51 Conn. App. 100 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1998
Opinion
The defendant freedom of information commission (commission)
On July 6,1995, Ramesh Mali, a member of the Nepalese Special Olympics team, was reported missing while swimming at Hammonasset Beach state park in Madison. On July 10, 1995, after an extensive rescue and recovery effort by state and federal agencies, Mali’s body was found off Meigs Point. An autopsy conducted the following day determined that the cause of Mali’s death was asphyxia due to submersion.
Immediately following the incident, the complainants
A hearing was held by the commission on January 24, 1996.
The plaintiff appealed to the trial court from the commission’s decision. The trial court determined that there was little or no evidence presented that a crime had been committed and that the plaintiff had, as early as July 19, 1995, foreclosed the possibility of a potential prosecution.* ***
“Judicial review of an administrative agency’s action is governed by the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), General Statutes § 4-166 et seq., and the scope of that review is limited. . . . When reviewing the trial court’s decision, we seek to determine whether it comports with the [UAPA]. . . . We look to see if the [trial] court reviewing the administrative agency acted unreasonably, illegally, or in abuse of discretion.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dortenzio v. Freedom of Information Commission, 48 Conn. App. 424, 430, 710 A.2d 801 (1998).
“Conclusions of law reached by the administrative agency must stand if . . . they resulted from a correct application of the law to the facts found and could reasonably and logically follow from such facts.” Board of Labor Relations v. Freedom of Information Commission, 43 Conn. App. 133, 137, 682 A.2d 1068 (1996), aff'd, 244 Conn. 487, 709 A.2d 1129 (1998). “The court’s ultimate duty is only to decide whether, in light of the evidence, the [agency] has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse of [its] discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Windham v. Freedom of Information Commission, 48 Conn. App. 522, 526, 711 A.2d 738, cert. denied, 245 Conn. 913, 718 A.2d 18 (1998). Neither we nor the trial court may retry the case or substitute our own judgment for that of the commission. See Shew v. Freedom of Information Commission, 44 Conn. App. 611, 616, 691 A.2d 29 (1997), aff'd, 245 Conn. 149, 714 A.2d 664 (1998).
Section 1-19 (b) (3) (C) creates an exemption to the disclosure otherwise required by the Freedom of Information Act. Under that exemption, disclosure is not
In this case, the record discloses, as the commission correctly points out, that the plaintiffs evidentiary claim had its basis in a showing that the completed records had not yet been reviewed by the division of criminal justice and that the office of the state’s attorney had not yet closed the case. The statute, however, does not require that an investigation be closed before disclosure is required. Additionally, the statute is not satisfied and, consequently, information is not exempted from disclosure by the mere good faith assertion that the matter to which the information pertains is potentially criminal. As we have stated, there must be an evidentiary showing that the actual information sought is going to be used in a law enforcement action and that the disclosure of that information would be prejudicial to that action.
The trial court improperly concluded, therefore, that “the law does not require disclosure of records of investigations where it is not yet known if a crime has been committed or whether a prosecution will ensue, as long as there is a good faith basis for the assertion.” The trial court, misinterprets the clear language of the statute.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment consistent with this opinion.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
The defendants Tracey Thomas and T. Dennie Williams, staff reporters, and the Hartford Courant were the complainants in this matter before the commission. Only the commission has appealed. The commission is a state agency empowered to investigate alleged violations by public agencies of the Freedom of Information Act, General Statutes § l-18a et seq.
General Statutes § 1-19 (b) provides in relevant part: “Nothing in sections 1-15, 1-18a, 1-19 to 1-19b, inclusive, and 1-21 to l-21k, inclusive, shall be construed to require disclosure of . . . (3) records of law enforcement
Because we conclude as we do on this issue, we find it unnecessary to address the other issues raised by the commission.
See footnote 1.
All records concerning the entire incident were eventually made available to the complainants on or about November 8, 1995. Although these records were provided prior to the hearing, we conclude that this matter is not moot. “[WJhere an order issued by the commission is prospective in nature and impacts obligations of the plaintiff in the future with respect to disclosure requests from members of the public, an appeal from that order is not
In its brief, the plaintiff states: “The plaintiff does agree with the defendants, however, that the trial court could have sustained the appeal in view of the conclusions of law it reached.”
The commission found that from the outset of the investigation, the plaintiff treated it as a potential criminal matter, but abandoned that view as of August 16, 1995.