69 A. 347 | Conn. | 1908
This is a suit against a livery-stable keeper by one who had hired a team from him, for injuries due to the insufficiency of the harness.
The following statements made by the court in charging the jury are the only errors assigned in the appeal: —
(1) "A livery-stable keeper is freed from liability for an accident, by showing that he exercised the usual skill, care and diligence ordinarily exercised by livery-stable keepers."
(2) "If the jury find that the horse was easily frightened by proximity to automobiles and the plaintiffs had knowledge of this fact, and that the plaintiffs drove on a road not contemplated in the hiring, and which was more traveled by automobiles than was contemplated, and if the *555 jury further find that the plaintiffs, by driving on such road not contemplated in the contract of hiring, came in proximity to an automobile and that such proximity so brought about contributed to the accident, then the verdict should be for the defendants."
The plaintiffs' criticism of the first statement is that it fails to correctly define the degree of care required of the defendants in furnishing the plaintiffs with a safe and sufficient harness, in that it makes the standard of such care that "ordinarily exercised by livery-stable keepers," instead of that "usually exercised by persons of ordinary prudence in the conduct of such livery-stable business," as the required standard is described in Stanley v. Steele,
The instruction given in the second statement complained of was adapted to the evidence presented. The finding shows that the defendants had offered evidence to *556 prove, among other things, that after the plaintiffs, with full knowledge that the horse was easily frightened at the proximity of automobiles, had driven it about ten miles beyond the destination stated by them in their agreement of hiring — the road to which destination was seldom traveled by automobiles and was free from that source of danger — and while driving down a steep hill upon a road much frequented by automobiles and extremely dangerous for public travel "so far as automobiles were concerned," the horse became frightened by a passing automobile and turned sharply to one side, and Mrs. Deming, unnecessarily and in a very careless manner, jumped from the carriage and fell, although the horse did not run and the carriage was not overturned, while her husband, who remained in the carriage, was not injured.
Section 1430 of the General Statutes makes it a criminal offense for any person hiring a horse to wilfully make any false statement relative to the time, place, or manner of using or driving the same, with intent to defraud any person.
The plaintiffs themselves requested the court to charge the jury that the mere fact that they hired the team to drive to Pleasant Valley, and drove beyond that point to the place of the accident, would not prevent them from recovering, and that their violation of any contract or statute, in order to prevent their recovery, must have contributed to the injury. The court so charged, and added, what was implied in the request, that if the jury found that the plaintiffs had so violated the terms of the contract of hiring, and that such violation contributed to the accident, the verdict should be for the defendants; and further added the statement complained of in the second assigned error.
It is true that the plaintiffs were not barred of redress merely because they had violated the terms of a contract or the provisions of a statute. The violation of the statute or of the contract of hiring, by driving upon a different road from that named in the agreement of hiring, was a material fact only as it constituted a breach of a duty which *557
the plaintiffs owed the defendants respecting the prevention or avoidance of such an accident as that that happened.Monroe v. Hartford Street Ry. Co.,
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.