192 Conn. 271 | Conn. | 1984
In May, 1975, the plaintiffs, property owners in Monroe, instituted an action against the town planning and zoning commission (commission), Claude Betterton, Jr., the zoning enforcement officer of the town of Monroe, and Monroe Little League, Inc. (MLL), claiming, inter alia: that MLL had expanded the use of premises utilized for Little League baseball playing activities authorized under a special exception issued by the commission; that the activities of MLL violated Monroe zoning regulations and constituted a nuisance; and that the defendant Betterton had failed to enforce the zoning regulations against MLL although requested by the plaintiffs to do so. The plaintiffs sought, inter alia, relief by way of injunction.
On June 19,1975,. the Superior Court ordered injunc-tive relief on behalf of the plaintiffs against the defendant MLL in accordance with a written stipulation of the plaintiffs and MLL. That injunction imposed certain restrictions on the days, hours, location and conditions of play. From June 19, 1975, through about March, 1982, MLL conducted Little League baseball activities in Monroe in conformity to that injunction.
In April, 1982, the officers and some of the directors of MLL, on the advice of counsel, organized a corporation known as Little League Baseball of Monroe, Inc. (LLBM), to conduct Little League baseball in Monroe and some Little League games were scheduled and
After an evidentiary hearing on the plaintiffs’ motion, both defendant corporations, MLL and LLBM, were found in contempt of the 1975 injunction and the court ordered the defendants to pay court costs of the plaintiffs in the amount of $328 in addition to their reasonable attorney’s fees.
On appeal the defendants claim that the trial court erred (1) in finding that the 1975 injunction provided a valid basis for holding either defendant in contempt in 1982 when no judgment file expressing the 1975 trial court’s decision had ever been prepared or signed by that trial judge; (2) in applying the 1975 injunction to LLBM, a corporation organized in 1982, when it was not a part of the 1975 injunction proceedings and not bound by the terms of that injunction; (3) in holding MLL in contempt for acts occurring after it had ceased conducting Little League activity and after the plaintiffs had withdrawn their claims against it; (4) in con
First, we take up the claim of the lack of a judgment file. There can be no question but that the parties, who stipulated in 1975 that the injunction order enter, knew exactly what the judgment provided. Indeed, not only did MLL scrupulously obey that judgment for almost seven years, but it unsuccessfully moved the court in 1981 to modify that injunction claiming circumstances had substantially changed since that time.
The claim that it was error to apply the 1975 injunction to LLBM, a corporation which was not organized until 1982, and which was not a party to the 1975 proceedings and, therefore, not bound by that injunction, likewise lacks merit. The trial court agreed with the plaintiffs that LLBM and those active in its organization and operation realized that any playing of Little League baseball on Saturday under the name of LLBM would violate the injunction order. It also found that the officers of LLBM were “practically identical” with those of MLL and that MLL had not ceased to
“When the statutory privilege of doing business in the corporate form is employed as a cloak for the evasion of obligations, as a mask behind which to do injustice, or invoked to subvert equity, the separate personality of the corporation will be disregarded.” Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
Additionally, the claims of LLBM that the 1975 order did not run to the successors or assigns of MLL must be rejected. Persons who are beyond the scope of an injunction are, of course, not bound by it and are “free to ignore it.” See G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Webster Dictionary Co., 639 F.2d 29, 34 (1st Cir. 1980). At common law an injunction decree bound not only the parties defendant “but also those identified with them in interest, in ‘privity’ with them, represented by them
The defendants’ argument that the trial court erred in holding MLL in contempt for acts occurring after it ceased to conduct organized Little League activity and after the plaintiffs withdrew their claims against MLL requires little discussion. First, as the facts have shown, MLL was conducting Little League baseball. Second, any reasonable examination of the record persuades us that the plaintiffs simply did not withdraw their claim against MLL.
In Board of Education v. Shelton Education Assn., 173 Conn. 81, 85, 376 A.2d 1080 (1977), referring to McTigue v. New London Education Assn., 164 Conn. 348, 321 A.2d 462 (1973), we said, “a criminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court. In contrast, civil contempt is conduct directed against the rights of the opposing party. A contempt is considered civil when the punishment is wholly remedial, serves only the purposes of the complainant, and is not intended as a deterrent against the public .... In distinguishing between [criminal and civil contempt], much weight has been placed on the character and purpose of the punishment.” Criminal contempt sanctions “are punitive in their nature and are imposed for the purpose of vindicating the authority of the court.” United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 302, 67 S. Ct. 677, 91 L. Ed. 884 (1947), citing Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 31 S. Ct. 492, 55 L. Ed. 797 (1911); see Board of Education v. Shelton Education Assn., supra. In United States v. United Mine Workers of America, supra, 303-304, the United States Supreme Court said: “Judicial sanctions in civil contempt proceedings may, in a proper case, be employed for either or both of two purposes: to coerce the defendant into compliance with the court’s order, and to compensate the complainant for losses sustained. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., [supra, 448, 449]. Where
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Paragraph 2 of the 1975 stipulation provided: “Playing time shall be restricted to Monday through Friday, inclusive, and no play shall be sanctioned or permitted by Defendant | Monroe Little League, Inc.] on Saturday or Sunday.” Paragraph 4 of that stipulation provided that “[p]laying field number three (3) so called shall not be used by the Defendant for organized Little League activity.”
The trial court issued an ex parte injunction enjoining any further playing of baseball on Saturdays at the proscribed location and that order was obeyed.
The trial court, in awarding reasonable attorney’s fees to the plaintiffs, ordered that such fees were “to be determined by the court following a hearing thereon.”
In their motion for contempt, the plaintiffs also point out that MLL “after losing [its] Motion to Modify [the 1975 injunction]” so conducted itself in the formation of LLBM with the result that “the sole and exclusive reason for the formation of the new corporation was the belief that the Court-ordered injunction could be thus circumvented.”
The president of LLBM who was also the president of MLL said that the only difference in the operation- is “we’re like operating on Saturdays. . . . Play baseball on Saturdays.” The treasurer of LLBM who had earlier been the treasurer of MLL said that the only reason that LLBM was formed was “[s]o we could play baseball more on--on Saturdays [at Beardsley Field].”
In employing the concept of “piercing the corporate veil” it has been said that the mere fact that the entity involved is a nonprofit corporation does not preclude the application of that equitable remedy which looks to the substance and not the form. Macaluso v. Jenkins, 95 Ill. App. 3d 461, 464-67, 420 N.E.2d 251 (1981); 1 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations (Perm. Ed.) § 41.75, p. 459.
In this connection, we also note that MLL’s 1981 motion to modify the 1975 injunction was denied by the court on March 8, 1982. Shortly thereafter, as stated in the defendants’ brief, the officers and some of the directors of MLL organized LLBM in April, 1982.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has recently stated: “Whether one not named in an injunctive decree may nevertheless be bound by it depends on the facts of each case . . . .” (Citations omitted.) Vuitton et Fils S. A. v. Carousel Handbags, 592 F.2d 126, 130 (2d Cir. 1979).