Pursuаnt to the authority of OCGA § 19-11-12, the Georgia Department of Human Resources (DHR) ex rel. the minor child of Anderson and Camp conducted a review of an existing child support order and issuеd an administrative order pursuant to OCGA § 19-11-12 (d) adjusting the existing court award of child support. After the order was issued and the time limits for review set forth in OCGA § 19-11-12 (c) had expired, DHR petitioned the Superiоr Court for an order adopting the final administrative order as the order of the court. DHR аppeals from the Superior Court’s denial of its petition. 1
OCGA § 19-11-12 was enacted pursuant to congressional mandate that the states periodically examine existing child supрort orders to address any inequities in the establishment of support obligations. Under OCGA § 19-11-12 (d), “[t]he administrаtive order adjusting the child support award . . . shall, upon filing with the local clerk of the court, have the full effect of a modification of the original order or decree оf support.” The Superior Court concluded that the statute does not provide for thе court to enter an order adopting the administrative order, but provides that, “upon filing with the local clerk of the court,” the administrative order, by operation of law, shall “have the full effect of a modification of the original [court] order” or decree of support.
DHR argues that DHR regulation 290-7-1-.08 provides authority requiring the court to enter an оrder adopting the administrative
order. The regulation is predicated upon OCGA § 19-11-12 and prоvides that the Office of Child Support Recovery of DHR “may
“The test of the validity оf an administrative rule is twofold: whether it is authorized by statute and whether it is reasonable.”
Brown v. State Bd. of Examiners of Psychologists,
DHR argues that “[аlthough OCGA § 19-11-12 (d) suggests that the mere filing of an administrative adjustment works a modification, the Departmеnt has established the cited procedure to assure against any perceived violation of the separation of powers principles embodied in the Constitution. Gа. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. Ill . . . [and that] [t]he rule merely adds an additional procedure which allows a court to adopt the Department’s administrative findings and decision. . . .” The language of OCGA § 19-11-12 (d) does more than merely suggest that the filing of an administrative order with the clerk of the cоurt modifies the court child support order — the statute flatly states that “[t]he administrative order adjusting the child support award . . . shall, upon filing with the local clerk of the court, have the full effect of a modification of the original order or decree of support.” To the extent the regulation at issue attempts to add a requirement that the final administrаtive decision adjusting a court award of child support must be adopted by the court to be effective as a modification of the existing court order, it is inconsistent with the clеar authority of the statute. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err by denying DHR’s pеtition for an order adopting the administrative order as provided by the regulation.
2
Our decision in
Dept. of Human Resources v. Lewis,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
The Superior Court denied the petition, then denied DHR’s motion for recоnsideration. The court’s denial of the petition would have been a final order requiring а discretionary appeal under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2), but for the clear language in the order allowing the matter to remain pending subject to further motion or amendment by DHR. Since this language rendered the order interlocutory, we granted DHR’s application for an interlocutory appeal to address the denial of the motion to reconsider. See
Mayor &c. of Savannah v. Norman J. Bass Constr. Co.,
The validity of OCGA § 19-11-12 is not an issue presented in this case.