The discrete, single issue in this case is whether the Florida Civil Rights Act, section 760.10, Florida Statute,
Two district courts have addressed this question. In Carsillo v. City of Lake
In General Electric Company v. Gilbert,429 U.S. 125 ,97 S.Ct. 401 ,50 L.Ed.2d 343 (1976), the Supreme Court held that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was not sex discrimination under Title VII. However, in 1978, in response to the Gilbert decision, Congress amended Title VII by enacting the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). The PDA specifies that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is sex discrimination, and therefore violative of Title VII. Florida has not similarly amended its Human Rights Act to include a prohibition against pregnancy-based discrimination.
O’Loughlin,
We believe this holding in O’Loughlin
We certify conflict with Carsillo.
Affirmed.
Notes
. The Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA) provides in section 760.10:
It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer: (a) to discharge or to fail or refuse to hire any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status.
. There is no question that the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, explicitly provides that protection:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, (PDA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), specifies that discrimination because of pregnancy is sex discrimination and violative of Title VII: "The terms 'because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy[.]”
After the ruling below, Ms. Delva in fact brought an action under the federal act in the Dade County Circuit Court. After the case was removed to the federal district court, however, she voluntary dismissed the case without explanation.
. Ms. Delva's complaint alleged in part:
1. Count I is a pregnancy discrimination claim seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and damages to redress violations of Chapter 760, Fla. Stat. (the "Act”).
2. Plaintiff is female and she was discriminated against by Defendant because of her pregnancy.
3. Plaintiff worked for Defendant as a Front Desk Manager from October 2005 until October 2010.
4. In February 2010, Plaintiff told Defendant’s Property Manager and her Supervisor [ ] that she was pregnant. Immediately thereafter, [her Supervisor] started to treat Plaintiff in a disparate manner by scrutinizing and criticizing her work and initially refusing to approve plaintiff’s transfer from the night shift to day shifts despite having a doctor’s note requiring such a transfer.
5. Plaintiff complained ... that [her Supervisor] was treating her in a disparate manner due to her pregnancy.
6. In response to Plaintiff’s complaint, contrary to Defendant’s policy of allowing its employees to earn extra income by working extra shifts, [her Supervisor] refused to allow Plaintiff to earn more income by covering shifts and instead hired a temporary employee.
7. In July 2010, Plaintiff left on pregnancy leave. When Plaintiff was medically cleared to go back to work, Defendant never placed Plaintiff back on a work schedule. Similarly situated male employees who went out on medial leave were allowed to return to work.
. Because the issue is not before us, we express no opinion as to the merits of the alternative holding of O’Loughlin, that the plaintiff could proceed under the FCRA on a federal preemption analysis.