70 N.Y.S. 312 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1901
Lead Opinion
This action is brought to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff on .tlm evening of July 3, 1897, by reason, as she claims, of the negligence of the defendant in not maintaining proper barriers against an excavation or embankment in Eighth or Hurlburt street, which was one of the public streets of the defendant.
The defendant was incorporated on May 1, 1896. It included within its boundaries a quantity of land formerly owned and used by the county as a fair ground, and upon which there had ■ been a race course. It had b.een conveyed in 1892 by the county to Compton & Hurlburt, by whom, after the removal óf the buildings and fences, the ground was laid out into lots, and streets were indicated
In 1896 the defendant, for the purpose as it may he assumed of improving Eighth street, established its grade, along where it was intersected by the driveway referred to, and in accordance therewith the street was graded by the village authorities during that year. Eighth street was sixty feet wide and the grading included thirty feet of the central portion. At the place where the driveway crossed Eighth street, this grading at the outer edge of the thirty feet upon either side was to the depth of about two and a half feet, leaving an abrupt descent from the surface of the street as it remained outside of the grading. This, as one witness says, was as ■abrupt as a gravel bank can be cut. There is evidence tending to show that the driveway was well defined, having a well-worn beaten track for wagons and teams and was frequently used by the public. The owners of the property in laying out and selling lots paid no attention to the driveway, but practically its course had not been interrupted by anything that was done until tfie grading of Eighth street. This operated to make a break with a sudden declivity to the depth of the grading. Some teams had passed over it necessarily lessening to some extent the abruptness. In the .fall of 1896 there was a barrier upon either side within the outer line of the street. It consisted of posts and boards. It does not appear who put up the barriers. The one on the south side of the street was removed in the spring of 1897 by some person unknown. The one upon the north side was thrown down by a traveler at about the same time as it may be inferred.
In the evening of July 3, 1897, the plaintiff, with her husband and daughter and a Mr. Wicker, left Elmira in a two-horse carriage.
" The court in effect held that there was no duty upon the defendánt to furnish protection to those using the driveway. There is no point about contributory .negligence.
This is not a case where one traveling along a highway has been injured by reason of some obstruction in it or some dangerous situation in or so near it as to impose the duty of protection upon the municipality. Many of the cases, therefore, to which we are referred •do not apply. It is not claimed by the plaintiff that the driveway is a public street. The defendant claims that, if it is not a public highway, the plaintiff cannot under her complaint recover; that the negligence alleged is with reference to the condition of the driveway as a public highway and not with reference to any neglect to maintain barriers on Eighth street.
In the complaint it is alleged that Eighth street is one of the highways laid out and used by the defendant; that prior to the laying out, grading and excavating in that street, there had been a well-used beaten highway crossing Eighth streét at right' angles; that in the laying out and establishing Eighth street" the defendant caused an excavation to be made about .three or more feet in depth at the place -where this traveled highway crossed Eighth street and this left there a sharp bank; that the highway which crossed Eighth
The question then is whether the defendant owed any duty of .protection to travelers coming along the driveway. The measure of duty upon a 'municipal corporation in regard to people coming upon the street from a private way or a road not recognized as a ■public highway under the circumstances shown in this case has not, so far as the cases cited by counsel show, been determined in this State. In Carpenter v. Citry of Cohoes (81 N. Y. 21) there was no •charge of negligence upon the ground of failure to barricade the .street. The situation had not been made dangerous by any act of ■the city. In Barr v. Village of Bainbridge (42 App. Div. 628) the injury occurred by reason of the horse of plaintiff taking fright at a pile of rubbish improperly allowed by the defendant to be within .the limits of the highway, and the fact that the plaintiff reached the .highway from a cross road nearby was not deemed to affect the question of defendant’s liability.
The question has been considered in other States. In Burnham v. City of Boston (10 Allen, 290) the plaintiff, coming upon the street from a traveled way, was injured by reason of an •excavation in the street which had been sufficiently barricaded to
In O'Malley v. Parsons Borough (191 Penn. St. 612) the plain , tiff, while entering upon the street at night from a private way, was injured by falling over an abrupt embankment, produced by the defendant in improving the street, and left unguarded. A verdict ^ for the plaintiff was sustained, the court holding that “ Whenever, owing to the existence of embankments or excavations alongside of a public street or highway it would be reasonably prudent and nec- • essary to erect and maintain, railings or other' suitable barriers to prevent accidents to'passengers traveling along, coming into or leaving the public street ór highway at customary and proper points, it becomes the duty of the proper municipal authorities to provide such guards or barriers; and its neglect to do so will render it liable in. damages to those, who, in the exercise of ordinary and.reasonable bare themselves, sustain injury in consequence of such neglect.”
In Orme v. City of Richmond (19 Va. 86) the plaintiff was injured under circumstances similar to those in the O'MaUey case. 'The city was held to be liable, the court saying that the city was bound to use all necessary measures to guard against injury to persons coming upon its streets from private ways over adjoining lots upon that portion of its streets which may be inclosed by barriers.
In Omaha v. Randolph (30 Neb. 699) the plaintiff, in' driving
On the other hand, it was held in Goodin v. The City of Des Moines (55 Iowa, 67) that the city was not liable for a failure to guard its streets from approach by private ways at points where such approach has been made dangerous by recent excavations by the city. It was said that the city was not bound to provide a safe, or any, way by which the streets may be entered from private property ; that the citizen or traveler must get into the public ways of a city as best he can. »
In the present case there exists, as we may assume, a well-defined and well-traveled road, not a public highway, and, therefore, a private way, which'the public has been accustomed to use for several years. This use was of such a character and extent that the village authorities must be presumed to have known it, or the jury had a right to .so find. Such use prior to the grading was perfectly safe. When, then, the village, in the exercise of its undoubted right, in the process of grading lowered the street so that the entrance to it from the .driveway became dangerous, should it be said as matter of law that there was no duty upon the defendant to guard the approach or make it reasonably safe? Under the proof the jury might have found that the village authorities might have reasonably expected that the travel would continue, and that in the absence of bander or notice accidents like the one here involved would be likely to occur.
The rule applicable to cases like this may, I think, be fairly stated as follows : If a road apparently, though not in fact, a public highway, is commonly used by the public, and a municipality, in the exercise of its right in improving an intersecting street, leaves the approach from the road in a dangerous condition, the duty of the
It follows that a case was presented for the consideration of the jury, and that the nonsuit should not have been granted.
Judgment and order reversed on the law and the facts and new trial granted, costs of appeal to the .appellant to abide the event.
All concurred, except Kellogg, J., dissenting in an opinion.
Dissenting Opinion
Eighth street is one of the public streets over which defendant has control. The village was incorporated in 1896, and in the spring and summer of 1896 the defendant graded this street, and, at the place of the accident, fixed the street roadbed some two and one-fourth or two and one-half feet below the surface of the abutting land. The land through which Eighth street was laid out was the old fair ground, and was owned by Compton ■& Hurlburt. This fair ground, up to 1893, had been inclosed by a fence, and within the fair grounds was a race track, in form either circular or eliptical, and this was also inclosed by a fence on each side.; the track had been worked and used for. racing purposes up to 1893, and the roadbed was smooth and hard. The fair ground outside the track was level, smooth and hard, “so that by'the tread of the people and vehicles it was so hard that you could drive anywhere over that portion of it. When the fences were taken down it was a fairly level piece of ground.” This fence inclosing the fair ground and the fence inclosing the track, as well as the fair ground buildings, were removed in 1893 by the owners of the land. The entrance to the fair ground before the removal of the fences was from McCann’s boulevard, running east and west on the southerly side. On the easterly side of the fair grounds was a much-used road running north and south, and called Grand Central avenue. On the west and north there was no way of access or egress. After' the removal of the fences and in 1893-1894-, Compton & Hurlburt laid out this plot of ground into village lots. They laid out on the west, side an avenue running north and south in the general direction of Grand Central avenue on the east side, and another avenue running north and south near the cen
Had Compton & Hurlburt, as owners of the plot and streets, not. have turned the control of the streets over to the village and had themselves created this grade and excavation, tested by the rule as-laid down in Beck v. Carter (68 N. Y. 283), they would not have been liable to the plaintiff for any injury sustained and happening-under the facts appearing in this record. That I think is clear. There was no invitation here, either express or implied, to any person to come upon their lands or to drive along the old race-, track. On the contrary, the laying out of the streets across the old track and’making gutters on each side of the streets, with only about 300 feet of space between such cross streets, and providing-an avenue running north and south near the old race track with safe connections with the cross streets, was a plain declaration to all parties that the old race track was not to be considered or treated, as a roadway for- travelers. In the Beck Case (supra) Andrews, J., says: “ If, however, he gives but a bare license or permission to-cross his premises the licensee takes the risk of accidents in using-the premises in the condition in which they are.” The obligation resting upon an individual is not less but greater than that resting-Upon a public governing body. With the individual it is, in a sense,, a moral obligation expanded in certain cases into a legal obligation,„ but "the duties of a municipality do not rest upon moral obligation,, they are .purely statutory, either express or implied. The municipality exercises statutory powers and discharges statutory duties. As respects the public way8 over which it has control its duty' relates to the convenience and safety of travelers thereon, and whatever is needful for such safety must be done. The erection of barriers to prevent travelers upon, the public ways from falling into dangerous pits, or places, is a duty well understood, but what, duty does the municipality owe to persons who are not travel-ers % To would-be travelers % Those seeking access to the public-ways ? It is. too plain to- need discussion, I think, that every one-has a right with the consent of the abutting owner fo obtain access to the public way at any point that he may choose provided-only that the safety or convenience of travelers on the public way
In Requa v. City of Rochester (45 N. Y. 129) the city was held liable for cutting down the grade of a street and leaving an entrance by an alley in a dangerous condition, but the decision was placed expressly on the ground that the alley by dedication and over twenty years’ user, and by the terms of the city charter, became a public alley over which the city had jurisdiction and the city “ was bound so to shape any improvement of Clark street, as that people could continue to use the alley; * * * the alley, being also under its care, the duty of remedying the immediate consequence of its act (grading down Clark street) was incumbent upon it.” The decision is not placed upon the ground that the city was bound to erect a barrier or take some preventive means touching access to the alley or through the alley to the street, as it might well have been if appellant’s contention is to be accepted by the courts of this State as sound. The discussions and decisions in the so-called elevated railroad cases have more clearly defined the rights of the abutting owners upon public ways, and have more clearly defined the line between the rights and powers of the municipality on the one hand and the rights of the abutters which are subordinate thereto. It is now well understood that the abutting owner has rights which the municipality is bound to respect and that the municipality has rights which it has power to enforce without regard to the inconvenience of the abutting owners and with exclusive regard to the convenience of the travelers upon the public ways, and to the uses to which these ways may be properly devoted. The abutter’s right of access along his- entire premises is conceded, but this
Some cases have been cited to us to sustain the contention of the plaintiff. The case of Burnham v. City of Boston (10 Allen, 290) is much relied upon. That case, however, it will be seen on examination, is not in point. The facts there were so essentially different from the facts here that it is not authority. That case was decided by a divided Court. The dangerous excavation was not encountered by one'coming into the street. The way leading into the street was level and smooth and much traveled. After being safely upon the roadbed of the street and moving across it the plaintiff was thrown over an embankment or cut which had been made by a railroad crossing the street. The barrier had not been placed near the brink of the embankment or cut, but too far away and did not protect those using the street to cross at this point. The defect there was in the street and on its roadbed, and the court held that the city had failed in its duty to protect travelers upon the street. With this holding the appellant can find no argument -for the contention here. The court also held that plaintiff had become a traveler when he reached the traveled way of the street, whether his purpose was to travel along or across the street, and was entitled to protection. Such is not the case we are considering. Whatever else was stated, in the opinion was obiter and might not have been stated were it needful for a decision. The cases of O'Malley v. Parsons Borough (191 Penn. St. 612) and Orme v. City of Richmond (79 Va. 86) support, in a measure, the appellant’s contention.
In Smith v. Inhabitants of Wendell (7 Cush. 498) a town was
In Dougherty v. Village of Horseheads (159 N. Y. 154) it was held that the village was not liable for an injury to one seeking access to the public street through a private way, by reason of a stone placed - within the limits of such street and obstructing such private way, -thougli unknown to and unseen by the person injured, when such stone served to protect a tree or grassplat within the street.
These cases, and many other like cases which might be cited, point to the conclusion that the-governing body of a town, village or city owes no duty of protection to those seeking access to or egress from the public ways,’ and also that such access and egress cannot be interrupted or obstructed by such governing body unless the duty of such town, village or city respecting the safety of travelers upon the public ways and the protection of the public uses of such public ways requires it.
I do not think the facts presented by this appeal warrant the finding by a jury that defendant had failed in the discharge of any duty which the statute either expressly or by implication imposed upon the defendant, and the nonsuit was, therefore, proper.
Judgment and order reversed and new trial granted, with costs to appellant to abide event.