188 Ky. 30 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1920
Opinion op the Court by
Eeversing.
Appellant, Prank Denton, who was convicted in the Carlisle circuit court of the crime of murder, appeals to this court seeking a reversal of the judgment on the grounds, (1) insufficiency of evidence to support the verdict; (2) incompetent evidence admitted against him and competent evidence for him rejected by the trial court; (3) erroneous instructions; (4) a verdict of guilt by a jury in another case growing out of the charge against Denton, was read in the presence and hearing of the jury trying appellant.
After going over the record carefully, we are convinced that if appellant is entitled to a reversal, it is upon the ground that the verdict is not supported by sufficient evidence, although the record is not free from errors of less importance. The evidence introduced by the Commonwealth was circumstantial, as will be seen from a brief statement of the facts:
Denton, the owner of a farm, lived several miles from the town of Bar dwell, in Carlisle county. In the early spring of 1919 he entered into a rental contract with John Clark whereby Clark and his family were to move on to Denton’s lands and occupy a small tenant house; Clark was to make a crop, and work for Denton when he was not otherwise engaged. The Clark family were
The evidence relied upon by the Commonwealth to sustain the verdict is as follows:
The witness John Clark testified as follows:
“Q. Was anything said there about getting bloodhounds? A. Yes, sir. Q. Who spoke of it? A. Several talking and every time we say anything about it Prank would say we don’t need them, we have been tramping around the house and we don’t need them, that is what he would say every time we would say anything about it, that we didn’t need those hounds. . . . Q. Did he (Denton) come back and say anything about the women folks being there at the house? A. Not that evening. Q. Did he at any time make any statement? A. What he said to me he said one time that was before this occurred, he said you will have to get them women out of there, they are bawling me out and I am not going to stand it. Q. Told you to get them out they were bawling him out and he wasn’t going to stand it? A. Yes, sir. . . . Q. I will hand you a pistol and ask you to examine it? A. I couldn’t tell, but I can tell one thing, that is the pistol I had in my hand and went down there when he throwed in, I thought it was him throwed in that night, somebody did, he gave me this pistol, told me to go by and tell his wife -to give it to me and I took it in my hands and she loaded it all the way around and I went to Mr. Tucker’s, my wife gone up there. Q. Whose pistol is that? A. Prank Denton’s.”
Mollie Clark testified and from her testimony we glean the follownig:
. . Q. What caused you to be afraid of any one hurting you? A. Because there were threats made. . . . Q. Just tell this jury what you first heard before these shots were fired if anything? A. That night? Q. Yes, that night. A. Yes, sir; well that threats made that evening between three and four o’clock Mr. Denton who walked up to that porch, we had been off to Berkley
Concerning what took place after the homicide, Mrs. Clark said:
“Q. Mrs. Clark did yon see what direction these folks went away from there? A. It was dark, I could only tell the noise. What direction were they in? A. Kindly in like going up that way. Q. Who lived up that way? That is, I reckon north, towards Denton’s house. Q. Who lived up that way? A. Mr. Frank Denton was the next house from ns that way towards Bardwell.”
Mrs. Lucy Clark testified for the Commonwealth as to the time Mr. Denton came to the William Clark home that nigj'ht and his manner;
The Commonwealth also introduced Mr. B. P. Edrington, sheriff, who testified in part as follows:
“Mr. Edrington, you go to Frank Denton’s next morning? Yes, sir. Q. You see his gun there 'at his house? A. Yes, sir; went in and called for it. Q. I will now hand you a gun and ask you to examine it and state if you ever seen that gun before? A. Well, that is the gun, I think that is the one his wife gave us that morning. Q. Mrs. Frank Denton gave that gun to you next morning? A. Yes, sir. Q. What calliber gun was that she gave you? A. I judge from the looks, I never saw the marks, it is a forty-four, judge from looking at it. . . . Q. Tell the jury whether or not what you saw in that gun barrel that morning that gun barrel, the rifles of it, when you examined it? A. Well, we carried the gun out, I did, out to the hall on the front porch, and looked through it and my experience and what I deal with mine, the gun had evidently been shot recently. . . . Q. What did you base your belief on that the gun had been recently shot? A. When recently shot that burnt powder in there is loose and black, and after that gun stands a few- — leave it as long as three or four days the whiter that powder will get caked on the barrel and will get so hard you can’t get it off, but in this gun it
With reference to the caliber of the gun and its appearance, Mr. Roy M. Shelbourne, county attorney, testified as follows:
“Q. Did you go over to Frank Denton’s house and see a pistol? A. I did. Q. Is this the pistol that he has been exhibiting here? A. It is. Q. What number caliber of gun is that? A. Forty-four. Q. Did you look through the rifle barrel of that gun that morning? A. Yes, sir. Q. Tell the jury what you could see in that gun there from your observation and experience how recently had that gun been shot? A. Well, I am not an expert in the use of firearms but I have hunted with shotguns and
Mr. Ed. Riggs, testifying upon the same subject, said in part :
“Q. Did you go by Prank Denton’s and see a pistol that morning? A. I came back from there, as we came from there. Q. You see a pistol there that morning? A. I did. . . . Q. Was it the same pistol that Mr. Shelbourne and Mr. Edrington looked at? A. It was. Q. Yon look in that pistol barrel? A. Yes, I did. . . . Q. Describe to the jury the appearance of that pistol barrel what you saw in it? A. Well, I looked through it, it seemed to be"- dirty and black in there like it might have' had some powder or something in there. Q. Did you smell anything about the gun? A. Well, I tried to but couldn’t, I smelled of it but didn’t smell any powder, one of them asked me if I could smell the powder but I did not.”
Also Charles Witty testified concerning the condition of the pistol, as follows:
“Q. Mr. Witty, you see a gun that was had at the time of the examining trial of Prank Denton here before the county judge? A. Yes, sir. Q, You know whether that is the same gun or not? A. No, sir; I do not.. Q. Well, did you examine that gun on that date? A. Yes, sir. Q. What did you find from your examination of the barrel of it? A. Well, if I remember right, the muzzle of the gun was dry and up in the barrel was still wet. Q. Prom what? A. Prom using it I suppose. Q. Shooting it? A. Yes, sir. . . . Q. Can you state whether or not that gun had been recently fired? ... A. I think it had. Q. Now what color was that substance in it Mr. Witty? A. It was black on the barrel and little white in the muzzle.”
This in brief is all of the evidence introduced by the Commonwealth which tends in any measure to support
The. Commonwealth relied largely for its conviction upon the fact that at the house of Denton was this large forty-four caliber pistol, and the further fact the ball which struck and killed Ola Clark was of a large caliber. Denton did not own the pistol but it was the property of Ms wife, given to her by her father, Judge Hutson, some years before and kept about the house for the protection of the family. There is no accusation of Denton carrying or using the pistol unless he did sp on the night in question. The mere fact that there was a pistol of large caliber in the house of appellant is no evidence whatever that he did the killing, because it is not infrequent that good, law abiding citizens have a large caliber pistol in
So far as the evidence shows appellant Denton, when found by the sheriff, was at home sound asleep.' He went directly from William Clark’s back to his house and went to bed on the night of the killing, not knowing of the death of Ola Clark until some hours later. His evidence does not read like that of a guilty man. All evidence against him that appears incriminating is contradicted, and all the fragments of evidence offered by the Commonwealth which tends to support the charge in the indictment are not sufficient, when taken together, to support the verdict.
■Appellant insists that the court erred to his prejudice in refusing to allow him to prove his good moral character although the court did allow him to prove his good character for peace and quietude. It is a generally recognized rule that the accused may himself invoke his good character as tending to disprove his guilt. 1 Greenleaf, p. 39.
The defendant’s character, as indicating his probability of doing or not doing the act charged, is essentially relevant.
A defendant’s good character is always admissible in his favor. 1st Wigmore, page 123.
This rule is of comparatively recent origin, but evidence of good character on the part of the defendant is regarded and received as substantive evidence and not merely collateral; especially is this true in cases where the evidence is circumstantial. Of course where the evidence is direct and certain the evidence of good character of the defendant would have little relevancy or importance, but in a case like the one at bar, where the defendant is accused of a heinous crime, and the only evidence offered against him, in addition to being fragmentary and circumstantial, is unsatisfactory and not altogether convincing, the good character of the defendant both for morality and for peace and good order, ought to
This docs not include the right to assail his general moral character but only his character for truth and veracity.
Ordinarily we would not attach much importance to the refusal of the court to allow defendant to prove Ms good reputation for morality, but in a case where the evidence is so unsatisfactory' as this one, where the evidence for the Commonwealth is wholly circumstantial, evidence of good character of the defendant might have weight to turn the scales in his favor. At any rate, he was entitled to show his good moral character as well as his character for peace and quietude, and the court erred to his prejudice in failing to allow him to do so.
Appellant also complains that the trial court refused to allow him to impeach the witness, John Clark, who testified for the Commonwealth, by showing that Clark on different occasions after the homicide and before the trial had made statements exculpating appellant, whereas on the trial he testified to quite a different state of facts, and when asked about those exculpatory statements, denied making them. Appellant called witnesses to show that the witness John Clark had made such statements, but the Commonwealth objected to the questions and the court sustained the objection and declined to allow the witness to answer. Appellant avowed that the witness would answer that Clark had made the statements. These questions and answers are as follows:
“Q. Just after the trial (examining trial) John Clark have a conversation with you out near the front door of the court house?
Objection by the Commonwealth.
Sustained by the court.
Avowal that the witness if permitted to answer^ would state that he did.
“Q. Did John Clark have a further conversation with you on Monday last on- the public road between Jesse Crawford’s and his home? A. Yes, sir. Q. State whether or not he told you on that occasion that Mr. Frank Den-ton did not do the killing?”
Objection by Commonwealth.
Sustained b'y the court.
Exception by defendant and avowed that if the witness were permitted to answer his answer be that he made these statements to him.
Each of these questions was asked of the witness John Clark while on the stand testifying for the Commonwealth, and he denied making the statements. These questions only called for the opinion of Clark as expressed to the witnesses, and for this reason, if for no other, were incompetent. Moreover, the contradiction was on a collateral matter brought out by defendant, and therefore incompetent, opinion.
Judgment reversed for new trial -consistent with this opinion.