38 Wash. 354 | Wash. | 1905
Appellant Margaret Denham was riding upon a street car of the defendant company, and was in some manner thrown therefrom, and seriously injured, while the
Among the errors assigned, is the action of the court in overruling appellants’ objections to a juryman by the name of White. A portion of the examination of said juryman was as follows:
“Q. Do you know any reason why, Mr. White, that you could not render a fair and impartial verdict in this cause ? A. Why, I sometimes think I have a prejudice in cases of this kind. Q. And you still have that slight prejudice in cases of this kind, have you not, Mr. White ? A. I think so. Mr. Roche: I submit a challenge for cause. Q. (By Mr. Stephens). Mr. White, would you give the same weight to evidence in this character of a case as you would in any other case ? A. I think so. Q. And would decide from the evidence fairly and impartially under the instructions of the court? A. Yes, sir, but it might take evidence to remove some of my prejudices.- Q. Still, you have not an opinion one way or the other of the case before you hear the evidence? A. I have not; no; sir. Q. And your opinion, when you heard the evidence, would he made up from the evidence, would it ? A. It would. . . . Q. (By the Court.) You think, Mr. White, that you have a prejudice which might influence you one way or the other in arriving at a verdict? A. No, I don’t think I have. Q. You think you could try the case fairly and impartially and on the evidence and the instructions given you by the court, uninfluenced by any prejudice that you might have ? A. I think so. Q. (By Mr. Rochei) What I mean by prejudice is, what degree of respect that you would pay to the testimony of the plaintiffs’ witnesses. Could you give them the same credit as you could give in any other case where you are not prejudiced at all? A.
Tinder the holding of this court in the case of Stata v. Groney, 31 Wash. 122, 71 Pac. 783, we think the action of the trial court was justified. The answers of this juryman showed that he was frank and fair; that he knew nothing whatever about the facts of this case, and had no predilections concerning the same, or the merits thereof, that he could and would try the case upon the evidence, disregarding any feelings or prejudice that he might have against the general class of cases to which this belonged. The case cited above was a criminal case. In such cases freedom from prejudice is ordinarily insisted upon more strictly than in a civil case; yet in that case, although one of the jurymen said that he had a prejudice against a man charged with crime, and that said prejudice was to a certain extent a fixed opinion against a person charged, and that he would go into that particular trial with that prejudice against the defendant, inasmuch as the juryman said that he would not allow that prejudice to affect his
Some exceptions were entered to the court’s rulings upon the introduction of evidence. An examination shows that they are not well taken. Among other instructions, the trial court gave the following:
“I instruct you, that a railway company or a street railway company who undertakes to transport passengers for hire, is what is known in law as a common carrier, and it is the duty of every common carrier who undertakes to transport passengers for hire to exercise a high degree of care in the operation of its road, and in providing proper cars in order to prevent accident and injury to passengers they undertake to- transport.”
Appellants contend that this instruction was insufficient. They requested the court to give the following instruction:
“I further instruct you that it is the duty of the defendant railway company to exercise the highest degree of skill and care in the management of their cars, and in providing safe and suitable accommodations and protection for their passengers.”
If the instruction given by the court was not sufficiently definite and specific, the appellants had the privilege of submitting an instruction that would be more definite and specific; and, when so requested, it would have been the duty of the court to have given such an instruction, if correct. But the instruction requested by the appellants is not a correct statement of the law. It lacks proper qualifications. The railway company is not called upon to exercise the “highest degree of skill and care;” but it has complied with its duty when it uses the highest degree
In this case, even if the action of the trial court in the matters complained of had constituted error, it would, in our opinion, have been harmless, for the reason that the evidence fails to sustain a cause of action. The verdict could not properly have been otherwise than it was; and had it been favorable to appellants, it would have been the duty of the trial court to set it aside and grant a new trial, as being clearly against the evidence.
Perceiving no reversible error, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
