.1145(1), Fla.Stat. (Supp. 1980) — the court found that “the ‘best interest of the public’ whether limited to the County of Flagler or the general public of the State of Florida, would be best served by confirming the taxes levied against the interim assessments to be final in 1980.”
The facts recited above are not analytically the same as those in Adkinson.
In Markham, the Fourth District Court of Appeal recognized many of the same factors raised by Flagler County, but found they did not, in Broward County, pose a threat of governmental fiscal and administrative chaos, a finding of fact necessary to the granting of the Flagler County’s motion for certification. We note that the Fourth District, in dicta, stated that the interpretation given the statute by the Fifth District rendered the statute unconstitutional by permitting certification of a tax levied against less than just valuation. However, on rehearing, that court acknowledged “the trial court’s inherent power to head off such [governmental] crisis.” 426 So.2d at 566.
Because we find no conflict, we discharge jurisdiction.
It is so ordered.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I dissent to the ruling of the Court. I would quash the decision of the district court of appeal and disapprove its rationale. Article VII, section 4 of the Florida Constitution requires that assessments of all property for ad valorem taxation purposes be at “just valuation.” The requirement of “just valuation” was also in predecessor provisions of our. state constitutions before 1968. Art. IX, § 1, Fla. Const. (1885); art. XII, § 1, Fla. Const. (1868). The language was held by this Court to require assessment of property at full market value as early as 1945. See Root v. Wood, 155 Fla. 613, 21 So.2d 133 (1945). There are no expressed exceptions in article VII, section 4, and the only judicially recognized implied exception to the full-market-value requirement has arisen only in cases where relief was needed to avert governmental catastrophe. Slay v. Department of Revenue, 317 So.2d 744 (Fla.1975); State ex rel. Butscher v. Dickinson, 196 So.2d 105 (Fla.1966); State ex rel. Glynn v. McNayr, 133 So.2d 312 (Fla.1961). None of those cases, however, was like this case, because in none of those cases was there an available final tax roll assessing property at its full value. In the present case the property appraiser submitted a final tax roll for approval by the Department of Revenue and it was approved on May 29, 1981. Then, on June 17, 1981, the appraiser filed the complaint seeking to have the interim roll declared as the final roll. Thus a final roll assessing property at full market value existed when the court decided to declare the interim roll as final. That existing, approved, and valid final roll should have been ordered adopted and used.
My review of the record convinces me that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s factual conclusions and its decision to relieve the property appraiser of the duty to use the valid final roll. This case is not substantially different from State Department of Revenue v. Markham, 426 So.2d 555 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) and State Department of Revenue v. Adkinson, 409 So.2d 53 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Thus the failure to use the valid final full-market value assessment roll is being excused on the ground of inconvenience. I therefore dissent.
