3 P.2d 283 | Mont. | 1931
This action was brought by George H. Demarais, as guardian adlitem for Leonard F. Demarais, a minor, to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the latter. Plaintiff recovered judgment, from which defendants appealed.
The complaint charges that defendants, being engaged in the dairy business at Oilmont, Toole county, on January 13, 1929, had employed plaintiff, Leonard F. Demarais, who was then eighteen years of age, to drive and operate an automobile truck for the purpose of distributing milk; that while so engaged, *368 on that day, the left rear wheel of the truck broke causing the truck to overturn, resulting in the injuries complained of; that the defendants were negligent in requiring plaintiff to use an unsafe and defective truck; that the spokes on the left rear wheel were loose in the hub and felloes and the hub bolts were worn and loose, which the defendants knew or in the exercise of reasonable care would have known; that prior to January 13 plaintiff informed defendants of the unsafe condition of the truck and requested that it be inspected and repaired, which defendants promised to do; that plaintiff relied upon the promise and at the direction of defendants continued driving the truck.
The answer alleges that if the truck was defective, plaintiff knew it; that at the time of the accident plaintiff was driving at a reckless rate of speed and at a speed in excess of that which defendant warned him not to exceed; that plaintiff had neglected to watch where he was driving, and, as one of the persons who was riding with him warned him that he was driving off the road into the ditch, he turned the truck at a sharp angle away from the ditch causing it to overturn; and that, therefore, plaintiff's own negligence was the cause of the injuries sustained, and that he assumed the risk of injury arising from the defects complained of.
The evidence is conflicting, but, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, it shows that the truck was a 1928 Chevrolet; that on the thirteenth day of January "there was a grind in the rear end." As plaintiff was driving it on the public highway going south at about twenty-five miles per hour and on the right-hand side of the road, there was a crash and the rear end went down. This caused the truck to drag to the left toward the ditch on the left of the road. When the truck turned over, it was crossways in the road, with the front end toward the west. He had told defendant Johnson, on the Thursday before the accident (the accident happening on Sunday), that there was a grind in the rear end. The next day he again called Johnson's attention to it and was told to take it to the garage and have it greased. *369 This he did, but it did not prevent the grinding sound. That night defendant Johnson tried out the truck and heard the grind. On Saturday morning plaintiff asked him if he was going to get it fixed, and he said "if it keeps up like it is, I guess we will have to get it fixed." Plaintiff said he requested him "to have the automobile tested and repaired." On the morning of the accident he again asked Johnson if he was going to have the truck fixed, and Johnson said, "Go out and deliver milk today and see how it acts today; we might get it fixed."
The plaintiff said he traveled twenty or twenty-five feet after the crash before the car turned over. Wilfred Bacon, who was riding in the truck with plaintiff when it overturned, testified that he heard the crash; that the car swung toward the ditch; that plaintiff turned the wheel and the car tipped over.
There was evidence by plaintiff's witnesses that all but two spokes in the wheel were broken and pulled out of the felloes. The ends of the spokes had been worn slick and shining, which results from rubbing against metal, causing a grinding noise. When the truck was straightened up, it stood on three wheels; the bottom of the left rear wheel was tipped under the axle and the top of the wheel away from the truck. The rim was still left on the wheel and the tire was still on the rim. The bolts in the hub were worn and the hub was loose on the axle.
One witness said that the wooden parts and bolts of the wheel were beyond repair, though defendants' proof showed that the bolts were used in fastening the new wheel on the hub. There was quite a deep track in the middle of the road immediately north of where the car overturned, which then turned left and extended near the east edge of the highway and then turned west again to where the car overturned.
Plaintiff testified that he started working for defendants in August, 1928, and that from that time until the accident defendants never made any inspection of the car for the purpose *370 of ascertaining defects. He admitted, however, on cross-examination, that in November, 1928, the car was taken to a garage and everything was fixed that was known, or pointed out by the mechanic, to be wrong with it.
To prove the specific cause of the collapse of the rear wheel, plaintiff called the witness Royfield G. Klinger, a garageman of thirteen years' experience in the repair of automobiles and who had experience with automobile wheels that collapsed, and propounded to him a hypothetical question based upon the testimony, to elicit his opinion as to what caused the wheel to collapse. Over objection of defendants the witness was permitted to answer, saying: "According to the testimony, in my estimation the testimony that you read, it is my opinion that the wheel collapsed due to a loose wheel. By a loose wheel, I mean a wheel that would be loose on the felloes and the hub. I mean that the spokes in the wheel were loose."
He was then asked: "Now, if the spokes in the wheel were loose, according to your opinion, state whether or not that defect in the wheel could have been discovered by a reasonable inspection of the wheel?" Objection of the defendants being overruled, he answered: "Yes, it could."
He was also asked: "If the bolts in the hub holding the spokes were loose and worn, state whether or not that in your opinion could have been discovered by the making of a reasonable inspection." Over objection he answered that it could.
Defendants contend that the answers in response to these questions were improperly admitted in evidence, and that without these statements, the evidence is insufficient to establish negligence on the part of the defendants.
The general rule is that a witness must state facts, and not[1, 2] opinions or conclusions. An exception to this rule, based upon necessity, exists where the witness possesses special skill or knowledge of the subject matter, and where the facts are such that inexperienced persons are likely to prove incapable of forming a correct judgment without the assistance of the opinion of such witness. (See note in 51 L.R.A. (n.s.) 566.) The exception is contained in our statutes *371
(subd. 9, sec. 10531, Rev. Codes 1921) and has been recognized by this court in proper cases. Thus, in Coleman v. Perry,
Though recognizing the exception, the court refused to apply it in the case of Metz v. City of Butte,
In speaking of this question in Cummings v. Reins CopperCo.,
Applying this test of admissibility to the questions here under consideration, we think the answer to the first question was properly admitted. It was the opinion of the witness as *372
to the cause of the collapse of the wheel. That was a question concerning which the mass of mankind could not reach as intelligent a conclusion as could one who had experience with the effect of loose spokes in a wheel. But the opinion or conclusion of the witness that the condition of the wheel was such that the defects could have been discovered by reasonable inspection was incompetent and erroneously admitted. The defects in the wheel rendering it unsafe were pointed out to the jury. It would have been competent for the witness to state in what method the defects could be ascertained (Pacheco v. Judson Mfg. Co.,
Error is assigned in the giving of Instruction No. 8, in which[3] the jury were told that it was the duty of the defendants to provide the plaintiff with a reasonably safe and secure vehicle with which to do his work. This instruction was erroneous for the reason that the master is chargeable with the duty only of using reasonable care to provide plaintiff with a reasonably safe and secure vehicle. (Markinovich v. Northern P. Ry.Co.,
The same may be said of instruction numbered 9, which informed the jury that the defendants "were required to keep the equipment and appliances in a reasonably safe condition," whereas their duty was discharged by using reasonable care to keep the equipment and appliances in a reasonably safe condition.
While the objection to instruction numbered 10 did not point out the ground relied upon here, upon another trial it should be modified to meet the requirements of the rule stated in Reino
v. Montana Mineral Land Dev. Co.,
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE CALLAWAY and ASSOCIATE JUSTICES GALEN, FORD and MATTHEWS concur.