12 Conn. 1 | Conn. | 1837
The objection to proof of the acts and declarations of Seth Cowles, is founded on the general rule of law, which excludes hearsay evidence. This salutary rule, we are not disposed to invade, nor are we inclined to extend the exceptions to it. It must, however, be admitted, that there are several classes of cases in which the spirit of this rule is not violated, by the admission of evidence, which, in a limited sense, may be denominated hearsay ; and we think the present case falls within one of these classes.
The declarations of a person deceased, while in possession of
The declarations and acts of Cowles, which were received in evidence, related, (as we have before remarked) to the extent of his occupancy. They were made while he was in possession, claiming to be owner ; they were adverse to the title now set up by the defendants ; and were offered against those who claim through him, or justify under him. Cowles is, therefore, identified in interest with the persons against whom they were
The case of Fitch v. Chapman, 10 Conn. Rep. 8., is not opposed to the views we have expressed. In that case, the declarations of John Chapman, (who was alive) were offered to prove what title he intended to acquire, when he took a deed of the premises to himself. His admissions were, that he made the purchase for the defendant, and not for himself, although the deed was executed to him as sole grantee. It was an attempt, therefore, by the most dangerous of all evidence, — by his own declarations out of court — to give a construction to the deed, different from that which the law gave to it; and we said, “ the deed shows what title he did actually obtain ; and as the question here is merely as to the legal title, that is settled by the deed itself.” Besides, it does not appear, that these declarations were made while John Chapman was in posses
There is another view in which the question submitted to us may be considered, and from which it will be apparent, that the evidence was properly received Cowles was in possession as adjoining proprietor, and directed where the ditch was to be dug, which was to be in the dividing line between himself and the plaintiff. He pointed out the place of that line ; made himself a party to the act of digging the ditch there ; and may and ought to be treated as having participated in that act. Being-then in possession of the adjoining land, and occupying up to a certain place, his declarations accompanying his acts, were admissible as part of the res gesta, showing the extent of his right to occupy and his occupancy in fact. Williams v. Ensign, 4 Conn. Rep. 456. Davis v. Pierce & al. 2 Term Rep. 53. Pool v. Bridges, 4 Pick. 378. Wooden v. Executors of Cowles, 11 Conn. Rep. 292.
The ruling of the superior court was correct; and a new trial ought not to be granted.
New trial not to be granted.