DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, Petitioner,
v.
Jeffrey DeGROOT, Respondent.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Judson Chapman, General Counsel, and Jason Helfant, Assistant General Counsel, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Miami, for Petitioner.
Bruce H. Denson of Bruce H. Denson, P.A., St. Petersburg, for Respondent.
SALCINES, Judge.
The Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV) seeks second-tier certiorari review of the circuit court order which granted a petition for writ of certiorari. The circuit court acting in its appellate capacity overturned the suspension of Jeffrey DeGroot's driver's license privileges following an arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol. We conclude that the circuit court committed a legal error which violated a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice when it held the evidence was insufficient to support the suspension of DeGroot's license.
On August 20, 2006, DeGroot was arrested for DUI. He cooperated and submitted to a breath test on an Intoxilyzer 8000. Based on the results of that test, DeGroot's driving privilege was suspended. See § 322.2615(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2006). At an administrative formal review, the hearing officer was only presented with a Breath Test Result Affidavit to support *238 the determination that DeGroot's breath-alcohol level was 0.08 or higher. A Final Order of Suspension was issued by DHSMV based upon the evidence before it. This order was the subject of DeGroot's petition for writ of certiorari to the circuit court.
A three-judge circuit court panel considered the petition for writ of certiorari. The circuit court was convinced by DeGroot's argument that the suspension should be overturned because pursuant to State, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Garcia,
This court considered the evidentiary requirements of rule 15A-6.013(2) in Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Snelson,
In a second-tier certiorari proceeding, the scope of this court's review is limited to whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process and whether it applied the correct law. See Miami-Dade County v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc.,
Petition granted.
FULMER, J., and GALLEN, THOMAS M., Associate Senior Judge, Concur.
NOTES
Notes
[1] The 2005 and 2006 version of the rule state:
(2) The hearing officer shall consider any report or photocopies of such report submitted by a law enforcement officer, correctional officer or law enforcement or correctional agency relating to the arrest of the driver, the administration or analysis of a breath or blood test, the maintenance of a breath testing instrument, or a refusal to submit to a breath, blood, or urine test, which has been filed prior to or at the review. Such reports, which shall be in the record for consideration by the hearing officer, include:
(a) The uniform traffic citation or notice of suspension issued to the driver;
(b) An affidavit stating the officer's grounds for belief that the person arrested was in violation of s. 316.193;
(c) An affidavit of any breath, urine or blood test refusal, submitted by a law enforcement officer;
(d) The results of any breath or blood test documenting the driver's alcohol level.
(e) The officer's alcohol influence report or a description of the field sobriety test;
(f) Any video or audio tape of the driver incidental to the arrest, including any field sobriety test performed or attempted to be performed by the driver;
(g) Notice of Commercial Driver's License/Privilege Disqualification, HSMV Form 72005;
(h) Certification of Blood Withdrawal, FDLE/ICP Form 11;
(i) Breath Test Result Affidavit, FDLE/ICP Form 14;
(j) Blood Test Result Affidavit, FDLE/ICP Form 15; or
(k) Agency Inspection Checklist, FDLE/ICP Form 24.
(Emphasis added). We note that rule 15A-6.013(2) was amended effective March 9, 2007, to eliminate the enumerated list of documents that is the source of dispute in the present case. 2007 FL Reg. Text 67611. All references to the rule in this opinion relate to rule 15A-6.013 in effect from 1997 prior to the 2007 amendment.
