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DeNardo v. Calista Corp.
111 P.3d 326
Alaska
2005
Check Treatment

*1 .110(c) Bailey’s governs section medical constitutionally applied valid

claims and is as

to these claims.

IV. CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the board’s dismissal of Bai-

ley’s 1999 claims. We 1997 and REVERSE

the board’s dismissal of his 2001 claim and proceedings

REMAND for further on that DeNARDO, Appellant,

Daniel

CALISTA and Alaska CORPORATION

Newspapers, Inc., Appellees.

No. S-11183.

Supreme of Alaska. (Alaska 1992). employer hearing years Once an controverts for more than two after receiv- advice, employee ing any the burden shifts to the previous to that deficiencies in prosecute promptly. the claim When viewed written notices had no effect on his claims. whole, requirements as a these Bailey’s procedural are rational To the extent due they promote purpose process the core of the claims are based on the assertion that compensation workers' act: hearing establish a the board should have scheduled a sua efficient, quick, system resolving 23.30.155(h), sponte and fair argument for under AS disputes. .155(h) § Ch. SLA 1988. In the con- gives meritless. Subsection at most whole, system hardly text of the aas it is sponte the board act discretion to sua in set- impose proceed- ting hearing unreasonable to ing the burden of a claim request. without a employer Bailey on claimant after the has filed a has not shown circumstances dem- formal onstrating controversion. board's failure to schedule (c) 23.30.110(c), Bailey hearing next asserts that AS a (d) was an abuse of discretion. him, applied right procedural Finally, Bailey argues violates his Geophysical act- process. Bailey due To the extent bases ed in bad faith when it controverted his claims. argument inadequate on issues opinion or mis- But independent the medical of the leading statutory examiner, vagueness, notice or expressly medical who stated that assuming Bailey lack merit even deficiencies did not need narcotics and benzodiaze- in the pines, written notices he received. Our review Geophysi- would have sufficed to allow specific of the prevail record satisfies us that the ad- hearing opinion cal to at a if the re- hearing vice he received from the officer at the opinion mained uncontradicted. The prehearing adequately independent conference in- medical examiner is thus suffi- obligation request formed him of his Harp, hear- cient reason under 831 P.2d at for a ing years. request good-faith within two Since he filed his controversion.

July 2000. His Case No. 3AN- claims, alleged Cl numerous 00-8753 includ- contract, filing retaliation ing breach of Department of Labor and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis- *3 sion, negligent intentional and and infliction DeNardo, se, pro Anchorage. Daniel on of emotional distress based harassment toward, by, and favoritism some of ANI’s Weiss, E. and Pamela D. Guess Joan Rohlf employees. DeNardo amended his female P.C., Anchorage, Appellees. & Rudd 7, 2000, complaint August changes on but the purposes appeal. are not material for BRYNER, Justice, Chief Before: EASTAUGH, MATTHEWS, FARE, and lawsuit. In 2000 DeNar- Second October CARPENETI, Justices. against his do filed second lawsuit Calista brought

and ANI. He this action federal A00-309-CV, OPINION court in Case No. and based his claims on the same facts asserted in his EASTAUGH, Justice. state court action. The federal I. INTRODUCTION alleged state law claims of and intentional infliction of emotional distress Plaintiff filed three state and federal law- law gender federal claims of discrimination employer. against suits former After the his under 42 and sexual harassment U.S.C. dismissed, superior first two actions were 2000(e)-2000(e)(17)(Title VII). § third, it holding was his judicial policy barred and the res Calista and ANI removed Case No. 3AN- against appeals. claim splitting. Plaintiff Cl, action, 00-8753 the state court to federal Because terms of the dismissal court in where November it became in the first court action preserved state A00-351-CV; in Case No. December defen- claims, plaintiffs ju- res non-federal neither dants moved for consolidation of the two against splitting dicata nor the doctrine claim cases. Judge federal United District States bars the third action. We vacate therefore consolidation, H. Russel Holland ordered but in the dismissal order third action and in April 2001 Case No. remanded A00-351- proceedings. remand for further jurisdiction retaining CV to state court while over No. Case A00-309-CV. II. AND FACTS PROCEEDINGS remand, Following this DeNardo offered Daniel DeNardo filed three state and fed- to dismiss his now-remanded state court ac- against employer, eral his lawsuits former tion, No. 3AN-00-8753 Cl. The defen- (ANI) Inc., Alaska Newspapers, and its ma- offer, accepted dants and on shareholder, jority Calista Corporation. parties signed a three-paragraph employed ANI had DeNardo as an advertis- stipulation prepared by defense counsel for ing representative sales from October 1999 dismissal Case No. 3AN-00-8753 Cl with July until his termination It is prejudice.1 In May Superior superior court’s dismissal of the last-filed Judge signed Elaine M. Andrews defense lawsuits, judi- grounds these three res proposed granting Stipu- counsel’s “the against cata policy splitting, and the Prejudice.” lation to Dismiss With appeal. that leads to this Calista and ANI then moved for dismissal First remaining lawsuit. DeNardo filed first Case No. ANI, Calista, A00-309-CV, against eight lawsuit contending for- that as tribal enti- they VII, mer co-workers in state court in ties could not be sued under Title stipulation provided, part: plaintiff’s This not affect does Corporation by plaintiff and Alaska [T]he claims asserted [Case Newspapers, currently Inc. in ... A00-309 ... Cl] 3AN-00-8753 ... all defendants entirety, preju- are dismissed in their in the U.S. District Court for the Dis- dice .... of Alaska. trict otherwise, context we refer “employer.” was an Unless dictates neither because collectively appellees to the granted their as “Calista.” District Court States United Judge Holland’s in November 2001. motion stated, III. DISCUSSION howev- dismissal order

memorandum er, no court had A. of Review Standard jurisdiction it “de- over the Title VII judicata applies is a Whether supplemental clines to exercise law, an question of issue that we review de law inflic- plaintiffs state claim for the over interpret stipulations using We novo.2 also The order tion of emotional distress.” interpretation.3 rules of contract We review pursuit that it “is without stated contracts, stip and thus may have in plaintiff law claims state ulations, de novo.4 Court of court.” The United States *4 Ninth affirmed Appeals Circuit DeNar- B. Res Judicata Does Not Bar in 2002. dismissal Negligent of do’s Claims Infliction 2001, In after Third lawsuit. December Distress, of Emotional Intentional Distress, first state action and his federal his of Infliction Emotional dismissed, DeNardo commenced were and Discrimination. by filing superior court com-

third lawsuit disagree whether the about against plaint in Case No. 3AN-01-12484 Cl previ- entered two dismissals DeNardo’s and ANI. This was based Calista ous lawsuits bar his third lawsuit. Resolu- alleged facts first state on the same requires of this issue to consider the tion us It a claim of expressly court action. asserted superior stipula- effect court dismissal against Calista and ANI discrimination the federal order. tion and court dismissal indirectly him in violation of AS 18.80. It negligent intentional claims asserted 1. Parties’ contentions infliction of emotional distress. argues stipulation that a will not DeNardo give of a construed to effect to a waiver and ANI moved to dismiss Case be Calista relinquished.5 right plainly of res to be Cl on the basis intended No. 3AN-01-12484 con- split argues that a must be judicata against and the doctrine claim He according Phillip parties’ R. Vol- intention ting. Superior Judge strued language.6 De- grounds. expressed the document’s granted land their motion on those stipula- requested the dis Nardo contends the dismissal withdrawal of preserved filed No. tion’s terms the discrimination missal in Case 3AN-00- jurisdic- Cl, superior regardless of which court had but the court denied 8753 argues He the federal appeals dis tion over it. request. DeNardo the court’s claim be- and its court dismissed discrimination missal of Case No. 3AN-01-12484 Cl jurisdiction; contends that cause it lacked he request of his withdraw his dismiss denial judicata jurisdictional dismissals have no res Case No. 3AN-00-8753 CI. al contracts.”) Prods., applied Metal United States 2. Tru-Line Inc. v. Erection, Sales, Inc., 150, (Alaska Spinali (quoting 202 & 52 P.3d 153 Harris v. Auto Fabrication 215, 586, (1962)). Cal.App.2d Cal.Rptr. 20 589 2002). 596, Seavey, Deusen v. 603 n. 3. See Van Deusen, See also 4. Van 53 P.3d at 603. See 2002) ("We (Alaska independent apply 23 our 345, Corp., Traynor v. & 260 Wis.2d Thomas Betts reviewing judgment superior inter court's 158, ("Construction (App.2003) 162 659 N.W.2d judg pretation of the and the final question we is a law that of a intentions.”) (cit parties' to determine the ment independently."). review Barbero, 786, (Alaska ing v. 776 788 Jackson P.2d 1989) question ("Interpretation a contract is a (Alaska Hemenway, Godfrey law, reviewing uses inde for which court 1980). judgment.")). v. World pendent See also Jones Inst., Cal.App.3d 131 Cal. Research Life Co., (1976) ("If v. Pierce 87 Idaho Rptr. interpretation of a 6. Kershaw Cattle 31, 34 (1964). applied are those is in the rules prior argue that He also seems to his first claims and the effect.7 not include a discrimination state action did stipulated dismissal claim under AS 18.80 and that therefore the and amended court action dismissal in his first state cannot complaints action, in his first state court bar his current discrimination Cl, alleged, among 3AN-00-8753 argues that under the doctrine of negligent other causes of claims for judicata, res dismissal of the first state law- and intentional infliction of emotional dis It present suit lawsuit. asserts that bars They tress. also stated that Calista and ANI give judicata present all are res elements “sexually DeNardo, discriminated” It effect to the dismissal. states although complaints pursuant stipu- explicitly that a dismissal entered to a did not prejudice lation for dismissal of claims with refer to AS 18.80. The discrimination claim a final has the same res effect as relied on the same facts as the judgment entered after trial.8 It therefore intentional infliction of emotional distress granting stipula- that the order contends pleadings claims. We have held that “the judg- tion to dismiss with is a final litigants should be held to less strin judicata purposes. argues ment for It also gent lawyers.”11 standards than those of the first state proposition policy This reflects action had and that the same finding unintended waiver of techni *5 parties in are involved both state actions. litig cally pleadings by pro defective filed se argues that DeNardo does not dis- We therefore conclude that DeNar- ants.12 pute that he could have asserted a claim for complaints do’s in No. Case 3AN-00-8753 Cl discrimination under AS 18.80.220in his first encompassed statutory a state-law based sex stipu- action. It therefore reasons though discrimination claim they even did lated dismissal resolved not the claims specifically not refer to AS 18.80.13 Alaska specifically brought, the but also claims De- 18.80.220(a) Statute makes it unlawful for an brought Nardo could have under AS employer unjustifiably discriminate argues 18.80.220.9 It also that we should not permit person a prolong litigation by person’s DeNardo to because of the splitting his claim.10 sex.14 Prods., ed). States, 7. Tru-Line Metal Inc. v. United States See also Castro v. United 540 U.S. Erection, 150, (Alaska 375, 381-82, 786, & Fabrication 52 P.3d 154 124 S.Ct. 157 L.Ed.2d 778 (2003) (noting "[f]ederal courts sometimes 2002). ignore legal pro litigant will label that a se Miller, 1304, (Alaska attaches to a motion and recharacterize the mo- Tolstrup v. 726 P.2d 1306 place 1986). legal tion in order to it within a different category unnecessary ... in order to avoid an dismissal, inappropriately stringent ap- to avoid 9. Id. plication labeling requirements, of formal or to correspondence create better between the sub- State, 453, (Alas- 10. See 740 P.2d 457 pro underly- stance of a se motion's claim and its 1987). ka basis.”) (internal omitted) (em- ing legal citations added). phasis Ulmer, 66, (Alaska 1987); 11. Breck v. 745 P.2d 75 Kerner, 519, 520, see also Haines v. 404 U.S. 902, Sampson, 13. See (1972) Smith v. 816 P.2d curiam) (per S.Ct. 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (Alaska 1991) (relaxing requirement Appellate of (stating pleadings pro that Court holds of se 210(e) discussing pro appellant's Rule complainants and se due stringent "to less standards than process points appeal); claims not listed pleadings by lawyers”); in of formal drafted Gilbert v. State, Servs., Ass'n, Dep't Wilkerson v. (Alas Health & Soc. Nina Condo 64 P.3d Plaza of Servs., Family 2003) ("We indicated, Div. & Youth example, ka have of (Alaska 1999) (concluding pro ap se generally pleadings pro courts should hold the of pellant’s identify apply precise litigants "failure to and stringent se to less standards than those legal determining tests for lawyers.”). violation of those provisions constitutional is not fatal” when "those tests are well established and could have State, 12. See Zok v. 576 n. 2 court”). easily by applied been (Alaska 1995) (holding appellant waived is- sue, applying “even a more lenient standard for [appellant] 18.80.220(a) pro litigant”) (emphasis provides, part: as a se add- 14. AS in as well argues at that DeNar- tional distress as federal-law based dissent 336-37 appeal, which disavows position on The federal com-

do’s claims of discrimination. in his a claim 18.80 to assert under AS intent alleged pleaded in the plaint the same facts complaint, precludes us original state in No. state law discrimination claim Case complaint encompassing such reading that Cl; complaint Case No. 3AN-00-8753 of DeNar- The dissent’s discussion read to in- A00-309-CV therefore should be might be and the complaint do’s complaint clude the same claims as the represented if compelling DeNardo had been reason, For that Case 3AN-00-8753 Cl. given leniency with But counsel. given leniency interpreting oür interpret pleadings se we which pro se pleadings litigants,16 we read focusing think that on DeNar- litigants, we complaint No. A00-309-CV understanding of his do’s current (1) federally to have asserted: based dis- litigant’s misplaced. proA pleadings is (2) claim, dis- crimination a state-law based complaint of his own need claim, (3) crimination state-law based actually pleads; be what it determinative negligent and infliction of emo- intentional judg- independent must exercise its the court tional distress claims. determining the com- what claims ment plaint’s assert. recitation words asserted that federal “sexually dis- and use the term facts important, given stipula terms of the are complaint in his first establish criminated” signed by tion for dismissal post hoc pleaded that it a AS 18.80 Case No. 3AN-00-8753 CI. To determine not- pleading of his intentions explanation dismissal, effect of withstanding.15 necessary stipulation’s it determine the interpreta- Although present effect. complaint determina- of his first is not tion first state After the action was removed to alleged, claims that tive of what *6 supe- court and then to the federal remanded understanding of contemporaneous court, parties stipulation signed rior stipulation meaning of the for dismissal dismissing No. Cl with Case 3AN-00-8753 interpretation. its As to this relevant to prejudice.17 issue, that he appeal DeNardo contends on preserve his understood the to in court.

claims then “(1) judicata a applies Res if: (2) jurisdiction, competent has rendered of No. DeNardo’s federal Case (3) merits, judgment final on the and asserted state-law based A00-309-CV parties cause of action same or and intentional infliction of emo- same and testified, (c) [inap- complaint, Except provided person a or as- this section has filed here], proceeding chapter.... a plicable sisted in under it is unlawful for (1) employer employment to to a an refuse Hustad, (Alaska Leis v. Cf. person employment, person, a or to bar 2001) property (giving weight little division against compen- person to discriminate a or party’s testimony re- about intent case to trial term, condition, privilege of sation or in a or par- garding property because transmutation of race, person’s employment reli- because of the during marriage proba- are more ties’ actions tive). color, origin, gion, or or because of national physical disability, person's age, the sex, or mental status, status, changes in marital marital Castro, supra 16. See note 11. See also 540 U.S. pregnancy, parenthood or when the reasonable 381-82, (noting S.Ct. 786 federal court at position require distinc- demands do not recharacterizing pro litigant's policy mo- age, physical mental on the basis or tion unnecessary in order to avoid dismissal or tions sex, status, disability, changes marital in mari- stringent application inappropriately of formal status, pregnancy, parenthood; tal or align labeling requirements, or to substance of basis). legal pro se motion’s claim with its (4) employer, organization, or em- an labor expel, ployment agency discharge, or other- removed first 17. Recall that defendants court, against person discriminate a where it became wise case to the federal opposed person any practices court later has forbidden Case No. A00-351-CV. The federal superior to the remanded Case A00-351-CV under AS 18.80.200—18.80.280 or because rights plainly involved in privies their were both suits.”18 waive “not intended to be relin University Alaska Anchor- quished.” recognize In Plumber v. We that “courts look age whether a for stipulations designed simpli we discussed with favor give fy, could prejudice litigation, dismissal with rise to res shorten or settle or to save judicata: give stipulations costs and will not such Moreover, forced construction.”23 the “lan stipulation to dismiss claims with

[A] guage purporting to reserve a claim must be judicata prejudice pur is sufficient for res explicit, parties so that ‘the ha[ve] poses: stipulation [to dismiss claims “[A] opportunity an language, to dicker over the just prejudice] is as valid as a final with [are] but thereafter on notice about which resulting judgment from trial on the claims were reserved and which were not.’ merits, judicata is res as to all issues and rights Blanket reservations of will not suf or could have deter that were raised been fice.” pleadings.”[19] mined under the dispute no that the first and third There is We therefore turn to the judicata requirements present for res are pre determine which claims DeNardo dispute superi- parties here. The do not served. or court’s in the first state action. Defendants’ counsel drafted the undisputed parties It is also in both CI, in Case No. 3AN-00-8753 and DeNardo present the first state action and the attorney signed and defendants’ it on DeNardo, Calista, ANI, included and paragraph 2001. The first stated that causes of action are the same both “the claims asserted [DeNardo] [Case lawsuits. No. 3AN-00-8753 ... all CI] defen concerning dispute But there is a the sec- entirety, dants are their with requirement. dispute ond do not prejudice.” paragraph But the second stated judg- court rendered final plain “[t]his does not affect “granted” ment on the merits when it Corporation tiffs claims prejudice in dismiss Alaska Newspapers, Inc. in ... A00-309 Civ Cl, they disagree No. 3AN-00-8753 but ...., currently pending in the U.S. District about what claims the dismissal re- Therefore, the District of Alaska.” solved.20 though even agreed in the first Res based on a paragraph to a dismissal with prevent plaintiff dismissal does not from the claims he had asserted in his first state *7 bringing that expressly cause of action was court paragraph preserved the second adjudication.21 for later stipula reserved A his claims Calista and ANI then may litigation, tion a claim for pending 27, reserve later in April federal court as of when and courts not construe the parties signed will the stipulation. See, Plumber, brought court and retained e.g., over Case No. in the first action. A00-309-CV. 936 P.2d at 166. Municipality Anchorage, 18. DeNardo v. 775 Christianson, 1240, Tope 21. See v. 959 P.2d 1245 515, (Alaska 1989). P.2d 517 (Alaska 1998) ("Res judicata prevent does not suing debtor from on a cause of action that the Anchorage, 19. Plumber v. Univ. Alaska 936 163, expressly (Alaska 1997) adjudica- debtor reserved for later (quoting Tolstrup 166 v. tion.”). Miller, 1304, (Alaska 1986)); 726 P.2d 1306 see State, ("It also DeNardo v. 740 P.2d at 456 is judicata precludes relitigation by settled that res Godfrey, 22. (quoting by 617 P.2d at 8 State & parties, only the same not of claims raised in the Feves, Through Highway State Comm'n v. 228 Or. proceeding, first but also of those relevant claims 273, 97, (1961)). 365 P.2d 102 raised.''). that could have been Id. incorrectly 20. DeNardo contends that the dis- rights missal of a does not affect not (citation omitted) complaint. Tope, asserted in the It is clear that res 959 P.2d at 1245 judicata, through (quoting preclu- Props. Crystal the doctrine of claim D & K v. Lake Mut. Life sion, Co., (7th Cir.1997)). also bars claims could have been Ins. F.3d pending litiga- claims then federal court included emotional distress claims. Given the history infliction employment dispute, par- claims for and intentional tion of the of emotional distress and discrimination. rationally thought ties could have it was de- attempt remaining sirable to to resolve all ambiguous, is because it claims, including the Title VII claim and the clearly explain did not how to resolve claims claims,” single “state law in a forum in a 27, 2001, pending, April that were as of single proceeding. court, i.e., both state and federal claims en- compassed by para- both the first and second might justify Two circumstances a differ- graphs stipulation. of the The dissent cor- First, policy favoring ent outcome. rectly prejudice” *8 grounds). Godfrey, at 8. See also Alaska Civil supra policy against 26. See note 12. Castro's 41(a) ("Unless Rule otherwise stated in the no- through unintentional waiver of claims technical stipulation, tice is of dismissal or dismissal pleading by pro litigants suggests defects se that prejudice...."). without application appropriate of lenient standards is some, all, stipulate they when to dismiss but not contempo- 29. That DeNardo has not asserted a States, of their claims. See Castro v. United understanding stipulation spe- raneous 375, 381-82, U.S. 124 S.Ct. 157 L.Ed.2d cifically preserved AS 18.80 claim does not his (2003). interpret leniently We therefore preclude interpretation stipulation as an stipulation to dismiss. preserving that claim. DeNardo claims he un- generally pre- derstood the more as Co., 27. Klosterman v. Hickel Inv. serving pending all claims then in federal court. (Alaska 1991) ("Applying n. 6 an established construction, DeNardo, pro litigant, enti- rule of contract we will construe Because as a se ambiguity against party supplied that tled to a lenient of his federal contract.”); State, Dep’t Highways, complaint, understanding Wessellsv. of the claims, remaining Title VII claims those claims were then where not the forum plaintiffs pendent state law claims for stipulation described the are That the pending. distress.” The federal pending those then infliction of (cid:127)emotional preserved as claims to be jurisdiction “original that does preclude not their court stated court did in the federal Instead, plaintiffs Title VII claim. Ac- court. not exist for adjudication state later cordingly, sup- to exercise not state that the the court declines stipulation did because the plaintiffs over plemental in state claims would be barred preserved finally adjudicated in law claim for the infliction of emotional dis- they if were not court “is court, tress.” It concluded that the dismissal designate it did not the federal federal prejudice pursuit state law pre- for the without the exclusive forum court as may apparent plaintiff claims have state court.” Despite the dis- claims. served above, Because, disputed claims as we concluded Case prejudice of the missal negli- court, included claims of both state court A00-309-CV in state their dismissal they gent infliction emotional were and intentional without was discrimination, and all of these expressly distress and among federal independently claims were based on state preserved. law, Title the dismissal VII by that we err argues at 337 dissent claim did not affect these claims. on “unraised substan- giving DeNardo relief substantially grounds” that from tive differ parties compare and contrast claims briefed. the issues that the under Title and AS 18.80. Because the VII view, grounds raised the In our DeNardo DeNardo’s Title federal dismissed VII holding rests when he asserted which our jurisdictional grounds claim on based on Cal- paragraph opening that the second brief claims, exemption ista’s from Title VII dis- preserved all claims then pre- missal of his Title VII does pending in court. federal clude his AS 18.80claim.30 first state court com- Because DeNardo’s present complaint law- complaint in- plaint and his federal both explicitly suit refers to the state anti-discrim- and the cluded AS 18.80 claims statute, ination AS 18.80. It also seeks dam- preserved all claims in DeNardo’s federal ages anxiety for “emotional and distress” and complaint, we conclude that outrageous “for the faith conduct bad prevent litigating does not disregard defendants done with a reckless claim in state court. his AS 18.80 and deliberate indifference to [DeNardo’s] rights.” again, civil Once because of our The federal court’s dismissal leniency greater pleadings toward Judge litigants,31 turn to Holland’s dis and because all of the claims are nowWe facts, what claims based on the we missal order to determine re same conclude present mained after he dismissed DeNardo’s federal DeNardo’s case al- theory, leges both discrimination and case. At least dismiss al effect. But intentional infliction of emotional order could have res distress. above, order declined to rule As described neither the the federal dismissal precluded nor the on the merits of DeNardo’s non-federal federal court dismissal 2001 these claims. therefore conclude that it claims. The federal court’s We November judicata prevented error to dismissing No. A00-309-CV rec was hold ognized “[h]aving plaintiffs pursuing DeNardo from the current action.32 I, encompasses preserving Article section 16 of the Alaska all the claims therein Constitution provides his AS 18.80 claim. civil cases where the amount ''[i]n *9 dollars, controversy fifty in exceeds two hundred Tru-Line, 30. See 52 at 155. P.3d right by jury preserved of trial of twelve is to the same extent as it existed at common law.” supra 31. See note disputes interpretation present But over contract Ek, questions law. 93 P.3d argues passing of See Peterson v. 32. DeNardo Alaska 458, (Alaska 2004). such, they are jury 463 As not Constitution entitles to a determination him jury, questions meaning of the Calista. submitted to a which decides of his with

335 entirety with ... affect- splitting [without 4. Claim ... cur- ing] plaintiffs claims prohib- splitting The doctrine rently District pending in the U.S. part of the claim an “advancing one its meaning of the the District of Alaska.” The remaining parts reserving the initial suit questions order and raise of law. present law- Because the for a later suit.”33 41(a)(1) presumes Rule that a Civil already only claims' raised suit raises prejudice” will be entered “without dismissal split his DeNardo did not first state supply it to the a differ- but leaves It was therefore error to hold parties expressly meaning. ent Here the splitting against claim barred the doctrine prejudice”; agreed to a dismissal “with but current action. proceedings provision allowing further DeNardo’s federal claims make it obvious Rescission of something they contemplated narrower stipulations “can asserts that be DeNardo traditionally meaning than the broad of “with justice in the interests of rescinded circumstances, I prejudice.” Given these injustice.” superior a manifest The avoid guidance would take from the somewhat nar- court denied DeNardo’s motion rescind usually given meaning rower dismissal stipulation. DeNardo’s brief does 41(b)’s “on the merits” under Civil Rule de- deny it was error to rescission assert recently provision. recognized, As we fault reference to the issue is com- and its terse prejudice under the default dismissal with to demonstrate that it was pletely insufficient 41(b) provision typically Rule bars the deny request.34 of discretion to an abuse refiling claimant from claims in the same “ the dismissal: ‘unlike a that ordered IV. CONCLUSION prejudice,” “without the dismissal dismissal reasons, foregoing For the we VACATE refiling ... of the same claim the bar[s] ”1 dismissing plaintiffs complaint order [same court].’ proceedings this lawsuit and REMAND for Apart being meaning given the usual opinion. consistent with this prejudice” in a dismissal to the term “with kind, meaning comports this order of this Justice, BRYNER, dissenting. Chief express terms of the with the BRYNER, Justice, dissenting. Chief case, contemplated unequivocally which finally dismissing DeNardo’s state-court ac- opinion’s interpretation disagree I with the tion, leaving while at the same time DeNardo dismissing state ac- of the order already pursue pending federal free to its conclusion that the dismissal tion and with meaning action in federal court. The usual left DeNardo free to renew his state similarly comports and ANI’s with Calista court dismissed his federal after the federal understanding stipulation; more to the action. comports DeNardo’s own it also point, question meaning is The crucial here stipulated dismissal’s description of dismissing DeNar- court’s order meaning. prejudice.” initial action “with The do’s parties’ stipulation, argument advances incorporated (1) it, here, I down to this: agreed to dismiss DeNardo’s state see boils which asserted tort claims “against all ... in their state action defendants State, Dep’t & Soc. 34. Wilkerson v. Health fact. is a contract. DeNardo's Servs., Servs., Family argument & Youth without merit. Further- Div. therefore State, 1018, 1999); more, (Alaska Wren v. 577 1021-22 our ren- 235, (Alaska 1978). argument litigation 2 P.2d 237 n. ders this irrelevant to future this case. Barrans, (Alas- P.3d 268-69 1. DeNardo v. Int’l, State, 2002) (Alaska (quoting v. Lockheed Semtek Inc. 33. McDowellv. ka 497, 506, Inc., 2001); Mech., U.S. 121 S.Ct. Corp., Martin see also Robertson Am. (2001)). (Alaska 2002). 149 L.Ed.2d 32 *10 statutory nal state action.2 Under DeNardo’s own include a discrimination and did not (2) meaning, claim; origi- stipulated to view of dismissal’s stipulating dismiss his the then, action, statutory his discrimination claim simply give up meant to his new nal he claims, by preserving stipulated while is barred a matter of law the his as state-court tort dismissing claims.3 then-pending action in his state right pursue his to court, statutory a included dis- which federal Today’s opinion nonetheless comes to De- (3) claim; and the federal once crimination by invoking Nardo’s the maxim that a rescue his discrimination claim court dismissed pleadings should be litigant’s inter- was to it in prejudice,” he free raise “without preted leniently. opinion reads DeNar- court, he had raised it because never state original complaint advancing as an do’s state before. there implied statutory discrimination and case, Thus, new discrimination claim his own DeNardo concludes that his presenting understanding consequently claim-splitting that the evades the doc- essentially admits trine; returning opinion him finds that the stipulation precluded from to already to DeNardo to return to state claims that he had meant allow state court with raised; any pending that then in his merely argues claim he ease; filing him from federal and it construes DeNardo’s preclude did new state not above, already permissibly including out this new state pointed is claims. As an implied to a his claim and meaning given dismissal with both discrimination usual 41(b)’s Rule IIED Civil default under meaning provision. The issue this analysis is The trouble with this that it is whether DeNardo’s cur- open leaves here meaning that gives a neither “a claim is new claim” or rent discrimination asserted, party adopts has and it a ever part originally claim” he filed of “the same flatly theory that legal substantive conflicts the superior court. theory aspect with each actu- DeNardo ally argues though argument point might on here. Even DeNardo’s this briefing assuming repeatedly correct insists that he if he were did have merit claim be- assert his current discrimination claim in his his discrimination could evade says ing merely original opinion it state that he relied on new barred wrong Although legal theory chose not to did. DeNardo ac- that he include —he complaint. knowledges by original stipulating his But this as- dismiss the state statutory original legally right flawed: dis- action he meant to abandon his sumption is claims,4 pursue opinion from trans- tort crimination claim arises the same his state rejects his own original description tort claims and could of his intentions action as his claims; stipulations and finds left him have filed with those so for free to been purposes determining stipulated dis- return to court with claim state effect, case, including preclusive claim-splitting his federal his tort claim. missal’s despite requires us to treat the later dis- And the facts DeNardo’s new doctrine express if claim as “the same claim”—as omits the IIED claim crimination origi- complaints included advanced in DeNardo had it in his his earlier and that State, See, e.g., and McDowellv. claim from his state claims file it in (Alaska2001). electing by But court. dismiss his prejudice, state claims with he consented to a that, law, though judgment true even all And this holds DeNardo as matter barred mistakenly statutory arising might have believed that the future state claims same trans- originally not be barred action as the claims he filed. DeNar- would legal at do’s understand the effects of his dismissal. For his mistaken belief would most failure to law, law, have amounted to unilateral mistake of is a mistake of because ANI and, misunderstanding, viewing pleadings in the did not in this it was a even share him, light unilateral law. most charitable to he has failed to mistake of justification allege any compelling that would during argument ignorance justify put the law 4.As it oral before excuse his DeNardo remedy up extraordinary judgment summed of relief from court when he intent dismissal, "So, 60(b). ground stipulating what I Civil Rule to the did is I under undeniably right split just the state tort claims.” had discrimination *11 briefing any mention of appellate omits pursue opin- tort an intent to this must have meant to

ion insists that DeNardo it, finding implied that an IIED claim

pursue complaint. in his new state

lies embedded view, analysis improvidently my

In allowing pro

expands the rule courts to treat now, leniently: litigants’ pleadings until

se carefully confined this rule to situa-

we have

tions in which courts need to relax technical pro liti-

pleading requirements to enable se points they

gants to make the substantive

actually today’s opinion try pursue.5 Yet leniency

vastly power toward broadens litigants using it to assist DeNardo theory prevailing on a substantive that he

actively my judgment, disavows. In by giving un-

court errs DeNardo relief on grounds stray

raised substantive so dra-

matically from the theories briefed.6 ruling

I would affirm the court’s actually argued.

the issues DeNardo

Accordingly, I dissent. FARM

STATE MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE COMPANY,

INSURANCE

Petitioner,

Asa and Barbara DOWDY

Dowdy, Respondents.

No. S-10946.

Supreme Court of Alaska. See, Assn, proposed ruling e.g., v. Nina Condo advance notice of the court’s Gilbert Plaza (Alaska 2003). supplemental opportunity address it in and an briefs. minimum, 6. At a that fundamental fair- I think require given ness that both be should notes a dismissal “with stipulations simplify litigation or settle usually plaintiff refiling bars a from the same reading paragraphs way favors two given claim in the same court.25 But Second, that avoids conflict. extrinsic evi- ambiguity by stipulation’s introduced sec- might help apparent dence resolve the ambi- paragraph, ond we cannot conclude that the guity: 2001 offer to paragraph’s first dismissal of claims “with stipulation implies enter into a that he was prejudice” bars this action before we resolve willing to dismiss his entire state court ac- which claims the dismisses tion; only it stated that he wished to “main- preserves. which claims it prosecution tain the of his Title VII action court.” The-text his dismissal conclude, reasons, We three support offer would a conclusion that he should not be read to fore prevent intended to state court para close the claims reserved the second interfering dismissal from with the federal First, graph. litigants to we hold less proceeding through any (perhaps Second, stringent standards.26 we construe judicata proposed effect the dismissal could ambiguous terms of the document con action). sup- have on the federal This would document, trary preparer to the Calis- port a conclusion that the reservation Third, interpret ta’s counsel.27 we waiver necessarily was not intended to language narrowly.28 permit begin a DeNardo to new state court reading stipula- This does render the asserting “in claims that were nullity inception; tion a from its when the only through federal court” of that exercise stipulation, entered into the the fed- jurisdiction. pendant court’s yet eral court had not ruled that was “employer.” entering stipulation’s not an Parties into the But the reservation not as was Furthermore, rationally could have assumed limited as DeNardo’s offer. court, resolving stipulation explicitly preserved that the federal the Title DeNar- court,29 pendant YII would also resolve the do’s claims then in federal Barrans, (Alaska 1977) (stating 25. See it (Alaska 2002) (barring plaintiff filing "ambiguities same established rule of construction that party supplied in federal court for failure to are construed form”). proceed with trial state court on res drafted the

Case Details

Case Name: DeNardo v. Calista Corp.
Court Name: Alaska Supreme Court
Date Published: Apr 22, 2005
Citation: 111 P.3d 326
Docket Number: S-11183
Court Abbreviation: Alaska
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