16 S.W. 111 | Tex. | 1891
This suit was brought to recover damages by Bernard Delz against the members of the firm of Winfree, Norman Pearson, and the members of the firm of Borden Borden.
Plaintiff's petition stated his cause of action as follows: That he was pursuing the occupation of a butcher in the city of Galveston, and was making and would have continued to make large profits and gains in the business but for the grievances committed by the defendants as alleged; that in the prosecution of his business he had opened and was conducting two butcher shops in said city for the sale of different kinds of fresh meat; that it became necessary that he should buy live animals suitable and fit to be slaughtered for the purposes of his business as a butcher, and for a long time before and at the time of the commission by defendants of the grievances herein stated he was engaged in the business of buying live animals suitable and fit to be slaughtered and sold as fresh butcher's meat, and which he slaughtered and sold as such at his said two butcher shops; that the persons from whom plaintiff bought said live animals were engaged in the business of transporting to Galveston and receiving for sale live animals suitable and fit to be slaughtered and sold as butcher's meat, and in selling such live animals for such purposes to whomsoever would buy; that long before and at the time of the commission by defendants of the wrongs herein charged the defendants were engaged, and are now engaged, as separate firms in said business of receiving and selling live animals for the purposes aforesaid on Galveston Island, and were and are now the only persons or association of persons so engaged in said business in Galveston County; that without justifiable cause and unlawfully, and with the malicious intent to molest, obstruct, hinder, and prevent plaintiff from carrying on his said business and making a living thereby, the said Winfree, Norman Pearson, on or about the 1st day July, 1889, and at divers times thereafter, and until the filing of this petition, did combine, confederate, and conspire with said firm of Borden Borden, and with one Gerhard Barbour, a butcher, not to sell to petitioner for cash any live animals or slaughtered meat for the purposes or for the prosecution of his said business; that the said Winfree, Norman Pearson solicited and procured from said Borden Borden an agreement not to sell any live animals to plaintiff, and did so induce said Gerhard Barbour and others to plaintiff unknown not to sell to him slaughtered meat for the purposes of his said business.
The petition charges that in pursuance of said combination each of said firms subsequently refused to sell plaintiff live animals when he applied to them to purchase them at their own price in money which he then offered to pay them, and that said Gerhard Barbour likewise refused to sell him slaughtered meat; that by reason of such unlawful combination and malicious interference with his business, plaintiff was compelled to close up and discontinue his business in one of his two shops, and in order to continue it at the other one of his shops he has *404 been and is now forced to buy slaughtered meat at a great disadvantage and at higher prices than he would have had to pay but for the aforesaid unlawful combination and malicious interference with and hindrance of his business by defendants.
The court sustained a general demurrer to the petition.
Appellant's assignment of error brings before us the correctness of this ruling.
The appellee contends that at common law "a conspiracy can not be made the subject of a civil action, although damages result, unless something is done which without the conspiracy would give a right of action. In other words an act which if done by one alone constitutes no ground of action can not be made the ground of such action by alleging it to have been done by and through a conspiracy of several; that the true test as to whether such action will lie is whether or not the act accomplished after the conspiracy has been formed is itself actionable."
We think that the proposition here asserted is well sustained by the authorities, and the first question to be determined is whether, on account of the acts charged by plaintiff against the defendants, he would have had a cause of action against either of them if no conspiracy had been charged.
If he would have had, then he may maintain his action for a conspiracy. If he could not have sustained a separate action against either of the defendants on account of the matters complained of, the additional charge of a conspiracy will not give it. Cool. on Torts, 125; Kimball v. Harmon Burch,
The appellee also asserts the following proposition, which may be conceded to be correct. "A person has an absolute right to refuse to have business relations with any person whomsoever, whether the refusal is based upon reason or is the result of whim, caprice, prejudice, or malice, and there is no law which forces a man to part with his title to his property."
The privilege here asserted must be limited however to the individual action of the party who asserts the right. It is not equally true that one person may from such motives influence another person to do the same thing. If without such motive the cause of one person's interference with the property or privileges of another is to serve some legitimate right or interest of his own, he may do acts himself, or cause other persons to do them, that injuriously affect a third party so long as no definite legal right of such third party is violated.
In the case of Walker v. Cronin, 107 Massachusetts, 562, it was recognized to be a general principle that, "In all cases where a man has a temporal loss or damage by the wrong of another, he may have an action upon the case to be repaired in damages. The intentional causing of *405 such loss to another, without justifiable cause and with the malicious purpose to inflict it, is of itself a wrong.
"There are indeed many authorities which appear to hold that to constitute an actionable wrong there must be a violation of some definite legal right of the plaintiff. But those are cases, for the most part at least, where the defendants were themselves acting in the lawful exercise of some distinct right, which furnished the defense of a justifiable cause for their acts, except so far as they were in violation of a superior right in another.
"Thus every one has an equal right to employ workmen in his business or service; and if by the exercise of this right in such manner as he may see fit persons are induced to leave their employment elsewhere, no wrong is done to him whose employment they leave, unless a contract exists by which such other person has a legal right to the further continuance of their services. If such a contract exists, one who knowingly and intentionally procures it to be violated may be held liable for the wrong, although he did it for the purpose of promoting his own business.
"Every one has a right to enjoy the fruits and advantages of his own enterprise, industry, skill, and credit. He has no right to be protected against competition; but he has a right to be free from a malicious and wanton interference, disturbance, or annoyance. If disturbance or loss come as a result of competition, or the exercise of like rights by others, it is damnum absque injuria, unless some superior right by contract or otherwise is interfered with. But if it come from the merely wanton or malicious acts of others, without the justification of competition or the service of any interest or lawful purpose, it then stands upon a different footing."
Plaintiff's petition goes further than to charge that each of the defendants refused to sell to him. It charges that they not only did that, but that they induced a third person to refuse to sell to him. It does not appear from the petition that their interference with the business of plaintiff was done to serve some legitimate purpose of their own, but that it was done wantonly and maliciously, and that it caused, as they intended it should, pecuniary loss to him.
We think the petition stated a cause of action and that the demurrer should have been overruled.
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
Delivered March 24, 1891.
Forster Rose, for defendants in error, argued a motion for rehearing. The motion was transferred to Austin and there refused. *406