ORDER (1) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT; (2) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; AND (3) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
The court upholds Hawaii’s open primary election against this facial constitutional challenge.
The Democratic Party of Hawaii (“DPH”) challenges the constitutionality of Hawaii’s open primary election, contending that article II, § 4, of the Hawaii Constitution (and the Hawaii statutes that implement it) facially violates the First Amendment of the United States Constitution by allowing voters to select a political party’s general-election candidates (other than a Presidential candidate) without publicly declaring their affiliation with that party. As explained to follow, a party’s First Amendment right of free association includes the right to limit its association to people who share its views. Arguing that association is a “two way street,” the DPH contends that this right is severely burdened if a party does not know who is associating with it, and thus has no opportunity to restrict persons from participating in the nomination of a party’s candidates. Further arguing that Hawaii has no narrowly-tailored, compelling state interest justifying such a burden, the DPH seeks to prevent Defendant Scott T. Nago, in his official capacity as the Chief Election Officer of the State of Hawaii (“Nago” or the “State”), from administering this unconstitutional law any further.
Before the court are (1) Cross Motions for Summary Judgment; and (2) a Motion
II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Hawaii law requires candidates in any general election (except for a Presidential election) to be nominated in the preceding primary election. See Hawaii Revised Statutes (“HRS”) § 12-1 (“All candidates for elective office, except as provided in Section 14-21, shall be nominated in accordance with this chapter and not otherwise.”)
Specifically, as amended in 1978, the Hawaii Constitution provides:
The legislature shall provide for the registration of voters and for absentee voting and shall prescribe the method of voting at all elections. Secrecy of voting shall be preserved; provided that no person shall he required to declare a party preference or nonpartisanship as a condition of voting in any primary or special primary election. Secrecy of voting and choice of political party affiliation or nonpartisanship shall be preserved.
Haw. Const, art. II, § 4 (emphasis added). This provision was ratified by Hawaii’s voters in November 1978, after delegates debated different types of primary elections in the 1978 Constitutional Convention. See Doc. No. 16-1, Nago Decl. ¶¶ 4, 5; II Proceedings of the Constitutional
Prior to 1978, section 4 simply stated: “The legislature shall provide for the registration of voters and for absentee voting; and shall prescribe the method of voting at all elections. Secrecy of voting shall be preserved.” Haw. Const, art. II, § 4 (1968). And in the decade before the 1978 amendment to the Hawaii Constitution, Hawaii utilized a “closed” primary based upon statute. As amended in 1970, HRS § 12-31 provided in pertinent part: “No person shall be entitled to vote at a primary or special primary election who shall refuse to state his party preference or nonpartisanship to the precinct officials, unless he wishes to vote only for the board of education.” Further, county clerks kept records of a voter’s party designation, and a voter was restricted from voting in a different party’s primary in the next election cycle, unless “he has registered with the county clerk to change his party to another party or to a nonpartisan designation” “not later than 4:30 p.m. on the ninetieth day preceding the primary or special primary election[.]” Id. County clerks also kept records of a new voter’s party selection. See id. (“In all primary or special primary elections the precinct officials shall note the voter’s party selection where the voter list indicates no previous party selection. This information shall be forwarded to the county clerk.”).
Many delegates at the 1978 Constitutional Convention voiced a clear desire to eliminate the former closed primary system, with a goal of protecting the privacy of a person’s vote, and encouraging voter participation. See, e.g., II 1978 Proceedings 744 (“[A] large percentage of the electorate in Hawaii continues to stay away from the polls because of discontent over the closed primary system. Many people feel this is an invasion of their privacy, that it is repugnant to our democratic process[.]”) (statement of Delegate Campbell); id. at 766-67 (“An open primary election operates to protect a person’s voting and privacy rights.... [A]s the [closed-primary] system operates now, a voter must declare to a total stranger his party preference at the time of registration and at the primary voting.”) (statement of Delegate Odanaka); id. at 768 (“[I]n the earlier days in this State, ... if you ... went in and asked for the wrong ballot — that would be a stigma attached to you in your daily lives.”) (statement of Delegate Blean).
No person eligible to vote in any primary or special primary election shall be required to state a party preference or nonpartisanship as a condition of voting. Each voter shall be issued the primary or special primary ballot for each party and the nonpartisan primary or special primary ballot. A voter shall be entitled to vote only for candidates of one party or only for nonpartisan candidates. If the primary or special primary ballot is marked contrary to this paragraph, the ballot shall not be counted.
In any primary or special primary election in the year 1979 and thereafter, a voter shall be entitled to select and to vote the ballot of any one party or nonpartisan, regardless of which ballot the voter voted in any preceding primary or special primary election.
See 1979 Haw. Sess. L. Act 139, § 9 at 317. “The first open primary [in Hawaii] was in 1980. Hawaii’s primary has been open ever since.” Doc. No. 16-1, Nago Deck ¶ 6. “When the primary is conducted, voters must indicate on the primary ballot which party primary they are participating in. If they attempt to cast votes for any other party, those votes will not be counted.” Id. ¶ 19.
The DPH claims that these provisions requiring an open primary are facially unconstitutional because allowing voters to “associate” anonymously with a political party violates a party’s First Amendment right of free association. The open primary conflicts with the DPH’s formal policy that “prefers a nomination electorate composed of its members, and other voters, even if they are not members, who are supportive of the DPH and are willing to publicly declare their affiliation with it.” Doc. No. 4-1 at 16, PL’s Mot. at 11. To this end, the DPH has certified and adopted the following provision in its constitution:
The Democratic Party of Hawaii shall be open to all persons who desire to support the Party, who wish to be known as Democrats, and who live in Hawaii.
The Democratic Party of Hawaii believes that its primary election, a state-imposed mandatory nomination procedure, ought to be open to participation of only such persons as are willing to declare their affiliation with and support for the Party, either through public registration to vote, or through maintenance of membership in the Party. The Party further believes that the current Constitution and laws of the State of Hawaii, by maintaining secrecy of affiliation, and by compelling the Party to admit to its nomination procedures those who may have no interest in, or actually oppose the interests, values, and platform of the Party, do violence to the Party’s associational freedoms and the individual freedoms of its membership to define their own political views, guaranteed under the Constitution of the United States. The State Central Committee and Party Chairperson shall take appropriate action to correct this injustice.
Doc. No. 4-2, Carpenter Decl. ¶ 4.
According to its Chairperson, DPH membership records in 2005 showed approximately 20,000 members. Doc. No. 13-1, Carpenter Suppl. Deck ¶ 5. “DPH membership had been in the 15,000 to 20,000 range for at least a decade before 2005, and possibly two decades or more.” Id. ¶ 6. “In the period of the Obama-Clinton campaign for the 2008 election, DPH membership expanded dramatically.” Id. ¶ 10. “Many persons joined the DPH in order to cast votes for one or the other in DPH meetings [that is, caucuses], held in early 2008. DPH membership rose from approximately 20,000 to approximately 65,000.” Id. In July of 2013, DPH membership was 65,461. Id. ¶ 11. “Memberships are normally not terminated by DPH unless the member resigns, is known to have died, is expelled for cause, or for a few other reasons. Membership does not require the regular payment of dues, which are voluntary.” Id. ¶ 12.
B. Procedural Background
DPH filed this action on June 17, 2013. Doc. No. 1. In conjunction with the Complaint, the DPH filed a combined Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Rule 56(a) mandates summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to the party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
“A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery responses that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc.,
“An issue is ‘genuine’ only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable fact finder could find for the non-moving party, and a dispute is ‘material’ only if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” In re Barboza,
IV. DISCUSSION
The DPH’s challenge is limited to a facial attack on Hawaii’s open primary. Although its Complaint might be read more broadly, the DPH’s memoranda in these Motions explicitly argue only that Hawaii’s open primary provisions are facially unconstitutional, and the DPH made clear during oral argument that its action is only a facial — not an “as applied” — challenge.
A. Legal Standards for Assessing Whether a State Election Law Imposes a Facially Unconstitutional Burden
1. A Facial Challenge — “Unconstitutional in All of its Applications?” Or “A Plainly Legitimate Sweep? ”
The parties offer differing standards for the court to apply. The State requests
Ultimately, the court’s conclusion is not impacted by the choice between these alternative formulations (“no set of circumstances” or “plainly legitimate sweep”). That is, the court’s ruling would be the same under either standard. See United States v. Stevens,
Courts disfavor facial challenges for several reasons. “Claims of facial invalidity often rest on speculation. As a consequence, they raise the risk of ‘premature interpretation of statutes on the basis of factually barebones records.’ ” Wash. State Grange,
Facial challenges also run contrary to the fundamental principle of judicial restraint that courts should neither anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it nor formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Further, “facial challenges threaten to short circuit the democratic process by preventing laws embodying the will of the people from being implemented in a manner consistent with the Constitution.” Id. at 451,
2. A “Severe Burden” on First Amendment Rights?
“The Constitution grants States broad power to prescribe the ‘Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,’ Art. I, § 4, cl. 1, which power is matched by state control over the election process for state offices.” Clingman v. Beaver,
But this does not mean that States are free to regulate all aspects of a primary election — “when States regulate [a political] parties’ internal processes they must act within limits imposed by the Constitution.” Id. at 573,
And so, when considering a challenge to a state election law, the court must “weigh the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate against the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule, taking into consideration the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiffs rights.” Burdick v. Takushi,
“Election regulations that impose a severe burden on associational rights are subject to strict scrutiny, and [courts] uphold them only if they are ‘narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.’ ” Wash. State Grange,
In short, the court must assess whether Hawaii’s open primary necessarily and facially “severely burdens” a political party’s First Amendment right to free association. If so, then the court will uphold the open primary provisions only if they are narrowly tailored to meet compelling state interests. The analysis changes, however, if the burden is not “severe.” Rather, “lesser burdens will be upheld as long as they are justified by a state’s important regulatory interests.” Alaskan Independence Party v. Alaska,
B. Application of Legal Standards
1. The DPH’s Arguments
The DPH, relying primarily on Jones, argues that Hawaii’s open primary violates a party’s — any party’s — First Amendment associational rights because a party is, or
Jones struck as unconstitutional a California blanket primary system in which a primary ballot listed “every candidate regardless of party affiliation and allow[ed] the voter to choose freely among them.” Id. at 570,
Jones relied on evidence (for example, statistical surveys of past primary elections, and expert witness testimony) establishing a “clear and present danger” that a party’s nominee could be “determined by adherents of an opposing party.” Id. at 578,
Further, the evidence indicated that “the deleterious effects” were “not limited to altering the identity of the nominee”— the blanket primary actually forced nominees to change their message and views. Id. at 579,
The DPH likens Hawaii’s open primary to the blanket primary that Jones struck down. Because a party has no other option but to nominate candidates by primary, see HRS § 12-1, the DPH contends that a party is powerless to exclude, for example, (1) those who are indifferent to its beliefs; (2) those whose interest in the party is “fleeting or transient, or a matter of momentary convenience or accident;” (3) “adherents of opposing parties;” or (4) those “who have worked to undermine and oppose” the party. Doc. No. 4-1, Pl.’s Mot. at 15. It argues that “Hawaii voters can nominate the candidates of [ ] political organization^] they would, as matter of conscience, refuse to join, and by which, in a reciprocal exercise of conscience, they would be rejected.” Id. at 16. The DPH thus concludes that (1) the open primary imposes a severe burden, and is facially unconstitutional as a matter of law; and (2) the DPH suffers irreparable harm, and the public interest therefore favors the entry of a preliminary injunction preventing Nago from enforcing and applying Hawaii’s open primary provisions. Id. at 29-30.
The DPH’s challenge fails for two reasons. First, even if Jones applies to this open primary challenge, there are realistic factual situations that would not “severely” burden other parties’ associational rights— and thus, given legitimate and important state interests, the open primary is not “unconstitutional in all of its applications.” Wash. State Grange,
2. A Purely Facial Challenge Fails
The DPH’s facial challenge is premised on the open primary being a severe burden per se. And in doing so, the DPH emphasizes its own party “preference” (adopted into the DPH Constitution) to have voters who are willing to declare their affiliation with the DPH publicly. Its formal policy is that it should not
Initially, it is far from clear the extent to which Jones ’ holding (arising from a blanket primary) applies to an open primary. Indeed, Jones stated that California’s prior blanket primary was “qualitatively different” from a closed primary system where it may be “made quite easy for a voter to change his party affiliation the day of the primary, and thus, in some sense, to ‘cross over’[.]”
In this sense, the blanket primary also may be constitutionally distinct from the open primary ... in which the voter is limited to one party’s ballot. See La Follette, [450 U.S.] at 130, n. 2,101 S.Ct. 1010 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“[T]he act of voting in the Democratic primary fairly can be described as an act of affiliation with the Democratic Party.... The situation might be different in those States with ‘blanket’ primaries — i.e., those where voters are allowed to participate in the primaries of more than one party on a single occasion, selecting the primary they wish to vote in with respect to each individual elective office”). This case does not require us to determine the constitutionality of open primaries.
Id. at 577 n. 8,
Even applying Jones’ reasoning here, however, the DPH’s facial challenge necessarily raises other parties’ perspectives, an issue not squarely addressed in Jones.
In Clingman, for example, the Libertarian Party of Oklahoma (“LPO”) wanted to open its primary to all registered voters regardless of party affiliation, whether Republican, Democratic, Reform, or independent.
Tashjian found unconstitutional a Connecticut closed primary that required voters in any primary to be registered as party members, contrary to the Republican Party of Connecticut’s rule inviting independents to vote in its primaries. The Supreme Court reasoned that the closed primary “impermissibly burdens the right of [the party’s] members to determine for themselves with whom they will associate, and whose support they will seek, in their quest for political success.” Id. at 214,
The DPH disagrees that the burden turns on a party’s policy or desires, contending that an unconstitutional law is still unconstitutional even if one embraces it. The DPH argues that “[a] political party that prefers the ‘open’ primary suffers a lack of liberty by having no other choice.” Doc. No. 19, Pl.’s Reply at 10. “[A] citizen may not want to stand in a public forum and make political speeches, but being prohibited from doing so is still a loss of
Consequently — regardless of which test for facial invalidity (“no set of circumstances” or “plainly legitimate sweep”) is proper here — there are realistic (perhaps even likely) factual situations where a party’s associational rights would not be “severely” burdened by Hawaii’s open primary. Given a lesser burden, the open primary is clearly supported by important and legitimate State rights such as protecting the privacy of a person’s vote, and encouraging voter participation by removing barriers to vote. See, e.g., Clingman,
3. An Evidentiary Record Is Necessary
The DPH’s challenge fails for a second, independent reason — the court cannot measure whether the burden is severe (or not) without proof — and proof requires an evidentiary record.
The DPH argues that this court can address its facial First Amendment challenge after ensuring “that there are no troublesome facts hidden beneath the surface, so that the claim really can be decided on the record” and after making certain that “there truly is but one avenue for its application.” Doc. No. 19, Pl.’s Reply at 8. It asserts that the open primary is unconstitutional by emphasizing the primary’s impact on its own policies (although not explicitly challenging the primary “as applied” only to the DPH). But even given the DPH’s interpretation of a “facial challenge,” and even if the court could address the DPH’s challenge without looking to the possible impact on other parties, the court cannot — on the present record — assess whether the DPH’s associational rights have been burdened without considering evidence as to the extent, if any, of that burden.
Jones determined that California’s blanket primary constituted a “clear and present danger” that a party’s nominee would be “determined by adherents of an opposing party,” but it did so based on evidence.
Recognizing that Jones relied on evidence to establish the burden on those political parties, Bayless subsequently held that a challenge to a primary election (and in particular, the severity of the burden on a party’s associational rights) raised a factual issue that must be proven.
The district court ... erred in failing to consider separately whether the participation of nonmembers in the selection of candidates is constitutional under [Jones ]. Although forcing the Libertarians to open their primary to nonmembers for the selection of party candidates raises serious constitutional concerns, we conclude that the resolution of the constitutional issue turns on factual questions not decided by the district court. We therefore remand so that the district court may consider the severity of the burden this aspect of the primary system imposes on the Libertarian Party’s associational rights, [and] whether the state has sufficiently justified that burden[.]
Id. (emphasis added). It explained that
Jones treated the risk that nonparty members will skew either primary results or candidates’ positions as a factual issue, with the plaintiffs having the burden of establishing that risk. On remand, the district court should separately consider the constitutionality of nonparty members voting for Libertarian party candidates for public office, including the primary system’s potential to change the party’s nominee or the candidates’ positions.
Id. (emphasis added).
And in a subsequent election law challenge (after Washington State Grange), Crawford reemphasized the inherently factual nature of the relevant inquiry. Referring to the “heavy burden” necessary to invalidate an election law “in all its applications,” Crawford reiterated that a court errs by “failing] to give appropriate weight to the magnitude of that burden when [analyzing] a preelection facial attack on ... primary election procedures.”
Under this precedent, this court cannot consider the DPH’s challenge without analyzing proof of a burden. See also Alaskan Independence Party,
The DPH simply asserts that it will be, or can be, forced to “associate” with voters who are “adherents of opposing parties,” and “who have worked to undermine and oppose” the DPH. Doc. No. 4-1, PL’s Mot. at 15. The court, however, cannot assume (1) that such “non-adherents” have burdened the DPH by voting in a Democratic primary in the past, (2) that DPH candidates have in fact been forced to change their message to cater to these non-DPH voters, much less (3) that the DPH has been “severely” burdened over the past thirty-three years that Hawaii has had an open primary.
Of course, it is possible (even likely) that some “crossover” voters (ie., members of, or sympathizers with, a rival party) have temporarily affiliated with the DPH by voting Democrat in a Hawaii primary election. But it is also possible (even likely) that — given Hawaii’s demographics
Even if anonymity creates some burden to the DPH, the court cannot assume— without a developed evidentiary record— that the DPH is severely burdened (as opposed to being merely inconvenienced) by such a system, especially a system adopted specifically to protect privacy of the vote and to encourage voter participation. And the current record in this case establishes no more than that the DPH has a formal preference to associate with those who are willing to publicly declare their support for the DPH, and that approximately 65,000 people have formally registered with the DPH in a heavily Democratic state with a population of over one million people.
In short, the DPH’s arguments rest on assumptions about voter behavior that cannot be judged without evidence. The DPH’s challenge thus fails for this second reason. See Wash. State Grange,
Y. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court upholds Hawaii’s open primary against the Democratic Party of Hawaii’s facial constitutional challenge. The DPH has failed to prove that the open primary is facially unconstitutional. Accordingly, the court DENIES the DPH’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion for Pre
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. HRS § 14-21, regarding the nomination of presidential electors, requires political parties to select such electors by "state party or group convention pursuant to the constitution, bylaws, and rules of the party or group[.]” This action does not challenge § 14-21.
. Generally, an "open” primary allows a person to vote without being “required to declare publicly a party preference or to have that preference publicly recorded.” Democratic Party of the U.S. v. La Follette,
Such an open primary differs from a "blanket” primary that allows a voter to choose “any candidate regardless of the candidate’s political affiliation.” Id. at 570,
. The 1978 Constitutional Convention's Committee of the Whole reported as follows in recommending adoption of the amendment:
... No longer will prospective voters have to register as a Democrat, Republican or nonpartisan. However, voters will still be required to vote only for candidates of one political persuasion. Therefore, any person who votes for candidates in both the Republican and Democratic primary shall not have his vote counted.
Your Committee believes that this change is warranted to encourage voters with minimal party affiliation or those without any party affiliation to participate in the electoral process.
Implementation is left to the appropriate body but your Committee wishes to make clear its intent that a person registering to vote need not state his political affiliation, be it a party preference or nonpartisan. Thus, the change from the current system is only in the fact that a voter's party preference or political affiliation need no longer be revealed.
I 1978 Proceedings 1025 (Comm, of the Whole Rep. No. 16); see also id. at 996 ("The people of Hawaii have indicated by polls that they favor a system that will not violate their privacy and not force them to reveal a political preference before being allowed to vote.”) (Minority Rep. No. 13).
Consistent with this view, in addressing the constitutionality of a Connecticut closed primary law, Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut,
. The provision was certified by the DPH “State Central Committee on July 28, 2012,” although the second paragraph "was adopted by the Convention of the DPH on May 27, 2006.” Doc. No. 4 — 2, Carpenter Deck ¶ 4.
. During the October 7, 2013 hearing, the DPH explained that its summary judgment is "partial” only to distinguish proceedings on liability (z.e., the constitutionality of Hawaii’s open primary) from issues regarding a remedy, if the DPH succeeds in establishing that Hawaii law is unconstitutional.
. In contrast to a facial attack, a " ‘paradigmatic’ ... as-applied challenge is one that ‘tests’ a statute’s constitutionality in one particular fact situation while refusing to adjudicate the constitutionality of the law in other fact situations.” Hoye v. City of Oakland,
. The State concedes that a ruling in its favor on the facial challenge in this case would not preclude an “as-applied” challenge in later proceedings with a fully-developed evidentiary record. Oct. 7, 2013 Tr. at 43-44. This recognition is consistent with Ninth Circuit caselaw distinguishing facial and as-applied challenges — in upholding a facial challenge to Arizona's Legal Worker Act, Chícanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano,
We uphold the statute in all respects against this facial challenge, but we must observe that it is brought against a blank factual background of enforcement and outside the context of any particular case. If and when the statute is enforced, and the factual background is developed, other challenges to the Act as applied in any particular instance or manner will not be controlled by our decision.
Id. at 861 (citing Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd.,
. The DPH also relies on La Follette, which struck a Wisconsin open primary provision as inconsistent with a Democratic National Party rule providing that "only those who are willing to affiliate publicly with the Democratic Party may participate in the process of selecting delegates to the Party’s National Convention” for selection of a Presidential candidate.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court considered the question before it to be the constitutionality of the 'open’ feature of the state primary election law, as such. Concluding that the open primary serves [a] compelling state interest by encouraging voter participation, the court held the state open primary constitutionally valid. Upon this issue, the Wisconsin Supreme Court may well be correct.
Id. at 120-21,
. The DPH makes much of the mandatory nature of Hawaii’s open primary. That is, unlike in some other states with open primaries, Hawaii law does not allow a party to "opt out” and nominate a general election candidate by other means. See HRS §§ 12-1, 12-2. Other courts have relied on such an "opt out” possibility to uphold (facially) an open primary against a forced association constitutional challenge under Jones. See Miller v. Brown,
Nevertheless, it is “too plain for argument” that "a State may require parties to use the primary format for selecting their nominees!.]” Jones,
. Jones was brought by a coalition of parties across the political spectrum (the California
. Clingman ultimately upheld Oklahoma’s semiclosed primary, under which a political party could invite only its own registered members and registered independents to vote in its primary.
. See Ariz. Libertarian Party, Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors of Pima Cnty.,
. Idaho Republican Party v. Ysursa,
. Both the DPH and the State agree as a matter of common knowledge that Hawaii is a heavily Democratic State. See, e.g., Doc. No. 15-1, Def.’s Counter-Mot. at 8; Doc. No. 19, PL's Reply at 4. This fact is supported by publicly-available polls — according to an August 3, 2012 Gallup poll, "[ajlong with the District of Columbia, Rhode Island and Hawaii rank as the most Democratic states in the country[.]” L. Saad, Heavily Democratic States Are Concentrated in the East (Aug. 3, 2012), available at http://www.gallup.com/ poll/15643 7/heavily-democratic-states-concentrated-east.aspx (last visited Nov. 14, 2013). As an example, Hawaii’s current State Senate consists of twenty four Democrats and one Republican, and its House consists of forty four Democrats and seven Republicans. See http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/members/ legislators.aspx?chamber=S (last visited Nov. 14, 2013).
. "It may be the case, of course, that the public avowal of party affiliation ... provides no more assurance of party loyalty than does [a] requirement that a person vote in no more than one party's primary. But the stringency, and wisdom, of membership requirements is for the association and its members to decide — not the court' — so long as those requirements are otherwise constitutionally permissible.” La Foliate,
. The DPH relies on Democratic Party of Washington v. Reed,