In this juvenile dependency case, father appeals from a dispositional judgment in which the juvenile court determined that the Department of Human Services (DHS or the department) had made reasonable efforts to eliminate the need for removal of the child, D, from the home. Although he does not challenge the juvenile court’s disposition per se (“return to parent” with a concurrent plan of adoption), father argues that the court’s “reasonable efforts” conclusion was erroneous because the department did not contact him in the seven months between the filing of the jurisdictional petition and the disрositional hearing and provided him with no services during that period. DHS responds that, under the totality of the circumstances, its efforts were reasonable: Mother (who is not a party in this appeal) received extensive services, and DHS requested that officials in Kentucky, where father was living at the time, conduсt a home study to determine whether D could be placed with him. Because we agree with father that DHS’s efforts were not reasonable, we reverse and remand.
We review findings of fact (for example, what DHS did or did not do) for any evidence, and conclusions of law (in particular, whether the historical faсts constitute reasonable efforts) for legal error. In April 2011, when D was four years old, DHS became involved with the family due to, among other things, father’s anger management issues and the parents’ inability to meet D’s basic needs. Thereafter, but before the formal proceedings in this case began, father
In March 2012, four months after the court placed D in protective custody, DHS, pursuant to the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children (ICPC), requested that Kentucky officials complete a home study of father’s home (he was living with his mother at the time). The record does not show whether the study was ever conducted. Nonetheless, on May 29, 2012, the juvenile court entered a judgment asserting jurisdiction over D, as to father, based on father’s admission to the following facts:
“[Father] has an anger management issue that poses a thrеat to the safety of said child and requires evaluation and recommended treatment.
“Yes, I do go [sic] anger issues but I have been going to anger management to be a better father to my child [D].”
After the court asserted jurisdiction over D, DHS continued to provide services to mother and D, but it did not provide any services to father or have any contact with him until shortly before the dispositional hearing.
That hearing occurred on June 15, 2012. The only contested issue was whether DHS had made “reasonable efforts * * * to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the ward from the home since the date of the last court review.”
“I will say that DHS had a lot of contact with this family prior to the court’s involvement with them, including various referrals, which the Affidavit of Protective Custody delineates, that includes that in May 2011,1 personally spoke to [father] in regard to a referral and he stated at that time that he was going to leave the state. I told him at that time, prior to a legal case, that he needed to complete some sort of anger management if he was going to be around his child, and he left.
“After that—this is mostly just by reviewing the case file as I am not the caseworker right now. But I can see that in July 2011, after [father] left to go to Kentucky, the [mоther’s consent to have D placed in a foster home] was signed [by mother] and the child was placed voluntarily through DHS.
“It’s my understanding, in looking through the court documentation, that the legal case did not occur until November 2011, and at that time—I can’t speak to how much contact the agency had with [father], I’m not sure how much information we knew about his whereabouts except the general state that he was in.
“But that’s—that’s my attempt to argue the reasonable efforts finding.”
The juvenile court also received, as an exhibit, a DHS report that contained a “check the box” list of DHS’s efforts to return D to each parent. As to mоther, DHS provided parental training, a psychological evaluation, assistance with transportation and housing, supervised visitation, and referrals for services for D. In addition, the caseworker testified that D
“is a very challenging, very special needs child and he’s been involved with [In-Home Safety and Reunificatiоn Services] with his mother that we had continuing communication with, 30 day face-to-face contacts which aren’t articulated here, transportation for the mother, bus passes for visits, mental health referral and communication with that provider, going to * * * meetings every one to two weeks, continued communiсation with the foster parent regarding his special needs, and the list goes on.”
As to father, the DHS “check the box” report listed only one effort: “ICPC home study referral (2) for child’s family.” The caseworker testified that DHS did not have any information about the ICPC aside from the fact that a referral was made, but father’s attorney reported that father had not been contacted by Kentucky officials, “though apparently [father’s] mother has.” Father also stated that he had voluntarily enrolled in an anger management program in Kentucky.
The trial court ultimately determined that, although DHS’s delay in initiating the ICPC was unreasonable, DHS nonethеless made reasonable efforts when “viewed in the entirety, not just focused on one parent or services to one parent or a particular service to one parent,” and in consideration of the challenge posed by father residing out of state. The juvenile court subsequently entered the dispositional judgment, approving the case plan for reunification with a parent, with the concurrent plan of adoption. The judgment contained a check-the-box entry indicating that DHS “has made * * * reasonable efforts * * * to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the ward from the homе since the date of the last court review.”
On appeal, father argues that DHS’s failure to contact him in the seven months between the filing of the petition and the dispositional hearing renders its efforts unreasonable as a matter of law and that the efforts that DHS did make—requesting a home study through the ICPC and providing services to mother and D—were not reasonable efforts to reunify D with father. DHS responds that its efforts were reasonable when viewed in the totality, which, DHS argues, is the correct analysis at the dispositional stage of a juvenile dependency case.
It is the policy of the State of Oregon to offer “apрropriate reunification services” to parents when a child has entered protective custody and a dependency petition has been filed. ORS 419B.090(5). Pursuant to that policy, DHS generally is required to make “reasonable efforts” to make possible a child’s safe return home while the dependenсy case is pending. ORS 419B.340(1); ORS 419B.476(2)(a). To ensure compliance, the juvenile court is required to determine whether DHS has satisfied that mandate at the dispositional hearing, which generally occurs 60 days after the petition is filed. ORS 419B.305(1); ORS 419B.340(1).
“whethеr the department has made reasonable efforts * * * to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the ward from the home. If the ward has been removed prior to the entry of the order, the order shall also include a determination whether the department has made reasonable * * * effоrts to make it possible for the ward to safely return home.”
ORS 419B.340(1).
Father contends that the evidence in the record does not support a determination that DHS made reasonable efforts to eliminate the need for the removal of D or to make it possible for D to return home safely, because DHS provided no services to father other than requesting the ICPC. We agree with father that, based on the sparse record, the evidence does not support a determination that DHS made “reasonable efforts” to “eliminate the need for removal” of D or “to make it possible for [D] to safely return home” as to father. Thе only effort that DHS made as to father during the seven months between the filing of the jurisdictional petition and the dispositional hearing was to
Nevertheless, DHS contends that the juvenile court’s reasonable efforts determination under ORS 419B.340(1) does not require that DHS’s efforts be reasonable specifically as to father; rather, DHS argues, its efforts should be viewed under the totality of the circumstances, considering all of DHS’s efforts regarding mother and D.
In response, father cites State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Williams,
DHS argues that Williams and D. L. H. are distinguishable because the “reasonable efforts” findings in those cases were made in the context of the juvenile court changing the permanency plans from reunification to adoption, not at the dispositional stage. To make such a change, the juvenile court must
“determine whether [DHS] has made reasonable efforts * * * to make it possible for the ward to safely return home and whether the parent has made sufficient progress to make it possible for the ward to safely return home. In making its determination, the court shall consider the ward’s health and safety the paramount concerns.”
ORS 419B.476(2)(a) (emphasis added). Thus, DHS contends, changing the permanency plan requires thе court to measure DHS’s “reasonable efforts” in terms of each parent’s progress, whereas a “reasonable efforts” finding at the dispositional stage does not require the court to analyze DHS’s efforts directed at each parent individually.
We disagree. Although the type and sufficiency of effort thаt DHS is required to make depends on the particular circumstances of each case, Williams,
Because DHS’s efforts to eliminate the need for removal and make it possible for D to safely return hоme were not reasonable as to reunification with father, the court erred in determining that DHS made reasonable efforts. We therefore reverse and remand.
Reversed and remanded.
Notes
The juvenile court’s judgment cites ORS 419B.185 as the authority for its “reasonable efforts” finding. However, that statute applies to a juvenile court’s findings at a shelter hearing. Here, DHS had already been awarded custody of the child at the time of the dispositional hearing. Thus, ORS 419B.340 is the applicable statute.
The juvenile court is also required to determine at a permanency hearing whether DHS has made reasonable efforts to make possible a child’s safe return home; the hearing generally occurs 12 months after the petition is filed. ORS 419B.470(2); ORS 419B.476(2)(a).
“Active efforts,” as opposed to “reasonable efforts,” were necessary because the child was an Indian Child as defined in 25 USC § 1903(4) (2006). ORS 419B.476(2).
The parties agree that the ultimate disposition—return to parent, with a concurrent plan of аdoption—should not he disturbed on remand. They also agree, however, that if we conclude, as we have, that DHS did not make reasonable efforts, a new judgment so specifying is necessary, because changing the reasonable efforts conclusion has collateral consequences regardless of whether the approved plan is changed. Regulations implementing the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA), Pub L 105-89, 111 stat 2115 (1997) (codified in scattered sections of USC titles 2 and 42), provide that, in order for a child to qualify for federal foster care payments, there must be a judicial determination of reasonable efforts to prevent the child’s removal from the home and to reunify the family. 45 CFR § 1356.21(b)(1). Further, should the department move to the concurrent plan of adoption, a conclusion that the department has not provided father with services to “make it possible for the ward to safely return home” will delay the filing of a termination of parental rights petition, thereby allowing father more time to make necessary progress. ORS 419B.498(2)(c).