Dennis v. StateDennis v. State
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Quillian
R. T. Dennis appeals his conviction for the offense of mutiny in a penal institution by assaulting Correctional Officer George Carnes — by striking him in the mouth with his hands and kicking him in the groin. Officer Carnes was escorting Dennis from the Office of Inmate Discipline to the 4th floor of the prison where he lived. Dennis asked to speak to another officer and then refused to return to his cell. Carnes started to leave to request assistance in returning Dennis to his cell. Dennis struck Officer Carnes with his hands, which were handcuffed together. Thereafter Dennis kicked Carnes in the stomach and in the groin. Two other officers subdued Dennis. Carnes was taken to the hospital. He required an operation for a hernia caused by the kick to his groin by Dennis. Held:
1. We find no error in the admission of a prior conviction of Dennis for aggravated assault on a peace officer. Before evidence of an independent crime is admissible two conditions must be met: (1) there must be evidence that the defendant was the perpetrator, and (2) there must be sufficient similarity or connection between the two that proof of the former tends to prove the latter. State v. Johnson, 246 Ga. 654 (272 SE2d 321). The main thrust of the defense in the instant case was that the mental condition of the defendant prevented him from forming the element of intent to cause serious injury to the officer. The previous conviction for aggravated assault upon another officer was admissible on the issue of intent. Foster v. State, 230 Ga. 666 (1) (198 SE2d 847).
2. Testimony of the prison psychologist was presented by the defendant that he had been diagnosed as a chronic paranoid schizophrenic. Schizophrenia is a psychosis, but a psychosis is not the equivalent of insanity — although they may be difficult to distinguish. Guttmacher, ALI Model Penal Code 171 (Commentary, Tentative Draft No. 4). It is a mental illness and is “a general term for any
In the instant case the psychologist was unequivocal in his diagnosis of the defendant’s psychosis, but said that he had no opinion as to his sanity at the time of the offense. Under the law of this state, an individual’s sanity is presumed.
3. The trial court authorized the defendant to be restrained in handcuffs and leg-chains during the trial. “ ‘[A] defendant has a right to be tried in an atmosphere free of partiality created by the use of excessive guards [and restraint] except where special circumstances [exist], which in the discretion of the trial judge, dictate added security precautions.’ ”
Allen v. State,
235 Ga. 709, 711 (221 SE2d 405); accord ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial Judge § 5.3 (b). “It is essential to the proper administration of criminal justice that dignity, order, and decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings in our country.” Illinois v. Al
There was evidence of the plea of guilty of the defendant to a prior offense of stabbing a police officer with a deadly weapon, and the defendant had been indicted for the present offense of mutiny in a penal institution by an assault upon an officer with intent to cause serious bodily injury. In addition, the trial court had observed the defendant’s conduct at the arraignment. He recited those facts for the record as his reason for the additional restraint imposed upon the defendant. “The purpose of the court allowing this to be done is that when he was brought before the Court at arraignment, it took several officers to handle him, to actually physically bring him into the courtroom and to take him out of the courtroom. That during the time he was being brought into the courtroom, at the time he was leaving the courtroom, he was calling the court officials and all other people present in the courtroom members of the Ku Klux Klan.” “ . . . [A]s I recall he had to be dragged in, kicking and screaming . . . Being subdued by some six or eight officers and based on that, his prior action in the court, the Court authorized him to be brought in” with handcuffs and leg chains.
The court charged the jury that he had authorized the additional restraint imposed upon the defendant and that they were to totally disregard such restraint in determining his guilt or innocence and erase that fact from their minds. He asked if they could disregard such restraint or if defendant’s appearance in handcuffs and leg chains would prejudice them as to his case. There was no response.
At trial, where there is good and sufficient cause, the court has discretion in requiring a defendant to be handcuffed or shackled for security reasons.
Gates v. State,
244 Ga. 587, 593 (261 SE2d 349); cf. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. S. 337, supra. Abuse of discretion is the test on appeal where restraining devices have been used in the trial court.
Allen v. State,
235 Ga. 709, 712, supra. Where, as here, there was evidence of prior assaults on police officials, prior disruptive misconduct before the court, evidence that the defendant was suffering from
Judgment affirmed.
Birdsong and Carley, JJ., concur.