DENVER AREA LABOR FEDERATION, AFL-CIO, a Colorado corporation; and Jack Hawkins, Petitioners-Appellants, v. Natalie MEYER, Secretary of State for the State of Colorado, and Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority, Respondents-Appellees.
No. 94CA0319
Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. IV.
March 9, 1995.
As Modified on Denial of Rehearing April 13, 1995.
Certiorari Granted Nov. 28, 1995.
Jack Hawkins, pro se.
Colorado Compensation Ins. Authority, Michael J. Steiner, Denver, for respondent-appellee Colorado Compensation Ins. Authority.
Opinion by Judge RULAND.
Petitioners, Denver Area Labor Federation, AFL-CIO, and Jack Hawkins, appeal from a judgment affirming the Secretary of State‘s order dismissing their complaint against Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority (CCIA). The complaint alleged that CCIA had violated the Campaign Reform Act of 1974,
In 1992, petitioners obtained the required signatures to include the “Safe Work Environment Amendment” on the general election ballot. An opposing political action group, “Coalition to Save Colorado Jobs,” was organized to attempt defeat of the ballot proposal. The CCIA actively supported the Coalition‘s efforts by placing negative editorials in CCIA‘s newsletter and by sending out posters to over 40,000 CCIA subscribers urging them to vote against the proposal.
Petitioners filed a verified complaint with the Secretary of State alleging that CCIA, as a political subdivision of the state, was making an unlawful in-kind contribution to a political committee as defined by
CCIA moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that its funds were neither a “public fund” nor “public money” under
The district court concurred with the Secretary‘s interpretation of the Act and affirmed the Secretary‘s order of dismissal.
I
Petitioners first contend that, because CCIA is a political subdivision of the state and because the fund it administers is a part of the state treasury pursuant to
Section 1-45-116(1)(a) of the Campaign Reform Act states in pertinent part:
No agency, department . . . or any political subdivision [of the state] . . . shall make any contribution or contribution in kind in campaigns involving the nomination, retention, or election of any person to any public office, nor shall any such entity expend any public moneys from any source, or make any contributions in kind, to urge electors to vote in favor of or against any issue before the electorate.
(emphasis supplied).
CCIA was created to furnish compensation insurance for employers in exchange for specified premiums. See
As petitioners correctly point out, CCIA is, by statute, a political subdivision of the state, and, for purposes of
Further, CCIA is subject to regulation, as are other private insurance carriers, by the Commissioner of Insurance. See
The funds administered by CCIA consist of premiums paid for insurance, and the manager of the fund is vested with power to expend the fund in the same manner as a “private insurance company might or could do” unless another provision of the applicable statute provides otherwise. See
Finally, under certain circumstances, premiums held in the fund may be repaid to an employer. See
Prior to the General Assembly‘s decision to establish CCIA or its predecessor, the fund in question was operated by the former Industrial Commission. In Stong v. Industrial Commission, 71 Colo. 133, 204 P. 892 (1922), the commission challenged the treasurer‘s decision relative to investment of the fund. In noting that the treasurer did not have decision-making authority, our supreme court stated:
Full control of the fund is given to the commission; the custodian [treasurer] is authorized to do nothing with it except upon their order. . . .
[T]he constitution is not violated, because the fund in question is not the general property of the state. . . .
71 Colo. at 134, 204 P. at 893 (emphasis supplied).
Subsequently, in Pensioners Protective Ass‘n v. Davis, 112 Colo. 535, 150 P.2d 974 (1944), our supreme court came to a similar conclusion as to the meaning of the term “public funds” in the context of the old age pension. There, the court determined that the pension fund was not a part of general revenue of the state and thus could be subjected to the payment of attorney fees. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted:
The fund is not dependent on legislative appropriation. The state in its sovereign capacity, has, and can have, no interest therein . . . the monies involved are not public funds. They stand segregated for a special and designated use. “The term public fund means funds belonging to the state . . . the term does not apply to special funds which are collected or voluntarily contributed, for the sole benefit of the contributors, and of which the state is merely the custodian.”
112 Colo. at 540, 150 P.2d at 976 (emphasis supplied).
The construction of a statute is a question of law, and thus, we are not bound by the Secretary‘s decision if it has resulted from a misconstruction or misapplication of the law. State Division of Employment & Training v. Parkview Episcopal Hospital, 725 P.2d 787 (Colo. 1986); Virginians Heritage Square Co. v. Smith, 808 P.2d 366 (Colo. App. 1991). However, the Secretary‘s construction of the statute is entitled to great deference because her office is charged with enforcement of the law. See
Further, we must presume that, in adopting the Colorado Compensation Insurance Act, the General Assembly was aware of our
In applying that presumption here, we note that the General Assembly has adopted a definition of the term “public funds” for purposes of legal investments by various public entities which would include the funds here. See
As a result, we conclude that while the insurance premiums paid to CCIA are held in public trust for specified statutory purposes, those funds do not constitute “public money.” Hence, for purposes of the Campaign Reform Act, we concur with the Secretary‘s decision.
II
Petitioners next contend that even if CCIA funds are not “public funds,” CCIA still violated
We must avoid the interpretation of a statute that would lead to an absurd result. See
The judgment is affirmed.
PLANK, J., concurs.
NEY, J., dissents.
DENVER AREA LABOR FEDERATION, AFL-CIO, a Colorado corporation; and Jack Hawkins, Petitioners-Appellants, v. Natalie MEYER, Secretary of State for the State of Colorado, and Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority, Respondents-Appellees.
No. 94CA0319
Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. IV.
Judge NEY dissenting.
I dissent. Section 1-45-116(1)(a), C.R.S. (1980 Repl. Vol. 1B) prohibits expenditures by any political subdivision of this state of public monies from any source to urge electors either to vote for or against any issue.
There is no controversy that CCIA is a political subdivision of the state, that its funds are in the custody of the state treasury pursuant to
Relying on Pensioners’ Protective Ass‘n v. Davis, 112 Colo. 535, 150 P.2d 974 (1944), the majority concludes that CCIA did not violate the statute because its funds are not public monies.
This reliance is misplaced. In Davis, the supreme court reasoned that special funds which are collected or voluntarily contributed for the sole benefit of the contributor and for which the state is merely the custodian are not considered public funds. However, the Campaign Reform Act of 1974 specifically included public funds from any source, and therefore, the rationale of Pensioners’ Protective Ass‘n is distinguishable.
I conclude that funds of a political subdivision of this state held by the state treasurer for specified statutory purposes constitute “public monies from any source” within the meaning of the Campaign Reform Act. See