258 So. 2d 340 | Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 1972
Plaintiff has appealed a final judgment on the pleadings rendered in favor of defendant. It is contended that the trial court erred in holding that defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Applying the controlling principles applicable to a consideration of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the following undisputed facts are established.
Charles F. Jimerson was adjudged mentally incompetent by the County Judge’s Court of Duval County and was admitted as a patient to the Florida State Hospital for the Insane at Chattahoochee on May 14, 1935, where he remained until the time of his death on January 16, 1971. Appellee, Maude J. Harrell, was duly appointed ad-ministratrix of the decedent’s estate in which plaintiff filed its claim for the cost of care, maintenance, and treatment furnished the decedent while a patient at the state hospital. Appellee filed her written objection to the claim, whereupon this suit was instituted.
Appellant’s claim represents what is alleged to be the reasonable charges and expenses incurred in furnishing care, maintenance, and treatment to the incompetent between August 1, 1955, the effective date of the statute on which the claim is based, and January 16, 1971, the date on which the decedent died.
The legislature of 1955 enacted Chapter 29909, effective August 1, 1955, which contained the following provision respecting payment for the care of committed incompetents, to wit:
“Reasonable charges and expenses for the care, maintenance and treatment of committed incompetents under any pro*341 vision of this Section and reimbursement for such charges and expenses that may be advanced by the State or any political subdivision thereof, shall be a lawful charge against the person and estate or property, real, tangible or intangible, of said incompetent in this state. Such charges and expenses may lawfully he paid from the estate of the said incompetent by any authorized personal representative, parent, or legal guardian of said incompetent; provided, however, that the payment thereof, in advance or otherwise, shall never be a prerequisite to the care, maintenance and treatment of any committed incompetent under any circumstances whatsoever. In cases of commitments to State hospitals or institutions, such charges and expenses shall be fixed or approved by the Board of Commissioners of State Institutions of Florida. In the case of commitments to private hospitals or to public hospitals or institutions other than State hospitals or institutions, such charges and expenses shall be fixed or approved by the board of county commissioners of the county wherein the patient is or has been committed. Any suit or action instituted by the State of Florida or any political subdivision thereof for the recovery of such charges and expenses against the person or his duly authorized personal representative, parent, or legal guardian, shall be brought by the State Attorney of the Judicial Circuit in which said incompetent was committed, or by the Office of the Attorney General or both such State Attorney and Office of the Attorney General, as the case may be, as party plaintiff.”1
Appellee contended and the trial court held, on the authority of the decision rendered by the Third District Court of Appeal in the case of Kirk v. Wiggin,
Our Supreme Court, in the decisions rendered by it in Warren v. Pope
A careful examination of the above-quoted statute, under which appellant asserts its claim, reveals no language or pro
The general rule followed by a majority of courts in this country is to the following effect:
“As will be shown in succeeding subdivisions of this section, the legislatures may permit the public authorities to recover expenses incurred in the maintenance of an insane person from him or his estate, his relatives, or other public authorities. Such recovery may be authorized with respect to persons committed prior to the passage of the statute, and claims due at time of its passage, as well as those to become due thereafter. ”6
In the case of State v. Romme
“It has been suggested in support of the claim that the statute ought not to be given a retroactive construction; that recovery by the state of payment made prior to the passage of the act would be so unfair and unjust that it must be presumed not to have been within the legislative contemplation. This argument is based upon a premise more superficially plausible than sound. Reimbursement is sought from the unfortunate’s estate left at her decease and not otherwise. That estate was primarily chargeable for her care and support, and was directly benefited by the state’s contribution to that end. The amount remaining in the defendant administrator’s hands represents, in part at least, that benefit. What unfairness or injustice there can be in compelling repayment out of it of the state's contribution for the unfortunate’s welfare we are unable to discover. The consequence of such repayment will, of course, be that the estate to be divided among the expectant heirs, who permitted the unfortunate to become a public charge, will be diminished in amount, but the superiority of their position in either law or morals over that of the state is not apparent.”
“We conclude from the foregoing authorities that the liability of defendant for the maintenance of his wife commenced on January 1, 1952, the effective date of the Mental Health Act of 1951, and the ‘Saving Clause’ made clear that any maintenance charges were not to be applied retroactively and did not confer any prospective exclusive privilege or immunity from charges to patients who might have been inmates of a state institution prior to January 1, 1952. The only vested right possessed by defendant or his wife was that either or both could not be charged for any prior maintenance.”
In reaching its decision the court in the Sal-mar case cited with approval the decision of Department of Public Welfare v. A’Hern
“ ‘It is thus obvious from the statute that liability of the patient, his estate, or the specified responsible person exists at all times, either from the effective date of the act or from the admission of the patient, whichever occurs later. * * * The principle of making retroactive charges for the furnishing of such care by a public body is not new, but is a common-law remedy. * * * No provision of the Mental Health Code provides that such services are gratuitous where an ability to pay appears, and no officer can form such a gratuitous intention.’ ”
In the case sub judice the trial court based its judgment squarely upon the decision rendered by the Third District Court of Appeal in the case of Kirk v. Wiggin, supra. The facts in the Kirk case are substantially identical in all material respects with those in the case we now review. There the State sought to recover against a solvent incompetent the cost of care and maintenance furnished her while a patient at the state hospital for the insane. She was committed to the hospital on March 31, 1936, and apparently continued to be a patient in that hospital at the time the action was brought against her. The State of Florida sought to recover from the incompetent and her legal guardian the cost of maintenance and care furnished her from August 1, 1955, the effective date of the statute which permitted recovery of such expenses from solvent incompetents, down to the date the suit was filed. In affirming the action of the trial court in dismissing the complaint with prejudice, the Third District Court held:
“At the time the incompetent was committed, there was no statute providing that the State could recover reasonable costs for care and maintenance. Without such being in effect on the date of the adjudication of incompetency, there is no cause of action by the State-pursuant to a statute enacted after the party [who is committed] whose estate is to be charged was declared incompetent. See: Heidt v. Caldwell, Fla.1949, 41 So.2d 303; Warren v. Pope, Fla.1953, 64 So.2d 564; Warren v. Rhea, Fla.1953, 64 So.2d 567.”10
We are not unmindful of the sympathy which the pitiful condition of a mental incompetent invariably attracts. The policy of the law generally tends to treat the welfare of such unfortunate persons with compassion and mercy. We are not here dealing, however, with an indigent lunatic for whose benefit state-supported mental institutions were originally created but with a person financially capable of paying for his own support and maintenance in the same manner as he would have been required to do had he been entirely sane.
In reaching our conclusion it should be emphasized that we are not giving a retroactive effect to the statute in question but, on the contrary, are giving it a prospective application only. Any mental incompetent, whether solvent or insolvent, who was committed to a state mental institution prior to August 1, 1955, enjoyed a financial windfall for all expenses incurred by the state in furnishing him care and maintenance prior to August 1, 1955. This fortuitous circumstance does not create in him a vested right to continuous free care and support for the remainder of his life. Since the enactment of the 1955 statute, such previously committed patient should and must be placed on the same basis as any other solvent incompetent who is thereafter committed to the same institution and is receiving the same care, maintenance, and treatment. So long as each is financially able to pay the reasonable cost incurred on his behalf at the hospital, he should be required to do so without discrimination or arbitrary differences in their status as paying or nonpaying patients. To hold otherwise would be to create an artificial and unreasonable classification between equally solvent patients, giving rise to a violation of the due process and equal protection clause of our state and federal constitutions.
In conclusion, we regretfully are impelled to take a position of disagreement with our sister court of appeal in its decision rendered in Kirk v. Wiggin, supra, and the judgment appealed herein based thereon must be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
Reversed and remanded.
. F.S. § 394.22(13), F.S.A.
. Kirk v. Wiggin, (Fla.App.1971) 242 So.2d 725.
. Warren v. Pope, (Fla.1953) 64 So.2d 564.
. Warren v. Rhea, (Fla.1953) 64 So.2d 567.
. Chapter 14527, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1929.
. 44 C.J.S. Insane Persons § 75(2) (a), p. 178. See also South Carolina Mental Health Commission v. May, 226 S.C. 108, 83 S.E.2d 713; State v. Stone (Tex.Civ. App.) 271 S.W.2d 741; In re Wright’s Estate, 172 Misc. 215, 14 N.Y.S.2d 953.
. State v. Romme (1919) 93 Conn. 571, 107 A. 519, 520.
. Department of Mental Health v. Salmar, 82 Ill.App.2d 450, 226 N.E.2d 511, 513.
. Department of Public Welfare v. A’Hern, 14 Ill.2d 575, 153 N.E.2d 22, 24.
. Kirk v. Wiggin, supra note 2 at 726 of 242 So.2d.