In the Matter of Kristin D. MILLER, Respondent.
No. 49S00-1202-DI-96.
Supreme Court of Indiana.
Feb. 1, 2013.
On June 6, 2012, pursuant to Indiana Admission and Discipline Rule 23(10)(f), this Court suspended Respondent from the practice of law in this State for failing to cooperate with the Disciplinary Commission concerning a grievance filed against Respondent. The Disciplinary Commission has now moved to convert Respondent‘s suspension to an indefinite suspension from the practice оf law pursuant to Admission and Discipline Rule 23(10)(f)(4). Respondent has not responded to the Commission‘s motion to convert the current suspension.
The Court finds that more than six months have passed sinсe Respondent was suspended due to noncooperation with the disciplinary process. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Respondent‘s suspension should be converted to an indefinite suspension from the practice of law pursuant to Admission and Discipline Rule 23(10)(f)(4).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Respondent‘s current suspension from the practice of law for failure tо cooperate with the disciplinary process is converted to an indefinite suspension, effective immediately. Respondent is ordered to fulfill the continuing duties of a suspеnded attorney under Admission and Discipline Rule 23(26). To be readmitted to the practice of law in this State, Respondent must cure the causes of all suspensions in effect and succеssfully petition this Court for reinstatement pursuant to Admission and Discipline Rule 23(4) and (18).
The Clerk of this Court is directed to forward notice of this order to Respondent by certified mail, return receiрt requested, at the address reflected in the Roll of Attorneys; to the Disciplinary Commission; and to all other entities entitled to notice under Admission and Discipline Rule 23(3)(d). The Clerk is further directed to post this order to the Court‘s website, and Thomson Reuters is directed to publish a copy of this order in the bound volumes of this Court‘s decisions.
All Justices concur.
Dennis Jack HORNER, Appellant (Petitioner), v. Marciа (Horner) CARTER, Appellee (Respondent).
No. 34S02-1210-DR-582.
Supreme Court of Indiana.
Feb. 12, 2013.
David W. Stone IV, Stone Law Office & Legal Research, Anderson, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Brent R. Dechert, Kokomo, IN, Attorney for Appellee.
Indiana State Bar Assoc., Alternative Dispute Resolution Section and Indiana Assoc. of Mediators, Andrea L. Ciobanu, Ciobanu Law P.C., Indianapоlis, IN, Attorney for Amici Curiae.
DICKSON, Chief Justice.
When the parties’ marriage was dissolved in 2005, the trial court approved a
1. Exclusion of Husband‘s Statements to Mediator During Mediation.
Indiana policy strongly favors the confidentiality of аll matters that occur during mediation.
Alternative Dispute Resolution Rule 2.11 Confidentiality
Mediation shall be regarded as settlement negotiations as governed by Ind. Evidence Rule 408. For purposes of reference, Evid. R. 408 provides as follows:
Rule 408. Compromise and Offers to Compromise
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to com-
promise a claim, which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prеjudice of a witness, negating a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution. Compromise negotiations encomрass alternative dispute resolution. Mediation sessions shall be closed to all persons other than the parties of record, their legal representatives, and other invitеd persons.
Mediators shall not be subject to process requiring the disclosure of any matter discussed during the mediation, but rather, such matter shall be considered confidential and privileged in nature. The confidentiality requirement may not be waived by the parties, and an objection to the obtaining of testimony or physical evidence from mediation may be madе by any party or by the mediators.
In Vernon v. Acton, we held that the mediation confidentiality provisions of our ADR Rules “extend to and include oral settlement agreements undertaken or reached in mеdiation. Until reduced to writing and signed by the parties, mediation settlement agreements must be considered as compromise settlement negotiations....” 732 N.E.2d 805, 810 (Ind.2000). Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations or mediation is not admissible except when offered for a purpose other than “to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount.”
During the hearing on the husband‘s petition to modify the mediated settlement agreement, the trial court refused to allow the husbаnd to testify as to his statements to the mediator during the mediation session. The husband sought admission of this evidence to avoid liability under the agreed settlement on grounds that it reflected neithеr his intent, nor his oral agreement during the mediation.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the husband‘s statements during the mediation could be admitted as extrinsic evidence to aid in the сonstruction of an ambiguous agreement. We disagree. Indiana judicial policy strongly urges the amicable resolution of disputes and thus embraces a robust policy of confidentiality of conduct and statements made during negotiation and mediation.1 The benefits of compromise settlement agreements outweigh the risks that such policy may on occаsion impede access to otherwise admissible evidence on an issue.
2. Denial of Husband‘s Petition to Modify Agreement.
With respect to the husband‘s petition tо modify the Property Settlement Agreement‘s provisions obligating him to make house payments, we summarily affirm that portion of the decision of the Court of the Appeals that affirms the triаl court‘s rejection of the husband‘s claim. Horner, 969 N.E.2d at 118-19;
Conclusion
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
RUCKER, DAVID, MASSA, and RUSH, JJ., concur.
