*1 Plaintiff, FELIX, Denise Cooper as ad Irene
Naomi of Den estate ministrators Plaintiffs-Appellants, Felix, ise
v. TRANSIT CITY YORK NEW AUTHORITY, Defendant-
Appellee. No. 01-7967. Appeals, Court States United Circuit. Second May 2002. Argued 31, 2003. March Decided: section, addressing Hansen, the above-referenced People 99 N.Y.2d claim. See claim, (2003). which is equal protection petitioner's 756 N.Y.S.2d appeal. us on presented to claim any express to the merits of no view as 3. opinion other portion the District Court *2 activity. The United States District Court Southern District of New York (Shira Scheindlin, A. District Judge) granted summary judgment to the defen- dant because causally related to the accommodation requested. We affirm.
BACKGROUND In Denise Felix was hired as a Sager, Washington Square Laura Legal “Railroad Clerk” by the New York City (Valerie Services, Inc., Hsieh, Raminta Ru- (“NYCTA”). Transit Authority students, dys, brief, law argued and on the the NYCTA 3,417 employed approximately Ferrandino, student,
Margo law on the Railroad Clerks. The overwhelming ma- brief,), York, NY, New Plaintiff-Appel- jority Railroad Clerks work in token lant. in subway stations, booths they where sell Schoolman, Richard Office Gener- tokens, commuter passes, cards, and fare Counsel, al City New York Transit Au- provide and information passengers. NY, thority, Brooklyn, for Defendant-Ap- Approximately 50 Railroad Clerks pellee. jobs. office The Railroad assigned Clerks jobs to office are deployed to work in Sloan, L. Equal
Barbara Employment days token booths a few a year. (Nicholas Commission, Opportunity M. In- zeo, Acting Counsel, Deputy General Phil- 26, 1995, On November Felix was as- Sklover, ip B. Counsel, Assistant General signed Clerk, “extra” Railroad re- Blackwood, Vincent J. Assistant General lieving Railroad Clerks who were on Counsel, brief), DC, on the Washington, While breaks. en route to relieve the for Amicus Curiae. Railroad Clerk on the northbound plat- Kingston Station, form of the and Throop WALKER, Before: Chief Judge, Felix was informed the Railroad LEVAL, JACOBS and Judges. Circuit Clerk on platform the southbound of that station had been killed in firebombing joins Judge majority JACOBS incident. Felix plat- saw smoke-filled opinion and files a separate concurring form and was stuck inside the train for opinion. some time. Felix was traumatized Judge LEVAL dissents a separate realization that she could have been killed opinion. and Kings was taken to the County Hospi- Emergency tal’s Room. WALKER, Jr., JOHN M. Judge. Chief Denise Felix sued her employer, former reported Felix to the NYCTA’s Medical City York New Transit Authority, un- day. Assessment Center the next She was Act, der the Americans with initially categorized Disabilities temporarily .as medi- alleging that she was to a position cally entitled unable to work. From December that did not involve working the subway, 1995 until August Felix was des- which she could work, not do ignated Post- temporary.” “restricted Traumatic Stress Disorder that was inter- Her doctors diagnosed her with Post- fering ability with her sleep, major (“PTSD”); life Traumatic Stress Disorder City Tran- v. New York argument. feelings apprehension included (S.D.N.Y. Auth., 154 F.Supp.2d in- sit problems anxiety, recurrent 2001). affirm. in the inability to work
somnia, she specified that doctors subways. Her *3 work, subway but any to do DISCUSSION
was not not later point At some do clerical work. grant court’s district We review the 1996, a 13, Felix August novo, resolving summary judgment de of that would not a reassignment position to fa facts in the non-movant’s disputed all an subway in the as to work require her Servs., Inc. v. Empl. vor. Tri-State problems. medical of accommodation her Co., 256, Mountbatten Sur. designation was her August On (2d work, No- temporary.” On to “no changed Act with Disabilities The Americans 1996, was terminated vember disabilities, (“ADA”) with protects people § which Law to Civil Service pursuant “a physical as individuals defined of a civil service the termination authorizes substantially lim- mental unable to return who has been employee major the life activities one or more of its § 71. year. Civ. Serv. work for N.Y. 42 U.S.C. such individual.” of her administrative exhausting After ADA, 12102(2)(A). I the which § Title of Right to Sue receiving and remedies disability within individuals protects Oppor- Equal Employment from the letter “discriminating” workplace, prohibits (“EEOC”), Felix com- tunity Commission disability “be- employee with against an of the alleging violations menced this suit individual.” disability of such cause of the 1990, 42 Act of Americans with Disabilities 12112(a). defines § The statute 42 U.S.C. died §§ et Denise Felix seq. U.S.C. making “not rea- “discriminate” to include of completion July before on to the known sonable accommodations due to proceedings, court the district of an or mental limitations other- physical events at issue causes unrelated disability, with a qualified wise individual of this case and administrators can demonstrate ... unless employer] [the Be- plaintiffs. were substituted estate impose an that the accommodation ef- practical has no cause this substitution hardship operation undue adhere to the litigation, we fect on 12112(b)(5)(A). § business.” U.S.C. designations for the sake previous party that Felix The NYCTA concedes convenience. insomnia lim disability has summary judg- moved for The NYCTA sleeping. Al major life its (1) ment, receipt of Social arguing additional though presents the NYCTA ar estop should Security disability benefits why grant did not need to guments for she was able claiming from accommodation, we address (2) work, accommodation no reasonable the district court found de only the issue ability to work because the was available be a there must terminative: Whether function of subways was an essential specific link between the causal (3) Clerks, was no nex- there Railroad life major limits a which activity impaired us between required. requested. The and the accommodation the text of analysis with start our argu- first two rejected court district statutory language pro- judgment in the statute. summary granted ments but an against employee its third hibits discrimination on the basis of favor of NYCTA disability of such individu- any major “because limit life activity, injuries these 12112(a). Although al.” “dis- not a His employer termi- terms, very criminate” is defined in broad nates him position from a doing entry data expansive change definition does not and word processing produc- because his requirement that to be actionable the tivity has decreased. The fact that discrimination must be “because disability, the inability walk, and the disability.” Reading requirement limitation of his typing stem from the same reasonable light, accident does not change the fact that he employer discriminates against employ- was not discriminated against “because of disability ee with a by failing to pro- disability.” [his] Similarly, Felix’s (a vide a reasonable accommodation for the to sleep significant limitation on a *4 “disability” which is impairment the of activity) the life separate from inability major activity. life Other impairments (not to work in the subway a significant that do not amount to a “disability” as limitation on the major activity life of 12102(2)(a) 42 by § defined do not working general), in even though both require accommodation under the ADA. by were caused subway the firebombing and the resultant PTSD. principle
The is not altered by the fact (which disability that the must be accom- Felix and the EEOC as amicus curiae modated) by is caused impairment another argue prior precedent forecloses this (which accommodated). need not be conclusion and that a person once has a case, this her- disability was her disability insomnia by defined 42 U.S.C. substantially which limited her ability 12102(2)(A), to any impairment other sleep. Felix’s to work in the sub- resulted from the of cause the disability way did not substantially any major limit must be accommodated even if that im- activity. work, life She fully was able to pairment not substantially does limit a ma- just not the Her subway. inability to jor activity life and thus is not itself a in the subway was related to her disability. disagree. The cases Felix insomnia they because both stemmed from relies on inapposite to her case be- the same traumatic incident and resultant cause in each the impairment instance for disorder, psychological But PTSD. plaintiff which sought an accommodation common traumatic alone origin does not directly flowed from disability itself mean that the non-disability impairment is and was therefore “because of the disabili- entitled to an ty.” accommodation. points to cases addressing AIDS, epilepsy, paralysis, and mental ill- A simple hypothetical of a car accident ness. point illustrates the A passenger well. a car badly injured in an accident. The In Bragdon v. Abbott Supreme passenger walk, the ability loses to a ma- Court held that for purposes receiving of jor activity life and has a “disability” thus public treatment, accommodation of dental qualifies him accommodation. for with AIDS is a person with a passenger The also injury suffers some disability because AIDS interferes with arms, his which typing lower his speed major activity life of reproduction. from per 624, one-hundred words minute to 524 U.S. 118 S.Ct.
forty
minute,
per
(1998).
words
seriously
without
L.Ed.2d 540
Although
right
limiting
ability
his
to perform
major
public
accommodation of dental treat-
life
of
working
general. Be-
by
ADA,
ment is secured
Title III of the
injuries
his arm
cause
substantially
I,
do not
not
Title
“disability”
definition of
life
impairs
substantially
cause
Toyota Motor
ADA.
to all
applies
activity.1
Williams,
U.S.
Inc.
Ky.,
Manuf.,
L.Ed.2d 615
S.Ct.
from other
cases
to similar
Felix cites
argu-
Felix’s
However, contrary
(2002).
addressed
Circuit
Seventh
circuits.
ser-
denied
Bragdon
ment,
the dentist
from
paralyzed
a woman
where
case
of
because
purely
vices
down
waist
infection
disability,
Bragdon’s
periodically devel
that she
ulcers
pressure
repro-
of
the life
Although
Vande
paralysis.
HIV.
of her
aas
result
ops
Admin.,
connected to
directly
Dep’t
not
was
duction
v. State
Zande
of
of Wis.
(7th
Although
to accommo-
failure
unreasonable
543-44
dentist’s
directly
medical
specific
relate
the same
do
Bragdon,
ulcers
pressure
date
activity which
HIV transmission—
walking
of
risk
condition—the
—the
found
Seventh Circuit
for both
was
responsible
was
—the
man
“a characteristic
dentist’s
were
ulcers
capacity
reproductive
thus
disability”
were
her.
[the]
to accommodate
ifestation
failure
unreasonable
Id.
disability.”
underlying
part
Thus,
“a
the discrimination
support from
also looks
544. Felix
at
*5
a
whether
holding that
Ninth
the
Circuit’s
re-
that have
to cases
points
Felix also
in
limitations
substantial
“faced
plaintiff
dis-
for
accommodations
reasonable
quired
to whether
irrelevant
work
ability to
his
major life activities
impair
that
abilities
activities
major life
in other
limitations
his
also cause
workplace but
the
outside of
pur
ADA
for
as disabled
him
qualify
For
workplace.
the
within
impairments
San Die
County
v.
McAlindin
poses.”
a plaintiff
have permitted
example, we
Cir.1999).
(9th
1226, 1233
F.3d
go,
was
she
judgment where
summary
survive
a
that
Ninth Circuit
the
agree with
But we
not
she could
promotion
denied
at work
can seek accommodation
Lovejoy-Wilson
epilepsy,
due to her
drive
as a
qualifies
impairment
if the
even
Fuel, Inc.,
F.3d
v. NOCO Motor
activity other
a life
disability because
that
Cir.2001),
fact
(2d
despite the
cases to
the other
Like
working.
major
life activ-
considered
driving is not
cites,
differs from
McAlindin
which Felix
County Police
ity. Colwell
Suffolk
ap
McAindin
situation because
Felix’s
(2d
635, 643
Dep’t, 158
for
seeking
to be
peared
that because
argues
such as
impairments,
same mental
eligibility
Lovejoy-Wilson’s
affected
that
people,
with other
interact
inability to
drive,
inability
her
was
promotion
claimed
his
constituted
not
but
epilepsy
by
caused
her
was
which
accommo
workplace
activity
epilepsy
Felix seeks
major life
part
does
which
condition
be-
a mental
with,
connection
a causal
dation
interferes
disability
directly
from
flow
major life
not
tween
—the
prevents
of insomnia
be
cannot
mental
argue
Felix did
sleeping.
ina-
from
However, Lovejoy-Wilson’s
required.
unable work
that she was
NYCTA
disabili-
the same
is due to
bility to drive
aggra
such
subway because
all motor
loss of
and sudden
ty periodic
—
insomnia;
told
NYCTA
she
be- vated
disabled
her as
qualifies
control-—that
major life
which
to determine
have
Lovejoy-Wilson relied
1. The Court
F.3d at
Lovejoy-Wilson, 263
impaired.
epilepsy
specify that
regulations that
EEOC
1615.103(1)(ii)).
C.F.R.
(citing 29
did not
disability and therefore
constitutes
subway
she
not work
them on an even playing field with the
because she was
being
non-disabled;
“terrified of
alone
it does not authorize a pref-
Thus,
and closed in.”
in contrast
erence for disabled people generally. See
relies,
upon
cases
which she
the impair-
Airways,
Barnett,
U.S.
Inc. v.
535 U.S.
ment for which Felix seeks accommodation
S.Ct.
108 accommoda that the named showing sis
CONCLUSION 42 burden. See an undue tion creates in favor judgment summary affirm 12111(10)(B); v. Val Borkowski Felix. against of NYCTA 131, District, F.3d ley School Central (2d Cir.1995). assumption That concurring. JACOBS, Judge, Circuit cases, run of in the common makes sense a plaintiff, argues dissent The would named which the from in- who suffers subway token-clerk perform employee enable the either or near underground she is when somnia de job some duties the essential to an accommoda- trains, entitled may be the dis or treat way alleviate monstrable position. a clerical reassigning her to tion See, Lovejoy-Wil- e.g., condition. abling Inc., Fuel, on the 263 F.3d is Motor dissenting argument based son v. NOCO (2d Cir.2001); v. is dis- Parker Co employee that an 217-218 assumption buried Indus., (and F.3d owes accommo- employer an lumbia Pictures abled (2d Cir.2000); City dation) is Stone even when 335-36 93-94, Vernon, job and would particular Mount by the caused something (2d Cir.1997); v. Federal Re employee did if the else. Wernick exist York, assump- 91 F.3d of this New Virtually all ramifications serve Bank of (2d (if be absurd. adopted) would 383-84 tion in- nasty supervisor if a example, For it) (as the dissent conceives This case substantially im- level duces stress new, ques- intermediate present would (a major life sleep employee’s pairs expected benefit tion: whether employer I not think that the activity), do the accommodation employee of im- sleep to accommodate the is required so a cost- being gauged, capable is transfer to a who by a boss pairment not, done; if analysis can be benefit has had Similarly, lifeguard nicer. who a mat- unreasonable cannot de- near-drowning experience Borkowski, F.3d at 138 law. ter of See job ground that she a desk on the mand (“In short, an accommodation is reasonable a substan- (arguably hyperventilate dispropor- clearly are not only if its costs impairment of the tial *7 pro- it benefits will tionate to the insomnia, if she were breathing), or suffer duce.”). The accommodation demanded And a whose go in the water. on the em- appreciable costs places here breathing his or flying impairs fear of would be subway token-seller ployer: a employment circus cannot insist on sleep subways and vicinity of removed from the and com- the human cannon-balls one Moreover, selling tokens. relieved from him to pel allows by reas- of insomnia the accommodation sell the tickets. stress or alleviate signments that reduce easily could entail transfers dissent, any. phobia plaintiffs According to plausi- who token-sellers rather numerous merely exacerbated insomnia is insomnia and demand bly assert working underground; than caused (or (or below), day above-ground so, however, reassign- requested even etcetera, according self- their night), accom- not be a reasonable ment would imperatives. See psychological that if a described The dissent assumes modation. 12111(10)(B)(ii)(definingrele- § an accom- U.S.C. disability has been shown and “the effect on factors to include named, vant cost modation the burden shifts resources, oth- impact analy- expenses advance a employer to cost-benefit erwise of such accommodations upon the specific which-limits a operation facility”). life activity and the accommodation” sought by the employee. Maj. Op. at 104. On the balance, other side of the I do not disagree with the majority’s per- benefit of accommodating this employee’s ception of requirement. The require- insomnia estimated, cannot be depending ment, however, is satisfied in this case. as it does relative severity of the (as disorder compared with some unknown As the majority agrees, Felix satisfied norm for sleeptime), the absolute severity requirement statute’s to be classified (which of the disorder is self-reported and as “disabled” because of evidence that her depends on a drowsy person’s estimate of Posh-Traumatic (“PTSD”) Stress Disorder long unconscious), how she is and the effi- involved impairment of a life activi- cacy or sufficiency of measures taken at ty ability to If sleep. she suffered —the work to help sleep better at impairment of major life activity, she (which night wholly depends on the em- was entitled to “reasonable accommoda- ployee’s say-so).1 ]” of that disability. tion! An accommodation that is demanded in 12112(b)(5)(A). majority asserts, The order to reduce stress or make the em- correctly my view, that Felix has no ployee tranquil more is in the nature of an statutory entitlement to accommodation amenity that if broadly required would unless demanded transform the workplace in a incom- way (or would alleviate avoid aggravating) her patible with productivity. sleep disorder. Her evidence shows exact- ly that. LEVAL, Judge, dissenting. Felix submitted evidence that working
I respectfully dissent. underground in the subway aggra- vate her inability to sleep, and, conversely, A. (the that working ground above accommodation) The majority would alleviate the affirms the district dis- court’s (or grant ability of summary it).1 avoid judgment aggravating the defen- If the dant concludes that under the accommodation was “reason- ADA must “there be a causal link between able” within the meaning statute, puts The 1. dissent diag- showed, store the medical example, evidence 1. that Fe- plaintiffs nosis that this product insomnia is a sleep lix did not for more than one or two post-traumatic stress disorder. [Dissent at per night weeks, hours for over two after syndrome 110.] That enough, is real but it is *8 being by psychiatrist asked her to visit a sub- (as phrase denotes) diagnostic grouping way token booth on June 1996. Felix's in each case whatever nervous manifesta- medical evaluations recommended work particular person tions a suffers in the wake ground, above stating below-ground that as- of insomnia, person stress. One may by react to stress signments PTSD, aggravate would by overmuch; sleeping another one sleep that caused the Al- disorder. manic, enervated; is is another one though the doctors did not state this with overeats, fasts; another one go cannot out in optimal clarity, a fact easily finder could find public, another needs a diagnosis crowd. The on the opinions basis insomnia, does not medical predict the that work symptom of suggest treatment, ground does not below severity aggraváte its would sleep dis- therefore by cannot be employer used an order. to differentiate the persons disabled from who merely are impaired or uncomfortable. and is quite is different case tickets. Our to it.2 entitled she was dis- who is very simple. A really has sleep by reason abled B. that assignment an relief from requested alone Jacobs, himself speaking Judge enti- disorder. Her sleep aggravates court, my that contends and not requested on whether depends tlement assump- the buried on based “is argument “reasonable,” given accommodation (and an is disabled employee tion that That business. employer’s nature accommodation) even owes employer never addressed was question by is caused when summary judgment, granted court district if the not exist job and particular the accommoda- recognize failing to that Op. Cone. something else.” did employee sought was alleviate tion inis My argument 108. He is mistaken. at trial. remand for should assumption. that premised way no notes, “[Felix’s] opinion majority As the Post-Traumat- her with diagnosed
doctors (‘PTSD’) re- [including] Disorder ic Stress Maj. insomnia.” problems current BYAM, Plaintiff-Appellant, D. Jean concludes, majority Op. at 103-104. her insom- disability was correctly, “[H]er Commissioner, suggestion BARNHART, There is no at 104. nia.” Id. Anne Jo she only when Security occurred insomnia Administration that her Social contrary, Defendant-Appellee. To underground. worked during sleep was ability to 01-6195. Docket No. leave, when medical months her twelve Appeals, States Court may be United at all. Felix working was not she Second Circuit. (only if rea- to an accommodation entitled sonable) above-ground of an in the form 8, 2002. Argued Oct. that jury find assignment because 31, 2003. March Decided sleep aggravates ground work below disorder.3 short, nothing to do with has the case sell circus who want to cannonballs
human by performing a usually determined dealing rela- tion majority avoids 2. The argue that the analysis. do not impairment of the I tionship between the cost-benefit accommodation are costs of Felix's argue to the observing benefits, did not by that "Felix but outweighed necessarily in the work unable to that she was NYCTA to a chance she was entitled aggravated subway because such Judge they are. at trial demonstrate Maj. if this is Op. at 106. Even insomnia.” so, argue that the appears in Jacobs addition own doctors NYCTA’s is irrelevant. can remedy of reasonable sleep disor- developed a that Felix had found of emotional basis found on the never be der, by going un- aggravated and that it was susceptible to confir- conditions thus aware derground. well NYCTA *9 position I objective On tests. mation assignment alleviate her above-ground that it note opinion, express no other personal view and Judge represents Jacobs’s correctly Judge observes Jacobs 3. holding the court. accommoda- reasonableness of