Billy Joe Dennis takes this appeal from the trial court’s grant of Laura Dennis’s motion to dismiss his April 2009 application for contempt concerning her alleged violation of his visitation rights. Because the trial court erred in refusing to consider Billy Joe’s allegations, and because his service on Laura’s attorney in other, still pending contempt proceedings was valid, we reverse.
The record shows that Billy Joe and Laura were divorced by final judgment and decree on November 21, 2006. Laura was to have physical custody of the minor children with Billy Joe having regular visitation. On December 4, 2007, Laura filed a motion for contempt alleging that Billy Joe had failed to pay her $80,000 due under the divorce decree. On January 11, 2008, Billy Joe filed his own motion alleging Laura’s interference with his visitation. These matters were tried on January 18, 2008. The trial court announced its decision and *792 instructed the parties to negotiate visitation and other issues and to submit a draft order within ten days. No order was filed in the course of 2008, however.
On April 14, 2009, Billy Joe filed a new motion for contempt, also styled as an “amended motion for contempt,” alleging that an order was never prepared because the parties could not agree on its content and that Laura had violated his visitation rights during the children’s spring break, “which occurred March 23rd through March 29th” in an unspecified year. Billy Joe served the new motion on Laura’s attorney of record.
On April 27, 2009, the trial court entered an order prepared by Laura’s counsel in the 2007 and 2008 proceedings, noting that order as nunc pro tunc to January 18, 2008. On May 13, 2009, and represented by new'counsel, Laura answered and moved to dismiss the April 14, 2009 motion on grounds including lack of personal jurisdiction. Attached to these responsive pleadings were (i) Laura’s affidavit that she was no longer a Georgia resident and had never been personally served and (ii) an April 28, 2009 letter from original counsel stating that her representation in the original motions was concluded, that she did not represent Laura in the new proceeding, and that she would not accept service in the latter. Billy Joe responded that service on original counsel had been sufficient because the two older motions were still pending at the time the new motion was made.
The trial court granted Laura’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that the allegations of Billy Joe’s new petition were too “generalized” and that he could not assert new matters after the close of evidence on January 18, 2008, but before the filing of an order. We granted Billy Joe’s application for discretionary appeal.
1. An application for contempt is a motion, not a complaint.
Brown v. King,
The petitioner initiates the contempt proceeding by serving the respondent with a copy of the contempt motion and a rule nisi. The rule nisi gives the respondent notice of the charges and the opportunity for a hearing at a specific time *793 and place. To comport with due process, the notice of the hearing must be reasonable.
Id. at 891 (1).
(a) In 2007, the General Assembly amended OCGA § 5-6-34 to provide a right of direct appeal for “[a]ll judgments or orders in child custody cases including, but not limited to, awarding or refusing to change child custody or
holding or declining to hold persons in contempt
of such child custody judgment or orders.” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11) (Ga. L. 2007, p. 554, § 2, effective January 1, 2008); see also
Taylor v. Curl,
(b) A trial court need not make findings of fact or conclusions of law on a motion for contempt arising from the enforcement of a divorce decree.
Hines v. Hines,
Here, the trial court failed to consider Billy Joe’s allegations except as inadequately pled and dismissed his new motion on that basis sua sponte and without a hearing. No matter whether the visitation at issue occurred in March 2008 or in March 2009, it occurred after the trial of January 2008 but before the order of April 2009. Because Billy Joe’s new motion for contempt gave Laura adequate notice of the nature of his claim, and because the trial court did not afford Billy Joe due process concerning it, we reverse the grant of Laura’s motion to dismiss and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. See
Smith v. Smith,
2. Although we would affirm the trial court’s order if it were right for any reason, Laura’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction lacked merit.
It has long been the law, and remains so after the passage of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act in 2001, that “ ‘a non-resident parent alleged to be in contempt of the visitation provisions of a Georgia divorce judgment and who was served outside Georgia may divest the court of its power to enforce its judgment by timely asserting a defense of lack of personal jurisdiction.’ ”
Daniels v. Barnes,
Here, however, Billy Joe’s January 2008 contempt motion was still pending when he served Laura with his new motion on April 14, 2009. Laura does not dispute that she was properly served in the January 2008 matter, and counsel had not yet prepared the final order concerning it when she was served with the new motion. This service of the new motion on Laura’s attorney of record in Billy Joe’s pending 2008 action was therefore sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over Laura on the trial court.
Smith v. Smith,
Judgment reversed and case remanded with direction.