20 N.C. 133 | N.C. | 1838
We are of opinion that there was error in refusing to instruct the jury, as prayed by the defendant’s counsel, that they were at liberty to disregard the distance called for in the first line of the deed of the lessors of the plaintiff to John Sowell, and to extend that line to the pine, the terminus called for in the deed of Jacob McLindon to Isaac Sowell. In the case of Campbell v. McArthur. 2 Hawks 33, it was recognised as a settled principle that a mistake in the course or distance of a deed shall not be permitted to disappoint the intent of the parties, if that intent appears, and if the means of correcting the mistake are furnished either by a more certain description in the same deed, or by reference to another deed containing a more certain description. This principle.we think applicable to the present case. In the deduction of title to the lessors of the plaintiff for the land in dispute, the plaintiff' had exhibited a deed of bargain and sale from Jacob McLindon to Isaac Sowell, dated 7th January, 1772, in which the tract conveyed is thus described: 300 acres of land lying on a branch of McLindon’s creek called Black creek, beginning at a maple on the south side of McLindon’s creek, and runs
T,he lessors of the plaintiff exhibited no evidence of any other sale from Jacob McLindon to Isaac Sowell, than the sale evidenced by the deed of McLindon. It was therefore to this sale as authenticated by this deed that the reference was made in their deed, and the very purpose of the reference would seem to be to ascertain with more particularity what it was apprehended might not have been otherwise sufficiently. described. They therefore declare their intent to convey unto John Sowell the same land which Jacob McLindon sold to Isaac Sowell. If, therefore, in the description of this land thus conveyed, there be found any inaccuracy or deficiency, that inaccuracy is corrected and that deficiency supplied the moment we ascertain the true boundaries of Isaac Sowell’s purchase, and these appear upon the face of McLindon’s deed.
The judgment is reversed and the cause must be sent back for another trial.
Per Curiam. Judgment reversed.