Mother and father separately appeal from a judgment of the juvenile court taking jurisdiction over their two-year-old daughter, T, under ORS 419B.100(1)(c),
Parents live together. They admitted at the hearing that mother is an alcoholic, that that condition presents a potential risk to T if she is left alone with mother, and that father lacks a custody order that would prevent mother from asserting control over T. Parents asserted, however, that they have voluntarily implemented a safety plan that prevents mother from parenting T alone and, for that reason, there is no risk of harm to T.
In assuming jurisdiction over T and establishing the wardship, the juvenile court found that mother’s unresolved substance abuse presents a danger to T, and found further that, although father “has taken appropriate protective actions to not allow mother to be alone with the child,” in the absence of an order granting father sole legal custody of T, he is unable to protect T from mother. See ORS 419B.100(1)(c) (juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction in any case involving a person who is under 18 years of age and “[w]hose condition or circumstances are such as to endanger the welfare of the person or of others [.]”); but see Dept. of Human Services v. R. L. F.,
On appeal, parents challenged the juvenile court’s determinations. The state now advises the court that father has obtained an order granting him sole legal custody of T and that, on the state’s motion, the juvenile court has dismissed jurisdiction and terminated the wardship. The state seeks to dismiss the appeal, asserting that the juvenile court’s dismissal of jurisdiction and termination
As the Oregon Supreme Court recently stated in State v. Hemenway,
Parents assert that C. W. J. was wrongly decided or is distinguishable. In C. W. J., the father appealed a jurisdictional judgment entered on the ground that the father did not have a custody order and therefore could not protect the child from the child’s mother, who presented a risk of harm to the child. After receiving notice that the juvenile court had entered a judgment terminating jurisdiction and the wardship, we dismissed the appeal as moot. We distinguished our opinions in State v. S. T. S.,
Mother and father assert that, despite the juvenile court’s dismissal of jurisdiction and termination of the wardship, and, despite our opinion to the contrary in C. W. J., there are collateral consequences in a case such as this that make the appeal justiciable. They point to possible consequences both outside of and within the child welfare system.
Outside of the agency, parents assert, there is a social stigma associated with a judicial determination of jurisdiction. DHS responds that juvenile court records are generally confidential and not available to the public, ORS 419A.255(1) (records of a prior adjudication are maintained in the juvenile court, but are marked “confidential” and may be viewed only by the juvenile court judge, court staff, the child, the parents or guardians, service providers, and DHS), and, for that reason, are unlikely to give rise to any social stigma.
We agree with DHS on this point. It is possible that the fact of parents’ involvement with DHS itself could result in social stigma, but that stigma would not be alleviated by a reversal of the underlying judgment. Additionally, jurisdiction has already been dismissed by the juvenile court. In light of the confidentiality of DHS and juvenile court records, we conclude that the possibility of a social stigma associated with the underlying jurisdictional judgment itself is minimal and speculative. See S. T. S.,
Mother argues that, although juvenile court and DHS records are technically confidential, there are many circumstances when those records are subject to disclosure. For example, citing administrative rules, mother points out that teachers, school volunteers, health and child care providers, and contractors for the Oregon Health Authority, are required to submit to background checks and, in those circumstances, the jurisdictional
Mother asserts, further, that in the absence of a reversal of the underlying jurisdictional judgment, DHS will not reconsider its “founded” referral, which will remain on the parents’ record within the agency, and subject to the agency’s consideration on future referrals. Mother asserts that the presence of a “founded” referral in a DHS client file might also affect the records DHS is permitted to transmit to third parties. See generally OAR 413-010-0045(2)(a)(B) (requiring disclosure of client records “if no court order prohibits the disclosure and the client has authorized the Department in writing to disclose the records to the third party”). Because of those potential collateral consequences, mother contends, it is important that parents have an opportunity to challenge within DHS any “founded” referrals, and they assert that a reversal of the jurisdictional judgment is a necessary prerequisite.
The state responds that DHS’s internal records include a history and prognosis that would not be affected by overturning either a “founded” referral or the underlying judgment establishing jurisdiction. Thus, the state asserts, there would be little practical effect in this case to reversing the underlying jurisdictional judgment when the juvenile court has already dismissed jurisdiction and terminated the wardship.
We recognize that in L. B., we concluded that the potential consequences of an outstanding jurisdictional judgment like those cited here by parents were sufficient “collateral, practical effects” to make the appeal a live controversy.
Here, no such factual findings underlie the jurisdictional judgment. The trial court expressly found that father “has taken appropriate protective actions to not allow Mother to be alone with the Child, including having his mother or other safe, responsible adults act as providers for her.” But that fact alone was not, in the court’s view, sufficient to eliminate the risk to the child. The record shows that, because father did not have sole legal custody of the child, there was nothing to prevent mother from breaching the safety plan and gaining control over the child. In addition to the undisputed findings regarding mother’s substance abuse and her risk of harm to the child, the dispositive paragraph of the judgment recites, simply:
“In [State v. A. L. M.,232 Or App 13 , 16,220 P3d 449 (2009)] cited by the State, the Court of Appeals concluded that a lack of custody order without other evidence that the other parent is a present danger to the child is not sufficient to form a basis for jurisdiction. In this case, there is evidence that Mother presents a danger to the Child’s welfare due to her unresolved substance abuse. Therefore, the Father is unable to protect the Child from the Mother without an order granting him sole legal custody.”
Thus, the underlying factual bases for the jurisdictional judgment were the undisputed fact of mother’s substance abuse and the fact that, without a custody order granting him sole legal custody, father lacked the ability to protect the child. Whether an underlying jurisdictional judgment presents collateral consequences will necessarily depend on the particular circumstances of the case, and whether the record shows more than a “mere possibility” of adverse consequence as a result of the challenged action — -“a speculative consequence does not prevent a case from being moot.” See State v. Hauskins,
For the same reasons, we reject mother and father’s contention that this court should vacate the juvenile court’s underlying jurisdictional judgment. See City of Eugene v. PERB,
Appeal dismissed as moot.
Notes
ORS 419B.100 provides, in part:
“(1) *** [T]he juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction in any case involving a person who is under 18 years of age and:
“(c) Whose condition or circumstances are such as to endanger the welfare of the person or of others!.]”