110 Minn. 49 | Minn. | 1910
The facts in this case, as found by the trial court, are as follows.
Defendant was the owner of certain real property in the state of North Dakota; and plaintiffs were the owners of certain land in the state of Iowa, which was incumbered by two mortgages, one for $4,000 and one for $1,440. On the eleventh of April, 1907, the parties entered into a written contract wherein and whereby defendant agreed to sell and convey to plaintiffs his Dakota land for the sum of $4,500, in payment of which plaintiffs agreed to pay him $2,000 in deferred cash payments, and to convey to defendant their Iowa land, subject to the two mortgages then existing against it. The contract and all documents evidencing the transaction were deposited with the First National Bank of Austin, this state, where the contract was entered into, to be delivered to the respective parties on being entitled thereto. Subsequently plaintiffs, at their residence in the state of Iowa, in the performance of the obligations imposed upon them by the contract, caused to be prepared and executed a warranty deed in due form by which they conveyed their Lrwa land to defendant. Without consultation with defendant, they caused to be inserted in the deed a clause by which he was made to assume the mortgage indebtedness upon the land. The contract between the parties did not require defendant to assume or pay the outstanding mortgages, and the clause was inserted in the deed without his knowledge or consent, and for the purpose of defrauding him. The deed, as so prepared and executed, was forwarded by plaintiffs to the bank at Austin, and by its officers subsequently sent for record to the proper recording office of the county in Iowa in which the land is located. It was never submitted to defendant for examination, and the fact that the clause by which he was made to assume the mortgages had been inserted therein was wholly unknown to him until after the commencement of this action. Subsequent to the exchange of deeds and the completion of the transaction, one Meyers, the holder of the second mort
Upon these facts, the trial court ordered judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs appealed from an order denying a new trial.
The principal question presented by the assignments of error is whether the findings of the court are sustained by the evidence. Upon this question we have only to say that the record has been carefully examined, with the result that ample evidence is found therein, to sustain the conclusions of the trial court. We are not required to discuss the evidence for the purpose of demonstrating the correctness of the trial court’s conclusions. It is sufficient that the evidence has been examined with the result stated. Carver v. Bagley, 79 Minn. 114, 81 N. W. 757.
There can be no question that if defendant accepted the deed containing the assumption clause with knowledge of its presence, and without protest or objection, it would be binding upon him, even though he had not previously agreed to pay the outstanding debt. Follansbee v. Johnson, 28 Minn. 311, 9 N. W. 882; Slocum v. Bracy, 55 Minn. 249, 56 N. W. 826, 43 Am. St. 499. But the trial court found, and the evidence justifies the finding, that defendant did not
The fact that defendant had no notice or knowledge of the terms of the deed in this respect until after the commencement of the action renders inapplicable the doctrine of laches or estoppel invoked by plaintiffs, even if it be conceded that a party may set up his own fraud as the foundation for an estoppel against the defrauded party.
The assignments of error challenging certain rulings of the court on the admission of evidence' are not discussed in the briefs, and are therefore waived.
Order affirmed.