In this case, we must decide whether the doctrine of “constructive voluntary quit” constitutes a ground for disqualification from unemployment benefits. We conclude that it does not apply as a bar to recovery of unemployment compensation.
Maria M. Taylor, appellee, applied for unemployment benefits after she was terminated from her employment with the County Commissioners of Frederick County, Maryland (“the County”). The County discharged Taylor because her Frederick County driving permit, which she needed in order to perform her job, was revoked after Taylor was convicted for driving while intoxicated. The Board of Appeals (“the Board”) of the Department of Economic and Employment Development (“DEED”), 1 appellant, held that Taylor’s loss of her driver’s permit constituted a breach of “a condition of continued employment ... required by her employer,” and amounted to a “constructive voluntary quit,” thus disqualifying her from receiving benefits under the “voluntarily leaving work” provision of the Maryland Unemployment Insurance Act, Md.Code (1991, 1995 Supp.), § 8-1001(a) of the Labor & Employment Article (“L.E.”).
Taylor sought review of the Board’s decision in the Circuit Court for Washington County. It reversed, holding that Taylor’s actions did not amount to “voluntarily leaving work.” The Board has now appealed to this Court; appellee did not *258 submit a brief or appear at oral argument. 2 The Board presents the following issues for our consideration:
I. Is the Board’s determination that Appellee voluntarily left her employment by failing to meet a condition of the employment correct as a matter of law?
II. Is the Board’s finding that Appellee voluntarily quit her employment supported by substantial evidence?
We hold that the Maryland Unemployment Insurance Act does not authorize the denial of benefits to a claimant on the ground of “constructive voluntary quitting.” Therefore, we answer both questions in the negative and shall affirm the circuit court.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
Since 1986, Taylor was employed as a laborer for the County. Her job entailed manual work for the County Department of Parks and Recreation, including a variety of parks maintenance and custodial tasks. As part of her job, she was required to operate a County vehicle, both in the parks and on public roads. Therefore, as a condition of her employment, Taylor was obligated to have a valid Maryland driver’s license and, in addition, a “Frederick County Employee Driving Permit.” In order for employees to retain their driving permits, the County required that the employees have fewer than six points on their driving records.
In January 1989, Taylor was stopped on suspicion of driving while intoxicated. She refused to submit to a chemical test and her driving record indicates that she was not convicted of any alcohol-related offense. Nor was her license revoked, notwithstanding her refusal to take the chemical test. Instead, the Motor Vehicle Administration (“MVA”) restricted her driver’s license to employment and educational purposes. *259 This apparently occurred because Earl A. Eyler, the County parks superintendent, wrote a letter to the MVA, dated February 17, 1989, informing it that Taylor needed to have a license to perform her job satisfactorily. Nevertheless, by March 1989, the County discovered that Taylor had accumulated four points on her driving record, due to prior speeding violations. Consequently, her County driving permit was placed on probationary status, and Taylor was warned that she would be terminated if her County driving permit were revoked.
Several years later, on February 2, 1993, Taylor was again arrested for driving while intoxicated and, on May 20, 1993, she was convicted. Pursuant to Md.Code (1977, 1993 Repl.Vol, 1995 Supp.), § 16—402(a) of the Transportation Article (“Transp”), twelve points were assessed on her driving record. Nevertheless, the MVA again allowed Taylor to keep her license, and restricted her driving to employment and educational purposes. See Transp. § 16-405.
During a routine check of driving records on July 20, 1993, the County discovered the points that had been assessed against Taylor’s license as a result of the alcohol offense, and it revoked her County driving permit. But, for reasons that are not apparent from the record, the County continued to retain Taylor as an employee. In February 1994, however, Taylor was ordered to clear the points from her license within ninety days, which she had no authority to do. Consequently, on May 27, 1994, Eyler sent Taylor a letter terminating her employment, effective the following day. The letter stated, “[t]he ability to drive is essential to satisfactorily perform the job of parks laborer,” and added, “Only a temporary accommodation of this requirement can be made for this position. I have made this temporary accommodation for a reasonable period of time.”
Taylor filed for unemployment benefits under L.E., Title 8. A claims examiner concluded that “insufficient evidence has been presented to show any misconduct connected with the work.” The claims examiner thus allowed Taylor’s claim.
*260 The County contested this determination and, on July 15, 1994, an evidentiary hearing was conducted before a hearing examiner. The hearing examiner found that, “as a condition of her employment,” Taylor was “required to possess ... the ability to obtain ... a Frederick Employee County Permit.” The hearing examiner also found that the “claimant became aware of the [Cjounty’s regulation that an accumulation of more then [sic] six points on a drivers [sic] record can result in disciplinary action leading to termination of employment.” The hearing examiner further noted that, although the claimant had the “legal right” to drive to and from work, she could not drive a vehicle while at work. Therefore, the hearing examiner determined that the County “was justified in discharging the claimant for her inability to continue in her work classification for lack of a valid County drivers [sic] permit. ...”
Although the hearing examiner concluded that Taylor’s conduct constituted “misconduct connected with employment,” within the meaning of L.E. § 8-1003(a), the hearing examiner rejected any finding of gross misconduct. The hearing examiner said:
Accordingly, I cannot find that the claimant’s violation of the employer’s rules concerning driving privileges rises to the level of gross misconduct---- But, clearly, the claimant’s conduct in driving while intoxicated is a matter which is connected with the work, because she knew or should have know [sic] that the accumulation of driving points could result ip termination from employment, and that she would be in violation of the employer’s rules and regulations if such would occur.
Taylor was thus denied unemployment benefits for ten weeks.
Both Taylor and the County appealed to the Board. After the Board reviewed the record, it issued an opinion in which it adopted the hearing examiner’s findings of fact, but disagreed with the hearing examiner’s legal conclusion. The Board determined that Taylor’s failure to retain her County driving permit constituted a “constructive voluntary quit” within the *261 meaning of L.E. § 8-1001(a). Accordingly, the Board disqualified Taylor from receiving benefits.
Taylor then sought judicial review in the circuit court, which held that the evidence was insufficient to support the conclusion that Taylor had voluntarily left her employment. It thus reversed the Board’s decision, and remanded the case to the Board for a determination of whether Taylor’s actions constituted misconduct under L.E. § 8-1003(a) or gross misconduct under L.E. § 8-1002(a).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard for our review is established by L.E. § 8-512(d), which states:
In a judicial proceeding under this section, findings of fact of the Board of Appeals are conclusive and the jurisdiction of the court is confined to questions of law if:
(1) findings of fact are supported by evidence that is competent, material, and substantial in view of the entire record; and
(2) there is no fraud.
In reviewing the decision of an administrative agency, our review is generally limited to a determination of: (1) whether the agency applied the correct principles of law; and (2) whether the agency’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence.
See Caucus Distributors, Inc. v. Maryland Securities Commissioner,
Our review of the Board’s findings of fact is deferential. In the absence of fraud, our inquiry is whether the
*262
findings are supported by substantial evidence and are reasonable, not whether they are right.
Bulluck v. Pelham Wood Apartments,
In contrast, our review of the Board’s decisions on issues of law is not deferential.
Columbia Road Citizens’ Association v. Montgomery County,
With these principles in mind, we shall analyze the issues presented.
DISCUSSION
I.
The Board disqualified Taylor from receiving benefits pursuant to L.E. § 8-1001(a)(1), which states: “An individual who otherwise is eligible to receive benefits is disqualified from receiving benefits if the Secretary finds that unemployment results from voluntarily leaving work without good cause.” 3 Yet the Board does not contend that Taylor actually “voluntarily [left] work” or quit. Rather, it contends that, based on her conduct, Taylor essentially put the employer in the position of having to terminate her because, without a County driving permit, she no longer met the criteria for employment. Thus, according to the Board, she “constructively” voluntarily left work due to the drunk driving conviction that resulted in the loss of the County driving permit that she needed for her employment.
We begin our analysis with a discussion of the doctrine of constructive voluntary leaving. It is a theory under which an employee who is actually discharged or terminated by the employer is nonetheless deemed to have “constructively” voluntarily quit. 4 Under the doctrine, the employee’s actual intent to terminate the employment is not relevant. The Board apparently first adopted the doctrine in 1984 in Queen *264 v. Maryland Lumber Co., No. 910-BR-84 (November 21, 1984). 5 Later, in Hoffman v. Maryland Car Care, No. 643-BH-93 (April 13, 1993), the Board described the principle as follows: “[W]hen a claimant has failed to abide by a condition of employment (in this case possession of a valid drivers [sic] license) the absence of which leaves the employer absolutely no choice but to terminate the claimant’s services, the claimant has ‘constructively’ voluntarily quit his employment without good cause or valid circumstances.” (Emphasis added).
While the states have split on the issue of whether to recognize the doctrine of constructive voluntary leaving,
see generally
76 Am.Jur.2d
Unemployment Compensation
§ 107 (1992); 81 C.J.S.
Social Security
§ 225b (1977), the Board’s articulation of the principle of constructive voluntary leaving is similar to the expressions of the doctrine by courts of those states that have recognized it. In
Steinberg v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board,
A claimant is said to have constructively quit his job when, although discharged by the employer, the claimant himself set in motion the chain of events which resulted in the employer’s having no choice except to terminate him.
All three of the following elements must be present before it can be said that a claimant has constructively quit his job.
1. The claimant voluntarily committed an act which
2. made it impossible for the employer to utilize his services, and
3. the claimant knew or reasonably should have known the act would jeopardize his job and possibly result in the loss of his employment.
*265
The issue is one of first impression in Maryland, although the Board asserts that the Court of Appeals “recognized” the doctrine of constructive voluntary leaving in
Allen v. Core Target City Youth Program,
[W]e can envision limited circumstances where, although the employee was shown to have been factually and technically discharged, it might be evident that he in fact undertook to terminate the employment relationship and thus be held to have “constructively” voluntarily left his employment. This is particularly true where an employee is shown to have abandoned his employment by pursuing a course of conduct which resulted in his severance from employment.
*266
Dictum
is, of course, worthy of consideration, but it is not binding. In
State v. Wilson,
Furthermore, any notion that the
Allen
Court recognized the doctrine of constructive voluntary leaving was put to rest by the Court in
Sinai Hospital of Baltimore, Inc. v. Department of Employment and Training;
This case squarely presents for resolution the question of the viability of the doctrine. There is evidence in the record that Taylor’s County driving permit was a condition of her employment, that the County permit was essential to Taylor’s ability to work, and she lost this permit through her voluntary act of drinking and driving. There was also testimony that Taylor was terminated because, without her driving permit, she was unable to perform the job for which she was hired. These facts fit within the concept of constructive voluntary leaving as articulated by the Board and the courts of other states. Therefore, we must determine whether the doctrine is encompassed in L.E. § 8-1001(a)(l). In essence, this is an issue of statutory construction.
II.
The principles of statutory construction are well settled. The polestar of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the Legislature.
Jones v. State,
A litigant who asks us to ignore the plain language of the statute bears an “exceptionally heavy” burden.
Union Bank v. Wolas,
We also read the language of the statute in the context that it appears, considering surrounding statutes, the statutory scheme as a whole,
see Outmezguine v. State,
In the context of unemployment insurance law, because of its remedial nature, its provisions are liberally construed in favor of eligibility for benefits.
Sinai Hospital of Baltimore, Inc. v. Department of Employment and Training,
III.
We turn next to the language of L.E. § 8-1001(a)(1). The provision is relatively straightforward. The statute disqualifies claimants from receiving benefits if their unemployment “results from voluntarily leaving work without good cause.” The plain language of the statute suggests that a claimant is disqualified under its terms only when the employee intentionally terminates his or her employment or affirmatively undertakes or elects to do so. See The American Heritage Dictionary at 762 (1983) (defining “voluntary,” inter alia, as “[a]rising from one’s own free will,” “acting by choice and without constraint or guarantee of reward,” “[n]ot accidental; intentional”).
The question is whether an employee, who is involuntarily discharged by the employer based on the employee’s voluntary act, such as driving while intoxicated, has voluntarily quit his or her employment. Clearly, a discharge is not the same thing as a voluntary quit.
See MacFarland v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review,
Two decisions of the Court of Appeals support a plain meaning approach to L.E. § 8-1001(a)(1):
Allen v. Core Target City Youth Program, supra,
In
Allen,
the Court held that a teacher who was discharged after she “contumaciously” refused to prepare for courses that she had undertaken to teach had not “voluntarily” left work. The Court recognized that “[t]he term ‘leaving work voluntarily’ is not anywhere defined in the statute and absent some imperative reason for enlarging its meaning the term ‘should be construed as having its ordinary and commonly-accepted meaning.’ ”
Id.,
The Court also considered dictionary definitions of the word “voluntary”:
“1. Proceeding from the will, or from one’s own choice or full consent; produced in or by an act of choice; ... 2. Unconstrained by interference; unimpelled by another’s influence; spontaneous; acting of oneself; free ... 3.a. Done by design or intention; intentional; purposed; intended, not accidental ... b. Made or given of one’s one free will; ____” [Webster’s New International Dictionary of the English Language at 2858 (2d ed. 1944) ] “[djone by design or intention, intentional, purposed, intended, or not accidental ... Intentionally and without coercion” [Black’s Law Dictionary at 1746 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968) ]
4; 4; 4< 4s 4: 4:
“of one’s own free will” [Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary at 998 (1967) ]
Id.,
After a brief discussion of the case law from this and other jurisdictions, the Court concluded:
*270 As we see it, the phrase “due to leaving work voluntarily” ... has a plain, definite and sensible meaning, free of ambiguity; it expresses a clear legislative intent that to disqualify a claimant from benefits the evidence must establish that the claimant, by his or her own choice, intentionally, of his or her own free will, terminated the employment. If an employee is discharged for any reason, other than perhaps for the commission of an act which the employee knowingly intended to result in his discharge, it cannot be said that his or her unemployment was due to “leaving work voluntarily. ”
******
In this case the record does not establish that the claimant of her own volition and from her own choice undertook to terminate her services. Although it certainly cannot be challenged that her conduct precipitated her severance, based upon the factual findings that she contumaciously refused to prepare herself to perform the duties she had undertaken, the record clearly demonstrates that the employer was the party who elected to and did, in fact, terminate the relationship when she was discharged. She did not quit or otherwise “voluntarily” leave.
In view of the plain meaning of the statutory language, and the clear intention of the Legislature, we cannot conclude, as a matter of law, upon the factual findings made by the referee, as adopted and affirmed by the Board, that the appellant’s unemployment was “due to [her] leaving work voluntarily, without good cause.” We hold-that the factual circumstances resulting in her termination did not bring her case within the provisions of Art. 95A, § 6(a). To construe the statute otherwise would render the distinction maintained by the Legislature between unemployment due to “leaving work voluntarily” and unemployment resulting from discharge as completely meaningless and the Legislature, in our view, did not intend such a result.
Id., 275
Md. at 79-80,
The Court of Appeals’s recent decision of
Wills v. Jones, supra,
is also instructive. There, the Court construed the
*271
term “voluntarily impoverished” in Maryland’s child support law, Md.Code Ann., Fam.Law §§ 12-201(b)(2)
&
12-204(b) (1991 & Supp.1995). In interpreting the word “voluntarily,” the Court discussed
Allen
at length and stated, “Our inquiry here is similar to that made in the unemployment context.”
Wills,
It is salient that, in
Wills,
the Court distinguished the intent to become impoverished from the intent to commit the act that necessarily resulted in impoverishment. Thus, the Court rejected the mother’s claim that the father had voluntarily impoverished himself because he purposely committed a criminal act that resulted in his impoverishment: “The contention that Jones’s incarceration and subsequent impoverishment should be considered ‘voluntary’ because he made the free and conscious choice to commit a crime stretches the meaning of the word beyond its acceptable boundaries. Jones’s incarceration can only be said to be ‘voluntary’ if it was an intended result.”
Id.,
The Board attempts to rely on a “foreseeability” argument to support its view that this case is governed by the doctrine of constructive voluntary quit. It argues that, although Taylor “may not have intended the ultimate consequences of her decision to drive drunk,” her conduct was tantamount to a voluntary quit because “it was reasonably foreseeable that her decision to engage in this conduct would result in a conviction, the accumulation of 12 points on her driving record, and the loss of the County driving permit.” This is a mirror image of an argument that the Court of Appeals also rejected in
Wills.
Rejecting as “without merit” the child support obligee’s contention that an incarcerated obligor had “voluntarily” impoverished himself because it was foreseeable that he would be imprisoned if he committed a crime, the Court said: “[T]he foreseeability of an action’s possible consequences is not suffi
*272
cient to conclude that the actor brought those consequences about ‘voluntarily.’ ”
Id.,
The structure of the Maryland unemployment insurance law also supports our conclusion that the doctrine of constructive voluntary leaving is not embodied in the statutory scheme. The doctrine denies benefits to claimants because of improper conduct on their part. But the Code
already has
provisions that disqualify claimants because of their misdeeds. Specifically, L.E. § 8-1002 provides a total disqualification for “gross misconduct,”
8
L.E. § 8-1002.1 provides a total disqualification for “aggravated misconduct,”
9
and L.E. § 8-1003 provides a partial disqualification for “misconduct.”
10
The General As
*273
sembly’s enactment of statutes to disqualify claimants because of their conduct indicates that it considered the question of what behavior warrants a sanction and drafted the statutory scheme accordingly.
See Allen, 275
Md. at 80,
The foregoing cases, coupled with the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “voluntary” and the structure of the statutory scheme, lead inexorably to the conclusion that the statute disqualifies persons who depart their employment by their own free choice; it does not disqualify persons who commit a voluntary antecedent act that eventually results in discharge. Instead, the issue of whether an employee has “voluntarily le[ft] work” within the meaning of L.E. § 8-1001(a)(1) hinges on the employee’s intent.
We conclude that it is a necessary element of “voluntarily leaving work” that the employee have the
intent
to terminate the employment relationship voluntarily.
Swanson v. State,
We recognize, however, that an employee’s conduct, both verbal and non-verbal, may, under some circumstances, constitute a voluntary quit, even if the employee does not expressly terminate the employment. Thus, it is not necessary for the employee actually to say, “I quit,” or words to that effect, in order to be deemed to have voluntarily left work. What is critical, however, is that the employee’s conduct must demonstrate the intent to quit voluntarily. Therefore, if an employee is to be deemed to have voluntarily left work based on his or her non-verbal conduct, it must be established that the employee engaged in the conduct with the intent to terminate the employment relationship.
A claimant’s intent or “state of mind is a factual issue for the Board to resolve.”
Dep’t. of Economic and Employment Develop. v. Hager,
*275 In this case, however, the Board did not make any findings concerning appellee’s intent to terminate employment. 11 Rather, the Board, in adopting the hearing examiner’s findings, determined only that the claimant “knew or should have known” that an accumulation of points would constitute a violation of the employer’s rules and “could” result in the discharge. That the employee could be fired does not mean that she would be fired. Indeed, the hearing examiner found that the employee was permitted to work for one year following her alcohol-related driving offense.
The case of
Maryland Employment Security Board v. Poorbaugh,
We also find unpersuasive two “public policy” arguments that the Board proffers in support of its position. First, the Board argues that the doctrine of constructive voluntary leaving is an extension of the policy of the General Assembly articulated in L.E. § 8-102, the “legislative findings and policy” statute of the unemployment insurance code. In § 8-102, the General Assembly declared that “involuntary unemployment” was a menace that the law sought to combat, and that *276 the Legislature was establishing a system of aid “for the benefit of individuals unemployed through no fault of their oum.” (Emphasis added). The Board claims that, because Taylor was at “fault” for her unemployment because of her voluntary decision to drink and drive and the resulting loss of her County driver’s license, she is not entitled to share in the benefits from this scheme.
This, too, is an argument that the Court of Appeals has consistently rejected. The Court has held that, although the “no fault of their own” language of L.E. § 8-102(c) is a “guide for the interpretation and application” of the Code,
see
L.E. § 8-102(a);
Celanese Corp. of America v. Davis,
It is thus the specific provisions of L.E. § 8-1001(a)(1) that we must consider to evaluate the Board’s contention. Because the doctrine of constructive voluntary leaving is not encompassed in the language of L.E. § 8-1001(a)(1), or any other provision, claimants cannot be denied benefits on the basis of that doctrine, regardless of their “fault.”
See Snyder v. State,
*277 Second, the Board also contends that, as a matter of policy, awarding benefits to Taylor would impose “an unjust burden” on the County by forcing the County to pay Taylor unemployment compensation, in addition to bearing the cost of paying her replacement. 12 The Board argues that “there is an inherent inequity” if the County is required to bear this double cost, because Taylor’s unemployment resulted from her decision to drink and drive—a voluntary, illegal act over which the County had no control. Id.
The problem with the argument is that the Board is directing it to the wrong branch of government. The statute simply does not admit to an interpretation allowing disqualification for claimants who are discharged because of the voluntary commission of an act that triggers discharge. Recognizing the doctrine of constructive voluntary leaving would require us to rewrite the statute to add a new disqualification provision that the General Assembly did not see fit to include. It is the function of the General Assembly to address the policy issues proffered by appellant and determine whether to adopt the doctrine of constructive voluntary leaving. See, e.g., Wis.Stat. Ann. § 108.04(1)(f) (West 1988 & Supp.1995) (employee disqualified if a license that the employee is “required by law to have ... to perform his or her customary work” was suspended, revoked, or not renewed due to the employee’s own fault).
We must view the law as it is, and not as we might wish it to be.
McCance v. Lindau,
For the foregoing reasons, we decline the Board’s invitation to rewrite L.E. § 8-1001(a)(1) by judicial fiat. Because of the unambiguous statutory language, the policy of construing disqualification provisions narrowly, and considerations concerning the proper scope of judicial functions, we hold that the doctrine of constructive voluntary leaving does not apply in Maryland.
Cases from other jurisdictions support our conclusion that L.E. § 8-1001(a)(1) does not embody the doctrine of constructive voluntary leaving.
See Brousseau v. Maine Employment Security Commission,
In Lewis, the Appellate Session of the Connecticut Superior Court stated:
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, the intent of the legislature must be derived from that statute. This court cannot, by construction, read into such a statute provisions which are not clearly stated. The defendant’s interpretation of [the voluntarily-leaving-work statute] would have us do just that. Moreover, it would contravene the clearly remedial purpose of the Unemployment Compensation Act.
What the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine stated in Brousseau is particularly cogent:
The term “voluntarily” is not defined in the Act, nor is there any reference to the doctrine of “constructive voluntary quit” or “constructive resignation.” Words which are not expressly defined in the applicable statute must be accorded their plain and common meaning and should be construed according to their natural import. Therefore, in the context of [the voluntarily-leaving-work statute], an individual leaves work “voluntarily” only when freely making an affirmative choice to do so. The clear import of the statute is that it is the intentional act of leaving employment rather than the deliberate commission of an antecedent act which disqualifies an individual from eligibility for benefits. To read the doctrine of constructive voluntary quit or constructive resignation into [the statute] is to overstep the bounds of administrative construction and usurp the legislative function.
We recognize that other jurisdictions have held that employees who are discharged after they lose, through their miscon
*280
duct, a driver’s license that they must have in order to work are deemed to have “voluntarily quit” within the meaning of those states’ versions of L.E. § 8-1001(a)(1).
See, e.g., In re Paladino,
In our view, the decisions upholding constructive voluntary leaving are flawed to the extent that they extend beyond the plain language of the particular statutes, and impose a disqualification provision that is not there. We agree with the dissent in the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Yardville Supply Co., supra, a ease involving a truck driver terminated after his driver’s license was suspended due to a drunk driving conviction:
I hold no brief for drunk drivers. But as judges we do not have the power to punish their conduct more than has the Legislature. To say that this driver “quit” work is to say that words mean what we want them to mean.... Drunk driving is an abhorrent social malady. But courts are expected to apply legislative policy, not enact it.
Finally, the Board also cites several cases from Pennsylvania that held that employees who needed to drive as part of their jobs, and who were discharged after their licenses were suspended or revoked, were ineligible for unemployment benefits.
See HiNe v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review,
IV.
In the wake of the preceding discussion, we now apply L.E. § 8-1001(a)(1) to the facts of the case at bar. In order to sustain the Board’s determination that Taylor “voluntarily le[ft] work,” the record must contain evidence that is sufficient to allow a reasoning mind to conclude that Taylor intentionally, or by her own choice or will, terminated her employment. The facts are virtually undisputed, and it is clear that the record is devoid of any evidence that Taylor intentionally left her job.
Taylor did not quit or otherwise undertake to terminate her employment; she was fired. The dismissal letter from Eyler *282 states in its first paragraph, “because you have more than 6 points assessed against your State drivers [sic] license you will be terminated on 5/28/94 from your position as Park Laborer,” and says in its last paragraph, “you are dismissed from employment effective May 28,1994.” (Emphasis added). Eyler testified that Taylor had been terminated and had not quit. 13 Taylor also testified that she would still be at her job if she had not been terminated. 14 Thus, the only rational conclusion from the evidence in the record is that Taylor was discharged. Furthermore, no reasonable inference can be made from the evidence that Taylor committed the act of drunken driving with the intent of terminating her employment with the County. In fact, the Board appears to concede that point in its brief. 15
Accordingly, because there is no evidence that Taylor intentionally and voluntarily relinquished her work, and all the evidence indicates that she was discharged, we conclude that the Board’s determination that appellee voluntarily left her work, within the meaning of L.E. § 8-1001(a)(1), is not supported by substantial evidence. Even though Taylor’s act of drinking and driving may have been voluntary, there is nothing in the record to suggest that she did so with the intention of being terminated. Therefore, the circuit court was correct in reversing the decision of the Board, and remanding the ease for the Board to determine whether Taylor is disqualified from receiving benefits for misconduct connected with her work, under L.E. § 8-1003, or gross misconduct, under L.E. § 8-
*283
1002.
See Allen,
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY AFFIRMED. CASE REMANDED TO CIRCUIT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REMAND TO THE BOARD OF APPEALS FOR PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.
APPEAL OF THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF FREDERICK COUNTY DISMISSED.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
Notes
. During the proceedings that gave rise to this appeal, the Board was a part of DEED. Effective July 1, 1995, the General Assembly transferred the Board to the Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation. 1995 Md.Laws, ch. 120, § 2.
. The County Commissioners of Frederick County filed an untimely notice of appeal, and the County did not file a brief or participate in oral argument. Although we -shall dismiss the County’s appeal, see Md.Rule 8-602(a)(3), (7), the dismissal of the County’s appeal does not affect the justiciability of the Board's appeal. See Md.Rule 8-401(a).
. At the time of the proceedings below, the statute was denoted simply as § 8-1001(a). In 1995, the General Assembly re-numbered the provision as § 8-1001(a)(1) and added § 8-1001(a)(2), which is not pertinent to this case. 1995 Md.Laws, ch. 578.
. When an employee leaves work voluntarily, he or she is generally not entitled to unemployment benefits. See, e.g., L.E. § 8-1001(a)(1); N.J.Stat.Ann. § 43:21-5(a) (West 1991); Mass.Ann.Laws ch. 151A, § 25(e)(1) (Law.Co-op.Supp.1995); N.Y.Lab.Law § 593(1)(a) (McKinney 1988). See generally 81 C.J.S. Social Security § 225a (1977).
. The numbers next to Board decisions are case numbers for written decisions of the Board.
. Former Art. 95A, § 6(a) of the Code provided, in pertinent part, that an individual was disqualified from receiving benefits “[i]f the Executive Director finds that the individual’s unemployment is due to his leaving work voluntarily without good cause.”
. The Board also asserts that the Court in
Allen
"approvfed]” the holding of the Michigan Supreme Court in
Echols v. Employment Security Commission,
. L.E. 8-1002(a) states:
"Gross misconduct" defined.—In this section "gross misconduct":
(1) means conduct of an employee that is:
(i) deliberate and willful disregard of standards of behavior that am employing unit rightfully expects and that shows gross indifference to the interests of the employing unit; or
(ii) repeated violations of employment rules that prove a regular and wanton disregard of the employee’s obligations; and
(2) does not include:
(i) aggravated misconduct, as defined under § 8-1002.1 of this subtitle; or
(ii) other misconduct, as defined under § 8-1003 of this subtitle.
. L.E. § 8-1002.1(a) reads:
"Aggravated misconduct” defined.—(1) In this section, “aggravated misconduct” means behavior committed with actual malice and deliberate disregard for the property, safety, or life of others that:
(i) affects the employer, fellow employees, subcontractors, invitees of the employer, members of the public, or the ultimate consumer of the employer’s product or services; and
(ii) consists of either physical assault or property loss or damage so serious that the penalties of misconduct or gross misconduct are not sufficient.
(2) In this section, “aggravated misconduct" does not include:
(i) gross misconduct, as defined under § 8-1002 of this title; or
(ii) misconduct, as defined under § 8-1003 of this title.
. L.E. § 8-1003(a) provides:
Grounds for disqualification.—An individual who otherwise is eligible to receive benefits is disqualified from receiving benefits if the Secretary finds that unemployment results from discharge or suspension as a disciplinary measure for behavior that the Secretary finds is misconduct in connection with employment but that is not:
*273 (1) aggravated misconduct, under § 8-1002.1 of this subtitle; or
(2) gross misconduct[,] under § 8-1002 of this subtitle.
. Interestingly, on facts far more compelling than those present here, neither the Board nor the Court in
Hager
found a constructive voluntaiy quit or a voluntary quit. Yet the employee there was described as "unyielding” in twice refusing to accept reassignment, gave no meaningful explanation for his conduct, was then warned that he could be fired, and nonetheless "impertinently and contumaciously retorted: ‘You do what you have to do.' "
Id., 96
Md.App. at 372,
. As a governmental entity, the County has the option, under L.E. § 8-616(c), of making an “election” to reimburse the Unemployment Insurance Fund, on a one-to-one basis, for benefits paid to its former employees. The Board has not informed us in its brief, and there is no indication in the record, as to whether the County has made this election.
. [FREDERICK COUNTY’S COUNSEL]: Going back to May 28th of '94, did Ms. Taylor quit or was she discharged?
MR. EYLER: She was dismissed.
. [APPELLEE’S COUNSEL]: Had you not been terminated from your job, would you still be working there?
MS. TAYLOR: Yes.
. As we have suggested, in an appropriate case, the evidence may support a conclusion that an employee’s conduct in drinking and driving constitutes a voluntary quit within the meaning of L.E. § 8-1001(a)(1). But the Board must find, based on the evidence, that the employee engaged in the act of drinking and driving with the intent of terminating the employment relationship.