6 Johns. 296 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1810
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court.. The judgment in this case, is regular upon the record. An attorney of this court appears for the defendant to a writ which had been sued out, but not served, and he, after-wards, confesses judgment. The want of a warrant of attorney is cured, after judgment, by the statute of amendements and jeofails. (Rev. Laws, vol. 1. 129, 132.) Ifthe attorney has acted without authority, the defendant has hisremedy against him ; but the judgment is still regular, and the appearance entered by the-attorney, without war, rant, is a good appearance, as to the court, (l Keble, 89. 1 Salk. 86. Comyns' Dig. tit. Attorney, (B). 7.) This rule of law, though perfectly, well settled, would oftentimes be unjust in its operation, if it was not so restrained as to save the party, who may be affected by it, from injury. It was, therefore, wisely laid down by the K. B. in the time of Lord Holt, (l Salk. 88.) that if the attorney for the defendant he not responsible^ or perfectly competent to answer to his assumed client, they would relieve the party against the judgment, for otherwise ;a defendant might be undone. I am willing .to go still. further.
The plaintiffs, in this case, are as innocent as the defendant, and their agent, reposing upon the appearance of the defendant, by a regular attorney of this court, 'suspends the prosecution of the writ which he had taken out, and after a delay equal to the ordinary prosecution of the suit to judgment, accepts of a cognovit. If all this proceeding is to be vacated, the plaintiffs would probably lose their debt; as other creditors may, in the mean time, step in and gain a preference ; and from suggestions made upon the argument, this application is very possibly a struggle of subsequent creditors, striving to gain a preference over an insolvent’s estate. The plaintiffs, and such creditors, (if such there be,) have, at least, equal equity, and in addition to that, the plaintiffs have the legal advantage. If there had been any collusion between the plaintiffs, and the attorney for the defendant, it would have altered the case; but there is none shown or pretended, and my whole opinion proceeds on the ground, that the plaintiffs have acted with good faith.
I am disposed, therefore, to prevent all possible injury to the defendant, and at the same time, to save the plaintiffs from harm. This can be done, only, by preserving the lien, which the plaintiffs have acquired by their judgment, and by giving the defendant an opportunity to. plead, if he has any plea to make, to the merits. To go further, is not required by any considerations of justice or policy ; and it would be repugnant to the established practice and precedents. It hink it can be shown that the court is bound, by a series of decisions, to preserve the judgment. The usual course has been to turn the injured party over to his remedy against the attorney, for the deceit; but we novz disarm this practice of
By licensing attorneys, the courts recommend them to the public confidence; and if the Opposite party, who has concerns with an attorney, in the business of a suit, must always, at his peril, look beyond the attorney, to his authority, it would be productive of great public inconvenience. It is not usual for an attorney to require a written warrant from his client. He is generally employed by means of some secret confidential communication. The mere fact of his appearance, is always deemed enough for the Opposite party, and for the court. If his client’s denial of authority is to vacate all the proceedings, the consequences would be mischievous. The imposition might be intolerable.
Fitzherbert, iti his N. B. 96. (E). says, that if an attorney deceitfully appear for the defendant, and plead, and suffer the inquest to pass by default, by which the plaintiff recovers, the defendant, who was never summoned, shall have a writ of deceit against such attorney, and the writ appears in the register. And in the case, in 21 Edw. III. 45. pl. 64. and which is cited in the note to F. N. B. 95. a. it seems to have been agreed by the judges, that if one answer for another, as attorney, without any warrant, the defendant may challenge that he was not his attorney, and appeal to the record ; but if judgment be rendered upon the plea of the attorney, then the only remedy of the defendant is by a writ of deceit against the attorney, to recover his damages; and ift he demandant be a party to the deceit, then he shall recover his lands also.
The same doctrine was laid down in Allesley v. Colley. (Cro. Jac. 695.) The court of C. B. would not relieve a party upon audita querela, when an attorney, without warrant from him, and without his notice, appeared for him- to an action,:and suffered judgment by default, upon’
The two cases already referred to from Salkeld, (and which are considered by Lord Chief Baron Cornyns, as good law,) show that the rule had not been altered in the time of Lord Holt; and the case of Lorymer v. Hollister, Which was in 12 Geo. I. (l Str. 693.) is a very strong decision of the K. B. for there, though the writ had been taken out, as in this case, it does not appear to have been served, and the court compelled an attorney, who had, through misinformation, undertaken to appear for the defendant, without warrant or direction, to complete his appearance, so as to render the judgment, which the plaintiffs had taken by default, regular. A similar rule was afterwards granted, in the similar case of Burnfield v. James, so late as Hil. 6 Geo. II. (Barnad. K. B. vol. 2. p. 232.) and the same principle, though in another shape, is contained in the case of Rex v. Addington, (Sayer, 259.) in the year 1756; for there an attorney entered into a rule of nisi prius, without authoritybut the court of K. B. made the rule absolute, notwithstanding; and said, that if an attorney exceeds his authority, and Ms client be thereby prejudiced, the attorney is liable to make satisfaction.
The supreme court of Pennsylvania have acted upon the same ground. In M'Cullough v. Guetner, (1 Binney, 214.) an attorney undertook to appear for a defendant, not summoned, and without any warrant of attorney, and the court held the appearance good. And in a subsequent case, in the same court, (1 Binney, 469.) an attorney undertook, without the knowledge or consent of the defendant, to revive a suit against him, after it had been, by a non pros, legally out of court, with the knowledge and consent of the attorney, for near two years; and the court said the act was binding, and that if the attorney had done wrong, he was answerable.
Against a rule, so long and so authoritatively established, there is very little to be found in the books. There are only a few solitary cases, which have never' been considered as affecting or diverting this long train of decisions. In Chivers v. Fenn, (2 Show. 126.) the court of K. B. did set aside a judgment against bail, on the ground, that the attorney, who: had appeared for them, as well as for their principal, had acted without authority. This case was in the time of Charles II. and It is a brief and loose report, not to be found in any
Having thus- ascertained the rule, and subjected it to such modifications as justice required, we are of opinion,
Ordered, that the defendant have leave, until the 1st day of September next, to plead the general issue, with notice of any special matter, if any there be, which could foe pleaded in bar, and could not be given in evidence, under the general issue; and in the mean time, that all further proceedings, under the judgment, be stayed on the part of the plaintiff; and in case of such plea, that the plaintiff be at liberty to change the venue to the county of Columbia, (if laid elsewhere,) so that the issue may be tried at the ensuing circuit, in that county. And in default of such plea, that the plaintiff be at liberty to proceed with his execution, under the said judgment; but that the costs of the said suit, together with the costs of this motion, abide the further order of the court.' And, it is further ordered, that Hezekiah L. Hosmer, the attorney for the defendant, show cause, by the first day of the next term, why an attachment should not issue against him, and that Mr. Bloodgood, the clerk of this court, as soon as may be, after the term, cause a copy of the affidavit of the defendant, John -Noyes, together with a copy of this rule, to be personally served on the said Hezekiah L. Hosmer.
Dissenting Opinion
and delivered his reasons, as follows; I consider the opinion which has just been delivered, as not founded on any facts or circumstances peculiar to this case ; but the broad ground taken is, that when a judgment has been entered upon a cognovit ac~ tionem, given by an attorney of this court, without the authority, or even knowledge of the debtor, that such judgment is regular. To this I cannot yield my assent, In assigning the reasons for my opinion, it becomes ne~
In an anonymous case, in 1 Keble, p. 89. it is said, “ if an attorney, without warrant, appear, this is a good appearance, as to the court, and the attorney only is liable to an action.” Whether there had been a suit brought, is not stated ; nor does it appear whether the party for whom the attorney appeared, or the opposite party, questioned the regularity of the proceeding, or the authority of the attorney.
In another anonymous case in 6 Mod. S. C. 16. (1 Salk. 88.) the court are represented to have said, that “ if a responsible attorney appears for another without warranty and there is judgment, the judgment shall stand, and the party shall be put to his action against the attorney. But if the attorney be a beggar, or a suspicious character, the court will set aside the judgment; for otherwise, the defendant has no remedy, and any one may be undone by that means.” Upon this case, it is to be remarked, that it does not appear whether a suithad been commenced or not. Most probably a suit had been brought. The court say they would “ set aside the judgment if the attorney was a beggar or a suspicious character.” What is intended by the attorney being a suspicious character, I can scarcely conjecture. One would suppose, however, that an attorney who had confessed a judgment, without the least authority, would fall within this description ; but the, court, it seems, thought otherwise.
It is very certain, that the decision,does not proceed upon the ground that the judgment was confessed for a debt actually due to the plaintiff; for if that were so, although the attorney might be liable to an action, yet the recovery against him would be merely nominal. For aught that appears, the plaintiff had no cause of action at all, or if he had any, it may have been for an assault and battery, or in slander. It is not to be doubted that
I think I shall presently show, that if a practice like the present be tolerated, the ruin of the defendant, in many cases will be equally inevitable, whether the attorney be solvent or a beggar. It appears to me most extraordinary, that the fact of the solvency or insolvency of the attorney, or his being a suspicious character or not, should have any influence upon the question. How is that question to be tried ? Is an issue to be awarded, if it be disputed, or is it to be tried by affidavit ? What proofs would be competent to. show the attorney to be a “ suspicious character,” would, I suspect, be a point of some nicety.
Another case is that of Allesly v. Colley. (Cro. Jac. 694, 695.) It was this; Allesly, the plaintiff, and an infant, was bound with one Castalon to Colley, the defendant, who prosecuted an original writ against him, in debt, and procured one Legat, an attorney, to appear for him, without warrant. Judgment was entered by non sum informatus, and Allesly (the infant) taken in execution, and he brought his audita querela to be discharged. The court refu'sed his discharge, saying, he ought to take his remedy against the attorney.
Let us examine this case. Here was an appearance-procured by the plaintiff himself, in the suit against the infant, knowing, of course, that the attorney had no authority; and by that means a judgment was fraudulently obtained against an infant upon a bond, and in a case, therefore, in which he had a perfect defence. Not with
I now come to the case, which appears to me most strongly to support the decision of the court. It is that of Longman v. Holliston. (1 Stra. 693.) The bailiff had a writ against the defendant; and one Stapleton, an attorney, was employed by the bailiff, without the authority of the defendant, to appear. Stapleton told the plaintiff’s attorney, he had ordered his agent to enter an appearance. The plaintiff’s attorney delivered a declaration, and signed a judgment for want of a plea. No appearance had been filed; and the court, on application, refused to set aside the judgment, and ordered the attorney to file common bail, nunc pro tunc, to make the proceedings, as they are pleased to call it, “ regular.” It is to be regretted, that the facts in this case are not more fully stated. But it is clearly distinguishable from the present. There is not the least doubt that the writ had been duly returned and filed; and, though it is not stated in the report, it is more than probable that the writ had been served upon the defendant, and that he, therefore, knew of the pendency of the suit, but took no measures £o make a defence.
These are the leading cases in support of the opinion of the court, though there are others which I do not deem it" necessary to mention, as they all go to the same point. One has been cited from Barnad. Rep., but he is a reporter of such doubtful authority, as not to be entitled
My brethren make a distinction, where the defendant suggests that he has merits; in such case he is allowed to plead, though the judgment is suffered to stand as security. The solvency or insolvency of the attorney is wholly disregarded, provided the judgment "be for a debt due from the defendant to the plaintiff. The attorney is deemed competent, not only to appear without authority, but also to sign a cognovit actionem, and that whether a suit had been previously commenced or not. In all these respects, the rule now established by this court is not only different from, but, in some points, repugnant to, that which appears at one time t& have prevailed , in the court of king’s bench.
Upon examination, I find, that the law in England, at one time, in relation to the binding effect of an unauthorized appearance for a defendant, was the same where a suit had been prosecuted without warrant, written- or
At common law, every person was obliged to appear, and prosecute in proper person. By the king’s paten ? they might appear by attorney; and now, under various statutes, all suitors in civil causes are permitted to appear by attorney. This was the privilege of the suitor, and was intended exclusively for his benefit and convenience. But how it ever happened, that the courts in England allowed an attorney to appear for a person who had not employed him, and thereby enable the plaintiff to bind the person and estate of the defendant, without even the shadow of authority, is, I confess, to me inconceivable. I have not had an opportunity to examine, but I verily believe, that the whole of this practice originated m some ancient rule of court, and that it never had a foundation in the principles of common law. If the law is settled, as my brethren suppose it is, I should hold myself, however reluctantly, bound to submit to it. But I think I shall be able to show, that the weight of authority is against the opinion of the court, or, at least, that the law is so far doubtful, as to leave us at liberty to establish a rule for ourselves.
In quare impedit, (Y. B. 38 Edw. III. 8.) an attorney appeared, and demanded the plaintiff, and nonsuited him, and obtained a writ to the bishop against him% and after, because it appeared he had no warrant, he
In the case of Chevers, Vicecom. v. Fenn and others, (2 Show. 161.) there were several suits in debt upon a bail-bond. The principal gave a warrant of attorney to appear for himself, and his bail being his neighbours, he ordered his attorney to appear for them too, which he did. Judgment was entered against all, for want of a plea. But, upon motion, the judgment was set aside, as to the bail; the principal’s order not being a warrant to appear for more than himself.
This is a case clearly and intelligibly reported, and in the principal fact, bears a very striking resemblance to the present. In the case of Gibson v. Bishop of Bath and others, (Barnes, 239.) issue was joined between the parties, and, afterwards, judgment was entered at the foot of the issue, for the plaintiff by cognovit, relic-ta verifications, UV. by virtue of a warrant of attorney for that purpose, pretended to be executed by Bond, one of the defendants; the validity of which warrant of attorney being contested, an issue was directed by the court, to try whether the same was duly executed by Bond or not; and upon the trial, the jury found it to be a forgery ; whereupon the court ordered the judgment, entered by virtue of the warrant of attorney, to be set aside. There the plaintiff did not appear to be in fault, as he was not charged with having committed the forgery. The proceedings on his part were as regular, as in any of the cases cited to support the present judgment. It is to be noted also, that the attorney, who had been regularly employed by the defendant, in this cause, does not appear to have been deemed competent to give a cognovit actionem; otherwise, the judgment would not have -been set aside. The warrant of attorney was, however, a forgery. I shall take notice of this fact presently.
But a case of a more recent date, and which proves, jsost satisfactorily, that the notion which prevailed in.
It may be said, in answer to this case, that the attorney appeared for the plaintiff; and, that the warrant of attorney, as in the case before mentioned, (Gibson v. Bishop of Bath and others,) was a forgery. But this does not alter the case. It has, I think, been fully shown, that the supposed rule in England applies as well when there is an appearance for a plaintiff, as a defendant;
During this term, we have decided upon an application which, in principle, is the same as that now under considertion. We were applied to to discharge a party from an attachment, for not paying the costs of an ejectment suit, in which he had been made a lessor of the plaintiff, by an attorney of this court, without his consent.
I have looked, though very cursorily', into some of the writers on the French and civil law, with a view of discovering to what extent a procurator, between whose powers and duties, and those of the attorneys of this court, there is a pretty strict analogy, could bind his clients. Pothier (tit. Con. de Mandat, no. 130.) is very full on the point. In speaking of the procureur, who is, I think, an attorney at law, in the most literal
After this review of the cases, I should suppose it would be readily conceded, that this question is not so settled, as to preclude us from establishing such a rule, as shall be deemed the most just, and the least objectionable. If this were a new point, there could not, I think, be a difference of opinion, what that rule ought to be. Gene
Let us consider, for a moment, to what the decision of the court may lead. A man perfectly solvent, and in good credit, who is liable to an action, but entitled to all the delay which the rules of the court allow, is subjected, without a moment’s warning, to imprisonment. •His property is encumbered, and exposed to be sacrificed. His credit is destroyed; and the result is inevitable ruin. Instead of providing for his meritorious and honorary creditors, such, for instance, as endorsers, the very creditor who has caused his ruin, acquires an unjust preference.
These are some of the evils which I anticipate from the present decision; and all of them might be forcibly illustrated, had I not already said much more on this subject than I, at first, intended. For the injuries which may be committed, by the toleration of this practice, what is the remedy "proposed ? The attorney is liable to be punished, and the ruined debtor may commence an action against him ! I will not dwell upon this • part of the argument; let me, however, be permitted to add, that an attorney who is base enough to confess a judg
But admitting, for a moment, that I am wrong in what I have hitherto said, there is another ground why these judgments ought now to stand, upon which I rely with the greatest confidence. By our statute, sess. 24. c. 32 s. 2. it is provided, that “ every attorney who shall confess any judgment, in any case, shall, at the time of making such confession, produce his warrant for making the same, to the court, or judge before whom he makes the confession, and the warrant shall then be filed with the clerk of the court, in which the judgment shall be entered,”
It is said, that the statute does not apply to confessions given after suit brought. This I deny. I have looked, in vain, for the authority upon which this is urged. The words of the act are positive and express ; “ every attorney who shall confess any judgment, in any c.asej? See. But suppose that I am wrong in this also, has there been a suit brought ? No writ has actually been issued, served or filed. A person who calls himself the agent of the plaintiff, (not an attorney qf this court,) makes out the writs, and then accepts an agreement from the attorney, who takes upon himself to represent this defendant, to enter special bail. After this follow ineffectual attempts to settle with the principal debtor, S. H. Noyes ; and then this same attorney, without the privity of this defendant, confesses judgment. The declaration, plea, and common bail-piece, and record of judgment.
, This part of my opinion applies equally to the two judgments against Edmunds. I think, therefore, that both the judgments against John Noyes and Samuel Edmunds ought to be set aside,
Motion denied.
See The People v. Bradt, past, p. 318.
There seems to be a distinction between the procurator ad litem oí the Homan law, and our attorney at lain. The employment or business of the former was strictly of a private nature, and might be exercised by any person whom the party thought proper to appoint. He was a mere agent or marldatary, responsible and amenable only to his employer. But by the English law, the office of an attorney partakes of a public nature. He is an officer of the court in which he is licensed to appear; and as such is entitled! to certain privileges, and is bound, under the sanction of an oath, to act witft honesty and fidelity. Before he is admitted, the court must be satisfied that he is of good moral character, and has sufficient learning and ability; and lie is always subject to the censure and animadversion of the judges, who will displace and punish him, if he is guilty of any malpractice. A Roman procurator, any more than an attorney in fact, or any other mandatary, was noh subject to the control or censure of the court, before whom he appeared-. But if he did not enrol his mandate or warrant of attorney, or was not appointed by his client in open court, he was bound to give security, that his client would ratify his proceedings. (Justin. Inst. lib. 4. tit. 10, & 11, es Vinn, Comment, 3 Bl.. Comm. 25, 26.)