CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF DELTA v DINOLFO
Docket No. 67485
Supreme Court of Michigan
Decided July 19, 1984
Argued October 4, 1983 (Calendar No. 5).
419 Mich. 253
In an opinion by Justice Brickley, joined by Justices Kavanagh, Levin, Ryan, and Cavanagh, the Supreme Court held:
The zoning ordinance of Delta Township that limits the occupation of a single-family residence to an individual or a group of two or more persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption and not more than one other unrelated person is unreasonable and arbitrary and violates the Due Process Clause of the Michigan Constitution.
1. A township has the power to regulate, by zoning ordinance, the use of land and structures within its boundaries for the public health, safety, and welfare, including control of the density of population. Consistent with the power is defining
2. Under the Constitution of the United States, it is permissible to limit occupation of residential property to a traditional, biological family and a number of unrelated persons. In this case, the ordinance is constitutional as a matter of federal law. However, under the Michigan Constitution, the ordinance, which speaks not to contending land uses but to who may occupy a residential dwelling, is not reasonably related to the achievement of the goals of preserving traditional family values, maintenance of property values, and population and density control. The appropriate standard to evaluate a state‘s exercise of the police power is the due process standard. In this case, the ordinance indiscriminately regulates where no regulation is needed and fails to regulate where regulation is most needed. The ordinance assumes that unrelated persons will manifest behavior different from a traditional family without offering support for the assumption. The number of unrelated persons who may occupy a residence is limited to as few as two while relаted persons may occupy a residence without limit. In the absence of a reasonable relation to the stated goals, the ordinance can only be termed arbitrary and capricious under the Due Process Clause of the Michigan Constitution.
Reversed.
Chief Justice Williams, joined by Justice Boyle, dissented. The zoning ordinance does not violate the defendants’ due process rights as guaranteed by the state constitution. To successfully challenge a zoning ordinance, a plaintiff must prove that there is no reasonable governmental interest advanced by the zoning classification and that the ordinance is unreasonable because of purely arbitrary, capricious, and unfounded exclusion of other types of legitimate land use from the area in question. In this case, because the dispute concerns occupants of land rather than competing uses, the opinion of the Court applies a “rational relationship” standard which has generally been employed in non-zoning matters. Regardless of whether an ordinance is viewed as a regulation of land uses or occupants of land, the principles articulated in well established zoning precedents are applicable and should not be so hastily discarded. Zoning matters are essentially legislative, not judicial, functions, and it is not for courts to interfere with the legislative function of local zoning authorities absent a showing that an ordinance arbitrarily and capriciously restricts land use
106 Mich App 1; 308 NW2d 437 (1981) reversed.
REFERENCES FOR POINTS IN HEADNOTES
[1, 3] 82 Am Jur 2d, Zoning and Planning § 110.
What constitutes a “family” within meaning of zoning regulation or restrictive covenant. 71 ALR3d 693.
Supreme Court‘s views as to constitutionality of residential zoning restrictions. 52 L Ed 2d 863.
Validity of ordinance restricting number of unrelated persons who can live together in residential zone. 12 ALR4th 238.
[2] 82 Am Jur 2d, Zoning and Planning §§ 108-110.
[3] 82 Am Jur 2d, Zoning and Planning § 15.
[4] 82 Am Jur 2d, Zoning and Planning § 15.
[5] 82 Am Jur 2d, Zoning and Planning § 354.
OPINION OF THE COURT
1. ZONING — MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — LAND USE — DUE PROCESS.
A township zoning ordinance that limited the occupation of a single-family residence to an individual or a group of two or more persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption and not more than one other unrelated person was unreasonable and arbitrary and violated the Due Process Clause of the Michigan Constitution (
2. ZONING — MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — LAND USE — DEFINITIONS.
A township has the power to regulate, by zoning ordinance, the use of land and structures within its boundaries for the public health, safety, and welfare, including control of the density of population; consistent with the power is defining such words as “family” within ordinances; a township may consider legal or other relationships among persons in arriving at a definition of family (
DISSENTING OPINION BY WILLIAMS, C.J.
3. ZONING — MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — DUE PROCESS — LAND USE.
To successfully challenge a zoning ordinance on constitutional grounds, a plaintiff must prove that there is no reasonable governmental interest advanced by the zoning classification and that the ordinanсe is unreasonable because of purely arbitrary, capricious, and unfounded exclusion of other types of legitimate land use from the land in question (
Zoning ordinances are presumed to be constitutional and are required to be liberally construed; zoning matters are essentially legislative and not judicial functions, and it is not for courts to interfere with the legislative function of local zoning authorities absent a showing that an ordinance arbitrarily and capriciously restricts land use and serves no governmental interest (
5. ZONING — MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — DUE PROCESS — BURDEN OF PROOF.
Evidence that raised a debatable question whether a township zoning ordinance that sought to maintain a traditional family environment by limiting use of certain real property primarily to persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption was unreasonable was not sufficient to rebut the presumption of the ordinance‘s validity; sufficient evidence that there was no room for a fair and legitimate difference of opinion that the classification drawn was an unreasonable exercise of the township‘s police power was required (
McKay, Murphy & Guerre, P.C. (by Vincent P. Spagnuolo and Thomas R. Meagher), for the plaintiff.
Foster, Meade, Magill & Rumsey (by Robert F. Magill, Jr., and Katherine E. Ward) for the defendant.
Amici Curiae:
Larry Betz for Robert Beard.
Bauckham, Reed, Lang, Schaefer & Travis (by Rоbert F. Travis) for Michigan Townships Association.
BRICKLEY, J. This case requires us to consider the constitutionality of a township zoning ordinance which limits the occupation of single-family
In July and September of 1977, the Sierawski and Dinolfo “families” moved into homes in plaintiff township. The defendants’ homes are located in an R 3, Moderate Density Residential District, which allows for single-family dwellings, duplexes, and quadruplexes. The defendants’ homes qualify only as single-family dwellings. Each household consists of a husband and wife, that couple‘s several children, and six unrelated single adults. All members of these households are members of The Work of Christ Community, a nonprofit and federally tax-exempt organization chartered by the State of Michigan. Each of these households functions as a family in a single housekeeping unit and members intend to reside in their respectivе households permanently. All of the members of these “families” have adopted their lifestyle as a means of living out the Christian commitment that they stress is an important part of their lives.
Over a year after defendants occupied these residences with their “families“, plaintiff‘s planning department sent violation notices citing them for having more than one unrelated individual residing in their homes in violation of the plaintiff‘s zoning ordinance. Plaintiff‘s zoning ordinance limits those groups which can live in single-family dwellings to an individual, or a group of two or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage, and not more than one other unrelated person,
Defendants jointly filed an application for a variance from the family definition section of the plaintiff‘s zoning ordinance, which was denied by the Zoning Board of Appeals. The minutes of the meeting at which the application was considered reflect no complaints abоut the defendants or the members of their households by any of their neighbors who attended that meeting. To the contrary, all present found them to be good neighbors. The variance was denied by the board because the defendants did not fall under the four general outlines for the granting of variances in the zoning ordinance.
Defendant Dinolfo then petitioned the Board of Trustees of Delta Township to overrule the decision of the Zoning Board of Appeals, and also formally presented a petition, supported by the signatures of twenty-seven neighbors, for a change in the language of the family definition section of the ordinance. Both of these efforts were unsuccessful. Plaintiff set a deadline for defendants to bring their households into compliance with the ordinance definition of a family.
After that time had expired, plaintiff filed separate complaints for injunctive relief against defen-
The trial court ultimately ruled in favor of the plaintiff on cross-motions for summary judgment under GCR 1963, 117.2(3). It found that plaintiff had the power under the Township Rural Zoning Act,
The Court of Appeals affirmed, 106 Mich App 1, 3; 308 NW2d 437 (1981), and this Court granted defendants’ application for leave to appeal. 417 Mich 887 (1983).
The defendants argue here, as below, that the plaintiff has no authority to define the word family and that the word “family“, as it appears in the Township Rural Zoning Act, is intended to be interpreted as referring to a functional family rather than a traditional biological family. Defendants contend that they constitute functional fami-
I
We first consider whether plaintiff had the power to define a family at all. The Township Rural Zoning Act is, on its face, a broad grant of power,2 providing in part:
“The township board of an organized township in this state may provide by zoning ordinance for the regulation of land development and the establishment of districts in the portions of the township outside the limits of cities and villages which regulate the use of
land and structures; to meet the needs of the state‘s citizens for food, fiber, energy, and other natural resources, places of residence, recreation, industry, trade, service, and other uses of land; to insure that use of the land shall be situated in appropriate locations and relationships; to limit the inappropriate overcrowding of land and congestion of population, transportation systems, and other public facilities * * *. Ordinances regulating land development may also be adopted designating or limiting the location, the height, number of stories, and size of dwellings, buildings, and structures that may be erected or altered, including tents and trailer coaches, and the specific uses for which dwellings, buildings, and structures, including tents and trailer coaches, may be erected or altered; the area of yards, courts, and other open spaces, and the sanitary, safety, and protective measures that shall be required for the dwellings, buildings, and structures, including tents and trailer coaches; and the maximum number of families which may be housed in buildings, dwellings, and structures, including tents and trailer coaches, erected or altered.” (Emphasis added.) MCL 125.271 ; MSA 5.2963(1).
As stated above, the defendants urge that the word “family” in the statute should be interpreted broadly to include a group functioning as a family. They urge that the words of the statute, “to limit the inappropriate overcrowding of land and congestion оf population, transportation systems, and other public facilities” and the grant of power to regulate the “maximum number of families” in structures relate to only the number of groups, not the composition of those groups. In support of this position, the defendants cite the definition of “family” which was contained in § 12202 of the Public Health Code,
The Township Rural Zoning Act is a broad grant of authority to townships to zone for the “public health, safety, and welfare“. Included within this broad grant is the power to zone for the purpose of density control. We do not suggest that the act delegates to townships the unfettered authority to define the term family because any definition by a political subdivision must be within the intendment of the Legislature. We do find, however, that the definition of “family” in the ordinance is consistent with the enabling legislation.
At the time of the adoption of the Township Rural Zoning Act the traditional family was the most prevalent living pattern. The literal meaning of the word “family“, particularly in the context of a statute dealing with living arrangements, could lead to the conclusion that the Legislature was considering only the existence of the biological family. Such an interpretation, however, would leave a void in the act, allowing townships to consider only traditional families in their zoning ordinances, legislatively precluding an individual living alone or a family from ever having an unrelated person in the household. On the other hand, to interpret “family” as being so fluid that each homeowner could define his own family would preclude townships from giving any consideration to the composition of a household. We do not think the Legislature intended either result. Nothing in the act precludes a township from considering the legal relationships between persons and nothing in the act forbids considering other kinds of relationships.
In Village of Euclid v Ambler Realty Co, 272 US 365, 395; 47 S Ct 114; 71 L Ed 303 (1926), the landmark zoning case, the Supreme Court first upheld the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance as a valid exercise of the state‘s police power. The standard used was whether the regulation was “clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare“. The Court recognized, however, that a zoning law may be constitutional on its face, while aspects of it could be invalid as it applies to a specific property owner.
Nearly fifty years later, in Village of Belle Terre v Boraas, 416 US 1; 94 S Ct 1536; 39 L Ed 2d 797 (1974), the Supreme Court confronted the constitutionality of a local zoning ordinance that is in all significant respects identical to the ordinance in question here. The Village of Belle Terre ordinance limited residential occupаncy to a biological family plus no more than two unrelated persons. The case arose when the house in question was leased to eight college students. In upholding the constitutionality of the ordinance, Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, held that there were no fundamental rights involved which would require a scrutiny higher than determining if the ordinance was arbitrary. The Court found that distinguishing between a biological family and an unrelated group was not unreasonable or arbitrary under the Due Process and Equal Protection
The defendants here argue for a distinction between their case and Belle Terre because Belle Terre dealt with the commercialization of residential property and transient students, rather than as here a permanent functional family structured around a nuclear family. While the analysis of Belle Terre is somewhat sketchy, its conclusion is not.5 The Supreme Court stated that the ordinance was not “aimed at transients“, involved “no procedural disparity inflicted on some but not on others“, and implicated “no ‘fundamental’ right guaranteed by the Constitution, such as voting“. Thus, we find Belle Terre to be clear authority for the proposition that to limit residentially zoned property to a traditional family and a number of non-related persons is permissible under the United States Constitution.
Our conclusion is not altered by Moore v East Cleveland, 431 US 494; 97 S Ct 1932; 52 L Ed 2d 531 (1977), notwithstanding defendants’ contention that Moore modifies Belle Terre. In Moore, the Court held unconstitutional an ordinance which allowed only nuclear families to reside in single-
“Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds uniting the members of the nuclear family. The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children has roots equally venerable and equally deserving of constitutional recognition. Over the years millions of our citizens have grown up in just such an environment, and most, surely, have profited from it. Even if conditions of modern society have brought about a decline in extended family households, they have not erased the accumulated wisdom of civilization, gained over the centuries and honored throughout our history, that supports a large conception of the family. Out of choice, necessity, or a sense of family responsibility, it has been common for close relatives to draw together and participate in the duties and the satisfactions of a common home.” Id., pp 504-505.
We view Moore not as a limitation of Belle Terre, but, instead, as dealing with the other side of the Belle Terre coin — that while the state can restrict residential occupancy to the family, it cannot dissect the family. Having so found, we, therefore, must conclude that plaintiff‘s ordinance is constitutional as a matter of federal law. We must then accept the defendants’ challenge that we examine the Delta Township ordinance in light of Michigan‘s Constitution.
The constitutionality of zoning in Michigan is well established. See Austin v Older, 283 Mich 667; 278 NW 727 (1938). In traditional zoning matters, where the issue is whether a certain parcel of land is zoned reasonably, as compared to
“The important principles require that for an ordinance to be successfully challenged plaintiffs prove: ‘[F]irst, that there is no reasonable governmental interest being advanced by the present zoning classification itself * * * or ‘[S]econdly, that an ordinance may be unreasonable because of the purely arbitrary, capricious and unfounded exclusion of other types of legitimate land use from the area in question.’ [Kropf v Sterling Heights, 391 Mich 139, 158; 215 NW2d 179 (1974)]. “The four rules for applying these principles were also outlined in Kropf. They are: “1. ‘“[T]he ordinance comes to us clothed with every presumption of validity.“’ 391 Mich 139, 162, quoting from Brae Burn, Inc v Bloomfield Hills, 350 Mich 425; 86 NW2d 166 (1957). “2. ‘“[I]t is the burden of the party attacking to prove affirmatively that the ordinance is an arbitrary and unreasonable restriction upon the owner‘s use of his property * * *. It must appear that the clause attacked is an arbitrary fiat, a whimsical ipse dixit, and that there is no room for a legitimate difference of opinion concerning its reasonableness.“’ 391 Mich 139, 162 quoting Brae Burn, Inc. “3. ‘Michigan has adopted the view that to sustain an attack on a zoning ordinance, an aggrieved property owner must show that if the ordinance is enforced the consequent restrictions on his property preclude its use for any purposes to which it is reasonably adapted.’ 391 Mich 139, 162-163. “4. ‘“This Court, however, is inclined to give considerable weight to the findings of the trial judge in equity cases.“’ 391 Mich 139, 163, quoting Christine Building Co v City of Troy, 367 Mich 508, 518; 116 NW2d 816 (1962).” Kirk v Tyrone Twp, 398 Mich 429, 439-440; 247 NW2d 848 (1976).
The dispute at bar is not between contending
The dispute here is not between contending land uses, but about who can occupy a residential dwelling. In evaluating the relative merits and effects of mixing related and non-related persons in a single-family dwelling, planning expertise becomes more questionable and human experience and values more paramount. Thus, our task here is not to evaluate the reasonableness of the township‘s designation of one land use as opposed to another, but, rather, to evaluate whether the existence of the distinction made is permissible.
We think the appropriate standard, which does not conflict with that described above, is that due process standard generally used to evaluate the normal use of the police power. Of course, we still presume the constitutionality of the ordinance. But, extraordinary deference given to the line drawing in traditional zoning matters is not appropriate here.
Even plaintiff urges our consideration of, and we find appropriate, the standard laid down in a non-zoning matter, Manistee Bank & Trust Co v McGowan, 394 Mich 655, 671; 232 NW2d 636 (1975), in which, after reviewing a number of different
“‘the governing rule is one of reason: The Equal Protection Clause, like the Due Process Clause, is a guaranty that controls the reasonableness of governmental action.’ The classification must be a reasonable one, and it must bear a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation.”
In a case similar to the present one, the New Jersey Supreme Court used the same standard:
“It is elementary that substantive due process demands that zoning regulations, like all police power legislation, must be reasonably exercised — the regulation must not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, the means selected must have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained, and the regulation or proscription must be reasonably calculated to meet the evil and not exceed the public need оr substantially affect uses which do not partake of the offensive character of those which caused the problem sought to be ameliorated.” Kirsch Holding Co v Borough of Manasquan, 59 NJ 241, 251; 281 A2d 513 (1971).
Plaintiff lists the objectives of this ordinance: preservation of traditional family values, maintenance of property values and population and density control.6 We cannot disagree that those are
Running through plaintiff‘s arguments is the assumption that unrelated persons will manifest a behavior pattern different from the biological family. They see
“the potential for occupancy by one ‘nuclear family’ together with any number of unrelated and unruly individuals who view regular late night parties as a common bond and a proper function of child rearing.”
If defendants succeed here, plaintiff fears that the next group taking advantage of the opportunity might not be of defendants’ character. Plaintiff suggests that the “common bond of the group * * * [might be] not the Work of Christ, but the Work of Satan“.
Amicus curiae, Michigan Townships Association, is even more direct in its perception of the evils
“The purpose of such regulations is to prohibit the influx of informal residential groups of people whose primary inclination is toward the enjoyment of a licentious style of living. “While it seems apparent that defendants are not of this character, it would seem equally apparent that allowing in excess of six unrelated individuals to occupy a single-family dwelling unit would allow college fraternities, ‘hippie’ communes, motorcycle clubs, and assorted loosely structured groups of people associating for the purpose of enjoying a purely licentious style of living to locate at will in settled, low density residential neighborhoods and, perhaps even worse in duplexes, quadruplexes, and even in high-density apartment buildings. No somber recitations of anthropologists and sociologists are required to make one visualize the problems of noise, nuisance, vehicular traffic, and general disruption of orderly and peaceful living that could be brought about by permitting such arrangements.”
We agree with amicus to the extent that the residential nature of a neighborhood is a proper subject for legislative protection. As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Belle Terre, p 9:
“A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs. This goal is a permissible one within Berman v Parker [348 US 26; 75 S Ct 98; 99 L Ed 27 (1954)]. The police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.”
But we fail to see how plaintiff‘s ordinance furthers these goals. We, therefore, must part com-
p>pany with the United States Supreme Court. In Belle Terre, the Supreme Court made no attempt to suggest how a line drawn between the related and the unrelated advances these goals. It merely said that the line drawing was a “legislative, not a judicial, function“. We agree that line drawing is a legislаtive function, but certainly there can be no argument against the well-understood rule of law that the task of deciding whether the line itself is reasonably related to the object of the line drawing is a judicial function.Here, plaintiff attempts to have us accept its assumption that different and undesirable behavior can be expected from a functional family. Yet, we have been given not a single argument in support of such an assumption, only the assumption. Defendants, on the other hand, relying on decisions from other jurisdictions construing their own state constitutions, present a compelling argument that the means are not rationally related to the end sought.
Those states that have rejected Belle Terre have stressed that a line drawn near the limit of the traditional family is both over- and under-inclusive. See New Jersey v Baker, 81 NJ 99; 405 A2d 368 (1979); Santa Barbara v Adamson, 27 Cal 3d 123; 164 Cal Rptr 539; 610 P2d 436 (1980) (finding over- and under-inclusiveness in the context of a right to privacy challenge). Unrelated persons are artificially limited to as few as two, while related families may expand without limit. Under the instant ordinance, twenty male cousins could live together, motorcycles, noise, and all, while three unrelated clerics could not. A greater example of over- and under-inclusiveness we cannot imagine. The ordinance indiscriminately regulates where nо regulation is needed and fails to regulate where
“The fatal flaw in attempting to maintain a stable residential neighborhood through the use of criteria based upon biological or legal relationships is that such classifications operate to prohibit a plethora of uses which pose no threat to the accomplishment of the end sought to be achieved. Moreover, such a classification system legitimizes many uses which defeat that goal. Plainfield‘s ordinance, for example, would prohibit a group of five unrelated ‘widows, widowers, older spinsters or bachelors—or even of judges’ from residing in a single unit within the municipality. Kirsch Holding Co v Borough of Manasquan, supra, p 248. On the other hand, a group consisting of 10 distant cousins could so reside without violating the ordinance. Thus the ordinance distinguishes between acceptable and prohibited uses on grounds which may, in many cases, have no rational relationship to the problem sought to be ameliorated.”
Plaintiff brings to our attention cases from those jurisdictions that have adopted the Belle Terre rationale. One in particular, Town of Durham v White Enterprises, Inc, 115 NH 645, 649; 348 A2d 706 (1975), is typical of that point of view. There the court said:
“The State has no particular interest in keeping together a certain group of unrelated persons. The State has a clear interest, however, in preserving the integrity of the biologiсal or legal family. The promotion of this legitimate government purpose justifies the exclusion of a blood related family from the density requirements of the ordinance which applies to an unrelated household. * * * Hence this classification is not invidious or arbitrary and is constitutional.”
Indeed, “the state has no particular interest in keeping together a certain group of unrelated
“no rational relationship between the restrictive definition of family in the Township ordinance and the state interest to preserve the residential character of the neighborhood“.
We know from common experience that, while the motorcycle gang argument is a threatening one, it is more a symbol, one that is not by any stretch of the imagination representative of the lifestyle of the countlеss people who seek residential living in something other than the biological family setting. As to the specter of a “Work of Satan” group that could slip in if defendants succeed here, we note that if this ordinance were upheld it would not keep out Ma Barker and her sons.
We agree that it would be easier for the plaintiff, with one broad stroke of its legislative brush, to sweep out of its residential neighborhoods a whole class of persons desiring residential accommodations than to have to legislate and enforce against the specific behavior it finds offensive and finds associated with the unrelated class. But protecting the constitutional rights of citizens comes before making life easy for government.
There has been no evidence presented nor do we
The plaintiff is not, as a result of anything we say here today, without authority to regulate the behavior it finds inimical to its concept of a residential neighborhood, including a rational limitation on the numbers of persons that may occupy a dwelling. Plaintiff need not open its residential borders to transients and others whose lifestyle is not the functional equivalent of “family” life.8 Nor
“If an unrelated household group exceeds the designated density requirement it is by voluntary action of the group. The blood related family by its natural growth may become in excess of the density limit.”
We find that plaintiff‘s ordinance is capricious, arbitrary, and in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
KAVANAGH, LEVIN, RYAN, and CAVANAGH, JJ., concurred with BRICKLEY, J.
WILLIAMS, C.J. (dissenting). This case brings into question the constitutionality of a township zoning ordinance which limits the occupancy of single-family residences to not more than two unrelated persons while not limiting the number of persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption. While I agree with the majority‘s holding that the zoning ordinance is a legitimate exercise of the township‘s police power under the
The appropriate standard for reviewing a challenge to the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance was set forth by this Court in Kirk v Tyrone Twp, 398 Mich 429, 439-440; 247 NW2d 848 (1976):
“The important principles require that for an ordinance to be successfully challenged plaintiffs prove:
“‘[F]irst, that there is no reasonable governmental interest being advanced by the present zoning classification itself * * * or
“‘[S]econdly, that an ordinance may be unreasonable because of the purely arbitrary, capricious and unfounded exclusion of other types of legitimate land use from the area in question.’ [Kropf v Sterling Heights,] 391 Mich 139, 158[; 215 NW2d 179 (1974)].
“The four rules for applying these principles were also outlined in Kropf. They are:
“1. ’ “[T]he ordinance comes to us clothed with every presumption of validity.” ’ 391 Mich 139, 162, quoting from Brae Burn, Inc v Bloomfield Hills, 350 Mich 425; 86 NW2d 166 (1957).
“2. ’ “[I]t is the burden of the party attacking to prove affirmatively that the ordinance is an arbitrary and unreasonable restriction upon the owner‘s use of his
property * * *. It must appear that the clause attacked is an arbitrary fiat, a whimsical ipse dixit, and that there is no room for a legitimate difference of opinion concerning its reasonableness.” ’ 391 Mich 139, 162, quoting Brae Burn, Inc. “3. ‘Michigan has adopted the view that to sustain an attack оn a zoning ordinance, an aggrieved property owner must show that if the ordinance is enforced the consequent restrictions on his property preclude its use for any purposes to which it is reasonably adapted.’ 391 Mich 139, 162-163.
“4. ’ “This Court, however, is inclined to give considerable weight to the findings of the trial judge in equity cases.” ’ 391 Mich 139, 163, quoting Christine Building Co v City of Troy, 367 Mich 508, 518; 116 NW2d 816 (1962).”
The majority opinion, however, fails to adhere to these principles and instead applies a rational relationship standard of review which has generally been employed by this Court in non-zoning matters. The majority reasons that because the dispute here concerns occupants of land rather than competing land uses the principles applicable in traditional zoning cases are inappropriate. Regardless of whether an ordinance is viewed as a regulation of land uses or occupants of land, the principles articulated in Kirk and other well-established Michigan precedent are nonetheless applicable and should not be so hastily discarded.
Zoning ordinances have long been accorded every presumption of constitutionality. Kirk, supra, p 439. Moreover, as mandated by our constitution, this Court is required to liberally construe all constitutional provisions and laws pertaining to counties, townships, cities and villages.
This judicial deference to the validity of municipality zoning laws is premised on the fact that
“[T]his Court does not sit as a superzoning commission. Our laws have wisely committed to the people of a community themselves the determination of their municipal destiny, the degree to which the industrial may have precedence over the residential, and the areas carved out of each to be devoted to commercial pursuits. With the wisdom or lack of wisdom of the determination we are not concerned. The people of the community, through their appropriate legislative body, and not the courts, govern its growth and its life. Let us state the proposition as clearly as may be: It is not our function to approve the ordinance before us as to wisdom or desirability. For alleged abuses involving such factors the remedy is the ballot box, not the courts. We do not substitute our judgment for that of the legislative body charged with the duty and responsibility in the premises. As Willoughby phrased it in his treatise, Constitution of the United States (2d ed, 1929), vol 1, § 21, p 32: ‘The constitutional power of a law-making body to legislate in the premises being granted, the wisdom or expediency of the manner in which that power is exercised is not properly subject to judicial criticism or control.’ We held similarly in Tel-Craft Civic Ass‘n v Detroit, 337 Mich 326, 331 [60 NW2d 294 (1953)]:
” ‘Unless it can be shown that the council acted arbitrarily or unreasonably, their determination is final and conclusive and no court may alter or modify the ordinance as adopted.
” ’ “While it is within the province of the courts to pass upon the validity of statutes and ordinances, courts may not legislate nor undertake to compel legislative bodies to do so one way or another.” ’ ”
Thus, it is not for this Court to second-guess the wisdom of local zoning authorities absent a show-
A companion rule to the judicial deference accorded to zoning matters is that the burden of proof rests upon the party attacking the validity of a zoning ordinance. Not only does the majority opinion bypass the extraordinary deference usually given to zoning ordinances, but it also appears to have impermissibly shifted the burden of proof onto plaintiff. The majority refers to the fact that the plaintiff has not convinced them that the classification at hand is reasonably related to the achievement of the stated goals of the ordinance. It is not, however, the plaintiff‘s burden to demonstrate the reasonableness of the ordinance, but rather it is defendants’ burden to affirmatively prove the arbitrariness and capriciousness of the classification.
One of several reasons advanced by plaintiff in support of the ordinance is that it was designed to preserve traditional family values. It is clearly within the state‘s police power to zone and regulate land use in promotion and preservation of the sanctity of the traditional family lifestyle. Village of Belle Terre v Boraas, 416 US 1, 9; 94 S Ct 1536; 39 L Ed 2d 797 (1974); see also Palo Alto Tenants Union v Morgan, 321 F Supp 908 (ND Cal, 1970), aff‘d, 487 F2d 883 (CA 9, 1973). The United States Supreme Court held in Belle Terre that the preservation of family values was a proper subject for zoning:
“A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs. This goal is a permissible one within Berman v Parker [348 US 26; 75 S Ct 98; 99 L Ed 27 (1954)]. The police power is not
confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area а sanctuary for people.” (Emphasis added.) 416 US 9.
The special values the local legislative body might consider in its zoning decision might well be more expansive, but just as fundamental, as those mentioned by the United States Supreme Court. A biological family, for example, could have concerns about schools that other living units either might not share or might even actively oppose.
The importance of the family was reaffirmed in the case of Moore v East Cleveland, 431 US 494; 97 S Ct 1932; 52 L Ed 2d 531 (1977), wherein the Court struck down an ordinance which prohibited extended biological or legal families to live in an area zoned for single-family dwellings. Justice Powell, writing for the plurality of the Court, distinguished Belle Terre as a case in which “family needs” and “family values” were promoted since the ordinance there barred only unrelated persons whereas the ordinance in Moore, by restricting the number of related persons who could live together, had sliced “deeply into the family itself“. 431 US 498. Justice Powell also noted the foundational role of the family in our society:
“Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation‘s history and tradition. It is through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural.” 431 US 503-504.
Justice Brennan, joining in the plurality opinion of Moore, wrote a separate concurrence, emphasizing the “preferred position” of the family:
“Whether it be the extended family of a more leisurely age or the nuclear family of today the role of the family in raising and training successive generations of the species makes it more important, we dare say, than any other social or legal institution * * *. If any freedom not specifically mentioned in the Bill of Rights enjoys a ‘preferred position’ in the law it is most certainly the family.” (Emphasis supplied by the Court, quoting from the Village of Belle Terre‘s brief.) 431 US 511.1
Decisions from other state jurisdictions which have addressed identical constitutional challenges to zoning ordinances similar to the ordinance in the instant case have upheld their respective ordinances on the ground that maintenance of a traditional family environment constitutes a reasonable basis for excluding uses that may impair the stability of that environment and erode the values associated with a traditional family style of life. See Rademan v City of Denver, 186 Colo 250; 526 P2d 1325 (1974); Town of Durham v White Enterprises, Inc, 115 NH 645; 348 A2d 706 (1975); Ass‘n for Educational Development v Hayward, 533 SW2d 579 (Mo, 1976); Penobscot Area Housing Development Corp v City of Brewer, 434 A2d 14 (Me, 1981); see, generally, Anno: Validity of ordinance restricting number of unrelated persons who can live together in residential zone, 12 ALR4th 238.
The two out-of-state cases cited by the majority in support of the claim that an ordinance drawn too closе to the traditional family model is an over- and under-inclusive classification, New Jer-sey v Baker, 81 NJ 99; 405 A2d 368 (1979), and Santa Barbara v Adamson, 27 Cal 3d 123; 164 Cal Rptr 539; 610 P2d 436 (1980), are wholly inapplicable in the instant case because they apply a different standard of review from that of Kropf and its progeny.
The majority does not dispute the township‘s police power to enact ordinances supportive of the biological or legal family but does point out that the ordinance in the instant case is an unreasonable exercise of that power because less restrictive means might have been chosen to accomplish the same objective. Whether a municipality could have adopted less restrictive means to achieve the same goals is not a controlling factor in considering the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance. Rather, a reviewing court‘s focus should be upon whether there exists some reasonable basis for the means actually employed. In making such a determination, if any state of facts either known or which could reasonably be assumed is presented in support of the ordinance, this Court must defer to the legislative judgment. Robinson Twp v Knoll, 410 Mich 293, 339; 302 NW2d 146 (1981) (dissent of MOODY, J.); Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 613-614; 267 NW2d 72 (1978).
Zoning matters necessarily involve difficult choices between the inclusion of certain land uses and the exclusion of others in a particular area. The drawing of these lines is exclusively a legislative judgment. In Village of Belle Terre v Boraas, supra, 416 US 8, the United States Supreme Court specifically addressed this restriction on the power of the judiciary in zoning cases:
“It is said, however, that if two unmarried people can constitute a ‘family,’ there is no reason why three or four may not. But every line drawn by a legislature
leaves some out that might well have been included. That exercise of discretion, however, is a legislative, not a judicial, function.”
In my opinion, the majority has overstepped its bounds as a judicial body and has intruded into the legislative sphere by acting as a superzoning commission contrary to the pronouncement by the United States Supreme Court in Belle Terre and this Court in Brae Burn, Inc, supra, pp 430-431. The majority goes so far as to give examples of ordinances from other states which they suggest offer innovative approaches to preserve the family character of a neighborhood in a more rational manner than the ordinance in the instant case. These references are of legitimate interest to the Legislature, but not to the judiciary. The task of line drawing is solely a legislative one, and this Court should not even attempt to interfere in this legislative function.
On the basis of thе record in the instant case, defendants have not sustained their burden of proof so as to rebut the presumption favoring the ordinance‘s validity. It is not enough that defendants present evidence which raises a debatable question as to the reasonableness of the ordinance. The defendants must present sufficient evidence to prove that there is no room for a fair and legitimate difference of opinion that the classification drawn is an unreasonable exercise of the township‘s police power. This defendants have failed to do.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
BOYLE, J., concurred with WILLIAMS, C.J.